H. P. Grice

H. P. Grice, M. A. Lit. Hum., F. B. A, Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, St. Johns, Oxford

NEGATION. A bit of palæo-Griceian history is in order. Sheffer, defines ‘not’ and negation in terms of incompatibility in ‘A set of five independent postulates for Boolean algebras, with application to logical constants,’ Trans. American Mathematical Society. Grice does refers to ‘the strokes.’ His use of the plural is interesting as a nod to Peirce’s minute logic in his ‘Boolian [sic] algebra with one constant.’ There is indeed Peirce’s stroke, or ampheck (↓), Sheffer’s stroke (|, /, ↑), and and Quine’s stroke (†, strictly Quine’s dagger). Some philosophers prefer to refer to Peirces Stroke as Peirce’s arrow, or strictly stressed double-edged sword. His editors disambiguate his ampheck, distinguishing between the dyadic functor or connective equivalent to Sheffer’s stroke and ‘nor.’ While Whitehead, Russell, and Witters love Sheffer’s stroke, Hilbert does not: ‘‘p/p’ ist dann gleichbedeutend mit ‘X̄.’ Grice explores primitiveness. It is possible, to some extent, to qualify this or that device in terms of primitiveness. As regards ‘not,’ if a communication-system did not contain a unitary negative device, there would be many things that communicators can now communicate that they would be then unable to communicate. He has two important caveats. That would be the case unless, first, the communication-system contained some very artificial-seeming connective like one or other of the strokes, and, second, communicators put themselves to a good deal of trouble, as Plato does in ‘The Sophist’ with ‘diaphoron,’ that Wiggins symbolises with ‘Δ,’ to find, more or less case by case, complicated forms of expression, not necessarily featuring a connective, but involving such expressions as ‘other than’or ‘incompatible with.’ Grice further refers to Aristotle’s ‘apophasis’ in De Int.17a25. Grice, always lured by the potentiality of a joint philosophical endeavour, treasures his collaboration with Strawson that is followed by one with Austin on Cat. and De Int. So what does Aristotle say in De Int.? Surely Aristotle could have started by referring to Plato’s Parmenides, aptly analysed by Wiggins. Since Aristotle is more of a don than a poet, he has to give ‘not’ a name: ‘ἀπόφασις ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος,’a predication of one thing away from another, i.e. negation of it. This is Grice’s reflection, in a verificationist vein, of two types of this or that negative utterance. His immediate trigger is Ryle’s contribution on a symposium on Bradley’s idea of an internal relation, where Grice appeals to Peirce’s incompatibility. ‘The proposition ‘This is red’ is imcompatible with the proposition, ‘This is not coloured.’ While he uses a souly verb or predicate for one of them, Grice will go back to the primacy of ‘potching’ at a later stage. A pirot potches that the obble is not fang, but feng. It is convenient to introduce this or that soul-state, ψ, sensing that …, or perceiving that … Grice works mainly with two scenarios, both involved with the first-person singular pronoun ‘I’ with which he is obsessed. Grice’s first scenario concerns a proposition that implies another proposition featuring ‘someone, viz. I,’ the first-person singular pronoun as subject, a sensory modal verb, and an object, the proposition, it is not the case that ‘the α is φ₁.’ The denotatum of the first-person pronoun perceives that a thing displays this or the visual sense-datum of a colour, and the corresponding sensory modal predicate. Via a reductive (but not reductionist) analysis, we get that, by uttering ‘It is not the case that I see that the pillar box is blue,’ the utterer U means, i. e. m-intends his addressee A to believe, U he sees that the pillar box is red. U’s source, reason, ground, knowledge, or belief, upon which he bases his uttering his utterance is U’s *indirect* mediated actual experience, belief, or knowledge, linked to a sense-datum φ₂ (red) other than φ₁ (blue). Grice’s second scenario concerns a proposition explicitly featuring the first-person singular pronoun, an introspection, involving an auditory sense-datum of a noise. Via reductive (but not reductionist) analysis, we get that, by uttering ‘It is not the case that I hear that the bell tolls in Gb,’ U means that he lacks the experience of hearing that the bell tolls simpliciter. U’s source, reason, ground, knowledge, or belief, upon which he bases his uttering his utterance is the *direct* unmediated felt absence, or absentia, or privatio or privation, or apophasis, verified by introspection, of the co-relative ψ, which Grice links to the absence of the experience, belief, or knowledge, of the sense-datum, the apophasis of the experience, which is thereby negated. In either case, Grice’s analysans do not feature ‘not.’ Grice turns back to the topic in seminars later at Oxford in connection with Strawson’s cursory treatment of ‘not’ in ‘Introduction to logical theory.’ ‘Not’ (and ~.) is the first pair, qua unary satisfactory-value-functor (unlike this or that dyadic co-ordinate, and, or, or the dyadic sub-ordinate if) in Grice’s list of this or that vernacular counterpart attached to this or that formal device. Cf. ‘Smith has not ceased from eating iron,’ in ‘Causal theory.’ In the fourth James lecture, Grice explores a role for negation along the lines of Wilson’s Statement and Inference.’ Grice’s ‘Vacuous Names’ contains Gentzen-type syntactic inference rules for both ‘not’’s introduction (+, ~) and the elimination (-, ~) and the correlative value assignation. Note that there are correlative rules for Peirce’s arrow. Grice’s motivation is to qualify ‘not’ with a subscript scope-indicating device on ~ for a tricky case like ‘The climber of Mt. Everest on hands and knees is not to atttend the party in his honour.’ The logical form becomes qualified: ‘~₂(Marmaduke Bloggs is coming)₁’, or ‘~₂(Pegasus flies)₁.’ generic formula is ~₂p₁, which indicates that p is introduced prior to ~. In the earlier James lectures he used the square bracket device. The generic formula being ‘~[p],’ where [p] reads that p is assigned common-ground status. Cancelling the implicata may be trickier. ‘It is not the case that I hear that the bell tolls because it is under reparation.’ ‘That is not blue; it’s an optical illusion.’ Cf. Grice on ‘It is an illusion. What is it?’ Cf. The king of France is not bald because there is no king of France. In Presupposition, the fourth Urbana lecture, Grice uses square brackets for the subscript scope indicating device. ‘Do not arrest [the intruder]!,’ the device meant to assign common-ground status. In ‘Method in philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre),’ Grice plays with the internalisation of a pre-theoretical concept of not within the scope of ‘ψ.’ In the Kant lectures on aspects of reasoning, Grice explores ‘not’ within the scope of this or that mode operator, as in the buletic utterance, ‘Do not arrest the intruder!’ Is that internal narrow scope, ‘!~p,’ or external wide scope, ‘~!p’? Grice also touches on this or that mixed-mode utterance, and in connection with the minor problem of presupposition within the scope of an operator other than the indicative-mode operator. ‘Smith has not ceased from eating iron, because Smith does not exist ‒ cf. Hamlet sees that his father is on the rampants, but the sight is not reciprocated ‒ Macbeth sees that Banquo is near him, but his vision is not reciprocated. Grice is having in mind Hare’s defense of a non-doxastic utterance. In his commentary in P(hilosophical) G(rounds of) R(ationality:) I(ntentions,) C(ategories), E(nds), Grice expands on this metaphysical construction routine of Humeian projection with the pre-intuitive concept of  ‘not,’ specifying the different stages the intuitive concept undergoes until it becomes fully rationally recostructed, as something like a Fregeian sense. In the centerpiece lecture of the William James set, Grice explores Wilson’s Statement and inference to assign a métier to ‘not,’ and succeeds in finding one. The conversational métier of ‘not’ is explained in terms of the conversational implicatum. By uttering ‘Smith has not been to prison yet,’ U implies that some utterer has, somewhere, sometime, expressed an opinion to the contrary. This is connected by Grice with the ability a rational creature has to possess to survive. The creature has to be able, as Sheffer notes, to deny this or that. Grices notable case is the negation of a conjunction. So it may well be that the most rational role for ‘not’ is not primary in that it is realised once less primitive operators are introduced. Is there a strict conceptual distinction, as Grice suggests, between negation and privation? If privation involves or presupposes negation, one might appeal to something like Modified Occam’s Razor (M. O. R.), do not multiply negations beyond necessity. In his choice of examples, Grice seems to be implicating negation for an empirically verifiable, observational utterance, such as U does not see that the pillar box is blue not because U does not exist, but on the basis of U’s experiencing, knowing, believing and indeed seeing that the pillar box is red. This is a negation, proper, or simpliciter (even if it involves a sense-datum phi2 incompatible with sense-datum phi1. Privation, on the other hand, would be involved in an utterance arrived via introspection, such as U does not hear that the bell is ringing on the basis of his knowing that he is aware of the absence, simpliciter, of an experience to that effect. Aristotle, or some later Aristotelian, may have made the same distinction, within apophasis between negation or negatio and privation or privatio. Or not. Of course, Grice is ultimately looking for the rationale behind the conversational implicatum in terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness underlying his picture of conversation as rational co-operation. To use his pirotological jargon in Method, in Pirotese and Griceish There is the Pirot₁, who potches that the obble is not fang, but feng. Pirot₁ utters p explicitly conveying that p. Pirot₂ alternatively feels like negating that. By uttering ~p, P₂ explicitly conveys that ~p. Pirot₁ volunteers to Pirot₂, ~p, explicitly conveying that ~p. Not raining! Or No bull. You are safe. Surely a rational creature should be capable to deny this or that, as Grice puts it in Indicative conditionals. Interestingly, Grice does not consider, as Gazdar does, under Palmer), he other possible unitary functors (three in a standard binary assignation of values) – just negation, which reverses the satisfactory-value of the radix or neustic.  In terms of systematics, thus, it is convenient to regard Grices view on negation and privation as his outlook on the operators as this or that procedure by the utterer that endows him with this or that basic expressive, operative power. In this case, the expressive power is specifically related to his proficiency with not. The proficiency is co-related with this or that device in general, whose vernacular expression will bear a formal counterpart. Many of Grices comments addressed to this more general topic of this or that satisfactoriness-preserving operator apply to not, and thus raise the question about the explicitum or explicatum of not. A Griceian should not be confused. The fact that Grice does not explicitly mention not or negation when exploring the concept of a generic formal device does not mean that what he says about formal device may not be particularised to apply to not or negation. His big concession is that Whitehead and Russell (and Peano before them) are right about the explicitum or explicatum of not being ~, even if Grice follows Hilbert and Ackermann in dismissing Peirces arrow for pragmatic reasons. This is what Grice calls the identity thesis to oppose to Strawsons divergence thesis between not and ~. More formally, by uttering Not-p, U explicitly conveys that ~p. Any divergence is explained via the implicatum. A not utterance is horribly uninformative, and not each of them is of philosophical interest. Grice joked with Bradley and Searles The man in the next table is not lighting the cigarette with a twenty-dollar bill, the denotatum of the Subjects being a Texas oilman in his country club. The odd implicatum is usually to the effect that someone thought otherwise. In terms of Cook Wilson, the role of not has more to do with the expressive power of a rational creature to deny a molecular or composite utterance such as p and q Grice comments that in the case of or, the not may be addressed, conversationally, to the utterability of the disjunction. His example involves the logical form Not (p or q). It is not the case that Wilson or Heath will be prime minister. Theres always hope for Nabarro or Thorpe.  The utterer is, at the level of the implicatum, not now contradicting what his co-conversationalist has utterered. The utterer is certainly not denying that Wilson will be Prime Minister. It is, rather, that the utterer U wishes not to assert or state, say, what his co-conversant has asserted, but, instead, to substitute a different statement or claim which the utterer U regards as preferable under the circumstances. Grice calls this substitutive disagreement. This was a long-standing interest of Grices: an earlier manuscript reads Wilson or MacMillan will be prime minister. Lets take a closer look at the way Grice initially rephrases his two scenarios involving not as attached to an auditory and a visual sense datum. I do not hear that the bell is ringing is rationally justified by the absence or absentia of the experience of hearing it. I do not see that the pillar box is blue is rationally justified by Us sensing that the pillar box is red. The latter depends on Kants concept of the synthetic a priori with which Grice tests with his childrens playmates. Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed! Can a pillar box be blue and red all over? Cf. Ryles symposium on negation with Mabbott, for the Aristotelian Society, a source for Grices reflexion. Ryle later discussing Bradleys internal relations, reflects that that the proposition, This pillar box is only red is incompatible with This pillar box is only blue. As bearing this or that conversational implicata, Grices two scenarios can be re-phrased, unhelpfully, as I am unhearing a noise and That is  unred. The apparently unhelpful point bears however some importance. It shows that negation and not are not co-extensive. The variants also demonstrate that the implicatum, qua conversational, rather than conventional, is non-detachable. Not is hardly primtive pure Anglo-Saxon. It is the rather convoluted abbreviation of ne-aught. Its ne that counts as the proper, pure, amorphous Anglo-Saxon negation, as in a member of parliament (if not a horse) uttering nay.  Grices view of conversation as rational co-operation, as displayed in this or that conversational implicatum necessitates that the implicatum is never attached to this or that expression. Here the favoured, but not exclusive expression, is not, since Strawson uses it. But the vernacular provides a wealth of expressive ways to be negative! Grice possibly chose negation not because, as with this or that nihilistic philosopher, such as Schopenhauer, or indeed Parmenides, he finds the concept a key one. But one may well say that this is the Schopenhauerian or the Parmenidesian in Griceian. Grice is approaching not in linguistic, empiricist, or conceptual key. He is applying the new Oxonian methodology: the reductive analysis in terms of Russells logical construction. Grices implied priority is with by uttering x, by which U explicitly conveys that ~p, U implicitly conveys that q. The essay thus elaborates on this implicated q. For the record, nihilism was coined by philosopher Jacobi, while the more primitive negatio and privatio is each a time-honoured item in the philosophical lexicon, with which mediaeval this or that speculative grammarian is especially obsessed. Negatio translates Aristotles apophasis, and has a pretty pedigreed history. The philosophical lexicon has nĕgātĭo, f. negare, which L and S, unhelpfully, render as a denying, denial, negation, Cicero, Sull. 13, 39: negatio inficiatioque facti, id. Part. 29, 102. L and S go on to add that negatio is predicated of to the expression that denies, a negative. Grice would say that L and S should realise that its the utterer who denies. The source L and S give is ADogm. Plat. 3, p. 32, 38. As for Grices other word, there is  prīvātĭo, f. privare, which again unhelpfully, L and S render as a taking away, privation of a thing. doloris, Cic. Fin. 1, 11, 37, and 38, or pain-free, as Grice might prefer, cf. zero-tolerance. L and S also cite: 2, 9, 28: culpæ, Gell. 2, 6, 10. The negatio-privatio distinction is perhaps not attested in Grecian The Grecians seem to have felt happy with ἀπόφασις, (A), from ἀπόφημι, which now L and S unhepfully render as denial, negation, adding oκατάφασις, for which they cites from Platos Sophista (263e), to  give then the definition ἀπόφασις ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος, a predication of one thing away from another, i.e. negation of it, for which they provide the source that Grice is relying.  on: Arist. Int.17a25, cf. APo. 72a14; ἀπόφασις τινός, negation, exclusion of a thing,  Pl. Cra. 426d; δύο ἀ. μίαν κατάφασιν ἀποτελοῦσι Luc. Gall.11. If he was not the first to explore philosophically negation, Grice may be regarded as a philosopher who most explored negation as occurring in a that-clause followed by a propositional complexus that contains ~, and as applied to a personal agent, in a lower branch of philosophical psychology. It is also the basis for his linguistic botany. He seems to be trying to help other philosopher not to fall in the trap of thinking that not has a special sense. The utterer means that ~p. In what ways is that to be interpreted? Grice confessed to never been impressed by Ayer. The crudities and dogmatisms seemed too pervasive. Is Grice being an empiricist and a verificationist? Let us go back to This is not red and I am not hearing a noise. Grices suggestion is that the incompatible fact offering a solution to this problem is the fact that the utterer of Someone, viz. I, does not hear that the bell tolls is indicating (and informing) that U merely entertains the positive (affirmative) proposition, Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls, without having an attitude of certainty towards it. More generally, Grice is proposing, like Bradley and indeed Bosanquet, who Grice otherwise regards as a minor philosopher, a more basic Subjects-predicate utterance. The α is not β. The utterer states I do not know that α is β if and only if every present mental or souly process, of mine, has some characteristic incompatible with the knowledge that α is β. One may propose a doxastic weaker version, replacing the dogmatic Oxonian know with believe. Grices view of compatibility is an application of the Sheffer stroke that Grice will later use in accounts of not. ~p iff p|p or ~p ≡df p|p. But then, as Grice points out, Sheffer is hardly Griceian. If Pirotese did not contain a unitary negative device, there would be many things that a pirot should be able to express that the pirot should be unable to express unless Pirotese contained some very artificially-looking dyadic functor like one or other of the strokes, or the pirot put himself to a good deal of trouble to find, more or less case by case, complicated forms of expression, as Platos Parmenides does, involving such expressions as other than, or incompatible with. V. Wiggins on Platos Parmenides in a Griceian key. Such a complicate form of expression would infringe the principle of conversational helpfulness, notably in its desideratum of conversational clarity, or conversational perspicuity [sic], where the sic is Grices seeing that unsensitive Oxonians sometimes mistake perspicuity for the allegedly, cognate perspicacity (L. perspicacitas, like perspicuitas, from perspicere). Grice finds the unitary brevity of not-p attractive. Then theres the pretty Griceian idea of the pregnant proposition. Im not hearing a nose is pregnant, as Occam has it, with I am hearing a noise. A scholastic and mediæval philosopher loves to be figurative. Grices main proposal may be seen as drawing on this or that verificationist assumption by Ayer, who actually has a later essay on not falsely connecting it with falsity. Grices proposed better analysis would please Ayer, had Grice been brought on the right side of the tracks, since it can be Subjectsed to a process of verification, on the understanding that either perception through the senses (It is red) or introspection (Every present mental or souly process of mine ) is each an empirical phenomenon. But there are subtleties to be drawn. At Oxford, Grices view on negation will influence philosophers like Wiggins, and in a negative way, Cohen, who raises the Griceian topic of the occurrence of negation in embedded clauses, found by Grice to be crucial for the rational genitorial justification of not as a refutation of the composite p and q), and motivating Walker with a reply (itself countered by Cohen  ‒ Can the conversationalist hypothesis be defended?). So problems are not absent, as they should not! Grice re-read Peirces definition or reductive analysis of not and enjoyed it!  Peirce discovers the logical connective Grice calls the Sheffer Stroke, as well as the related connective nor (also called Joint Denial, and quite appropriately Peirces Arrow, with other Namess in use being Quines Arrow or Quines Dagger and today usually symbolized by “/”). The relevant manuscript, numbered MS 378 in a subsequent edition and titled A Boolian [sic] Algebra with One Constant, MS 378, was actually destined for discarding and was salvaged for posterity A fragmentary text by Peirce also shows familiarity with the remarkable meta-logical characteristics that make a single function functionally complete, and this is also the case with Peirces unfinished Minute Logic: these texts are published posthumously. Peirce designates the two truth functions, nand and nor, by using the symbol “” which he called ampheck, coining this neologism from the Grecian ἀμφήκης, of equal length in both directions. Peirces editors disambiguate the use of symbols by assigning “” to the connective we call Sheffers troke while preserving the symbol /  for nor.   In MS 378, Peirces A Boolian Algebra with One Constant, which swas tagged “to be discarded” at the Department of Philosophy at Harvard, Peirce reduces the number of logical operators to one constant. Peirce states that his notation uses the minimum number of different signs and shows for the first time the possibility of writing both universal and particular propositions with but one copula. Peirce’s notation is later termed Sheffers stroke, and is also well-known as the nand operation, in Peirce’s terms the operation by which two propositions written in a pair are considered to be both denied. In the same manuscript, Peirce also discovers what is the expressive completeness of ‘nor,’ indeed today rightly recognized as the Peirce arrow. Like Sheffer, of Cornell, independently does later (only to be dismissed by Hilbert and Ackermann), Peirce understands that these two connectives can be used to reduce all mathematically definable connectives (also called primitives and constants) of propositional logic. This means that all definable connectives of propositional logic can be defined by using only Sheffers stroke or nor as the single connective. No other connective (or associated function) that takes one or two variables as inputs has this property. Standard, two-valued propositional logic has no unary functions that have the remarkable property of functional completeness. At first blush, availability of this option ensures that economy of resources can be obtained—at least in terms of how many functions or connectives are to be included as undefined. Unfortunately, as Grice, following Hilbert and Ackermann realise, there is a trade-off between this philosophical semantic gain in economy of symbolic resources and the pragmatically unwieldy length and rather counterintuitive, to use Grices phrase, appearance of the formulas that use only the one connective.  It is characteristic of his logical genius, however, and emblematic of his rather under-appreciated, surely not by Grice, contributions to the development of semiotics that Peirce grasps the significance of functional completeness and figure out what truth functions — up to arity 2 — are functionally complete for two-valued propositional logic, never mind helping the philosopher to provide a reductive analysis of negation that Grice is looking for. Strictly, this is the property of weak functional completeness, given that we disregard whether constants or zero-ary functions like 1 or 0 can be defined. Peirce subscribes to a semeiotic view, popular in the Old World with Ogden and Welby, and later Grice, according to which the fundamental nature and proper tasks of the formal study of communication are defined by the rules set down for the construction and manipulation of symbolic resources. A proliferation of symbols for the various connectives that are admitted into the signature of a logical system suffers from a serious defect on this view. The symbolic grammar fails to match or represent the logical fact of interdefinability of the connectives, and reductive analysis of all to one. Peirce is willing sometimes to accept constructing a formal signature for two-valued propositional logic by using the two-members set of connectives, which is minimally functionally complete. This means that these two connectives — or, if we are to stick to an approach that emphasizes the notational character of logical analysis, these two symbols —are adequate expressively. Every mathematically definable connective of the logic can be defined by using only these two. And the set is minimally functionally complete in that neither of these connectives can be defined by the other (so, as we say, they are both independent relative to each other.) The symbol   can be viewed as representing a constant truth function (either unary or binary) that returns the truth value 0 for any input or inputs. Or it can be regarded as a constant, which means that it is a zero=ary (zero-input) function, a degenerate function, which refers to the truth value 0. Although not using, as Grice does, Peanos terminology, Peirce takes the second option. This set has cardinality 2 (it has exactly 2 members) but it is not the best we can do. Peirces discovery of what we have called the Sheffer functions or strokes (anachronistically and unfairly to Peirce, as Grice notes, but bowing to convention) shows that we can have a set of cardinality 1 (a one-member set or a so-called singleton) that is minimally functionally complete with respect to the definable connectives of two-valued propositional logic. Thus, either one of the following sets can do. The sets are functionally complete and, because they have only one member each, we say that the connectives themselves have the property of functional completeness. / is the symbol of Sheffers stroke or nand and /is the symbol of the Peirce Arrow or nor. Grice stipulates as such, even though he does not introduce his grammar formally. It is important to show ow these functions can define other functions. Algebraically approached, this is a matter of functional composition In case one wonders why the satisfaction with defining the connectives of the set that comprises the symbols for negation, inclusive disjunction, and conjunction, Namesly , there is an explanation. There is an easy, although informal, way to show that this set is functionally complete. It is not minimally functionally complete because  and  are inter-definable. But it is functionally complete. Thus, showing that one can define these functions suffices for achieving functional completeness. Definability should be thought as logical equivalence. One connective can be defined by means of others if and only if the formulas in the definition (what is defined and what is doing the defining) are logically equivalent. Presuppose the truth-tabular definitions of the connectives. and  and  and  and and . Grice enjoyed that. Meanwhile, at Corpus, Grice is involved in serious philosophical studies under the tutelage of Hardie. While his philosophical socialising is limited, having been born on the wrong side of the tracks, first at Corpus, and then at Merton, and ending at St. Johns, Grice fails to attend the seminal meetings at All Souls held on Thursday evenings by the play group of the seven (Austin, Ayer, Berlin, Hampshire, MacDermott, MacNabb, and Woozley). Three of them will join Grice in the new play group after the war: Austin, Hampshire, and Woozley. But at St. Johns Grice tutors Strawson, and learns all about the linguistic botany methodology on his return from the navy. Indeed, his being appointed Strawson as his tutee starts a life-long friendship and collaboration.

