"conversational maxim" -- from Grice's Dictionary

conversational maxim. Grice is echoing Kant. Maximen (subjektive Grundsätze): selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen ausdrücken, vs. Imperative (objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft bestimmt; Ratschläge, moralisch relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das objektive Prinzip, gültig für jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach dem es handeln soll, d. i. ein Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die Subjektivität der Maxime. When considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational maxim,’ one has to be careful. First, he hesitated as to the choice of the label. He used ‘objective’ and ‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this, in WoW:PandCI he adds one – leading the number of maxims to ten, what he called the ‘conversational catalogue.’

So when exploring the maxims, it is not necessary to see their dependence on the four functions that Kant tabulated: quantitas, qualitas, relatio, and modus, or quantity, quality, relation, and mode (Grice follows Meiklejohn’s translation), but in terms of their own formulation, one by one.

Grice formulates the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”

He then goes on to introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’

 “On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall certain more specific MAXIMS

maxims and submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle.”

 Note that in his comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in terms of the force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicature, he could have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.”

He is comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’

He is having in mind something like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the introductory passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is very interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he is calling the submaxim.

Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim. Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”

Grice: “Echoing Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!

“The category of QUANTITY” – i. e. either the conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category of conversational quantity – “relates to the quantity of information to be provided,”

So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have it – just QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the quantity of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re: the pillar box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used ‘strength,’ even ‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailment – and here, neither the phenomenalist nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.

 “and under it fall the following maxims:”

That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational maxim.’ He will provide supermaxim for the other three conversational categories.

Why is the category of conversational quantity lacking a supermaxim?

The reason is that it would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be appropriately informative.’ By having TWO maxims, he is playing with a weighing in, or balance between one maxim and the other. Cf.

To say the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the truth.

No more no less.

One maximm states the ‘at most,’ the other maxim states the ‘at least.’

One maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the other maxim states the ‘min.’ Together they state the ‘maximin.’

First, “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).”

It’s the contribution which is informative, not the utterer. Cf. “Be as informative as is required.” Grice implicates that if you make your contribution as informative as is required YOU are being as informative as is required. But there is a category-shift here.

Grice means, ‘required BY the goal of the exchange). e.g.

How are you

Fine thanks – the ‘and you’ depends on whether you are willing to ‘keep the conversation going’ or your general mood.

Second, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.”

“ (The second maxim is disputable;”

He goes on to give a different reason. But the primary reason is that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” is ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)” – vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative inferences” IN a diagram:

Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)

Therefore, do not make your contribution more informative than is required (by the current purposes of the exchange).

Grice gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the maxim is ‘disputable.’

“it might be said that to be overinformative is not a transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time.”

For both conversationalists, who are thereby abiding by Ferraro’s law of the least conversational effort.”

“A waste of time” relates to Grice’s previous elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and ‘unnecessary trouble.’

He is proposing a conversational maximin.

When he formulates his principle of economy of rational effort, it is a waste of ‘time and energy.’

Here it is just ‘time.’ “Energy” is a more generic concept.

“However, it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side issues;”

Methinks the lady doth protest too much.

His example, “He was in a blacked out city.”

It does not seem to relate to the pillar box

A: What color is the pillar box

B: It seems red.

Such a ‘confusion’ and ‘side issue,’ if so designed, is part of the implicatum.

“and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information.”

Cf. Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”

More boringly, it is part of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of information.”

This may be counterproductive, or not.

“Meet Mr. Puddle”

“Meet Mr. Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”

The introducer point: to keep the conversation going.

Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless at nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED).

One has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice cares for.

Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!” – Malcolm implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’ – If knowledge is justified true belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE CONDITIONS for it. Cf.

I didn’t know you were pregnant.

You still do not.

(Here the cancellation is to the third clause).

Grice: “However this may be, there is perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which concems relevance.)”

He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:

“there is another reason to doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”

No “later” about it!

Grice:

“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim” – he forgets to add, as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf. Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS the case.

Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he means “more specific supermaxims and maxims” – He is following Porophyry in being confusing! Cf. supramaxim.

Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one that is true' –“

This surely requires generality – and Grice spent the next two decades about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’

“Try to make your contribution one that is acceptable”

“True for your statements; good for your desiderative-mode utterances.”

“and two more specific maxims:”

“1. Do not say what you believe to be false.”

There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!” “Say the true!” “MAKE – don’t just TRY – to make your contribution one that is true.”

“I was only trying.”

Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill”

“Thou shalt trye not to kylle.”

Grice:

“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”

This is involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?

The qualification, “adequate,” turns the maxim slightly otiose.

Do not say that for you lack evidence which would make your contribution not a true one.

However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.

If we are talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on ‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential justification.’

“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz., 'Be relevant.'”

The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’

RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman ‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or ‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place predicate. What about

X = x

Is identity a relation, in the case of x = x?

Can a thing relate to itself?

In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim states that one brings y back to x.

“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”

“The weather has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”

If INTENDED to mean, “You ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.

To utter an utterly irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.

“Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in a later work.”

He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette becomes logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the north, to settle in the very fashionable Kent.

Grice is also having in mind Urmson’s appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your painting “Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!” – and Grice is also having in mind P. F. Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance vis-à-vis the principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.

So it was in the Oxonian air.

“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE EXPLICITUM, THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said is to be said,”

Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p reduces to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares with ‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what is seen.’

He is having the form-content distinction.

If that is a distinction.

This multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or posited.    The Role of the Form/Content Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com › 2012/01 › formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results    The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Researchwww.karger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction is a potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain characteristics of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG Levine - ‎1979 - ‎Cited by 25 - ‎Related articles    The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research ...www.karger.com › Article › Abstract Dec 23, 2009 - The Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research. Levine C.G.. Author affiliations. University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. by CG Levine - ‎1979 - ‎Cited by 25 - ‎Related articles    Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in ...www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pubmed Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in communicative tasks. Hedelin L(1), Hjelmquist E. Author information: (1)Department of Psychology, ... by L Hedelin - ‎1998 - ‎Cited by 10 - ‎Related articles    Form and Content: An Introduction to Formal Logic - Digital ...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi › viewcontentPDF terminology has to do with anything. In this context, 'material' means having to do with content. This is our old friend, the form/content distinction again. Consider. by DD Turner - ‎2020    Simmel's Dialectic of Form and Content in Recent Work in ...www.tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1, 2019 - This suggests that for Simmel, the form/content distinction was not a dualism; instead, it was a duality.11 Ronald L. Breiger, “The Duality of ...    Are these distinctions between “form” and “content” intentionally ...www.reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments › are_th... The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction between form and matter (say, in Aristotle), although Hegel develops the distinction between form ...    Preschool Children's Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com › article Preschoolers' mastery of the form/content distinction in language and communication, along its contingency on the characteristics of p. by L Hedelin - ‎1998 - ‎Cited by 10 - ‎Related articles    Verbal Art: A Philosophy of Literature and Literary Experiencebooks.google.com › books Even if form and content were in fact inseparable in the sense indicated, that would not make the form/content distinction unjustified. Form and matter are clearly ... Anders Pettersson - 2001 - ‎Literary Criticism    One Century of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathologybooks.google.com › books He then outlines the most important implications of the form–content distinction in a statement which is identical in the first three editions, with only minor ... Giovanni Stanghellini, ‎Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - ‎Medical

“I include the supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –”

Or supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and submaxims” becomes the clumsier “supermaxims and maxims”

Note that in under the first category it is about making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer himself who has to be ‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be relevant. It’s not the weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or “Make your contribution a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”

Knowing that most confound ‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but forgot to pronounce it, in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’ under the prolixity maxim.

“and various maxims such as:

The “such as” is a colloquialism.

Surely it was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it becomes viz. The fact that the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicatable.

“1. Avoid obscurity of expression.”

Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,              /They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd how often you and I  /Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take.

In a way this is entailed by “Be perspicuous,” if that means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.

Be clear

Therefore, or what is the same thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.

“2. Avoid ambiguity.”

Except as a trope, or ‘figure, (schema, figura). “Aequi-vocate, if that will please your clever addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma: “My apartment was so small, that I've barely enough room to lay a hat and a few friends

“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).”

