In a talk to the Oxford Philosophical Society H. P. Grice begins by outlining to his concept of the implicature: what *an utterer* implies, not what what he implies implies.
At the end of his talk Grice makes this comment:
‘To distinguish between what *a man* implies and *what he implies* implies equips us, we may suppose, with a shining new tool to crack the crib of reality maybe."
"It also equips us — it always does — with a shining new skid under our metaphysical feet’."
The partial pessimism, if that's what it was, of Grice’s comment has proved abundantly justified.
Grice's shining new tool has led in fact to the skidding of the philosopher’ feet.
One bright idea may well lead a philosopher off in the wrong direction, and the rest of us back in the end, with rather little gained, to a position not far from that of our predecessors
This dismal story, I should in justice make clear at the outset, is not that of the whole of philosophy, not even of the whole of philosophy at Oxford.
The line Grice traces is readily recognised as being, more conspicuous than most.
Thursday, April 30, 2020
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