IDENTITY: Grice advocates psychological or soul criterianism. Psychological or soul criterianism has been advocated, in one form or another, by philosophers such as Locke, Butler, Duncan-Jones, Berkeley, Gallie, Grice, Flew, Haugeland, Jones, Perry, Shoemaker and Parfit, and Quinton. What all of those theories have in common is the idea that, even if it is the case that some kind of physical states are necessary for being a person, it is the unity of consciousness which is of decisive importance for personal identity over time. In this sense, person is a term which picks out a psychological, or mental, "thing". In claiming this, all Psychological Criterianists entail the view that personal identity consists in the continuity of psychological features. It is interesting that Flew has an earlier "Selves," earlier THAN his essay on Locke on personal identity. The first,  for Mind, criticising Jones, "The self in sensory cognition."; the second for Philosophy. Surely under the tutelage of Grice. Cf. Jones, Selves: A reply to Flew, Philosophy.  The stronger thesis asserts that there is no conceivable situation in which bodily identity would be necessary, some other conditions being always both necessary and sufficient. Grice takes it that Locke’s theory (II, 27) is an example of this latter type. To say "Grice remembers that he heard a noise", without irony or inverted commas, is to imply that Grice did hear a noise. In this respect remember is like, know , a factive. It does not follow from this, nor is it true, that each claim to remember, any more than each claim to know, is alethic or veridical; or, not everything one seems to remember is something one really remembers. So much is obvious, although Locke -- although admittedly referring only to the memory of actions, section 13 --  is forced to invoke the providence of God to deny the latter. These points have been emphasised by Flew in his discussion of Locke’s views on personal identity. In formulating Locke’ thesis, however, Flew makes a mistake; for he offers Lockes thesis in the form if Grice can remember Hardies doing such-and-such, Grice and Hardie are the same person. But this obviously will not do, even for Locke, for we constantly say things like I remember my brother Derek joining the army without implying that I and my brother are the same person. So if we are to formulate such a criterion, it looks as though we have to say something like the following. If Derek Grice remembers joining my, he is the person who did that thing. But since remembers doing means remembers himself doing, this is trivially tautologous, and moreover lends colour to Butlers famous objection that memory, so far from constituting personal identity, presupposes it.  As Butler puts it, one should really think it self-evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. Butler then asserts that Lockes misstep stems from his methodology. This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. One of the points that Locke emphasizes—that persistence conditions are determined via defining kind terms—is what, according to Butler, leads Locke astray.  Butler additionally makes the point that memory is not required for personal persistence. But though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings. This is a point that others develop when they assert that Lockes view results in contradiction. Hence the criterion should rather run as follows. If Derek Grice claims to remember joining the army. We must then ask how such a criterion might be used.  Grices example is: I remember I smelled a smell. He needs two experiences to use same. I heard a noise and I smelled a smell.The singular defines the hearing of a noise is the object of some consciousness. The pair defines, "The hearing of a noise and the smelling of a smell are objects of the same -- cognate with self as in I hurt me self, -- consciousness. The standard form of an identity question is Is this x the same x as that x which ? and in the simpler situation we are at least presented with just the materials for constructing such a question; but in the more complicated situation we are baffled even in asking the question, since both the transformed persons are equally good candidates for being its Subjects, and the question Are these two xs the same (x?) as the x which  ? is not a recognizable form of identity question. Thus, it might be argued, the fact that we could not speak of identity in the latter situation is no kind of proof that we could not do so in the former. Certainly it is not a proof, as Strawson pointed out to Grice. This is not to say that they are identical at all. The only case in which identity and exact similarity could be distinguished, as we have just seen, is that of the body, same body and exactly similar body really do mark a difference. Thus one may claim that the omission of the body takes away all content from the idea of personal identity, as Pears pointed out to Grice. Leaving aside memory, which only partially applies to the case, character and attainments are quite clearly general things. Joness character is, in a sense, a particular; just because Jones’s character refers to the instantiation of certain properties by a particular (and bodily) man, as Strawson points out to Grice (Particular and general). If in ‘Negation and privation,’ Grice tackles Aristotle, he now tackles Locke. Indeed, seeing that Grice went years later to the topic as motivated by, of all people, Haugeland, rather than perhaps the more academic milieu that Perry offers, Grice became obsessed with Hume’s sceptical doubts! Hume writes in the Appendix that when he turns his reflection on himself, Hume never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions. Nor can Hume ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. It is the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self, Hume thinks. Hume grants that one can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose, says Hume, the mind to be reduced even below the life of an oyster. Suppose the oyster to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider the oyster in that situation. Does the oyster conceive any thing but merely that perception? Has the oyster any notion of, to use Gallies pretentious Aristotelian jargon, self or substance? If not, the addition of this or other perception can never give the oyster that notion. The annihilation, which this or that philosopher, including Grices first post-war tutee, Flew, supposes to  follow upon death, and which entirely destroys  the oysters self, is nothing but an extinction  of all particular perceptions; love and hatred,  pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other. Is self the same with substance? If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? For his part, Hume claims, he has a notion of neither, when conceived distinct from this or that particular perception. However extraordinary Hume’s conclusion may seem,   it need not surprise us. Most philosophers, such as Locke, seems inclined to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness. But consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception, Hume suggests. This is Grices quandary about personal identity and its implicata. Some philosophers have taken Grice as trying to provide an exegesis of Locke. However, their approaches surely differ. What works for Grice may not work for Locke. For Grice it is analytically true that it is not the case that Person₁ and Person may have the same experience. Grice explicitly states that he thinks that his logical-construction theory is a modification of Locke’s theory. Grice does not seem terribly interested to find why it may not, even if the York-based Locke Society might! Rather than introjecting into Lockes shoes, Grices strategy seems to dismiss Locke, shoes and all. Specifically, it not clear to Grice what Lockes answer in the Essay would be to Grices question about this or that I utterance that he sets his analysis with. Admittedly, Grice does quote, albeit briefly, directly from Lockes Essay. As far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action, Locke claims, so far the being is the same personal self. Grice tackles Lockes claim with four objections. These are important to consider since Grice sees as improving on Locke. A first objection concerns icircularity, with which Grice easily disposes by following Hume and appealing to the experience of memory or introspection. A second objection is Reid’s alleged counterexample about the long-term memory of the admiral who cannot remember that he was flogged as a boy. Grice dismisses this as involving too long-term of a memory. A third objection concerns Locke’s vagueness about the aboutness of consciousness, a point made by Hume in the Appendix. A fourth objection concerns again circularity, this time in Locke’s use of same in the definiens ‒ cf. Wiggins, Sameness and substance. It’s extraordinary that Wiggins is philosophising on anything Griceian. Grice is concerned with the implicatum involved in the use of the first person singular. I will be fighting soon. Grice means in body and soul. The utterance also indicates that this is Grices pre-war days at Oxford. No wonder his choice of an example. What else could he have in his soul? The topic of personal identity, which label Hume and Austin found pretentious, and preferred to talk about the illocutionary force of I, has a special Oxonian pedigree, perhaps as motivated by Humes challenge, that Grice has occasion to study and explore for his M. A. Lit. Hum. with Locke’s Essay as mandatory reading. Locke, a philosopher with whom Oxford identifies most, infamously defends this memory-based account of I. Up in Scotland, Reid reads it and concocts this alleged counter-example. Hume, or Home, if you must, enjoys it. In fact, while in the Mind essay he is not too specific about Hume, Grice will, due mainly to his joint investigations with Haugeland, approach, introjecting into the shoes of Hume ‒ who is idolised in The New World ‒ in ways he does not introject into Lockes. But Grices quandary is Hume’s quandary, too. In his own approach to I, the Cartesian ego, made transcendental and apperceptive by Kant, Grice updates the time-honoured empiricist mnemonic analysis by Locke. The first update is in style. Grice embraces, as he does with negation, a logical construction, alla Russell, via Broad, of this or that I utterance, ending up with an analysis of a someone, less informative, utterance. Grices immediate source is Gallies essay on self and substance in the pages of Mind. Mind was still a review of psychology and philosophy, so poor Grice had no much choice. In fact, Grice is being heterodoxical or heretic enough to use the Broads taxonomy, straight from the other place of I utterances. The logical-construction theory is a third proposal, next to the Bradleyian idealist pure-ego theory and the misleading covert-description theory. Grice deals with the Reids alleged counterexample of the brave officer. Suppose, Reid says, and Grice quotes verbatim, a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life. Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when he₂ took the standard, he₂ was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and that, when made a general, he₃ was conscious of his₂ taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his1 flogging. These things being supposed, it follows, from Lockes doctrine, that he1 who is flogged at school is the same person as him₂ who later takes the standard, and that he₂ who later takes the standard is the same person as him₃ who is still later made a general. When it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person with him₁ who is flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness does emphatically not reach so far back as his1 flogging. Therefore, according to Locke’s doctrine, he₃ is emphatically not the same person as him1 who is flogged. Therefore, we can say about the general that he₃ is, and at the same time, that he₃ is not the same person as him₁ who was flogged at school. Grice, wholl later add a temporal suffix to =t yielding, by transitivity. The flogged boy =_t1 the brave officer. And the brave officer =_t2 the admiral. But the admiral ≠_t3 the flogged boy. In Mind, Grice tackles the basic analysans, and comes up with a rather elaborate analysans for a simple I or Someone statement. Grice just turns to a generic affirmative variant of the utterance he had used in Negation. It is now someone, viz. I, who hears that the bell tolls. It is the affirmative counterpart of the focus of his earlier essay on negation, I do not hear that the bell tolls. Grice dismisses what, in the other place, was referred to as privileged-access, and the indexicality of I, an approach that will be made popular by Perry, who however reprints Grices essay in his influential collection for the University of California Press. By allowing for someone, viz. I, Grice seems to be relying on a piece of reasoning which hell later, in his first Locke lecture, refer to as too good. I hear that the bell tolls; therefore, someone hears that the bell tolls. Grice attempts to reduce this or that I utterance (Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls) is in terms of a chain or sequence of mnemonic states. It poses a few quandaries itself. While quoting from this or that recent philosopher such as Gallie and Broad, it is a good thing that Grice has occasion to go back to, or revisit, Locke and contest this or that infamous and alleged counterexample presented by Reid and Hume. Grice adds a methodological note to his proposed logical-construction theory of personal identity. There is some intricacy of his reductive analysis, indeed logical construction, for an apparently simple and harmless utterance (cf. his earlier essay on I do not hear that the bell tolls). But this intricacy does not prove the analysis wrong. Only that Grice is too subtle. If the reductive analysis of not is in terms of each state which I am experiencing is incompatible with phi), that should not be a minus, or drawback, but a plus, and an advantage in terms of philosophical progress. The same holds here in terms of the concept of a temporary state. Much later, Grice reconsiders, or revisits, indeed, Broads remark and re-titles his approach as the (or a) logical-construction theory of personal identity. And, with Haugeland, Grice re-considers Humes own vagaries, or quandary, with personal identity. Unlike the more conservative Locke that Grice favours in the pages of Mind, eliminationist Hume sees ‘I’ as a conceptual muddle, indeed a metaphysical chimæra. Hume presses the point for an empiricist verificationist account of I. For, as Russell would rhetorically ask, ‘What can be more direct that the experience of myself?’ The Hume Society should take notice of Grices simplification of Hume’s implicatum on I, if The Locke Society won’t. As a matter of fact, Grice calls one of his metaphysical construction routines the Humeian projection, so it is not too adventurous to think that Grice considers I  as an intuitive concept that needs to be metaphysically re-constructed and be given a legitimate Fregeian sense. Why that label for a construction routine? Grice calls this metaphysical construction routine Humeian projection, since the mind (or soul) as it were, spreads over its objects. But, by mind, Hume does not necessarily mean the I. Cf. The minds I. Grice is especially concerned with the poverty and weaknesses of Humes criticism to Lockes account of personal identity. Grice opts to revisit the Lockeian memory-based of this or that someone, viz. I utterance that Hume rather regards as vague, and confusing. Unlike Humes, neither Lockes nor Grices reductive analysis of personal identity is reductionist and eliminationist. The reductive-reductionist distinction Grice draws in Retrospective epilogue as he responds to Rountree-Jack on this or that alleged wrong on meaning that. It is only natural that Grice would be sympathetic to Locke. Grice explores these issues with J. C. Haugeland mainly at seminars. One may wonder why Grice spends so much time in a philosopher such as Hume, with whom he agreed almost on nothing! The answer is Humes influence in the Third World that forced Grice to focus on this or that philosopher. Surely Locke is less popular in the New World than Hume is. One supposes Grice is trying to save Hume at the implicatum level, at least. The phrase or term of art, logical construction is Russells and Broads, but Grice loved it. Rational reconstruction is not too dissimilar. Grice prefers Russells and Broads more conservative label. This is more than a terminological point. If Hume is right and there is NO intuitive concept behind I, one cannot strictly re-construct it, only construct it. Ultimately, Grice shows that, if only at the implicatum level, we are able to provide an analysandum for this or that someone, viz. I utterance without using I, by implicating only this or that mnemonic concept, which belongs, naturally, as his theory of negation does, in a theory of philosophical psychology, and again a lower branch of it, dealing with memory. The topic of personal identity unites various interests of Grice. The first is identity (=) simpliciter. Instead of talking of the meaning of I, as, say, Anscombe would, Grice sticks to the traditional category, or keyword, for this, i. e. the theory-laden, personal identity, or even personal sameness. Personal identity is a type of identity, but personal adds something to it. Surely Hume was stretching person a bit when using the example of a soul with a life lower than an oyster. Since Grice follows Aristotles De Anima, he enjoys Hume’s choice, though. It may be argued that personal adds Locke’s consciousness, and rational agency. Grice plays with the body-soul distinction. I, viz someone or somebody, fell from the stairs, perhaps differs from I will be fighting soon. This or that someone, viz. I utterance may be purely bodily. Grice would think that the idea that his soul fell from the stairs sounds, as it would to Berkeley, harsh. But then theres this or that one may be mixed utterance. Someone, viz. I, plays cricket, where surely your bodily mechanisms require some sort of control by the soul. Finally, this or that may be purely souly ‒ the one Grice ends up analysing, Someone, viz. I, hear that the bell tolls. At the time of his Mind essay, Grice may have been unaware of the complications that the concept of a person may bring as attached in adjective form to identity. Ayer did, and Strawson and Wiggins will, and Grice learns much from Strawson. Since Parfit, this has become a common-place topic for analysis at Oxford. A person as a complexum of a body-soul spatio-temporal continuant substance. Ultimately, Grice finds a theoretical counterpart here. A pirot may become a human, which Grice understands physiologically. That is not enough. A pirot must aspire, via meteousis, to become a person. Thus, person becomes a technical term in Grices grand metaphysical scheme of things. Someone, viz. I, hear that the bell is tolls is analysed as  ≡df, or if and only if, a hearing that the bell tolls is a part of a total temporary t_n souly state S₁ which is one in a s. such that any state S_n,  given this or that condition, contains as a part a memory M_n of the experience of hearing that the bell tolls, which is a component in some pre-sequent t₁n item, or contains an experience of hearing that the bell tolls a memory M of which would, given this or that condition, occur as a component in some sub-sequent t₂>t_n item, there being no sub-set of items which is independent of the rest. Grice simplifies the reductive analysans. Someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls iff a hearing that the bell tolls is a component in an item of an interlocking s. with emphasis on lock, s. of this or that memorable and memorative total temporary t_n state S₁. Is Grices Personal identity ever referred to in the Oxonian philosophical literature? Indeeed. Parfit mentions, which makes it especially memorable and memorative. P. Edwards includes a reference to Grices Mind essay in the entry for Personal identity, as a reference to Grice et al on Met. , is referenced in Edwardss encyclopædia entry for metaphysics. Grice does not attribute privileged access or incorrigibility to I or the first person. He always hastens to add that I can always be substituted, salva veritate (if baffling your addressee A) by someone or other, if not some-body or other, a colloquialism Grice especially detested. Grices agency-based approach requires that. I am rational provided thou art, too. If, by explicitly saying he is a Lockeian, Grice surely does not wish us to see him as trying to be original, or the first to consider this or that problem about I; i.e. someone. Still, Grice is the philosopher who explores most deeply the reductive analysis of I, i.e. someone. Grice needs the reductive analysis because human agency (philosophically, rather than psychologically interpreted) is key for his approach to things. By uttering The bell tolls, U means that someone, viz. himself, hears that the bell tolls, or even, by uttering I, hear, viz. someone hears, that the bell tolls, U means that the experience of a hearing that the bell tolls is a component in a total temporary state which is a member of a s. such that each member would, given certain conditions, contain as an component one memory of an experience which is a component in a pre-sequent member, or contains as a component some experience a memory of which would, given certain conditions, occur as a component in a post-sequent member; there being no sub-set of members which is independent of the rest. Thanks, the addressee might reply. I didnt know that! The reductive bit to Grices analysis needs to be emphasised. For Grice, a person, and consequently, a someone, viz. I utterance, is, simpliciter, a logical construction out of this or that Humeian experience. Whereas in Russell, as Broad notes, a logical construction of this or that philosophical concept, in this case personal identity, or cf. Grices earlier reductive analysis of not, is thought of as an improved, rationally reconstructed conception. Neither Russell nor Broad need maintain that the logical construction preserves the original meaning of the analysandum someone, viz. I, hears that the bell tolls, or I do not hear that the bell tolls ‒ hence their paradox of reductionist analysis. This change of Subjects does not apply to Grice. Grice emphatically intends to be make explicit, if rationally reconstructed (if that is not an improvement) through reductive (if not reductionist) analysis, the concept Grice already claims to have. One particular development to consider is within Grices play group, that of Quinton. Grice and Quinton seem to have been the only two philosophers in Austins play group who showed any interest on someone, viz. I. Or not!The fact that Quinton entitled his thing The soul didnt help. Note that Woozley was editing Reid on “Identity” in 1941. Cf. Duncan-Jones on mans mortality. Note that Quintons immediate trigger is Shoemaker. Grice writes that he is not “merely a s. of perceptions,” for he is “conscious of a permanent self, an I who experiences these perceptions and who is now identical with the I who experienced perceptions yesterday.” So, leaving aside that he is using I with the third person verb, but surely this is no use-mention fallacy, it is this puzzle that provoked his thoughts on temporal-relative “=” later on. As Grice notes, Butler argued that consciousness of experience can contribute to identity but not define it. Grice will use Butler in his elaboration of conversational benevolence versus conversational self-interest. Better than Quinton, it is better to consider Flew in Philosophy, 96, on Locke and the problem of personal identity, obviously suggested as a term paper by Grice! Wiggins cites Flew. Flew actually notes that Berkeley saw Lockes problem earlier than Reid, which concerns the transitiveness of =. Recall that Wigginss tutor at Oxford was a tutee by Grice, Ackrill.