Here he added a ‘sic’ that he failed to pronounce in case it may felt as insulting. But the idea of a self-refuting conversational maxim is surely Griceian, in a quessertive way.

Since this concerns FORM rather than CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with ‘informativeness.’

So given that p and q are equally informative, if q is less brief (longer – ars longa, vita brevis), utter p. This has nothing to do with logical strength. It is just to be assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.

Vide “Syntactics in Semiotics”

“4. Be orderly.”

This involves two moves in the contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’ if one just utters ‘p.’ So this involves a molecular proposition.

The ‘order’ can be of various types. Indeed, one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between Smith and Williams” – order of merit or size?

‘Between’ is not ambiguous!

There is LOGICAL order, which is prior.

But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’ ‘keep your room tidy.’

orderly (adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning "observant of rule or discipline, not unruly" is from 1590s. Related: Orderliness.

He does not in the lecture give a philosophical example, but later will in revisiting the Urmson example and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson, “He went to bed and took off his boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and took arsenic.”

“And one might need others.”

Regarding ‘mode,’ that is.

“It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others;”

Not as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say these are not MORAL.

“a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false.”

Except in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were obsessed with commenting on prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the prisoner?” “He left [while he is hiding in the attic].”

That’s why Grice has the ‘in general.’

“Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;”

But since ‘should’ is weak, I will.

“other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.”

So the keyword is co-ordination.

“While this may be correct, so far as the generation of implicatures is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a member of the list of maxims.”

He is having weighing, and clashing in mind. And he wants a conversationalist to honour truth over informativeness, which begs the question that as he puts it, ‘false’ “information” is no information.

In the earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a university lecturer, he was sure that his tutee will know that he was introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO MORALISE, but as GENERATORS of implicata – in philosophers’s mistakes.

But this manoeuver is only NOW disclosed. Those without a philosophical background may not realise about this.

“There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures.”

He is obviously aware that

Émile Durkheim

Will

Know that ‘conversational’ is subsumed under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps).  – keyword: ‘norm.’

Grice excludes ‘moral’ because while a moral maxim makes a man ‘good,’ a conversational maxim makes a man a ‘good’ conversationalist. Not because there is a distinction in principle!

“The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with”

He had this way with idioms.

Cf.

Einstein,

“E =, I hope, mc2.”

“the particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange)”

He is playing Dutch.

The English lost the Anglo-Saxon for ‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has ‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch have ‘taal.’

So he is distinguishing between the TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.

“is adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to serve.”

The ‘adapted’ is mechanistic talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’ elsewhere. He means ‘the particular goal language evolved to serve, viz.’ groom.

Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, in which the author argues that language evolved from social grooming. He further suggests that a stage of this evolution was the telling of gossip, an argument supported by the observation that language is adapted for storytelling.  The book has been criticised on the grounds that since words are so cheap, Dunbar's "vocal grooming" would fall short in amounting to an honest signal. Further, the book provides no compelling story[citation needed] for how meaningless vocal grooming sounds might become syntactical speech.  Thesis Dunbar argues that gossip does for group-living humans what manual grooming does for other primates—it allows individuals to service their relationships and thus maintain their alliances on the basis of the principle: if you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours. Dunbar argues that as humans began living in increasingly larger social groups, the task of manually grooming all one's friends and acquaintances became so time-consuming as to be unaffordable.[1] In response to this problem, Dunbar argues that humans invented 'a cheap and ultra-efficient form of grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now needs only to 'groom' them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple allies simultaneously while keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal grooming then evolved gradually into vocal language—initially in the form of 'gossip'.[1] Dunbar's hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that the structure of language shows adaptations to the function of narration in general.[2]  Criticism Critics of Dunbar's theory point out that the very efficiency of "vocal grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would have undermined its capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed by time-consuming and costly manual grooming.[3] A further criticism is that the theory does nothing to explain the crucial transition from vocal grooming—the production of pleasing but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive complexities of syntactical speech.[citation needed]  References  Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. London: Faber and Faber. ISBN 9780571173969. OCLC 34546743.  von Heiseler, Till Nikolaus (2014) Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast evolution. In: R. L. C. Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World Scientific, pp. 114-121. https://www.academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION  Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds), Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 111 29. Categories: 1996 non-fiction booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin DunbarEnglish-language booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press booksPopular science books

Grice: “I have stated my maxims”

the maxims

“as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information;”

“MAXIMALLY EFFECTIVE”

“this specification is, of course, too narrow,”

But who cares?

