Well, not really. But my marginalia on Chapman's rather 'unrigorous' (ha) comments on the 'rigour' of philosophical analysis as concerned with
p ≡ q
e.g.
"I am sleeping" ≡ "I am experiencing a meme such that a previous meme of me was not asleep but there is a causal link connecting them" (alla Grice, "Personal Identity"
I mean rain ≡ I intend you to believe that I believe that there is some probability that you will come to believe that because I say that I mean rain by saying it you'll get a conviction not for life but towards my belief that you believe it is raining.
Chapman on the necessity and sufficiency of anallysis. Cfr. Grice, WoW v on the prongs for 'means' being either too weak or too strong. Until he pours the right amount.
Friday, January 29, 2010
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Grice's point being, why care for a reductive analysis that is not reductionist?
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