SCEPTICISM: What is Grice’s answer to the sceptic’s implicature? The sceptic’s implicatum is a topic that always fascinated Girce. While Grice groups two essays as dealing with one single theme, strictly, only this or that philosopher’s paradox (not all) may count as sceptical. This or that philosopher’s paradox may well not be sceptical at all but rather dogmatic. In fact, Grice defines philosophers paradox as anything repugnant to common sense, shocking, or extravagant ‒ to Malcolms ears, that is! While it is, strictly, slightly odd to quote this as (1946) just because, by a stroke of the pen, Grice writes that date in the Harvard volume, we will follow his charming practice. This is vintage Grice. Grice always takes the sceptics challenge seriously, as any serious philosopher should. Grices takes both the sceptics explicatum and the scepticss implicatum as self-defeating, as a very affront to our idea of rationality, conversational or other. V: Conversations with a sceptic: Can he be slightly more conversational helpful? Hume’ sceptical attack is partial, and targeted only towards practical reason, though.  Yet, for Grice, reason is one. You cannot really attack practical or buletic reason without attacking theoretical or doxastic reason. There is such thing as a general rational acceptance, to use Grice’s term, that the sceptic is getting at. Grice likes to play with the idea that ultimately every syllogism is buletic or practical. If, say, a syllogism by Eddington looks doxastic, that is because Eddington cares to omit the practical tail, as Grice puts it. And Eddington is not even a philosopher, they say. Grice is here concerned with a Cantabrigian topic popularised by Moore. As Grice recollects, Some like Witters, but Moore’s my man. Unlike Cambridge analysts such as Moore, Grice sees himself as a linguistic-turn Oxonian analyst. So it is only natural that Grice would connect time-honoured scepticism of Pyrrhos vintage, and common sense with ordinary language, so mis-called, the elephant in Grices room. L and S have σκέψις, from σκέπτομαι, which they render as viewing, perception by the senses, ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ςκέψις, Pl. Phd. 83a; observation of auguries, Hdn. 8. 3. 7., also as examination, speculation, consideration, τὸ εὕρημα πολλῆς σκέψιος Hp. VM4, cf. Pl. Alc. 1.130d; βραχείας ςκέψις Id. Tht. 201a; ϝέμειν ςκέψις take thought of a thing, v. l. in E. Hi1323; ἐνθεὶς τῇ τέχνῃ ςκέψις Ar. Ra. 974; ςκέψις ποιεῖσθαι Pl. Phdr. 237d; ςκέψις προβέβληκας Id. Phlb. 65d; ςκέψις λόγων Id. R. 336e; ςκέψις περί τινος inquiry into, speculation on a thing, Id. Grg. 487e, etc.; περί τι Id. Lg. 636d;ἐπὶ σκέψιν τινὸς ἐλθεῖν X. Oec. 6.13.2. speculation, inquiry,ταῦτα ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως Arist. Pol. 1254a34; ἔξω τῆς νῦν ςκέψεως Id. Ph. 228a20; οὐκ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης ςκέψις Id. EN 1155b9, etc., also hesitation, doubt, esp. of the Sceptic or Pyrthonic philosophers, AP 7. 576 (Jul.); the Sceptic philosophy, S. E. P. 1.5; οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ςκέψεως, the Sceptics, ib. 229. in politics, resolution, decree, συνεδρίον Hdn. 4.3.9, cf. Poll. 6.178. If scepticism attacks common sense and fails, Grice seems to be implicating, that ordinary language philosophy is a good antidote to scepticism. Since what language other than ordinary language does common sense speak? Well, strictly, common sense doesnt speak. The man in the street does. Grice addresses this topic in a Mooreian way in a later essay, also repr. in Studies, Moore and philosophers paradoxes, repr. in Studies. As with his earlier Common sense and scepticism, Grice tackles Moores and Malcolms claim that ordinary language, so-called, solves a few of philosophers paradoxes. Philosopher is Grices witty way to generalise over your common-or-garden, any, philosopher, especially of the type he found eccentric, the sceptic included. Grice finds this or that problem in this overarching Cantabrigian manoeuvre, as over-simplifying a pretty convoluted terrain. While he cherishes Austins Some like Witters, but Moores MY man! Grice finds Moore too Cantabrigian to his taste. While an Oxonian thoroughbred, Grice is a bit like Austin, Some like Witters, but Moores my man, with this or that caveat. Again, as with his treatment of Descartes or Locke, Grice is hardly interested in finding out what Moore really means. He is a philosopher, not a historian of philosophy, and he knows it. While Grice agrees with Austins implicature that Moore goes well above Witters, if that is the expression (even if some like him), we should find the Oxonian equivalent to Moore. Grice would not Names Ryle, since he sees him, and his followers, almost every day. There is something apostolic about Moore that Grice enjoys, which is just as well, seeing that Moore is one of the twelve. Grice found it amusing that the members of The Conversazione Society would still be nickNamesd apostles when their number exceeded the initial 12. Grice spends some time exploring what Malcolm, a follower of Witters, which does not help, as it were, has to say about Moore in connection with that particularly Oxonian turn of phrase, such as ordinary language is. For Malcolms Moore, a paradox by philosopher [sic], including the sceptic, arises when philosopher [sic], including the sceptic, fails to abide by the dictates of ordinary language. It might merit some exploration if Moore’s defence of common sense is against: the sceptic may be one, but also the idealist. Moore the realist, armed with ordinary language attacks the idealists claim. The idealist is sceptical of the realists claim. But empiricist idealism (Bradley) has at Oxford as good pedigree as empiricist realism (Cook Wilson). Malcolm’s simplifications infuriate Grice, and ordinary language has little to offer in the defense of common sense realism against sceptical empiricist idealism. Surely the ordinary man says ridiculous, or silly, as Russell prefers, things, such as Smith is lucky, Departed spirits walk along this road on their way to Paradise, I know there are infinite stars, and I wish I were Napoleon, or I wish that I had been Napoleon, which does not mean that the utterer wishes that he were like Napoleon, but that he wishes that he had lived not in the his century but in the XVIIIth century. Grice is being specific about this. It is true that an ordinary use of language, as Malcolm suggests, cannot be self-contradictory unless the ordinary use of language is defined by stipulation as not self-contradictory, in which case an appeal to ordinary language becomes useless against this or that paradox by Philosopher. I wish that I had been Napoleon seems to involve nothing but an ordinary use of language by any standard but that of freedom from absurdity. I wish that I had been Napoleon is not, as far as Grice can see, philosophical, but something which may have been said and meant by numbers of ordinary people. Yet, I wish that I had been Napoleon is open to the suspicion of self-contradictoriness, absurdity, or some other kind of meaninglessness. And in this context suspicion is all Grice needs. By uttering I wish that I had been Napoleon U hardly means the same as he would if he uttered I wish I were like Napoleon. I wish that I had been Napoleon is suspiciously self-contradictory, absurd, or meaningless, if, as uttered by an utterer in a century other than the XVIIIth century, say, the utterer is understood as expressing the proposition that the utterer wishes that he had lived in the XVIIIth century, and not in his century, in which case he-1 wishes that he had not been him-1? But blame it on the buletic. That Moore himself is not too happy with Malcolms criticism can be witnessed by a cursory glimpse at hi reply to Malcolm. Grice is totally against this view that Malcolm ascribes to Moore as a view that is too broad to even claim to be true. Grices implicature is that Malcolm is appealing to Oxonian turns of phrase, such as ordinary language, but not taking proper Oxonian care in clarifying the nuances and stuff in dealing with, admittedly, a non-Oxonian philosopher such as Moore. When dealing with Moore, Grice is not necessarily concerned with scepticism. Time is unreal, e.g. is hardly a sceptic utterance. Yet Grice lists it as one of Philosophers paradoxes. So, there are various to consider here. Grice would start with common sense. That is what he does when he reprints this essay in WOW, with his attending note in both the preface and the Retrospective epilogue on how he organizes the themes and strands. Common sense is one keyword there, with its attending realism. Scepticism is another, with its attending empiricist idealism. It is intriguing that in the first two essays opening Grices explorations in semantics and metaphysics it seems its Malcolm, rather than the dryer Moore, who interests Grice most. While he would provide exegeses of this or that dictum by Moore, and indeed, Moore’s response to Malcolm, Grice seems to be more concerned with applications of his own views. Notably in Philosophers paradoxes. The fatal objection Grice finds for the paradox propounder (not necessarily a sceptic, although a sceptic may be one of the paradox propounders) significantly rests on Grices reductive analysis of meaning that  as ascribed to this or that utterer U. Grice elaborates on circumstances that hell later take up in the Retrospective epilogue. I find myself not understanding what I mean is dubiously acceptable. If meaning, Grice claims, is about an utterer U intending to get his addressee A to believe that U ψ-s that p, U must think there is a good chance that A will recognise what he is supposed to believe, by, perhaps, being aware of the Us practice or by a supplementary explanation which might come from U. In which case, U should not be meaning what Malcolm claims U might mean. No utterer should intend his addressee to believe what is conceptually impossible, or incoherent, or blatantly false (Charles Is decapitation willed Charles Is death.), unless you are Queen in Through the Looking Glass. I believe five impossible things before breakfast, and I hope youll soon get the proper training to follow suit. Cf. Tertulian, Credo, quia absurdum est. Admittedly, Grice edits the Philosophers paradoxes essay. It is only Grices final objection which is reprinted in Studies, even if he provides a good detailed summary of the previous sections. Grice appeals to Moore on later occasions. In Causal theory, Grice lists, as a third philosophical mistake, the opinion by Malcolm that Moore did not know how to use knowin a sentence. Grice brings up the same example again in Prolegomena. The use of factive know of Moore may well be a misuse. While at Madison, Wisconsin, Moore lectures at a hall eccentrically-built with indirect lighting simulating sun rays, Moore infamously utters, I know that there is a window behind that curtain, when there is not. But it is not the factiveness Grice is aiming at, but the otiosity Malcolm misdescribes in the true, if baffling, I know that I have two hands. In Retrospective epilogue, Grice uses M to abbreviate Moore’s fairy godmother – along with G (Grice), A (Austin), R (Ryle) and Q (Quine)! One simple way to approach Grices quandary with Malcolm’s quandary with Moore is then to focus on know. How can Malcolm claim that Moore is guilty of misusing know? The most extensive exploration by Grice on know is in Grices third James lecture (but cf. his seminar on Knowledge and belief, and his remarks on some of our beliefs NEEDING to be true, in Meaning revisited. The examinee knows that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815. Nothing odd about that, nor about Moores uttering I know that these are my hands. Grice is perhaps the only one of the Oxonian philosophers of Austins play group who took common sense realsim so seriously, if only to crticise Malcoms zeal with it. For Grice, common-sense realism = ordinary language, whereas for the typical Austinian, ordinary language = the language of the man in the street. Back at Oxford, Grice uses Malcolm to contest the usual criticism that Oxford ordinary-language philosophers defend common-sense realist assumptions just because the way non-common-sense realist philosopher’s talk is not ordinary language, and even at Oxford. Cf. Flews reference to Joness philosophical verbal rubbish in using self as a noun. Grice is infuriated by all this unclear chatter, and chooses Malcolms mistreatment of Moore as an example. Grice is possibly fearful to consider Austins claims directly! In later essays, such as The learned and the lay, Grice goes back to the topic criticising now the scientists jargon as an affront to the ordinary language of the layman that Grice qua philosopher defends.