This is slightly sad in that he is thinking Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own controversy with G. A. Paul on the sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’ and ‘the pillar box is red,’ involving an intensional context, are less amenable to fall under the maxims.

“and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others.”

He has a more obvious way below:

Giving and receving information

Influencing and being influenced by others.

He never sees the purpose as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but maximally effective EXCHANGE of information – does he mean merely ‘transmission.’ It may well be.

If I say, “I rain,” I have ex-changed information.

I don’t need anything in return.

If so, it makes sense that he is equating

INFORMING

With

INFLUENCING or better DIRECTION your addresse’s talk.

Note that, for all he loved introspection and conversational avowals, and self-commands, these do not count.

It’s informing your addressee about some state of affairs, and directing his action.

Grice is always clear that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s ACTION.

“As one of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges.”

Transaction is a good one.

TRANS-ACTIO

“I list briefly one such analog for each conversational category.”

While he uses ‘conversational category,’ he also applies it to the second bit: ‘category of conversational quantity,’ ‘category of conversational quality,’ ‘category of conversational relation,’ and ‘category of conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that justifies the sub-specifications.

They are not categories of thought or ontological or ‘expression’.

His focus is on the category as conversation.

His focus is on the ‘conversational category.’

“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required; if, e. g., at a particular stage I need four

screws, I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six.”

He always passed six, since two will drop.

“Make your contribution neither more nor less informative than is required (for the purposes of the exchange).”

This would have covered the maxi and the min.

“NEITHER MORE NOR LESS” is the formula of effectiveness, and economy, and minimization of expenditure.

“2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious.”

Here again he gives an expansion of the conversational category, which is more general than ‘try to make your contribution one that is true,’ and the point about the ‘quality of information,’ which he did not make.

Perhaps because it would have led him to realise that ‘false’ information, i.e. ‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious, is not ‘information.’

But

“Make your contribution one that is genuine and not spurious.”

Be candid.

Does not need a generalization as it covers both informational and directive utterances.

“If I need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt;”

Or you won’t eat the cake.

 “if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”

Spurious and genuine are different.

In the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just not being SERIOUS.

But surely a maxim, “Be serious” is too serious. – Seriously!

“3. Relation. I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of the transaction;”

Odd that he would use ‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of the “Prolegomena,” and what he was supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the explanation.

For each of the philosophers making a mistake are giving a judgment of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational appropriateness. Here it is good that he relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO the ‘need’.

Grice is not quite sticking to the etymology of ‘relatio’ and ‘refer,’ bring y back to x.

Or he is. Bring y (your contribution) back to the need x.

Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on relation, when he did a good bit!

“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate contribution at a later stage).”

“I just expect you to be silent.”

“4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.”

For Lewis, clarity is not enough!

The ‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’ seems quite different from “Be perspicuous.”

“Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch”

Is more like

“Execute your performance”

And not just STAND there!

A: What time is it

B just stands there

“These analogies are relevant to what I regard as a fundamental question about the principle of conversational helpfulness and its attendant conversational maxims,”

For Boethius, it is a PRINCIPLE because it does not need an answer!

“viz., what the basis is for the assumption which we seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a great range of implicatures depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the rather otiose maxims], that talkers will in

general (ceteris paribus and in the absence of indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these principles prescribe.”

Grice really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of the maxim, as in his response to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:

“Paul, I surely do not mean to imply that you may end up believing that I have a doubt about the pillar box being red: it seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum of ‘redness’ which attaches to me as I am standing in front of the pillar box in clear daylight.”