COMMUNICATION: This is the Peirce in Grice’s soul. Meaning provides an excellent springboard for Grice to centre his analysis on psychological or soul-y verbs as involving the agent and the first person: smoke only figuratively means fire, and the expression smoke only figuratively (or metabolically) means that there is fire. It is this or that utterer (say, Grice) who means, say, by uttering Where theres smoke theres fire, or ubi fumus, ibi ignis, that where theres smoke theres fire. A meantNN something by x, an utterance-token is (roughly) equivalent to utterer U intends the utterance of x to produce some effect in his addressee A by means of the recognition of this intention; and we may add that to ask what U means is to ask for a specification of the intended effect - though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a that-clause, for example, a belief that  He does provide a more specific example involving the that-clause at a later stage. By uttering x the utterer U means that-ψ­_b-dp iff (Ǝ.φ).(Ǝ.f).(Ǝ.c): I. U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ will think that (i) x has f  (ii) f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p (iii) (Ǝ.φ): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will think, via thinking (i) and (ii), that U ψ-s that p (iv) in view of (3), U ψ-s that p; and II (operative only for certain substituends for ψ_b-d). U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking (iv), himself ψ that p; and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will both (i) rely on E in coming to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p and (ii) think that (Ǝ.φ): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E. Besides St. John The Baptist, and Salome, Grice cites few Namess in Meaning. But he makes a point about Stevenson! For Stevenson, smoke means fire. Meaning develops out of an interest by Grice on the philosophy of Peirce. In his essays on Peirce, Grice quotes from many other authors, including, besides Peirce himself (!), Ogden, Richards, and Ewing, or A. C. Virtue is not a fire-shovel Ewing, as Grice calls him, and this or that cricketer. In the characteristic Oxonian fashion of a Lit. Hum., Grice has no intention to submit Meaning to publication. Publishing is vulgar. Bennett, however, guesses that Grice decides to publish it just a year after his Defence of a dogma. Bennett’s argument is that Defence of a dogma pre-supposes some notion of meaning. However, a different story may be told, not necessarily contradicting Bennetts. It is Strawson who submits the essay by Grice to The Philosophical Review. Strawson attends Grices talk on Meaning for The Oxford Philosophical Society, and likes it. Since In defence of a dogma was co-written with Strawson, the intention Bennett ascribes to Grice is Strawsons. Oddly, Strawson later provides a famous alleged counter-example to Grice on meaning in Intention and convention in speech acts, following J. O. Urmson’s earlier attack to the sufficiency of Grices analysans -- which has Grice dedicating a full James lecture (No. 5) to it. Urmsons case involved a tutee offering to buy Gardiner an expensive dinner, hoping that Gardiner will give him permission for an over-night visit to London. Gardiner knows that his tutee wants his permission. The appropriate analysans for "By offering to buy Gardiner an expensive dinner, the tuttee means that Gardiner should give him permission for an overnight stay in London" are fulfilled: (1) The tutee offers to buy Gardiner an expensive dinner with the intention of producing a certain response on the part of Gardiner (2) The tutee intends that Gardiner should recognize (know, think) that the tutee is offering to buy him an expensive dinner with the intention of producing this response; (3) The tutee intends that Gardiners recognition (thought) that the tutee has the intention mentioned in (2) should be at least part of Gardiners reason for producing the response mentioned. If in general to specify in (i) the nature of an intended response is to specify what was meant, it should be correct not only to say that by offering to buy Gardiner an expensive dinner, the tutee means that Gardiner is to give him permission for an overnight stay in London, but also to say that he meas that Gardiner should (is to) give him permission for an over-night visit to London. But in fact one would not wish to say either of these things; only that the tutee meant Gardiner to give him permission. A restriction seems to be required, and one which might serve to eliminate this range of counterexamples can be identified from a comparison of two scenarios. Grice goes into a tobacconists shop, ask for a packet of my favorite cigarettes, and when the unusually suspicious tobacconist shows that he wants to see the color of my money before he hands over the goods, I put down the price of the cigarettes on the counter. Here nothing has been meant. Alternatively, Grice goes to his regular tobacconist (from whom I also purchase other goods) for a packet of my regular brand of Players Navy Cuts, the price of which is distinctive (say 43p). I say nothing, but put down 43p. The tobacconist recognizes my need, and hands over the packet. Here, I think, by putting down 43p I meant something-Namesly, that I wanted a packet of Players Navy Cuts. I have at the same time provided an inducement. The distinguishing feature of the second example seems to be that here the tobacconist recognized, and was intended to recognize, what he was intended to do from my "utterance" (my putting down the money), whereas in the first example this was not the case. Nor is it the case with respect to Urmson’s case of the tutees attempt to bribe Gardiner. So one might propose that the analysis of meaning be amended accordingly. U means something by uttering x is true if: (i) U intends, by uttering x, to induce a certain response in A (2) U intends A to recognize, at least in part from the utterance of x, that U intends to produce that response (3) U intends the fulfillment of the intention mentioned in (2) to be at least in part As reason for fulfilling the intention mentioned in (i). While this might cope with Urmsons counterexample to Grices proposal in the Oxford Philosophical Society talk involving the tutee attempting to bribe Gardiner, there is Strawsons rat-infested house for which it is insufficient. An interesting fact, that confused a few, is that Hart quotes from Grices Meaning in his critical review of Holloway for The Philosophical Quarterly. Hart quotes Grice pre-dating the publication of Meaning. Harts point is that Holloway should have gone to Oxford! In Meaning, Grice may be seen as a practitioner of ordinary-language philosophy: witness his explorations of the factivity (alla know, remember, or see) or lack thereof of various uses of to mean. The second part of the essay, for which he became philosophically especially popular, takes up an intention-based approach to semantic notions. The only authority Grice cites, in typical Oxonian fashion, is, via Ogden and Barnes, Stevenson, who, from The New World (and via Yale, too!) defends an emotivist theory of ethics, and making a few remarks on how to mean is used, with scare quotes, in something like a causal account (Smoke means fire.). After its publication Grices account received almost as many alleged counterexamples as rule-utilitarianism (B. J. Harrison), but mostly outside Oxford, and in The New World. New-World philosophers seem to have seen Grices attempt as reductionist and as oversimplifying. At Oxford, the sort of counterexample Grice received, before Strawson, was of the Urmson-type: refined, and subtle. I think your account leaves bribery behind. On the other hand, in the New World ‒ in what Grice calls the Latter-Day School of Nominalism, Quine is having troubles with empiricism. Meaning was reprinted in various collections, notably in Strawsons Philosophical Logic (and it should be remembered that it was Strawson who had the thing typed and submitted for publication!). Why Meaning should be reprinted in a collection on Philosophical Logic only Strawson knows! But Grice does say that his account may help clarify the meaning of entails! It may be Strawsons implicature that Parkinson should have reprinted (and not merely credited) Grices Meaning in his s. for Oxford on The theory of meaning! The preferred quotation for Griceians is of course Grice 1948, seeing that Grice recalled the exact year when he gave the talk for the Philosophical Society at Oxford! It is however, the publication in The Philosophical Review, rather than the quieter evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, that occasioned a tirade of alleged counter-examples by New-World philosophers. Granted, one or two Oxonians ‒ Urmson and Strawson ‒ fell in! Urmson criticises the sufficiency of Grices account, by introducing an alleged counter-example involving bribery. Grice will consider a way out of Urmsons alleged counter-example in his fifth Wiliam James Lecture, rightly crediting and thanking Urmson for this! Strawsons alleged counter-example was perhaps slightly more serious, if regressive. It also involves the sufficiency of Grices analysis. Strawsons rat-infested house alleged counter-example started a chain which required Grice to avoid, ultimately, any sneaky intention by way of a recursive clause to the effect that, for utterer U to have meant that p, all meaning-constitutive intentions should be above board. But why this obsession by Grice with mean? He is being funny. Spots surely dont mean, only mean.They dont have a mind. Yet Grice opens with a specific sample. Those spots mean, to the doctor, that you, dear, have measles. Mean? Yes, dear, mean, doctors orders. Those spots mean measles. But how does the doctor know? Cannot he be in the wrong? Not really, mean is factive, dear! Or so Peirce thought. Grice is amazed that Peirce thought that some meaning is factive. The hole in this piece of cloth means that a bullet went through is is one of Peirce’s examples. Surely, as Grice notes, this is an unhappy example. The hole in the cloth may well have caused by something else, or fabricated. (Or the postmark means that the letter went through the post.) Yet, Grice was having Oxonian tutees aware that Peirce was krypto-technical. Grice chose for one of his pre-Meaning seminars (i.e. 1947) on Peirce’s general theory of signs, with emphasis on general, and Peirces correspondence with Welby. Peirce, rather than the Vienna circle, becomes, in vein with Grices dissenting irreverent rationalism, important as a source for Grices attempt to English Peirce. Grices implicature seems to be that Peirce, rather than Ayer, cared for the subtleties of meaning and sign, never mind a verificationist theory about them! Peirce ultra-Latinate-cum-Greek taxonomies have Grice very nervous, though. He knew that his students were proficient in the classics, but still! Grice thus proposes to reduce all of Peirceian divisions and sub-divisions (one sub-division too many) to mean. In the proceedings, he quotes from Ogden, Richards, and Ewing. In particular, Grice was fascinated by Peirces correspondence with Lady Viola Welby, as reprinted by Ogden/Richards in, well, their study on the meaning of meaning! Grice thought the science of symbolism pretentious, but then he almost thought Lady Viola Welby slightly pretentious, too, if youve seen her; beautiful lady! It is via Peirce that Grice explores examples such as those spots meaning measles. Peirce’s obsession is with weathercocks almost as Ockham was with circles on wine-barrels. Old-World Grices use of New-World Peirce is illustrative, thus, of the Oxonian linguistic turn focused on ordinary language. While Peirce’s background was not philosophical, Grice thought it comical enough. He would say that Peirce is an amateur, but then he said the same thing about Mill, whom Grice had to study by heart to get his B. A. Lit. Hum.! Plus, as Watson commented, Whats wrong with amateur? Give me an amateur philosopher ANY day, if I have to choose from professional Hegel! In finding Peirce krypo-technical, Grice is ensuing that his tutees, and indeed any Oxonian philosophy student (he was university lecturer) be aware that to mean should be more of a priority than this or that jargon by this or that (New World?) philosopher!? Partly! Grice wanted his students to think on their own, and draw their own conclusions! Grice cites Ewing, Ogden/Richards, and many others. Ewing, while Oxford-educated, had ended up at Cambridge (Scruton almost had him as his tutor) and written some points on Meaninglessness! Those spots mean measles. Grice finds Peirce krypto-technical and proposes to English him into an ordinary-language philosopher. Surely it is not important whether we consider a measles spot a sign, a symbol, or an icon. One might just as well find a doctor in London who thinks those spots symbolic. If Grice feels like Englishing Peirce, he does not altogether fail! 1957. Meaning, reprints, of Meaning and other essays, a collection of reprints and offprints of Grices essays. Meaning becomes a central topic of at least two strands in Retrospective epilogue. The first strand concerns the idea of the centrality of the utterer. What Grice there calls meaning BY (versus meaning TO), i.e. as he also puts it, active or agents meaning. Surely he is right in defending an agent-based account to meaning. Peirce need not, but Grice must, because he is working with an English root, mean, that is only figurative applicable to non-agentive items (Smoke means rain). On top, Grice wants to conclude that only a rational creature (a person) can meanNN properly. Non-human animals may have a correlate. This is a truly important point for Grice since he surely is seen as promoting a NON-convention-based approach to meaning, and also defending from the charge of circularity in the non-semantic account of propositional attitudes. His final picture is a rationalist one. Pirot₁ G wants to communicate about a danger to Pirot₂. This presupposes there IS a danger (item of reality). Then Pirot₁ G believes there is a danger, and communicates to Pirot₂ G2 that there is a danger. This simple view of conversation as rational co-operation underlies Grices account of meaning too, now seen as an offshoot of philosophical psychology, and indeed biology, as he puts it. Meaning as yet another survival mechanism. While he would never use a cognate like significance in his Oxford Philosophical Society talk, Grice eventually starts to use such Latinate cognates at a later stage of his development. In Meaning, Grice does not explain his goal. By sticking with a root that the Oxford curriculum did not necessarily recognised as philosophical (amateur Peirce did!), Grice is implicating that he is starting an ordinary-language botanising on his own repertoire! Grice was amused by Ewings reliance on very Oxonian examples contra Freddie Ayer: Surely Virtue aint a fire-shovel is perfectly meaningful, and if fact true, if, Ill admit, somewhat misleading and practically purposeless at Cambridge. Again, Grices dismissal of natural meaning is due to the fact that natural meaning prohibits its use in the first person and followed by a that-clause. I mean-N that p sounds absurd, no communication-function seems in the offing. Grice found, with Suppes, all types of primacy (ontological, axiological, psychological) in utterers meaning. In Retrospective epilogue, he goes back to the topic, as he reminisces that it is his suggestion that there are two allegedly distinguishable meaning concepts, even if one is meta-bolical, which may be called natural meaning and non-natural meaning. There is this or that test (notably factivity-entailment vs. cancelation, but also scare quotes) which may be brought to bear to distinguish one concept from the other. We may, for example, inquire whether a particular occurrence of the predicate mean is factive or non-factive, i. e., whether for it to be true that [so and so] means that p, it does or does not have to be the case that it is true that p. Again, one may ask whether the use of quotation marks to enclose the specification of what is meant would be inappropriate or appropriate. If factivity (as in know, remember, and see) is present and quotation marks (oratio recta) are be inappropriate, we have a case of natural meaning. Otherwise the meaning involved is non-natural meaning. We may now ask whether there is a single overarching idea which lies behind both members of this dichotomy of uses to which the predicate meaning that seems to be Subjects. If there is such a central idea it might help to indicate to us which of the two concepts is in greater need of further analysis and elucidation and in what direction such elucidation should proceed. Grice confesses that he has only fairly recently come to believe that there is such an overarching idea and that it is indeed of some service in the proposed inquiry. The idea behind both uses of mean is that of consequence, or consequentia, as Hobbes has it. If [x] means that p, something which includes p or the idea of p, is a consequence of [x]. In the metabolic natural use of meaning that p, p, this or that consequence, is this or that state of affairs. In the literal, non-metabolic, basic, non-natural use of meaning that p, (as in Smith means that his neighbour’s three-year child is an adult), p, this or that consequence is this or that conception or complexus which involves some other conception. This perhaps suggests that of the two concepts it is, as it should, non-natural meaning which is more in need of further elucidation. It seems to be the more specialised of the pair, and it also seems to be the less determinate. We may, e. g., ask how this or that conception enters the picture. Or we may ask whether what enters the picture is the conception itself or its justifiability. On these counts Grice should look favorably on the idea that, if further analysis should be required for one of the pair, the notion of non-natural meaning would be first in line. There are factors which support the suitability of further analysis for the concept of non-natural meaning. Meaning_NN that p (non-natural meaning) does not look as if it Namess an original feature of items in the world, for two reasons which are possibly not mutually independent. One reason is that, given suitable background conditions, meaning, can be changed by fiat. The second reason is that the presence of meaning_NN is dependent on a framework provided by communication, if that is not too circular.  Communication is in the philosophical lexicon, commūnĭcātĭo, from communicare, "(several times in Cicero, elsewhere rare), and as they did with negatio and they will with significatio, Short and Lewis render, unhelpfully, as a making common, imparting, communicating. largitio et communicatio civitatis (Cic. Balb. 13, 31), quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum, id. Fin. 5, 23, 65: consilii communicatio, id. Fam. 5, 19, 2: communicatio sermonis, id. Att. 1, 17, 6: criminis cum pluribus, Tiro ap. Gell. 7, 3, 14: communicatio nominum, i. e. the like appellation of several objects, Plin. 24, 14, 80, § 129: juris, Dig. 23, 2, 1: damni, ib. 27, 3, 1, § 14. In rhetorics, communicatio, trading on the communis, a figure, translating Grecian ἀνακοίνωσις, in accordance with which the utterer turns to his addressee, and, as it were, allows him to take part in the inquiry, Cic. de Or. 3, 53, 204; Quint. 9, 1, 30; 9, 2, 20 and 23. It seems to Grice, then, at least reasonable and possibly even emphatically mandatory, to treat the claim that a communication vehicle, such as this and that expression means that p, in this transferred, metaphoric, or meta-bolic use of means that as being reductively analysable in terms of this or that feature of this or that utterer, communicator, or user of this or that expression. The use of meaning that  as applied to this or that expression is posterior to and explicable through the utterer-oriented, or utterer-relativised use, i.e. involving a reference to this or that communicator or user of this or that expression. More specifically, one should license a metaphorical use of mean, where one allows the claim that this or that expression means that p, provided that this or that utterer, in this or that standard fashion, means that p, i.e. in terms of this or that souly statee toward this or that propositional complexus this or that utterer ntends, in a standardly fashion, to produce by his uttering this or that utterance. That this or that expression means (in this metaphorical use) that p is thus explicable either in terms of this or that souly state which is standardly intended to produce in this or that addressee A by this or that utterer of this or that expression, or in this or that souly staken up by this or that utterer toward this or that activity or action of this or that utterer of this or that expression. Meaning was in the air in Oxfords linguistic turn. Everybody was talking meaning. Grice manages to quote from Hares early “Mind” essay on the difference between imperatives and indicatives, also Duncan-Jones on the fugitive proposition,  and of course his beloved Strawson. Grice was also concerned by the fact that in the typical ordinary-language philosophers manoeuvre, there is a constant abuse of mean. Surely Grice wants to stick with the utterers meaning as the primary use. Expressions mean only derivatively. To do that, he chose Peirce to see if he could clarify it with meaning that. Grice knew that the polemic was even stronger in London, with Ogden and Lady Viola Welby. In the more academic Oxford milieu, Grice knew that a proper examination of meaning, would lead him, via Kneale and his researches on the history of semantics, to the topic of signification that obsessed the modistae (and their modus significandi). For what does L and S say about about this? There is indeed an entry for signĭfĭcātĭo, f. significare. L and S render it, unhelpfully, as “a pointing out, indicating, denoting, signifying; an expression, indication, mark, sign, token, = indicium, signum, ἐπισημασία, etc., freq. and class. As with Stevenson’s ‘communico,’ Grice goes sraight to ‘signĭfĭco,’ also dep.  signĭfĭcor (Gell. 18, 12, 10, without an example), f. ‘significare,’ from signum-facere, to make sign, signum-facio, I make sign, which L and S render as to signify, which is perhaps not too helpful. Grice, if not the Grecians, knew that. Strictly, L and S render significare as to show by signs; to show, point out, express, publish, make known, indicate; to intimate, notify, signify, etc. Note that the cognate signify almost comes last, but not least, if not first. Enough to want to coin a word to do duty for them all. Which is what Grice (and the Grecians) can, but the old Romans cannot, with mean. If that above were not enough, L and S go on, also, to betoken, prognosticate, foreshow, portend, MEAN (syn. praedico), as in to betoken a change of weather (post-Aug.): “ventus Africus tempestatem significat, etc.,” Col. 11, 2, 4 sq.: cf. Grice on those dark clouds mean a storm is coming.  Short and Lewis go on, to say that significare may be rendered as to call, name; to mean, import, signify. Hence, ‘signĭfĭcans,’ in rhet. lang., of speech, full of meaning, expressive, significant; graphic, distinct, clear: Adv.: signĭfĭcanter , clearly, distinctly, expressly, significantly, graphically: “breviter ac significanter ordinem rei protulisse,” Quint. 11, 1, 53: “rem indicare (with proprie),” id. 12, 10, 52: “dicere (with ornate),” id. 1, 7, 32. Comp.: “apertius, significantius dignitatem alicujus defendere,” Cic. Fam. 3, 12, 3: “narrare,” Quint. 10, 1, 49: “disponere,” id. 3, 6, 65: “appellare aliquid (with consignatius),” Gell. 1, 25, 8: “dicere (with probabilius),” id. 17, 2, 11. Sup., Pseudo Quint. Decl. 247. If perhaps Grice was unhappy about the artificial flavour to saying that a word is a sign, Grice surely should have checked with all the Grecian-Roman cognates of mean, as in his favourite memorative-memorable distinction, and the many Grecian realisations, or with Old Roman mentire and mentare.  mentĭor, f. mentire, L and S note, is prob. from root men-, whence mens and memini, q. v. The original meaning, they say, is to invent,  hence, but alla Umberto Eco with sign, mentire comes to mean in later use what Grice (if not the Grecians) holds is the opposite of mean. Short and Lewis render mentire as to lie, cheat, deceive, etc., to pretend, to declare falsely: mentior nisi or si mentior, a form of asseveration, I am a liar, if, etc.: But also, animistically (modest mentalism?) of things, as endowed with a mind. L and S go on: to deceive, impose upon, to deceive ones self, mistake, to lie or speak falsely about, to assert falsely, make a false promise about; to feign, counterfeit, imitate a shape, nature, etc.: to devise a falsehood,  to assume falsely,  to promise falsely, to invent, feign, of a poetical fiction: “ita mentitur (sc. Homerus),  Trop., of inanim. grammatical Subjects, as in Semel fac illud, mentitur tua quod subinde tussis, Do what your cough keeps falsely promising, i. e. die, Mart. 5, 39, 6. Do what your cough means! =imp. die!; hence, mentĭens,  a fallacy, sophism: quomodo mentientem, quem ψευδόμενον vocant, dissolvas, Cic. Div. 2, 4, 11, mentītus, imitated, counterfeit, feigned (poet.): “mentita tela,” Verg. A. 2, 422. For “mentior,” indeed, there is a Griceian implicatum involving rational control. The rendition of mentire as to lie stems from a figurative shift from to be mindful, or inventive, to have second thoughts" to "to lie, conjure up". But Grice would also have a look at cognate “memini,” since this is also cognate with “mind,” “mens,” and covers subtler instances of mean, as in Latinate, “mention,” as in Grices “use-mention” distinction. mĕmĭni, cognate with "mean" and German "meinen," to think = Grecian ὑπομένειν, await (cf. Schiffer, "remnants of meaning," if I think, I hesitate, and therefore re-MAIN. Cf. Gr. μεν- in μένω, Μέντωρ; μαν- in μαίνομαι, μάντις; μνᾶ- in μιμνήσκω, etc.; cf.: maneo, or manere, as in remain. The idea, as Schiffer well knows or means, being that if you think, you hesitate, and therefore, wait and remain], moneo, reminiscor [cf. reminiscence], mens, Minerva, etc. which L and S render as “to remember, recollect, to think of, be mindful of a thing; not to have forgotten a person or thing, to bear in mind (syn.: reminiscor, recordor).” Surely with a relative clause, and to make mention of, to mention a thing, either in speaking or writing (rare but class.). Hence. mĕmĭnens, mindful And then Grice would have a look at moneo, as in adMONish, also cognate. mŏnĕo, monere, causative from the root "men;" whence memini, q. v., mens (mind), mentio (mention); lit. to cause to think, to re-mind, put in mind of, bring to ones recollection; to admonish, advise, warn, instruct, teach (syn.: hortor, suadeo, doceo). L and S are Griceian if not Grecian when they note that monere can be used "without the accessory notion [implicatum or entanglement, that is] of reminding or admonishing, in gen., to teach, instruct, tell, inform, point out; also, to announce, predict, foretell, even if also to punish, chastise (only in Tacitus): “puerili verbere moneri,” Tac. A. 5, 9.  And surely, since he loved to re-minisced, Grice would have allowed to just earlier on just minisced. Short and Lewis indeed have rĕmĭniscor, which, as they point out, features the root men; whence mens, memini; and which they compare to comminiscere, v. comminiscor, to recall to mind, recollect, remember (syn. recordor), often used by the Old Romans  with with Grices beloved that-clause, for sure. For what is the good of reminiscing or comminiscing, if you cannot reminisce that Austin always reminded Grice that skipping the dictionary was his big mistake! If Grice uses mention, cognate with mean, he loved commenting Aristotle. And commentare is, again, cognate with mean. As opposed to the development of the root in Grecian, or English, in Roman the root for mens is quite represented in many Latinate cognates. But a Roman, if not a Grecian, would perhaps be puzzled by a Grice claiming, by intuition, to retrieve the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of this or that expression. When the Roman is told that the Griceian did it for fun, he understands, and joins in the fun! Indeed, hardly a natural kind in the architecture of the world, but one that fascinated Grice and the Grecian philosophers before him!