Grice is EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING SOMETHING TRUE, so at least he is not VIOLATING the principle of conversational helpfulness, or the category of conversational quality, or the desideratum of conversational candour.

And that is what he is concerned with.

“A dull but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that *people* (not pirots, although perhaps Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in these ways;”

Elinor Ochs was terrified Grice’s maxims are violated – never exploited, she thought – in Madagascar.

“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed, it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”

Effort again; least effort. And ease.

Great Griceian guidelines!

“I am, however, enough of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,”

OR EXPLAIN.

“undeniable though they may be;”

BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORY – not the theory for the generation of implicate, but for the theory of conversation.

He is less interested in this than the other.

“I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea that observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions:”

So how is this not quasi-contractual?

He is listing THIS OR THAT FEATURE that jointly distinguishes a cooperative transaction – all grand great words.

But he wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!

He is playing, as a philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from what.

A1. Conversasation is purposive

A2. Conversation is rational

A3. Conversation is cooperative

A4. There is such a thing as non-rational cooperation (is there?)

So he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice surely does not wish THAT to demolish his model. If he bases it in general constraints of rationality, the better.

“1. The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one,”

Is he being logical?

“second-order predicate calculus”

“meta-language”

He means higher or supervenient

Or ‘operative’

“, that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of the other.”

By identify he means assume.

YOU HAVE TO DESIRE what your partner desires.

The intersection between your desirability and your addressee’s desirability is not NULL.

And the way to do this is conditional

IF: You perceive B has Goal G, you assume Goal G.

“2. The contributions of the participants .should be dovetailed, mutually dependent.

Unless it’s one of those seminars by Grice and J. F. Thomson!

“3. There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit)”

i.e. implicated rather than explicated – part of the implicatum, or implicitum, rather than the explicatum or explicitum.

“that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.”

This is especially tricky over the phone (“He never ends!” Or in psychiatric interviews!)

Note that ‘starting doing something else’ may work. E. g. watch your watch!

“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”

TWO OPPOSITE EXAMPLES.

Fighting is arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not conversation, cooperation,  friendly, collaborative venture, and diagoge.

Letter writing is usually otiose – “what, with the tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.

“In any case, one feels that the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience but himself.”

And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant down!”

“So I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle of conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the following lines”

That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.

“: that any one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”

Where the keyword is: profit, effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble.

That conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable.

That a conversational exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.

“Whether any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”

It’s not clear what the premises are!

Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached? Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.

It seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.

“in any case, I am fairly sure that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”

For perhaps

“I don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”

IS irrelevant, yet true!

“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and conversational implicature on the other.”

This is clearer in the seminars. The whole thing was a preamble.

“A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly and unostentatiously VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead.”

And be blamed by Kant.

Mislead should not worry Grice, cf. “Misleading, but true.”

The violate (or fail to observe) shows that (1) covers two specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim as to ‘be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew obfuscation!”

This is Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is KNOWLEDGE of the maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to observe them

“2. He may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the principle of conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, e. g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.”

Where is the criminal?

I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.

I shall unseal them. What do you mean ‘cannot.’ You don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?

I think Grice means ‘may not.’

Is the universe finite?

Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.

“3. He may be faced by a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than one – or at least two specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).”

Odd that he doesn’t think this generates implicature:

He has obviously studied the sub-perceptualities here.

For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus, thinks that by uttering

The pillar box seems red to me – that is all I have adequate evidence for

He is conveying that he is unable to answer the question (“What colour is the pillar box?”)

And being as ‘informative’ as is required

Without saying something for which it is not the case that he has or will ever have adequate evidence.

Cf.

Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the noumenon?

Kant: My lips are sealed.

It may require some research to list ALL CLASHES.

Because each clash shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be all VERY CETERIS PARIBUS.

Cf.

Where is the criminal?

My lips are sealed.

The utterer has NOT opted out. He has answered, via implicature, that he is not telling. He is being relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to DISCLOSE the whereabouts of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a conversation! Odd that Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a clash with ‘Be truthful!’

“4. He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY fail to fulfill (or observe) it.”

Mock?
Taunt?