DISPOSITION: Grice is a philosophical psychologist. Does that make sense? So are Austin (Other Minds), Hampshire (Dispositions), Pears (Problems in philosophical psychology) and Urmson (Parentheticals). They are ALL against Ryle’s silly analysis in terms of single-track disposition" vs. "many-track disposition," and "semi-disposition." If I hum and walk, I can either hum or walk. But if I heed mindfully, while an IN-direct sensing may guide me to YOUR soul, a DIRECT sensing guides me to MY soul. When Ogden consider attacks to meaning, theres what he calls the psychological, which he ascribes to Locke Grices attitude towards Ryle is difficult to assess. His most favourable assessment comes from Retrospective epilogue, but then he is referring to Ryle’s fairy godmother. Initially, he mentions Ryle as a philosopher engaged in, and possibly dedicated to the practice of the prevailing Oxonian methodology, i.e. ordinary-language philosophy. Initially, then, Grice enlists Ryle in the regiment of ordinary-language philosophers. After introducing Athenian dialectic and Oxonian dialectic, Grice traces some parallelisms, which should not surprise. It is tempting to suppose that Oxonian dialectic reproduces some ideas of Athenian dialectic.  It would actually be surprising if there were no parallels. Ryle was, after all, a skilled and enthusiastic student of Grecian philosophy. Interestingly, Grice then has Ryles fairy godmother as proposing the idea that, far from being a basis for rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction, opposition that there are initially two distinct bundles of statements, bearing the labels analytic and synthetic, lying around in the world of thought waiting to be noticed, provides us with the key to making the analytic-synthetic distinction acceptable. The essay has a verificationist ring to it. Recall Ayer and the verificationists trying to hold water with concepts like fragile and the problem of counterfactual conditionals vis-a-vis observational and theoretical concepts. Grices essay has two parts: one on disposition as such, and the second, the application to a type of psychological disposition, which would be phenomenalist in a way, or verificationist, in that it derives from introspection of, shall we say, empirical phenomena. Grice is going to analyse, I want a sandwich. One person wrote in his manuscript, there is something with the way Grice goes to work. Still. Grice says that I want a sandwich (or I will that I eat a sandwich) is problematic, for analysis, in that it seems to refer to experience that is essentially private and unverifiable. An analysis of intending that p in terms of being disposed that p is satisfied solves this. Smith wants a sandwich, or he wills that he eats a sandwich, much as Toby needs nuts, if Smith opens the fridge and gets one. Smith is disposed to act such that p is satisfied. This Grice opposes to the ‘special-episode’ analysis of intending that p. An utterance like I want a sandwich iff by uttering the utterance, the utterer is describing this or that private experience, this or that private sensation. This or that sensation may take the form of a highly specific souly sate, like what Grice calls a sandwich-wanting-feeling. But then, if he is not happy with the privacy special-episode analysis, Grice is also dismissive of Ryles behaviourism in The concept of mind, fresh from the press in 1949, which would describe the utterance in terms purely of this or that observable response, or behavioural output, provided this or that sensory input. Grice became friendlier with functionalism after Lewis taught him how.  The problem or crunch is with the first person. Surely, Grice claims, one does not need to wait to observe oneself heading for the fridge before one is in a position to know that he is hungry.  Grice poses a problem for the protocol-reporter. You see or observe someone else, Smith, that Smith wants a sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich. You ask for evidence. But when it is the agent himself who wants the sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich, Grice melodramatically puts it, I am not in the audience, not even in the front row of the stalls; I am on the stage. Genial, as you will agree. Grice then goes on to offer an analysis of intend, his basic and target attitude, which he has just used to analyse and rephrase Peirces mean and which does relies on this or that piece of dispositional evidence, without divorcing itself completely from the privileged status or access of first-person introspective knowledge. In Intention and uncertainty, Grice weakens his reductive analysis of intending that, from neo-Stoutian, based on certainty, or assurance, to neo-Prichardian, based on predicting. All very Oxonian: Stout was the sometime Wilde reader in mental philosophy (a post usually held by a psychologist, rather than a philosopher ‒ Stouts favourite philosopher is psychologist James! ‒ and Prichard was Cliftonian and the proper White chair of moral philosophy. And while in Intention and uncertainty, he allows that willing that may receive a physicalist treatment, qua state, hell later turn a functionalist in his Method in philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre). Grice can easily relate to Hamsphires "Thought and Action," a most influential essay in the Oxonian scene. Rather than Ryle! And Grice actually addresses further topics on intention drawing on Hampshire, Hart, and his joint collaboration with Pears. 

SEMIOTICS: 1951 was a vintage year at Oxford. Holloway published his “Language and Intelligence”! It is best to see this as Grices psychologism. Grice would rarely use ‘intelligent,’ less so the more pretentious, ‘intelligence,’ as a keyword. If he is doing it, it is because what he saw as the misuse of it by Ryle and Holloway. Holloway, a PPE, is a tutorial fellow in philosophy at All Souls. He acknowledges Ryle as his mentor. (Holloway also quotes from Austin). Grice was amused that J. N. Findlay, in his review of Holloway’s essay in “Mind,” compares Holloway to C. W. Morris, and cares to cite the two relevant essay by Morris: The Foundation in the theory of signs, and Signs, Language, and Behaviour. Enough for Grice to feel warmly justified in having chosen another New-World author, Peirce, for his earlier Oxford seminar. Morris studied under G. H. Mead. But is ‘intelligence’ part of The Griceian Lexicon?Well, Lewis and Short have ‘interlegere,’ to chose between. The entry is ‘interlĕgo , lēgi, lectum, 3, v. a., I’. Lewis and Short render it as “to cull or pluck off here and there (poet. and postclass.).in tmesi) uncis Carpendae manibus frondes, interque legendae, Verg. G. 2, 366: “poma,” Pall. Febr. 25, 16; id. Jun. 5, 1.intellĕgo (less correctly intellĭgo), exi, ectum (intellexti for intellexisti, Ter. Eun. 4, 6, 30; Cic. Att. 13, 32, 3: I.“intellexes for intellexisses,” Plaut. Cist. 2, 3, 81; subj. perf.: “intellegerint,” Sall. H. Fragm. 1, 41, 23 Dietsch), 3, v. a. inter-lego, to see into, perceive, understand. I. Lit. A. Lewis and Short render as “to perceive, understand, comprehend.”Cf. Grice on his handwriting being legible to few. And The child is an adult as being UNintelligible until the creature is produced. In Aspects of reason, he mentions flat rationality, and certain other talents that are more difficult for the philosopher to conceptualise, such as nose (i.e. intuitiveness), acumen, tenacity, and such. Grices approach is pirotological. If Locke had used intelligent to refer to Prince Maurices parrot, Grice wants to find criteria for intelligent as applied to his favourite type of pirot, rather (intelligent, indeed rational.)

PINT: Figurative. This is Harvardite Gordon’s attempt to formulate a philosophy of the minimum fundamental ideas that all people on the earth should come to know. Reviewed by A. M. Honoré: Short measure. Gordon, a Stanley Plummer scholar, e: Bowdoin and Harvard (The Eastern Gazette). Grice would exclaim: I always loved Alfred Brooks Gordon! Grice was slightly disapppointed that Gordon had not included the fundamental idea of implicature in his pint. Short measure, indeed!

ESCHATOLOGY: Being and good, for Aristotle and Grice cover all. Good was a favourite of Moore and Hare, as Barnes was well aware! Like Barnes, Grice dislikes Prichards analysis of good. He leaned towards the emotion-based approach by Ogden. If Grice, like  Humpty Dumpty, opposes the Establishment with his meaning liberalism (what a word means is what I mean by uttering it), he certainly should be concerned with category shifts. Plus, Grice was a closet Platonist. As Plato once remarked, having the ability to see horses but not horsehood is a mark of stupidity. Grice would endure the flinty experience of giving joint seminars at Oxford with Austin on the first two books of Aristotles Organon, Categoriae, and De Int. . Grice finds Aristotles use of a category,  κατηγορία, a bit of a geniality. Aristotle is using legalese, from kata, against, on, and agoreuô [ἀγορεύω], speak in public), and uses it to designate both the prosecution in a trial and the attribution in a logical proposition, i. e., the questions that must be asked with regard to a Subjects, and the answers that can be given. As a representative of the linguistic turn in philosophy, Grice is attracted to the idea that a category can thus be understood variously, as applying to the realm of reality (ontology), but also to the philosophy of language (category of expression) and to philosophical psychology (category of representation). Grice kept his explorations on categories under two very separate, shall we say, categories: his explorations with Austin (very serious), and those with Strawson (more congenial). Where is Smiths altruism? Nowhere to be seen. Should we say it is idle (otiose) to speak of altruism? No, it is just an attribute, which, via category shift, can be made the Subjects of your sentence, Strawson. Its not spatio-temporal, though, right? Not really.  ‒ I dont particularly like your trouser words. The essay is easy to date since Grice notes that Strawson reproduced some of the details in his Individuals, dated 1959. Grice thought Aristotle was the best! Or at any rate almost as good as Kantotle! Aristotle saw Categoriæ, along with De Int.  as part of his Organon. However, philosophers of language tend to explore these topics without a consideration of the later parts of the Organon dealing with the syllogism, the tropes, and the topics ‒ the boring bits! The reason Grice is attracted to the Aristotelian category (as Austin and Strawson equally were) is that category allows for a linguistic-turn reading. Plus, its a nice, pretentious (in the Oxonian way) piece of philosophical jargon! Aristotle couldnt find category in the koine, so he had to coin it. While meant by Aristotle in a primarily ontological way, Oxonian philosophers hasten to add that a category of expression, as Grice puts it, is just as valid a topic for philosophical exploration. His tutee Strawson will actually publish a book on Subjects and predicate in grammar! (Trivial, Strawson!). Grice will later add an intermediary category, which is the Subjects of his philosophical psychology. As such, a category can be construed ontologically, or representationally: the latter involving philosophical psychological concepts, and expressions themselves. For Aristotle, as Grice and Austin, and Grice and Strawson, were well aware as they educated some of the poor at Oxford (Only the poor learn at Oxford ‒ Arnold), there are (at least  ‒ at most?) ten categories. Grice doesnt (really) care about the number. But the first are important. Actually the very first: theres substantia prima, such as Grice. And then theres substantia secunda, such as Grices rationality. The essentia. Then there are various types of attributes. But, as Grice sharply notes, even substantia secunda may be regarded as an attribute. Grices favourite game with Strawson was indeed Category Shift, or Subjects-ification, as Strawson preferred. Essence may be introduced as a sub-type of an attribute. We would have substantia prima AND attribute, which in turn gets divided into essential, the izzing, and non-essential, the hazzing. While Austin is not so fun to play with, Strawson is. Smith is a very altruist person. Where is his altruism? Nowhere to be seen, really. Yet we may sensically speak of Smiths altruism. Its just a matter of a category shift. Grice scores. Grice is slightly disappointed, but he perfectly understands, that Strawson, who footnotes  Grice as the tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about logic in Introduction to logical lheory, fails to acknowledge that most of the research in Strawsons Individuals: an essay in descriptive (not revisionary) metaphysics derives from the conclusions reached at his joint philosophical investigations at joint seminars with Grice. Grice later elaborates on this with Code, who is keen on Grices other game, The hazz and the hazz not, the izz. But then tutor from whom I never ceased to learn about metaphysics sounds slightlier clumsier, as far as the implicature goes. Categories, 1973, 1974, 1977, 1980, the Grice-Myro theory of identity, Relative identity, Grice on =, identity, notes, with Myro, metaphysics, philosophy, with Code, Grice izz Grice – or izz he? The idea that = is unqualified requires qualification. Whitehead and Russell ignored this. Grice and Myro didnt. Grice wants to allow for It is the case that a = b /t1 and  It is not the case that a = b /t2. The idea is intuitive, but philosophers of a Leibnizian bent are too accustomed to deal with = as an absolute. Grice applies this to human vs. person. A human may be identical to a person, but cease to be so. Indeed, Grices earlier attempt to produce a reductive analsysis of I may be seen as remedying a circularity he detected in Locke about same. Cf. Wiggins, Sameness and substance. Grice makes Peano feel deeply Griceian, as Grice lists his = postulates, here for consideration. And if you wondered why Grice prefers Latinate individuum to the Grecian, heres the Grecian,   ἄτομον, in logic, rendered by L and S as individual, of terms, Pl. Sph. 229d; of the εἶδος or forma, Arist. Metaph.1034a8, de An. 414b27.2. individual, Id. APo. 96b11, al.: as a subst., τό ἄτομον, Id. Cat. 1b6, 3a38, Metaph.1058a18 (pl.), Plot. 6.2.2, al. subst.; latinised from Grecian as indīvĭdŭum, an atom, indivisible particle: ex illis individuis, unde omnia Democritus gigni affirmat, Cic. Ac. 2, 17 fin.: ne individuum quidem, nec quod dirimi distrahive non possit, id. N. D. 3, 12, 29. Note the use of individuum in alethic modalities for necessity and possibility, starting with (11). 1. ⊢ (α izzes α). This would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. Grice applies it to war: War is war, as yielding a most peculiar implicature. 2. ⊢ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes γ) ⊃ α izzes γ. This above is transitivity, which is crucial for Grices tackling of Reids counterexample to Locke (and which according to Flew in Locke on personal identity was predated by Berkeley. 3. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃ ~(α izzes β). Or, what is accidental is not essential. Grice allows that what is essential is accidental is, while misleading, true. 4. ⊢ α hazzes β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β) 5. ⊢ (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes a forma). This above defines a universalium as a forma, or eidos. 6. ⊢ (α hazzes β ∧ α izzes a particular) ⊃ (∃γ).(γ≠α ∧ α izzes β) 7. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) 8. ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α 9. ⊢ α izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) 10. ⊢ α = β ⊃⊂ α izzes β ∧ β izzes α 11. ⊢ α izzes an individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α izzes β) 12. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β izzes α)) 13. ⊢ α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β izzes α) 14. ⊢ α izzes some-thing ⊃ α izzes an individuum. 15. ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium) 16. ⊢ α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x izzes α) 17. ⊢ α izzes essentially predicable of α 18. ⊢ α izzes accidentally predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β 19. ⊢ ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of β) ⊃ α ≠ β 20. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum 21. ⊢ α izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) 22. ⊢~ (∃x).(x izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma) 23. ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α) 24. ⊢ x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izz β) 25. ⊢ α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β hazz α) 26. ⊢ α izzes a forma ∧ β izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazz A) 27. ⊢ (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ izzes essentially predicable of α) 28. ⊢ (∃x) (∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing) 29. ⊢ (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing) 30. ⊢ α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β izzes essentially predicable of α) 31. ⊢ (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β)⊃ α izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. The use of this or that doxastic modality, necessity and possibility, starting with (11) above, make this a good place to consider one philosophical mistake Grice mentions in Causal theory: What is actual is not also possible. Cf. What is essential is also accidental. He is criticising a contemporary, if possible considered dated in the New World, form of ordinary-language philosophy, where the philosopher detects a nuance, and embarks risking colliding with the facts, rushing ahead to exploit it before he can clarify it! Grice liked to see his explorations on = as belonging to metaphysics, as the s.  on his Doctrines at the Grice Collection testifies. While Grice presupposes the use of = in his treatment of the king of France, he also explores a relativisation of =. His motivation was an essay by Wiggins, almost Aristotelian in spirit, against Strawsons criterion of space-time continuancy for the identification of the substantia prima. Grice wants to apply = to cases were the time continuancy is made explicit. This yields that a=b in scenario S, but that it may not be the case that a = b in a second scenario S. Myro had an occasion to expand on Grices views in his contribution on the topic for PGRICE, or P. G. R. I. C. E. for short. Myro mentions his System Ghp, a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of Grices System Q, in gratitude to to Grice. Grice explored also the logic of izzing and hazzing with Code. Grice and Myro developed a Geach-type of qualified identity. The formal aspects were developed by Myro, and also by Code. Grice discussed Wigginss Sameness and substance, rather than Geach. Cf. Wiggins and Strawson on Grice for the British Academy. At Oxford, Grice was more or less given free rein to teach what he wanted. He found the New World slightly disconcerting at first. At Oxford, he expected his tutees to be willing to read the classics in the vernacular Greek. His approach to teaching was diagogic, as Socratess! Even in his details of izzing and hazzing. Greek enough to me!, as a student recalled! 1980, correspondence with Code, Grice sees in Code an excellent Aristotelian. They collaborated on an exploration of Aristotles underlying logic of essential and non-essential predication, for which they would freely use such verbal forms as izzing and hazzing. 1980, izzing and hazzing, Code on the significance of the middle book in Aristotles Met. , Aristotle, metaphysics, the middle book. Very middle. Grice never knew what was middle for Aristotle, but admired Code too much to air this! The organisation of Aristotles metaphysics was a topic of much concern for Grice. With Code, Grice coined izzing and hazzing to refer to essential and non-essential attribution. Izzing and hazzing, Aristotle on the multiplicity of being, Aristotle on multiplicity, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1988, posthumously ed. by Loar, Aristotle, multiplicity, izzing, hazzing, being, good, Code. Grice offers a thorough discussion of Owens treatment of Aristotle as leading us to the snares of ontology. Grice distinguishes between izzing and hazzing, which he thinks help in clarifying, more axiomatico, what Aristotle is getting at with his remarks on essential versus non-essential predication. Surely, for Grice, being, nor indeed good, should not be multiplied beyond necessity, but izzing and hazzing are already multiplied. The Grice Papers contains drafts of the essay eventually submitted for publication by Loar in memoriam Grice. Note that the Grice Papers contains a typically Griceian un-publication, entitled Aristotle and multiplicity simpliciter. Rather than Aristotle on, as the title for The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly piece goes. Note also that, since its multiplicity simpliciter, it refers to Aristotle on two key ideas: being and the good. As Code notes in his contribution to PGRICE, Grice first presents his thoughts on izzing and hazzing publicly at Vancouver. R. B. Jones has developed the axiomatic treatment favoured by Grice. For Grice there is multiplicity in both being and good (ton agathon), both accountable in terms of conversational implicata, of course. If in Prolegomena, Grice was interested in criticising himself, in essays of historical nature like these, Grice is seeing Aristotles Athenian dialectic as a foreshadow of the Oxonian dialectic, and treating him as an equal. Grice is yielding his razor: senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. But then Aristotle is talking about the multiplicity of  is  and  is good. Surely, there are ways to turn Aristotle into the monoguist he has to be! There is a further item in the Grice collection that combines Aristotle on being with Aristotle on good, which is relevant in connection with this.  Aristotle on being and good (ἀγαθόν). Aristotle, being, good (agathon), ἀγαθός. As from this f., the essays are ordered alphabetically, starting with Aristotle, Grice will explore Aristotle on being or is and good (ἀγαθός) in explorations with Code. Grice comes up with izzing and hazzing as the two counterparts to Aristotles views on, respectively, essential and non-essential predication. Grices views on Aristotle on the good (strictly, there is no need to restrict Arisstotles use to the neuter form, since he employs ἀγαθός) connect with Grices Aristotelian idea of eudaemonia, that he explores elsewhere. Strictly: Aristotle on being and the good. If that had been Grices case, he would have used the definite article. Otherwise, good may well translate as masculine, ἀγαθός ‒the agathetic implicatum.  He plays with Dodgson, cabbages and kings. For what is a good cabbage as opposed to a cabbage? It does not require very sharp eyes, but only our willingness to use the eyes one has, to see that speech is permeated with the notion of purpose. To say what a certain kind of thing is is only too frequently partly to say that it is for. This feature applies to talk of, e. g., ships, shoes, sailing wax, and kings; and, possibly and perhaps most excitingly, it extends even to cabbages! Although Grice suspects Urmson might disagree. v. Grice on Urmsons apples. Grice at his jocular best. If he is going to be a Kantian, he will. He uses Kantian jargon to present his theory of conversation. This he does only at Harvard. The implicature being that talking of vaguer assumptions of helpfulness would not sound too convincing. So he has the maxim, the super-maxim, and the sub-maxim. A principle and a maxim is Kantian enough. But when he actually echoes Kant, is when he introduces what he later calls the conversational categories – the keyword here is conversational category, as categoria is used by Aristotle and Kant  ‒ or Kantotle. Grice surely knew that, say, his Category of Conversational Modality had nothing to do with the Kantian Category of Modality. Still, he stuck with the idea of four categories (versus Aristotles ten, eight or seven, as the text you consult may tell you): category of conversational quantity (which at Oxford he had formulated in much vaguer terms like strength and informativeness and entailment), the category of conversational quality (keyword: principle of conversational trust), and the category of conversational relation, where again Kants relation has nothing to do with the maxim Grice associates with this category. In any case, his Kantian joke may be helpful when considering the centrality of the concept category simpliciter that Grice had to fight with with his pupils at Oxford – he was lucky to have Austin and Strawson as co-lecturers! Grice was irritated by L and S defining kategoria as category. I guess I knew that. He agreed with their second shot, predicable. Ultimately, Grices concern with category is his concern with person, or prote ousia, as used by Aristotle, and as giving a rationale to Grices agency-based approach to the philosophical enterprise. Aristotle used kategorein in the sense of to predicate, assert something of something, and kategoria. The prote ousia is exemplified by o tis anthropos. It is obvious that Grice wants to approach Aristotles semantics and Aristotles metaphysics at one fell swoop. Grice reads Aristotles Met. , and finds it understandable. Consider the adjective French (which Aristotle does NOT consider) ‒ as it occurs in phrases such as Michel Foucault is a French citizen.  Grice is not a French citizen. Michel Foucault once wrote a nice French poem.  Urmson once wrote a nice French essay on pragmatics. Michel Foucault was a French professor.  Michel Foucault is a French professor.  Michel Foucault is a French professor of philosophy. The following features are perhaps significant. The appearance of the adjective French, or Byzantine, as the case might be  ‒ cf. Im feeling French tonight) in these phrases is what Grice has as adjunctive rather than conjunctive, or attributive. A French poem is not necessarily something which combines the separate features of being a poem and being French, as a tall philosopher would simply combine the features of being tall and of being a philosopher. French in French poem, occurs adverbially. French citizen standardly means citizen of France. French poem standardly means poem in French. But it is a mistake to suppose that this fact implies that there is this or that meaning, or, worse, this or that Fregeian sense, of the expression French.  In any case, only metaphorically or metabolically can we say that French means this or that or has sense. An utterer means. An utterer makes sense. Cf. R. Pauls doubts about capitalizing major. French means, and figuratively at that, only one thing, viz. of or pertaining to France. And English only means of or pertaining to England.  French may be what Grice (unfollowing his remarks on The general theory of context) call context-sensitive. One might indeed say, if you like, that while French means ‒ or means only this or that, or that its only sense is this or that, French still means, again figuratively, a variety of things. French means-in-context of or pertaining to France. Symbolise that as expression E means-in-context that p. Expression E means-in-context C₂ that p₂. Relative to Context C₁ French means of France; as in the phrase French citizen. Relative to context C₂, French means  in the French language, as in the phrase, French poem ‒ whereas history does not behave, like this. Whether the focal item is a universal or a particular is, contra Aristotle, quite irrelevant to the question of what this or that related adjective means, or what its sense is. The medical art is no more what an utterer means when he utters the adjective medical, as is France what an utterer means by the adjective French. While the attachment of this or that context may suggest an interpretation in context of this or that expression as uttered by the utterer U, it need not be the case that such a suggestion is indefeasible. It might be e.g. that French poem would have to mean, poem composed in French, unless there were counter indications, that brings the utterer and the addressee to a different context C₃. In which case, perhaps what the utterer means by French poem is poem composed by a French competitor in this or that competition. For French professor there would be two obvious things an utterer might mean. Disambiguation will depend on the wider  expression-context  or in the situational context attaching to the this or that circumstance of utterance.

HEDONISM: Grice well knows that for Aristotle pleasure is just one out of the three sources for phulia," -- the others being profit, and virtue. Griceian pleasures. Democritus seems to be the earliest philosopher on record to have categorically embraced a hedonistic philosophy. He calls the supreme goal of life "contentment" or "cheerfulness", claiming that "joy and sorrow are the distinguishing mark of things beneficial and harmful" (DK 68 B 188). The Cyrenaics were an ultra-hedonist Greek school of philosophy founded in the 4th century BC, supposedly by Aristippus of Cyrene, although many of the principles of the school are believed to have been formalized by his grandson of the same Names, Aristippus the Younger. The school was so called after Cyrene, the birthplace of Aristippus. It was one of the earliest Socratic schools. The Cyrenaics taught that the only intrinsic good (agathon) is pleasure (hedone), which meant not just the absence of pain, but positively enjoyable momentary sensations. Of these, physical ones are stronger than those of anticipation or memory. They do, however, recognize the value of social obligation, and that pleasure could be gained from altruism. Theodorus the Atheist is a latter exponent of hedonism who was a disciple of younger Aristippus, while becoming well known for expounding atheism. The school dies out within a century, and is replaced by Epicureanism.  The Cyrenaics are known for their skeptical theory of knowledge. They reduce logic to a basic doctrine concerning the criterion of truth. They think that we can know with certainty our immediate sense-experiences (e. g., that one is having a sweet sensation) but can know nothing about the nature of the objects that cause these sensations (e.g., that the honey is sweet). They also deny that we can have knowledge of what the experiences of other people are like. All knowledge is immediate sensation. These sensations are motions which are purely Subjectsive, and are painful, indifferent or pleasant, according as they are violent, tranquil or gentle. Further, they are entirely individual and can in no way be described as constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only possible criterion of knowledge and of conduct. Our ways of being affected are alone knowable. Thus the sole aim for everyone should be pleasure.  Cyrenaicism deduces a single, universal aim for all people which is pleasure. Furthermore, all feeling is momentary and homogeneous. It follows that past and future pleasure have no real existence for us, and that among present pleasures there is no distinction of kind. Socrates had spoken of the higher pleasures of the intellect; the Cyrenaics denied the validity of this distinction and said that bodily pleasures, being more simple and more intense, were preferable. Momentary pleasure, preferably of a physical kind, is the only good for humans. However some actions which give immediate pleasure can create more than their equivalent of pain. The wise person should be in control of pleasures rather than be enslaved to them, otherwise pain will result, and this requires judgement to evaluate the different pleasures of life. Regard should be paid to law and custom, because even though these things have no intrinsic value on their own, violating them will lead to unpleasant penalties being imposed by others. Likewise, friendship and justice are useful because of the pleasure they provide. Thus the Cyrenaics believed in the hedonistic value of social obligation and altruistic behaviour.  Epicureanism is a system of philosophy based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an atomic materialist, following in the steps of Democritus and Leucippus. His materialism leads him to a general stance against superstition or the idea of divine intervention. Following Aristippus —about whom very little is known — Epicurus believes that the greatest good is to seek modest, sustainable "pleasure" in the form of a state of tranquility and freedom from fear (ataraxia) and absence of bodily pain (aponia) through knowledge of the workings of the world and the limits of our desires. The combination of these two states is supposed to constitute happiness in its highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism, insofar as it declares pleasure as the sole intrinsic good, its conception of absence of pain as the greatest pleasure and its advocacy of a simple life make it different from "hedonism" as it is commonly understood. In the Epicurean view, the highest pleasure (tranquility and freedom from fear) was obtained by knowledge, friendship and living a virtuous and temperate life. Epicurus lauds the enjoyment of simple pleasures, by which he meant abstaining from bodily desires, such as sex and appetites, verging on asceticism. Epicurus argues that when eating, one should not eat too richly, for it could lead to dissatisfaction later, such as the grim realization that one could not afford such delicacies in the future. Likewise, sex could lead to increased lust and dissatisfaction with the sexual partner. Epicurus does not articulate a broad system of social ethics that has survived but had a unique version of the Golden Rule.  It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly (agreeing "neither to harm nor be harmed"), and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life. Epicureanism was originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the main opponent of Stoicism. Epicurus and his followers shun politics. After the death of Epicurus, his school is headed by Hermarchus; later many Epicurean societies flourished in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era (such as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes and Ercolano). The poet Lucretius is its most known Roman proponent. By the end of the Roman Empire, having undergone Christian attack and repression, Epicureanism has all but died out, and would be resurrected in the 17th century by the atomist Pierre Gassendi, who adapts it to the Christian doctrine.  Some writings by Epicurus have survived. Some scholars consider the epic poem On the Nature of Things by Lucretius to present in one unified work the core arguments and theories of Epicureanism. Many of the papyrus scrolls unearthed at the Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum are Epicurean texts. At least some are thought to have belonged to the Epicurean Philodemus. Cf. Barnes on epicures and connoiseurs. Many controversies arising out of value judgements are settled by saying I like it and you dont, and that s the end of the matter. We are content to adopt this solution of the difficult y on matters such as food and drink, though even here we admit the existence of epicures and connoisseurs.Why are we not content to accept the same solution on all matters where value is concerned? The reason we are not so content seems to lie in the fact that the action of one man dictated by his approval of something is frequently incompatible with the action of another man dictated by his approval of something. This is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian hedonistic Epicureians made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Oxford. L and S have "ἡδονή," Dor. ἁδονά (or in Trag. chorus ἡδονά S. OT1339), from "ἥδομαι," and which they render as enjoyment, pleasure, first in Simon.71, S.l.c., Hdt. 1.24, al.; prop. of sensual pleasures, αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ., X. HG 4.8.22,6.1.4; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡ. Pl. R. 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Pl R. 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ. Th. 3.38; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R. 582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ., Id. Phlb. 50a, D. 18. 138; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to pleasure, Th. l.c., Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or so as to humour you? Hdt. 7.101; εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν ib. 160; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ  one feels pleasure at the thought that.., Id. 1. 24; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied with, S. OC 1604; ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει, Pherecr. 145. 2, Alex. 263.6; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple, Hdt. 2. 137, δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονήν A. Pr. 494; ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ. D. 18.4; πρὸς ἡ. λέγειν to speak so as to please another, S. El. 921, Th. 2. 65; δημηγορεῖν D. 4.38; οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα Hdt. 3. 126; πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας D. 8.34; later πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι Parth. 8.8, Lib. Or. 12.1; καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν κλύειν S. Tr. 197; καθ᾽ ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι c.inf., A. Pr. 263; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν, Th. 2. 37,53;  καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι ib.65; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, it is a pleasure or delight to another, Hdt. 4.139; E. IT494; Hdt. 7.15; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς, to take pleasure in them, Th. 3.9; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, oοἱ λυπηροί, Id. 1.99; μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς Id. 4.19; ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς S. Ant. 648, etc.; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ. Alex.24, 110.23: as dat. modi, ἡδονᾷ with pleasure, S. OT 1339 (lyr.), cf. Hdt. 2. 137 (f.l.), a pleasure, S. El. 873, Ar. Nu.1072 (pl.); ἡδοναὶ τραγημάτων sweetmeats, Sopat. 17. 3. Pl., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts, X. Mem.1. 2.23, Ep. Tit.3.3, al. II. in Ion. Philosophers, taste, flavour, usu. joined with χροιή, Diog. Apoll. 5, Anaxag. 4, cf. Arist. PA 660b9, Thphr. HP4. 4.7, LXX Nu.11.8, Eudem. ap. Ath. 9. 369f, Mnesith. ap. eund. 8.357f. Note that Aristotle uses somatike hedone. As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of hedone in Aristotles system! Pleasure is rendered placitum (as in ad placitum) in scholastic philosophy, but thats because scholastic philosophy is not as Hellenic as it should be! Actually, Grice prefers agreeable. One of Grices requisites for an ascription of eudaemonia (to have a fairy godmother) precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an agreeable one. One form, or mode, of agreeableness, as Grice notes, is, unless counteracted, automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of ends to another. However, some other mode of agreeableness, such as being a source of delight, for example, which are _not routinely associated with the fulfilment of this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of other features relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and another. Further, a system of ends the operation of which is especially agreeable is stable not only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the somewhat weakening effect of incontinence, or akrasia, if you mustnt! A disturbing influence, as Aristotle knew from experience, is more surely met by a principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the principle alone! Grices favourite hedonistic implicatum was Please!, as in Please, please me!

AVOWAL: A discussion of a category mistake. Cf. Grice: I may be categorically mistaken but Im not categorically confused. It is only natural that if Grice was interested on Aristotle on pleasure he would be interested on Aristotle on pain. This is very philosophical, as Urmson will agree. Is pleasure just the absence of pain? Liddell and Soctt have it: λύπη, which they render as pain of body, oἡδον Id. Phlb. 31c, etc.; also, sad plight or condition, Hdt. 7. 152. 2. pain of mind, grief, ib.16. ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται A. Ag.791, τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; Id. Fr. 177, cf. S. OC 1217, etc.; ἐρωτικὴ λ. Th. 6.59; λύπας προσβάλλειν Antipho 2. 2. 2; λ. φέρειν τινί And. 2. 8; oχαρά, X. HG7. 1.32. Oddly, Grice goes back to pain in Princeton 1972, since it is Smarts example in his identtiy thesis.  “Take pain. Surely, Grice tells the Princetonians, “it sounds harsh,” to echo Berkeley, to say that it is Smiths brains being in this or that a state which is justified by insufficient evidence! Oddly, Im in pain vs. Ouch! is the example given by Barnes, of Corpus, for The Jowett, to apply Ogdens thesis on communication as emotional. Grice criticises this in Prolegomena, "Surely we have to qualify the idea that to say x is good is to approve of it." Pain is an excellent example for Grice ofr a privileged access incorrigible avowal, and stage 0 in his creature progression. By uttering Ouch!, under voluntary control, U means, iconically, that he is in pain. Pain should fall under keyword: emotion, as anger. Cf. Aristotle on emotions in De anima, Rhetorica, and Eth. Nich. At Oxford, if you are a classicist, you are not a philosopher, so Grice never explores the Stoic, say, approach to pain, or lack thereof! Walter Pater did! 

ESCHATOLOGY: Some like Hegel, but Collingwoods *my* man!  ‒ Grice. Grice participated in two consecutive evenings of the s. of programmes on metaphysics organised by Pears. Actually, charming Pears felt pretentious enough to label the meetings to be about the nature of metaphysics! Grice ends up discussing, as he should, Collingwood on presupposition. Met.  remained a favourite topic for Grices philosophical explorations, as it is evident from his essay on Met. , Philosophical Eschatology, and Platos Republic, reprinted in his WOW . Possibly Hardie is to blame, since he hardly tutored Grice on metaphysics! Grices two BBC lectures are typically dated in tone. It was the (good ole) days when philosophers thought they could educate the non-elite by dropping Namess like Collingwood and stuff! The Third Programme was extremely popular, especially among the uneducated ones at London, as Pears almost put it, as it was a way for Londoners to get to know what is going on down at Oxford, the only place an uneducated (or educated, for that matter) Londoner at the time was interested in displaying some interest about! I mean, Johnson is right: if a man is tired of the nature of metaphysics, he is tired of life! Since the authorship is Grice, Strawson, and Pears, Met. , in Pears, The Nature of Met., The BBC Third Programme, it is somewhat difficult to identify what paragraphs were actually read by Grice (and which ones by Pears and which ones by Strawson). But trust the sharp Griceian to detect the correct implicature! There are many (too many) other items covered by these two lectures: Kant, Aristotle, in no particular order. And in The Grice Collection, for that matter, that cover the field of metaphysics. In the New World, as a sort of tutor in the graduate programme, Grice was expected to cover the discipline at various seminars. Only I dislike discipline! Perhaps his clearest exposition is in the opening section of his Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos Republic, reprinted in his WOW , where he states, bluntly that all you need is  metaphysics! 1980, metaphysics, Miscellaneous, metaphysics notes, Grice would possible see metaphysics as a class – category figuring large. He was concerned with the methodological aspects of the metaphysical enterprise, since he was enough of a relativist to allow for one metaphysical scheme to apply to one area of discourse (one of Eddingtons tables) and another metaphysical scheme to apply to another (Eddingtons other table). In the third programme for the BBC Grice especially enjoyed criticising John Wisdoms innovative look at metaphysics as a bunch of self-evident falsehoods (Were all alone). Grice focuses on Wisdom on the knowledge of other minds. He also discusses Collingwoods presuppositions, and Bradley on the reality-appearance distinction. Grices reference to Wisdom was due to Ewings treatment of Wisdom on metaphysics. Grices main motivation here is defending metaphysics against Ayer. Ayer thought to win more Oxonian philosophers than he did at Oxford, but he was soon back in London. Post-war Oxford had become conservative and would not stand to the nonsense of Ayers claiming that metaphysics is nonsense, especially, as Ayers implicature also was, that philosophy is nonsense! Perhaps the best summary of Griceian metaphysics is his From Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics. It’s an ontological answer that one must give to Grices metabolic operation from utterers meaning to expression meaning. 