The magic flute. Grice’s magic flute.

flout (v.) "treat with disdain or contempt" (transitive), 1550s, intransitive sense "mock, jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of uncertain origin; perhaps a special use of Middle English “flowten,”"to play the flute" (compare Middle Dutch “fluyten,” "to play the flute," also "to jeer"). Related: Flouted; flouting.

Grice: “One thing we do not know is if the flute came to England via Holland.”

“Or he may, as we may say, ‘play the flute’ with a maxim, expecting others to be agreeable.”

“Or he may, as we might say, ‘play the flute’ with the conversational maxim, expecting others to join with some other musical instrument – or something – occasionally the same.”

“On the assumption that the speaker is able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim (because oi a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of his performance, trying to mislead,”

This is interesting. It’s the TRYING to mislead.

Grice and G. A. Paul:

Grice cannot be claimed to have TRIED to mislead, and thus deemed to have misled G. A. Paul, even if he had, when he said, “I hardly think there is any doubt about it, but that pillar box seems red to me.”

“the hearer is faced with a minor problem:”

Implicature: This reasoning is all abductive – to the ‘best’ explanation

“How can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing the overall principle of conversational helfpulness?”

This was one of Grice’s conversations with G. A. Paul:

Paul (to Grice): This is what I do not understand, Grice. How can your saying what you did say be reconciled with the supposition that you are not going to mislead me?”

Unfortunately, on that Saturday, Paul went to the Irish Sea.

Grice “This situation is one that characteristically”

There are others – vide clash, above – but not marked by Grice as one such situation –

“gives rise to a conversational implicature; and when a conversational implicature is generated”

Chomskyan jargon borrowed from Austin (“I don’t see why Austin admired Chomsky so!”)

“in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being EXPLOITED.”

Why not ‘flouted’? Some liked the idea of playing the flute.

EXPLOIT is figurative.

Grice exploits a Griceian maxim.

exploit (v.) c. 1400, espleiten, esploiten "to accomplish, achieve, fulfill," from Old French esploitier, espleiter "carry out, perform, accomplish," from esploit (see exploit (n.)). The sense of "use selfishly" first recorded 1838, from a sense development in French perhaps from use of the word with reference to mines, etc. (compare exploitation). Related: Exploited; exploiting.

exploit (n.) late 14c., "outcome of an action," from Old French esploit "a carrying out; achievement, result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern French exploit), a very common word, used in senses of "action, deed, profit, achievement," from Latin explicitum "a thing settled, ended, or displayed," noun use of neuter of explicitus, past participle of explicare "unfold, unroll, disentangle," from ex "out" (see ex-) + plicare "to fold" (from PIE root *plek- "to plait").  Meaning "feat, achievement" is c. 1400. Sense evolution is from "unfolding" to "bringing out" to "having advantage" to "achievement." Related: Exploits.

 exploitative (adj.) "serving for or used in exploitation," 1882, from French exploitatif, from exploit (see exploit (n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859) appears to be a native formation from exploit + -ive.

exploitation (n.) 1803, "productive working" of something, a positive word among those who used it first, though regarded as a Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun of action from exploiter (see exploit (v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in part from influence of French socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also perhaps influenced by use of the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and exploitation was hurled in insult at activities it once had crowned as praise.  It follows from this science [conceived by Saint Simon] that the tendency of the human race is from a state of antagonism to that of an universal peaceful association -- from the dominating influence of the military spirit to that of the industriel one; from what they call l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme to the exploitation of the globe by industry. ["Quarterly Review," April & July 1831]

Grice: “I am now in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicature.”

Not to provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it with one of my metaphysical routines.”

“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p”

That seems good for the analysandum

Grice loves the “by (in, when)” “(or making as if to)”

Note the oratio obliqua.

Or ‘that’-clause.

So this is not ‘uttering’

As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’

“By uttering ‘x’ U means that p.’

The “by” already involves a clause with a ‘that’-clause.

So this is not a report of a physical event.

It is a report embued already with intentionality.

The utterer is not just ‘uttering’

The utterer is EXPLICITLY conveying that p.

We cannot say MEANING that p.