PARADIGM-CASE ARGUMENT: The issue of analyticity is, as Locke puts it, the issue of whats trifle. That a triangle is trilateral Locke considers a trifling proposition, like Saffron is yellow. Lewes (who calls mathematical propositions analytic) describes the Kantian problem. Grices reductive ANALYSIS of meaning DEPENDS on the analytic. Few Oxonian philosophers would follow Loar (D. Phil Oxon, under Warnock) in thinking of Grices conversational maxims as empirical inductive generalisations over functional states! Synthesis may do in the New World,but hardly in the Old! The locus classicus for the ordinary-language philosophical response to Quine in Two dogmas of empiricism. Grice and Strawson claim that  is analytic does have an ordinary-language use, as attached two a type of behavioural conversational response. To an analytically false move (such as My neighbours three-year-old son is an adult) the addressee A is bound to utter, I dont understand you! You are not being figurative, are you? To a synthetically false move, on the other hand (such as My neighbours three-year-old understands Russells Theory of Types), the addressee A will jump with, Cant believe it! The topdogma of analyticity is for Grice very important to defend. Philosophy depends on it! He knows that to many his claim to fame is his In defence of a dogma, the topdogma of analyticity, no less. He eventually turns to a pragmatist justification of the distinction. This pragmatist justification is still in accordance with what he sees as the use of analytic in ordinary language. His infamous examples are as follows. My neighbours three-year old understands Russells Theory of Types. A: Hard to believe, but I will. My neighbours three-year old is an adult. Metaphorically? No. Then I dont understand you, and what youve just said is, in my scheme of things, analytically false. Ultimately, there are conversational criteria, based on this or that principle of conversational helfpulness. Grice is also circumstantially concerned with the synthetic a priori, and he would ask his childrens playmates: Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes allowed! The distinction is ultimately Kantian, but it had brought to the fore by the linguistic turn, Oxonian and other! In defence of a dogma, Two dogmas of empiricism, : the analytic-synthetic distinction. For Quine, there are two. Grice is mainly interested in the first one: that there is a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. Grice considers Empiricism as a monster on his way to the Rationalist City of Eternal Truth. Grice came back time and again to explore the analytic-synthetic distinction. But his philosophy remained constant. His sympathy is for the practicality of it, its rationale. He sees it as involving formal calculi, rather than his own theory of conversation as rational co-operation which does not presuppose the analytic-synthetic distinction, even if it explains it! Grice would press the issue here: if one wants to prove that such a theory of conversation as rational co-operation has to be seen as philosophical, rather than some other way, some idea of analyticity may be needed to justify the philosophical enterprise. Cf. the synthetic a priori, that fascinated Grice most than anything Kantian else! Can a sweater be green and red all over? No stripes allowed. With In defence of a dogma, Grice and Strawson attack a New-World philosopher. Grice had previously collaborated with Strawson in an essay on Met.  (actually a three-part piece, with Pears as the third author). The example Grice chooses to refute Quines attack of the top-dogma is the Aristotelian idea of the peritrope, as Aristotle refutes Antiphasis in Met.  (v. Ackrill, Burnyeat and Dancy). Grice explores chapter Γ 8 of Aristotles Met. .  In Γ 8, Aristotle presents two self-refutation arguments against two theses, and calls the asserter, Antiphasis, T1 = Everything is true, and T2 = Everything is false, Metaph. Γ 8, 1012b13–18. Each thesis is exposed to the stock objection that it eliminates itself. An utterer who explicitly conveys that everything is true also makes the thesis opposite to his own true, so that his own is not true (for the opposite thesis denies that his is true), and any utterer U who explicitly conveys that everything is false also belies himself.  Aristotle does not seem to be claiming that, if everything is true, it would also be true that it is false that everything is true and, that, therefore, Everything is true must be false: the final, crucial inference, from the premise if, p, ~p to the conclusion ~p is missing. But it is this extra inference that seems required to have a formal refutation of Antiphasiss T1 or T2 by consequentia mirabilis. The nature of the argument as a purely dialectical silencer of Antiphasis is confirmed by the case of T2, Everything is false. An utterer who explicitly conveys that everything is false unwittingly concedes, by self-application, that what he is saying must be false too. Again, the further and different conclusion Therefore; it is false that everything is false is missing. That proposal is thus self-defeating, self-contradictory (and comparable to Grices addressee using adult to apply to three-year old, without producing the creature), oxymoronic, and suicidal. This seems all that Aristotle is interested in establishing through the self-refutation stock objection. This is not to suggest that Aristotle did not believe that Everything is true or Everything is false is false, or that he excludes that he can prove its falsehood. Grice notes that this is not what Aristotle seems to be purporting to establish in 1012b13–18. This holds for a περιτροπή (peritrope) argument, but not for a περιγραφή (perigraphe) argument (συμβαίνει δὴ καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ (ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν.) It may be emphasized that Aristotles argument does not contain an explicit application of consequentia mirabilis. Indeed, no extant self-refutation argument before Augustine, Grice is told by Mates, contains an explicit application of consequentia mirabilis. This observation is a good and important one, but Grice has doubts about the consequences one may draw from it. One may take the absence of an explicit application of consequentia mirabilis to be a sign of the purely dialectical nature of the self-refutation argument. This is questionable. The formulation of a self-refutation argument (as in Grices addressee, Sorry, I misused adult.) is often compressed and elliptical and involves this or that implicatum. One usually assumes that this or that piece in a dialectical context has been omitted and should be supplied (or worked out, as Grice prefers) by the addressee. But in this or that case, it is equally possible to supply some other, non-dialectical piece of reasoning. In Aristotles arguments from Γ 8, e.g., the addressee may supply an inference to the effect that the thesis which has been shown to be self-refuting is not true. For if Aristotle takes the argument to establish that the thesis has its own contradictory version as a consequence, it must be obvious to Aristotle that the thesis is not true (since every consequence of a true thesis is true, and two contradictory theses cannot be simultaneously true). On the further assumption (that Grice makes explicit) that the principle of bivalence is applicable, Aristotle may even infer that the thesis is false. It is perfectly plausible to attribute such an inference to Aristotle and to supply it in his argument from Γ 8. On this account, there is no reason to think that the argument is of an intrinsically dialectical nature and cannot be adequately represented as a non-dialectical proof of the non-truth, or even falsity, of the thesis in question. It is indeed difficult to see signs of a dialectical exchange between two parties (of the type of which Grice and Strawson are champions) in Γ8, 1012b13–18. One piece of evidence is Aristotles reference to the person, the utterer, as Grice prefers who explicitly conveys or asserts (ὁ λέγων) that T1 or that T2. This reference by the Grecian philosopher to the Griceian utterer or asserter of the thesis that everything is true would be irrelevant if Aristotles aim is to prove something about T1s or T2s propositional content, independently of the act by the utterer of uttering its expression and thereby explicitly conveying it. However, it is not clear that this reference is essential to Aristotles argument. One may even doubt whether the Grecian philosopher is being that Griceian, and actually referring to the asserter of T1 or T2. The *implicit* (or implicated) grammatical Subjects of Aristotles ὁ λέγων (1012b15) might be λόγος, instead of the utterer qua asserter. λόγος is surely the implicit grammatical Subjects of ὁ λέγων shortly after ( 1012b21–22. 8). The passage may be taken to be concerned with λόγοι ‒ this or that statement, this or that thesis  ‒ but not with its asserter.  In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle states that no thesis (A three-year old is an adult) can necessarily imply its own contradictory (A three-year old is not an adult) (2.4, 57b13–14). One may appeal to this statement in order to argue for Aristotles claim that a self-refutation argument should NOT be analyzed as involving an implicit application of consequentia mirabilis. Thus, one should deny that Aristotles self-refutation argument establishes a necessary implication from the self-refuting thesis to its contradictory. However, this does not explain what other kind of consequence relation Aristotle takes the self-refutation argument to establish between the self-refuting thesis and its contradictory, although dialectical necessity has been suggested. Aristotles argument suffices to establish that Everything is false is either false or liar-paradoxical. If a thesis is liar-paradoxical (and Grice loved, and overused the expression), the assumption of its falsity leads to contradiction as well as the assumption of its truth. But Everything is false is only liar-paradoxical in the unlikely, for Aristotle perhaps impossible, event that everything distinct from this thesis is false. So, given the additional premise that there is at least one true item distinct from the thesis Everything is false, Aristotle can safely infer that the thesis is false. As for Aristotles ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής,, or eliding the γὰρ,  ὁ  λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής, (ho legon ton alethe logon alethe alethes) may be rendered as either: The statement which states that the true statement is true is true, or, more alla Grice, as He who says (or explicitly conveys, or indicates) that the true thesis is true says something true. It may be argued that it is quite baffling (and figurative or analogical or metaphoric) in this context, to take ἀληθής to be predicated  of the Griceian utterer, a person (true standing for truth teller, trustworthy), to take it to mean that he says something true, rather than his statement stating something true, or his statement being true. But cf. L and S: ἀληθής [α^], Dor. ἀλαθής, [α^], Dor. ἀλαθής, ές, f. λήθω, of persons, truthful, honest (not in Hom., v. infr.), ἀ. νόος Pi. O.2.92; κατήγορος A. Th. 439; κριτής Th. 3.56; οἶνος ἀ. `in vino veritas, Pl. Smp. 217e; ὁ μέσος ἀ. τις Arist. EN 1108a20. Admittedly, this or that non-Griceian passage in which it is λόγος, and not the utterer, which is the implied grammatical Subjects of ὁ λέγων can be found in Metaph. Γ7, 1012a24–25; Δ6, 1016a33; Int. 14, 23a28–29; De motu an. 10, 703a4; Eth. Nic. 2.6, 1107a6–7. 9. So the topic is controversial. Indeed such a non-Griceian exegesis of the passage is given by Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Metaph. 340. 26–29):9, when Alexander observes that the statement, i.e. not the utterer, that says that everything is false (ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι λέγων λόγος) negates itself, not himself, because if everything is false, this very statement, which, rather than, by which the utterer, says that everything is false, would be false, and how can an utterer be FALSE? So that the statement which, rather than the utterer who, negates it, saying that not everything is false, would be true, and surely an utterer cannot be true. Does Alexander misrepresent Aristotles argument by omitting every Griceian reference to the asserter or utterer qua rational personal agent, of the thesis? If the answer is negative, even if the occurrence of ὁ λέγων at 1012b15 refers to the asserter, or utterer, qua rational personal agent, this is merely an accidental feature of Aristotles argument that cannot be regarded as an indication of its dialectical nature. None of this is to deny that some self-refutation argument may be of an intrinsically dialectical nature; it is only to deny that every one is This is in line with Burnyeats view that a dialectical self-refutation, even if qualified, as Aristotle does, as ancient, is a subspecies of self-refutation, but does not exhaust it. Granted, a dialectical approach may provide a useful interpretive framework for many an ancient self-refutation argument. A statement like If proof does not exist, proof exists ‒ that occurs in an anti-sceptical self-refutation argument reported by Sextus Empiricus  ‒ may receive an attractive dialectical re-interpretation. It may be argued that such a statement should not be understood at the level of what is explicated, but should be regarded as an elliptical reminder of a complex dialectical argument which can be described as follows. Cf. If thou claimest that proof doth not exist, thou must present a proof of what thou assertest, in order to be credible, but thus thou thyself admitest that proof existeth. A similar point can be made for Aristotles famous argument in the Protrepticus that one must philosophise. A number of sources state that this argument relies on the implicature, If one must not philosophize, one must philosophize. It may be argued that this implicature is an elliptical reminder of a dialectical argument such as the following. If thy position is that thou must not philosophise, thou must reflect on this choice and argue in its support, but by doing so thou art already choosing to do philosophy, thereby admitting that thou must philosophise. The claim that every instance of an ancient self-refutation arguments is of an intrinsically dialectical nature is thus questionable, to put it mildly. V also 340.19–26, and A. Madigan, tcomm., Alexander of Aphrodisias: On Aristotles Met.  4, Ithaca, N.Y., Burnyeat, Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy,. Grices implicature is that Quine should have learned Greek before refuting Aristotle. But then *I* dont speak Greek! Strawson refuted.

OXONIANISM: Grice cannot possibly claim to talk about post-war Oxford philosophy, but his own! Cf. Oxfords post-war philosophy.  What were Grices first impressions when arriving at Oxford. He was going to learn. Only the poor learn at Oxford was an adage he treasured, since he wasnt one! Lets start with an alphabetical listing of Grices Play Group companions: Austin, Butler, Flew, Gardiner,  Grice, Hare, Hampshire, Hart, Nowell-Smith, Parkinson, Paul, Pears, Quinton, Sibley, Strawson, Thomson, Urmson, and Warnock.  Grices main Oxonian association is St. Johns, Oxford. By Oxford Philosophy, Grice notably refers to Austins Play Group, of which he was a member. But Grice had Oxford associations pre-war, and after the demise of Austin. But back to the Play Group, this, to some, infamous, playgroup, met on Saturday mornings at different venues at Oxford, including Grices own St. Johns  ‒ apparently, Austins favourite venue. Austin regarded himself and his kindergarten as linguistic or language botanists. The idea was to list various ordinary uses of this or that philosophical notion. Austin: They say philosophy is about language; well, then, lets botanise! Grices involvement with Oxford philosophy of course predated his associations with Austins play group. He always said he was fortunate of having been a tutee to Hardie at Corpus. Corpus, Oxford. Grice would occasionally refer to the emblematic pelican, so prominently displayed at Corpus. Grice had an interim association with the venue one associates most directly with philosophy, Merton ‒: Grice, Merton, Oxford. While Grice loved to drop Oxonian Namess, notably his rivals, such as Dummett or Anscombe, he knew when not to. His Post-war Oxford philosophy, as opposed to more specific items in The Grice Collection, remains general in tone, and intended as a defense of the ordinary-language approach to philosophy. Surprisingly, or perhaps not (for those who knew Grice), he takes a pretty idiosyncratic characterisation of conceptual analysis. Grices philosophical problems emerge with Grices idiosyncratic use of this or that expression. Conceptual analysis is meant to solve HIS problems, not others! Repr. in Grice, WOW . Grice finds it important to reprint this since he had updated thoughts on the matter, which he displays in his Conceptual analysis and the province of philosophy. The topic represents one of the strands he identifies behind the unity of his philosophy. By post-war Oxford philosophy, Grice meant the period he was interested in. While he had been at Corpus, Merton, and St. Johns in the pre-war days, for some reason, he felt that he had made history in the post-war period. The historical reason Grice gives is understandable enough. In the pre-war days, Grice was the good student and the new fellow of St. Johns ‒ the other one was Mabbott. But he had not been able to engage in philosophical discussion much, other than with other tutees of Hardie. After the war, Grice indeed joins Austins more popular, less secretive Saturday mornings. Indeed, for Grice, post-war means all philosophy after the war (and not just say, the forties!) since he never abandoned the methods he developed under Austin, which were pretty congenial to the ones he had himself displayed in the pre-war days, in essays like Negation and Personal identity. Grice is a a bit of an expert on Oxonian philosophy. He sees himself as a member of the school of analytic philosophy, rather than the abused term ordinary-language philosophy. This is evident by the fact that he contributed to such polemic  ‒ but typically Oxonian  ‒ volumes such as Butler, Analytic Philosophy, published by Blackwell (of all publishers). Grice led a very social life at Oxford, and held frequent philosophical discussions with the Play group philosophers (alphabetically listed above), and many others, such as Wood.  Post-war Oxford philosophy, 1958, miscellaneous, Oxford philosophy, in WOW , Part II, Semantics and Met. , Essay. By Oxford philosophy, Grice means his own! Grice went back to the topic of philosophy and ordinary language, as one of his essays is precisely entitled, Philosophy and ordinary language, 1970, philosophy and ordinary language, : ordinary-language philosophy, linguistic botanising. Grice is not really interested in ordinary language as a philologist might. He spoke ordinary language, he thought. The point had been brought to the fore by Austin. If they think philosophy is a play on words, well then, lets play the game. Grices interest is methodological. Malcolm had been claiming that ordinary language is incorrigible. While Grice agreed that language can be clever, he knew that Aristotle was possibly right when he explored ta legomena in terms of the many and the selected wise, 1960, philosophy and ordinary language, philosophy and ordinary language, : philosophy, ordinary language. At the time of writing, ordinary-language philosophy had become, even within Oxford, a bit of a term of abuse. Grice tries to defend Austins approach to it, while suggesting ideas that Austin somewhat ignored, like what an utterer implies by the use of an ordinary-language expression, rather than what the expression itself does. Grice is concerned, contra Austin, in explanation (or explanatory adequacy), not taxonomy (or descriptive adequacy). Grice disregards Austins piecemeal approach to ordinary language, as Grice searches for the big picture of it all. Grice never used ordinary language seriously. The phrase was used, as he explains, by those who HATED ordinary-language philosophy. Theres no such thing as ordinary language. Surely you cannot fairly describe the idiosyncratic linguistic habits of an Old Cliftonian as even remotely ordinary. Extra-ordinary more likely! As far as the philosophy bit goes, this is what Bergmann jocularly described as the linguistic turn. But as Grice notes, the linguistic turn involves both the ideal language and the ordinary language. Grice defends Austins choice of the ordinary seeing that it was what he had to hand! While Grice seems to be in agreement with the tone of his Wellesley talk, his idioms there in. Youre crying for the moon! Philosophy need not be grand! These seem to contrast with his more grandiose approach to philosophy. His struggle was to defend the minutiæ of linguistic botanising, that had occupied most of his professional life, with a grander view of the discipline. He blamed Oxford for that. Never in the history of philosophy had philosophers shown such an attachment to ordinary language as they did in post-war Oxford, Grice liked to say.  Having learned Grecian and Latin at Clifton, Grice saw in Oxford a way to go back to English! He never felt the need to explore Continental modern languages like German or French. Aristotle was of course cited in Greek, but Descartes is almost not cited, and Kant is cited in the translation available to Oxonians then. Grice is totally right that never has philosophy experienced such a fascination with ordinary use except at Oxford. The ruthless and unswerving association of philosophy with ordinary language has been peculiar to the Oxford scene. While many found this attachment to ordinary usage insidious, as Warnock put it, it fit me and Grice to a T, implicating you need a sort of innate disposition towards it! Strawson perhaps never had it! And thats why Grices arguments contra Strawson rest on further minutiæ whose detection by Grice never ceased to amaze his tutee! In this way, Grice felt he WAS Austins heir! While Grice is associated with, in chronological order, Corpus, Merton, and St. Johns, it is only St. Johns that counts for the Griceian! For it is at St. Johns he was a Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy! And we love him as a philosopher.