Because Grice uses “mean” as opposed to “explicitly convey”

His borderline scenarios are such,

“Keep me company, dear”

“If we are to say that when he uttererd that he means that his wife was to keep him company or not is all that will count for me to change my definition of ‘mean’ or not.”

Also irony.

But here it is more complicated.

A man utters, “Grice defeated Strawson”

If he means it ironically, to mean that Strawson defeated Grice, it is not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite. He explicitly conveyed that.

Grice considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’

“If I am dead, I shall have no time for reading.”

He is careful here that the utterer does not explicitly conveys that he will have no time for reading – because it’s conditioned on he being dead.

“has implicated that q,”

“may be said to have conversationally implicated that q,”

So this is a specification alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly conveying that p, U implicitly conveys that q.’

Where he is adding the second-order adverb, ‘conversationally.’

By explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL FASHION” iff or if

“PROVIDED THAT”

“(1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helfpulness;”

Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that an implicatum is ‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when  AT LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.

“(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE terms) consistent with this presumption;”

THIS IS THE CRUCIAL CLAUSE – and the one that not only requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the expectation that one’s addressee, BEING RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE RATIONAL.

This is the ‘rationalisation’ he refers to in “Retrospective Epilogue.”

Note that ‘q’ is obviously now the content of a state in the utterer’s soul – a desideratum or a creditum --, at least a CREDITUM, in view of Grice’s view of everything at least exhibitive and perhaps protreptic --

“and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) IS required.”

All that jargon about mutuality is a result of Strawson tutoring Schiffer!

“Apply this to my initial example, to B's remark that C has not yet been to prison.”

What made Grice think of such a convoluted example?

He was laughing at Searle for providing non-philosophical examples, and there he is!

“In a suitable setting A might reason as follows:”

“(1) B has APPARENTLY violated – indeed he has played the flute with -- the maxim 'Be relevant' and so may be regarded as [ALSO] having flouted one of the maxims conjoining perspicuity,”

In previous versions, under the desideratum of conversational clarity Grice had it that the desideratum included the expectation of this ‘relatedness’ AND that of ‘perspicuity’ (sic).

In the above, Grice is stating that if you are irrelevant (or provide an unrelated contribution) you are not being perspicuous.

But “He hasn’t been to prison” is perspicuous enough.

And so is the link to the question --.

Plus, wasn’t perspicuity only to apply to the ‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather than the content.

Here it is surely the CONTENT – that it is not the case that C is a criminal – that triggers it all.

So, since there is a “not,” here this is parallel to the example examined by Strawson in the footnote to “Logical Theory.”

The utterer is saying that it is not the case that C has been in prison yet.

The ‘yet’ makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian colouring ‘convention’!

“It is not the case that C has been in prison”

Is, admittedly, not very perspicuous.

“So what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”

So there is an equivocation here as to the utterance perhaps not being perspicuous, while the utterer IS perspicuous.

“yet I have no reason to suppose that he is opting out from the operation of the CP;”

Or playing the flute with my beloved principle of conversational helpfulness.

“(2) given the circumstances, I can regard his irrelevance as only apparent – as when we say that a plastic flower is not a flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy duck is surely not a duck! That trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only if, I suppose him to think that C is potentially dishonest;”

As many are!

The potentially is the trick.

Recall Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially dishonest?! Not me! PLATO was! Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”

“(3) B knows that I am capable of working out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially dishonest.'”

Unless he goes on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not mean of course to mean that I mean that he is potentially dishonest, because although he is, he shouldn’t, or rather, I don’t think you are expecting me to convey explicitly that he shouln’t or should for that matter.”

“The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL implicature.”

This is the Humpty Dumpty in Grice.

Cf. Provide the sixteen derivational steps in Jane Austen’s Novel remark, “I sense and sensibilia” – This is what happens sometimes when people who are not philosophers engage with Grice!

For a philosopher, it is clear Grice is not being serious there. He is mocking an ‘ideal’-language philosopher (as Waissmann called them). Let’s revise the word:

By “counting” he means “DEEM.” He has said that “She is poor, but she is honest,” is NOT CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not produced, this may not be a matter of argument.

Philosophers are OBSESSED, and this is Grice’s trick, with ARGUMENT. Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my father, who was rather blunt, Hardie taught me to ARGUE for this or that reason.”

His mention of “INTUITION” is not perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree that meaning is a matter of INTUITION, not a theoretical concept within a theory.

So it’s not like Grice does not trust the intuition. So the point is TERMINOLOGICAL and methodological. Terminological, in that this is a specfification of ‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases like “How rude!” (he just flouted the maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not a CONVERSATIONAL maxim.

Is Grice implicating that nonconversational nonconventional implicate are not calculable? We don’t think so.

But he might.

I think he will. Because in the case of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and ‘social maxim’ – such as “be polite,” – the calculation may involve such degree of gradation that you better not get Grice started!

“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicature.”

OK – So perhaps he does allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate ARE calculable.

But he may add:

“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, it will not be a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional implicature.”

Strawson: “And what nonconventional nonconversational implicate?

Grice: You are right, Strawon. Let me modify and refine the point: “It will be a dull, boring, undetachable, conventional implicatum – OR any of those dull implicate that follow from (or result – I won’t use ‘generate’) one of those maxims that I have explicitly said they were NOT conversational maxims.

“For surely, there is something very ‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicatum is involved with the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and yet that the maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicature.”

“Therefore, I restrict calculability to CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE, because it involves the conversational maxims that contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas you’ll agree that Queen Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as she frequently did not – “We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and Sullivan amuse me!””

“To work out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind nonconversational nonconventional] implicature is present, the hearer will reply on the following data:”

As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’

Perhaps assumption, alla Gettier, is better:

“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved;”

WoW Quite a Bit. This is the reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.

In he hasn’t been to ‘prison’ we are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my prison”).

Strawson: But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?

He hasn't been to prison

prison (n.) early 12c., from Old French prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive" (11c., Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;" see prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative *prehensio) "a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of prehendere "to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, + -hendere, from PIE root *ghend- "to seize, take"). 

"Captivity," hence by extension "a place for captives," the MAIN modern sense.” (There are 34 other unmain ones).

He hasn't been to a place for captives yet.

You mean he is one.

Cf. 

He hasn't been to asylum.

You mean Foucault?

(2) the principle of conversational helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”

This is more crucial seeing that the utterer may utter something which has no conventional meaning?

Cf. Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so for the ‘conventional’ one!”

What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have the ‘spirit’ as the implicatum. Or he needs the lines, so he can have the implicatum as a reading ‘between the lines.’

If the utterance is a gesture, like showing a bandaged leg, or a Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to distinguish or to identify what is EXPLICITLY conveyed.

By showing his bandaged leg, U EXPLICITLY conveys that he has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys that he cannot really play cricket.

The requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even tricker, “Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational? Substitutional?

In any case, Grice is not being circular in requiring that the addressee should use as an assumption or datum that U thinks that the expression E is generally uttered by utterers when they m-intend that p.

But there are tricks here.

“(3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”

Cf. Grice, “Is there a general context for a general theory of context?”

“(4) other items of background knowledge;”

So you don’t get:

How is C getting on at the bank?

My lips are sealed

Why do you care

Mind your own business.

Note that “he hasn’t been to prison yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’) is the sort of tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS that he’ll get that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does.

“and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case.”

This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.

“A general pattern for the working out of a conversational implicature might be given as follows:”

Again the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might expect

 'He has said that p;”

Ie explicitly conveys that p.

Note the essential oratio obliqua, or that-clause.

“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness”

That is, he is not a prisoner of war, or anything.

“He could not be doing this unless he thought that q;”

Or rather, even if more tautologically still, he could not be doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’ For if the utterer is IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do it!

“he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q IS required;”

Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY, which Grice fails to have added as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent logics – “he is using ‘and’ and ‘or’ in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,” – He is an intuitionist, his name is Dummett.

“he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.'”

The ‘or’ is delightful, for m-intention requires ‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous positions, so ‘willingess to allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE! Especially at Oxford where we are ever so subtle!