SENSE-DATUM: This is Grice on sense-datum. Note that Price is also cited by Grice in Personal identity. Grice: That pillar box seems red to me. The locus classicus in the philosophical literature for Grices implicatum. Grice introduces a dout-or-denial condition for an utterance of a phenomenalist report (That pillar-box seems red to me). Grice attacks neo-Wittgensteinian approaches that regard the report as _false_. In a long excursus on implication, he compares the phenomenalist report with utterances like He has beautiful handwriting (He is hopeless at philosophy), a particularised conversational implicatum; My wife is in the kitchen or the garden (I have non-truth-functional grounds to utter this), a generalised conversational implicatum; She was poor but she was honest (a Great-War witty (her poverty and her honesty contrast), a conventional implicatum; and Have you stopped beating your wife?  an old Oxonian conundrum. You have been beating your wife, cf. Smith has not ceased from eating iron, a presupposition. More importantly, he considers different tests for each concoction! Those for the conversational implicatum will become crucial: cancellability, calculability, non-detachability, and indeterminacy. In the proceedings he plays with something like the principle of conversational helpfulness, as having a basis on a view of conversation as rational co-operation, and as giving the rationale to the implicatum. Past the excursus, and back to the issue of perception, he holds a conservative view as presented by Price at Oxford. One interesting reprint of Grices essay is in Daviss volume on Causal theories, since this is where it belongs! Whites response is usually ignored, but shouldnt. White is an interesting Australian philosopher at Oxford who is usually regarded as a practitioner of ordinary-language philosophy. However, in his response, White hardly touches the issue of the implicature with which Grice is primarily concerned. Grice found that a full reprint from the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in a compilation also containing the James Harvard would be too repetitive. Therefore, he omits the excursus on implication. However, the way Grice re-formulates, in 1987, what that excursus covers is very interesting. There is the conversational implicatum, particularised (Smith has beautiful handwriting) and generalised (My wife is in the kitchen or in the garden). Then there is the præsuppositum, or presupposition (You havent stopped beating your wife). Finally, there is the conventional implicatum ( She was poor, but she was honest). Even at Oxford, Grices implicature goes, philosophers ‒ even Oxonian philosophers ‒ use imply for all those different animals! Warnock had attended Austins Sense and Sensibilia (not to be confused with Austens Sense and Sensibility), which Grice found boring, but Warnock didnt because Austin reviews his "Berkeley."  But Warnock, for obvious reasons, preferred philosophical investigations with Grice. Warnock reminisces that Grice once tells him, and not on a Saturday morning, either, How clever language is For they had found that ordinary language does NOT need the concept of a visum. Grice and Warnock spent lovely occasions exploring what Oxford has as the philosophy of perception. While Grice later came to see philosophy of perception as a bit or an offshoot of philosophical psychology, the philosophy of perception is concerned with that treasured bit of the Oxonian philosophers lexicon, the sense-datum, always in the singular! The cause involved is crucial. Grice plays with an evolutionary justification of the material thing as the denotatum of a perceptual judgement. If a material thing causes the sense-datum of a nut, that is because the squarrel (or squirrel) will not be nourished by the sense datum of the nut; only by the nut! There are many other items in the Grice Collection that address the topic of perception – notably with Warnock, and criticizing members of the Ryle group like Roxbee-Cox (on vision, cf. visa ‒ taste, and perception, in general – And we should not forget that Grice contributed a splendid essay on the distinction of the senses to Butlers Analytic philosophy, which in a way, redeemed a rather old-fashioned discipline by shifting it to the idiom of the day. 1959. The philosophy of perception: a retrospective, with Warnock, the philosophy of perception, : perception, the philosophy of perception, visum. Warnock was possibly the only philosopher at Oxford Grice felt congenial enough to engage in different explorations in the so-called philosophy of perception. Their joint adventures involved the disimplicature of a visum. Grice later approached sense data in more evolutionary terms: a material thing is to be vindicated transcendentally, in the sense that it is a material thing (and not a sense datum or collection thereof) that nourishes a creature like a human. Grice was particularly grateful to Warnock. By reprinting the full symposium on The causal theory of perception in his influential s. of Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Warnock had spread Grices lore of implicature all over! In some parts of the draft he uses more on visa, 1959, vision, 1969, vision, with Warnock, vision. Of the five senses, Grice and Warnock are particularly interested in seeing. As Grice will put it later, see is a factive. It presupposes the existence of the event reported after the that-clause. A visum, however, as an intermediary between the material thing and the perceiver does not seem necessary in ordinary discourse. Warnock will reconsider Grices views too (On what is seen, in Sibley). While Grice uses vision, he knows he is interested in Philosophers paradox concerning seeing, notably Witters on seeing as. 1959, vision, taste and the philosophy of perception, : vision, seeing. As an Oxonian philosopher, Grice was of course more interested in seeing than in vision. He said that Austin would criticise even the use of things like sensation and volition! 1959, taste, The Grice Papers, keyword: taste, the objects of the five senses, the philosophy of perception, perception, the philosophy of perception, : philosophy of perception, vision, taste, perception. Mainly with Warnock. Warnock reprinted Grices Causal theory of perception in his influential Reading in Philosophy, The philosophy of perception, 1959, perception, with Warnock, with Warner, : perception. Warnock learns about perception much more from Grice than from Austin! 1959, taste, 1960, The philosophy of perception, the philosophy of perception, notes with Warnock on visum, : visum, Warnock, Grice, the philosophy of perception.  Grice kept the lecture notes to a view of publishing a retrospective. Warnock recalled Grice saying, How clever language is! Grice took the offer by Harvard University Press, and it was a good thing he reprinted part of Causal theory. However, the relevant bits for his theory of conversation as rational co-operation lie in the excursus which he omitted. What is Grices implicature: that one should consider the topic rather than the method here.  being sense datum, and causation, rather than conversational helpfulness. After all, That pillar box seems red to me, does not sound very helpful. But the topic of Causal theory is central for his view of conversation as rational co-operation. Why? Pirot₁ gets an impression of danger as caused by the danger out there. He communicates the danger to Pirot₁, causing in Pirot₂ some behaviour. Without causation, or causal links, the very point of offering a theory of conversation as rational co-operation seems minimized. On top, as a metaphysician, he was also concerned with cause simpliciter. He was especially proud that Prices Casual Theory of Perception had been reprinted along with his essay in the influential volume by Davis on Causal theories. In Actions and events, he further explores cause now in connection with Greek aitia. As Grice notes, the original usage of this very Grecian item is the one we find in rebel without a cause, cause-to, rather than cause-because. The two-movement nature of causing is reproduced in the conversational exchange: a material thing causes a sense datum which causes an expression which gets communicated, thus causing a psychological state which will cause a behaviour. This causation is almost representational. A material thing or a situation cannot govern our actions and behaviours, but a re-præsentatum of it might. Govern our actions and behaviour is Grices correlate of what a team of North-Oxfordshire cricketers can do for North-Oxfordshire: what North Oxfordshire cannot do for herself, Namesly, engage in a game of cricket! In Retrospective epilogue he casts doubts on the point of his causal approach. It is a short paragraph that merits much exploration. Basically, Grice is saying his causalist approach is hardly an established thesis. He also proposes a similar serious objection to his view in Some remarks about the senses, the other essay in the philosophy of perception in Studies. As he notes, both engage with some fundamental questions in the philosophy of perception, which is hardly the same thing as saying that they provide an answer to each question! Grice: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. Examples which occur to me are the following. You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife. When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word know. For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual. For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is responsible, it must be the sort of action for which people are condemned. What is actual is not also possible. What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case. I have no doubt that there will be other candidates besides the six which I have mentioned. I must emphasize that I am not saying that all these examples are importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, they may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detectcd, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. The causal theory of perception, knowledge and belief, 1977,  knowledge, belief, philosophical psychology. Grice: the doxastic implicatum. I know only implicates I do not believe. The following is philosophers mistake. What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case. The topic had attracted the attention of some Oxonian philosophers such as Urmson in Parenthetical verbs. Urmson speaks of a scale: I know can be used parenthetically, as I believe can. For Grice, to utter I believe is obviously to make a weaker conversational move than you would if you utter I know. And in this case, an approach to informativeness in terms of entailment is in order, seeing that I know entails I believe. A A is thus allowed to infer that the utterer is not in a position to make the stronger claim. The mechanism is explained via his principle of conversational helpfulness. Philosophers tend two over-use these two basic psychological states, attitudes, or stances. Grice is concerned with Gettier-type cases, and also the factivity of know versus the non-factivity of believe. Grice follows Hintikkas lexicological innovations: the logic of belief is doxastic; the logic of knowledge is epistemic. The last thesis that Grice lists in Causal theory that he thinks rests on a big mistake he formulates as: What is known by me to be the case is NOT also believed by me to be the case. What are his attending remarks? Grice writes: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An example which occurs to me is the following: What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticising, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they are! The ætiological implicatum. Grice. For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual. This is an example Grice lists in Causal theory but not in Prolegomena. For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual. Similar commentary to his example on responsible/condemnable apply. The objector may stick with the fact that he is only concerned with proper utterances. Surely Grice wants to go to a pre-Humeian account of causation, possible Aristotelian, aetiologia. Where everything has a cause, except, for Aristotle, God! What are his attending remarks? Grice writes: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An example which occurs to me is the following: What is known by me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophising. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are! Causal theory, cause, causality, causation, conference, colloquium, Stanford, 1980, : cause, metaphysics, the abnormal/unusual implicatum, ætiology, ætiological implicatum. Grice: the ætiological implicatum. Grices explorations on cause are very rich. He is concerned with some alleged misuse of cause in ordinary language. If as Hume suggests, to cause is to will, one would say that The decapitation of Charles I willed his death, which sounds harsh, if not ungrammatical, too! Grice later relates cause to the Greek aitia, as he should. He notes collocations like rebel without a cause. For the Greeks, or Grecians, as he called them, and the Griceians, its a cause to which one should be involved in elucidating.  A cause to connects with the idea of freedom. Grice was constantly aware of the threat of mechanism, and his idea was to provide philosophical room for the idea of finality, which is not mechanistically derivable. This leads him to discussion of overlap and priority of, say, a physical-cum-physiological versus a psychological theory explaining this or that piece of rational behaviour. Grice can be Wittgensteinian when citing Anscombes translation: No psychological concept without the behaviour the concept is brought to explain.  It is best to place his later treatment of cause with his earlier one in Causal theory. Its surprising Grice does not apply his example of a philosophers mistake to the causal bit of his causal theory. Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows: For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual. This is an example Grice lists in Causal theory but not in Prolegomena. For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual. A similar commentary to his example on responsible/condemnable applies: The objector may stick with the fact that he is only concerned with PROPER utterances. Surely Grice wants to embrace a pre-Humeian account of causation, possible Aristotelian. Keyword: Aitiologia, where everything has a cause, except, for Aristotle, God! What are his attending remarks? Grice writes: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would Grice thinks need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. One example which occurs to Grice is the following: For an occurrence to be properly said to have a cause, it must be something abnormal or unusual. Grice feels he must emphasise that he is not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are! Re: responsibility/condemnation. Cf. Mabbott, Flew on punishment, Philosophy, 30. And also Hart. At Corpus, Grice enjoys his tutor Hardies resourcefulness in the defence of what may be a difficult position, a characteristic illustrated by an incident which Hardie himself once told Grice about himself. Hardie had parked his car and gone to a cinema. Unfortunately, Hardie had parked his car on top of one of the strips on the street by means of which traffic-lights were, at the time, controlled by the passing traffic. As a result, the lights are jammed, and it requires four policemen to lift Hardies car off the strip. The police decides to prosecute. Grice indicated to Hardie that this hardly surprised him and asked him how he fared. Oh, Hardie says, I got off. Then Grice asks Hardie how on earth he managed that! Quite simply, Hardie answers. I just invoked Mills method of difference. The police charged me with causing an obstruction at 4 p.m. I told the police that, since my car was parked at 2 p.m., it could not have been my car which caused the obstruction at *4* p.m. This relates to an example in Causal theory that he Grice does not discuss in Prolegomena, but which may relate to Hart, and closer to Grice, to Mabbotts essay on Flew on punishment, in Philosophy, 30. Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows: For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is responsible, it must be thc sort of action for which people are condemned. As applied to Hardie. Hardie was IRRESPONSIBLE? In any case, while condemnable, he was not! Grice writes: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An example which occurs to me is the following: For an action to be properly described as one for which the agent is responsible, it must be the sort of action for which people are condemned. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic NUANCES which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what SORT of nuances they are! The modal example (What is actual is not also possible) discussed under Indicative conditonals, 1967.  Grice on Macbeths implicature: seeing a dagger as a dagger. Grice elaborates on this in Prolegomena, but the austerity of Causal theory is charming, since he does not give a quote or source. OBVIOUSLY: Witters! Grice writes: Witters might say You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife. The issue, Grice notes, with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An example which occurs to Grice is the following: You cannot see a knife as a knife, though you may see what is not a knife as a knife. Grice feels that he must emphasise that he is not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. I am merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are! Is this a dagger which I see before me, the handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee. I have thee not, and yet I see thee still. Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible To feeling as to sight? or art thou but A dagger of the mind, a false creation, Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain? I see thee yet, in form as palpable As this which now I draw. Thou marshallst me the way that I was going; And such an instrument I was to use. Mine eyes are made the fools o the other senses, Or else worth all the rest; I see thee still, And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood, Which was not so before. Theres no such thing: It is the bloody business which informs Thus to mine eyes. Now oer the one halfworld Nature seems dead, and wicked dreams abuse The curtaind sleep; witchcraft celebrates Pale Hecates offerings, and witherd murder, Alarumd by his sentinel, the wolf, Whose howls his watch, thus with his stealthy pace. With Tarquins ravishing strides, towards his design Moves like a ghost. Thou sure and firm-set earth, Hear not my steps, which way they walk, for fear Thy very stones prate of my whereabout, And take the present horror from the time, Which now suits with it. Whiles I threat, he lives: Words to the heat of deeds too cold breath gives. [a bell rings] I go, and it is done; the bell invites me. Hear it not, Duncan; for it is a knell That summons thee to heaven or to hell. The Moore example is used both in Causal theory and Prolegomena. But the use in Causal Theory is more austere: Philosophers mistake: Malcolm: When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word know. Grice writes: The issue with which I have been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would I think need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which I have been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An example which occurs to me is the following: When Moore said he knew that the objects before him were human hands, he was guilty of misusing the word know. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by my objector seems to me to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. I am not condemning this kind of manoeuvre. Grice is merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are! So surely Grice is meaning: I know that the objects before me are human hands as uttered by Moore is possibly true. Grice was amused by the fact that while at Madison, Wisc., Moore gave the example: I know that behind those curtains there is a window. Actually he was wrong, as he soon realised when the educated Madisonians corrected him with a roar of unanimous laughter. You see, the lecture hall of the University of Wisconsin at Madison is a rather, shall we say, striking space. The architect designed the lecture hall with a parapet running around the wall just below the ceiling, cleverly rigged with indirect lighting to create the illusion that sun light is pouring in through windows from outside. So, Moore comes to give a lecture one sunny day. Attracted as he was to this eccentric architectural detail, Moore gives an illustration of certainty as attached to common sense. Pointing to the space below the ceiling, Moore utters. We know more things than we think we know. I know, for example, that the sunlight shining in from outside proves  At which point he was somewhat startled (in his reserved Irish-English sort of way) when his audience burst out laughing! Is that a proof of anything? Grice is especially concerned with I seem He needs a paradeigmatic sense-datum utterance, and intentionalist as he was, he finds it in I seem to see a red pillar box before me. He is relying on Paul. Grice would generalise a sense datum by φ I seem to perceive that the alpha is phi. He agrees that while cause may be too much, any sentence using because will do: At a circus: You seem to be seeing that an elephant is coming down the street because an elephant is coming down the street. Grice found the causalist theory of perception particularly attractive since its objection commits one same mistake twice: he mischaracterises the cancellable implicatum of both seem and cause! While Grice is approaching the philosophical item in the philosophical lexicon, perceptio, he is at this stage more interested in vernacular that- clauses such as sensing that, or even more vernacular ones like seeming that, if not seeing that! This is of course philosophical (cf. aesthetikos vs. noetikos), and L and S have perceptĭo, f. perceptio, as used by Cicero (Ac. 2, 7, 22) translating catalepsis,and which they render as a taking, receiving; a gathering in, collecting.  Ambros. in Luc. 4, 15: frugum fruetuumque reliquorum, Cic. Off. 2, 3, 12: fructuum, Col. 1, 3, 2., also as perception, comprehension, cf.: notio, cognitio ): animi perceptiones, notions, ideas, Cic. Ac. 2, 7, 22: cognitio aut perceptio, aut si verbum e verbo volumus comprehensio, quam κατάληψιν illi vocant, id. ib. 2, 6, 17, in philosophy, direct apprehension of an object by the mind, Zeno Stoic.1.20, Luc. Par. 4, al.; τῶν μετεώρων Philostr. Her. 10.9; ἀκριβὴς κ. certainty, Herod. Med. ap. Aët. 9.37: pl., perceptions, Stoic.2.30, Luc. Herm.81, etc.; introduced into Latin by Cicero, Plu. Cic. 40. As for causa, he was even more sure he was exploring a time-honoured philosophical topic. The entry in L and S is causa (by Cicero, and also a little after him, caussa , Quint. 1, 7, 20; so Fast. Prænest. 321, 322; Inscr. Orell. 3681; 4077; 4698 al.; in Mon. Ancyr. 3, 1 dub.), which they judge to be perh. root cav- of caveo, prop. that which is defended or protected; cf. cura, and that they render as, unhelpfully, as cause, that by, on account of, or through which any thing takes place or is done; a cause, reason, motive, inducement; also, in gen., an occasion, opportunity (oeffectis, Quint. 6, 3, 66; 7, 3, 29: factis, id. 4, 2, 52; 12, 1, 36 al.; very freq. in all periods, and in all kinds of discourse. In its different usages syn. with ratio, principium, fons, origo, caput; excusatio, defensio; judicium, controversia, lis; partes, actio; condicio, negotium, commodum, al.). Correlated to aition, or aitia, cause, δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν Hdt. Prooem., cf. Democr. 83, Pl. Ti. 68e, Phd. 97a sq., etc.; on the four causes of Arist. v. Ph. 194b16, Metaph. 983a26: αἰ. τοῦ γενέσθαι or γεγονέναι Pl. Phd. 97a; τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ τῇ πόλει αἰτία ἡ κοινωνία Id. R. 464b: αἰτίᾳ for the sake of, κοινοῦ τινος ἀγαθοῦ Th. 4.87, cf. D. H. 8.29: αἴτιον (cf. αἴτιος 11.2) is used like αἰτία in the sense of cause, not in that of accusation. Grice will go back to perception at a later stage, reminiscing on his joint endeavours with akin Warnock. 1972. Pirots karulise elatically, potching and cotching obbles, Pirotese, Pirotese, creature construction, philosophical psychology. Grice was fascinated by Carnaps pirots which karulise elatically. Grice adds potching for something like perceiving and cotching for something like cognising. 

SENSE-DATUM: With his essay Some remarks about the senses, Grice introduces the question by which criterion we distinguish our five senses into the contemporary philosophy of perception. The literature concerning this question is not very numerous but the discussion is still alive and was lately inspired by the volume The Senses2. There are four acknowledged possible answers to the question how we distinguish the senses, all of them already stated by Grice: (1) The senses are distinguished by the properties we perceive by them. (2) The senses are distinguished by the phenomenal qualities of the perception itself or as Grice puts it “by the special introspectible character of the experiences” 3. (3) The senses are distinguished by the physical stimuli that are responsible for the relevant perceptions. (4) The senses are distinguished by the sense-organs that are (causally) involved in the production of the relevant perceptions. Most contributions discussing this issue reject answers (3) and (4) in a very short argumentation. Nearly all philosophers writing on the topic vote either for answer (1) or for answer (2). Accordingly, most part of the debate regarding the initial question takes the form of a dispute between these two positions. Or” was a big thing in Oxford philosophy. The only known published work of Wood, our philosophy tutor at Christ Church, was an essay in Mind, the philosophers journal, entitled “Alternative Uses of “Or” ”, a work which was every bit as indeterminate as its title. Several years later he published another paper, this time for the Aristotelian Society, entitled On being forced to a conclusion. Cf. Grice and Wood on the demands of conversational reason. Wood, The force of linguistic rules. Wood, on the implicatum of or in review in Mind of Connor, Logic. The five senses, as Urmson notes, are to see that the sun is shining, to hear that the car collided, to feel that her pulse is beating, to smell that something has been smoking and to taste that. An interesting piece in that it was commissioned by Butler, who knew Grice from his Oxford days. Grice cites Wood and R. Albritton. Grice is concerned with a special topic in the philosophy of perception, notably the identification of the traditional five senses: vision, audition, taste, smell, and tact. He introduces what is regarded in the philosophical literature as the first thought-experiment, in terms of the senses that Martians may have. They have two pairs of eyes: are we going to allow that they see with both pairs? Grice introduces a sub-division of seeing: a Martian x-s an object with his upper pair of eyes, but he y-s an object with the lower pair of eyes. In his exploration, he takes a realist stance, which respects the ordinary discursive ways to approach issues of perception. A second interesting point is that in allowing this to be reprinted in Butlers Analytic philosophy, Grice is demonstrating that analytic philosophers should NOT be obsessed with ordinary language. Butlers compilation, a rather dry one, is meant as a response to the more linguistic oriented ones by Flew (Grices first tutee at St. Johns, as it happens), also published by Blackwell, and containing pieces by Austin, and company. One philosopher who took Grice very seriously on this was Coady, in his The senses of the Martians. Grice provides a serious objection to his own essay in Retrospective epilogue We see with our eyes. I.e. eye is teleologically defined. He notes that his way of distinguishing the senses is hardly an established thesis. Grice actually advances this topic in his earlier Causal theory. Grice sees nothing absurd in the idea that a non-specialist concept should contain, so to speak, a blank space to be filled in by the specialist; that this is so, e.g., in the case of the concept of seeing is perhaps indicated by the consideration that if we were in doubt about the correctness of speaking of a certain creature with peculiar sense-organs as seeing objects, we might well wish to hear from a specialist a comparative account of the human eye and the relevant sense-organs of the creature in question. He returns to the point in Retrospective epilogue with a bit of doxastic humility, We see with our eyes is analytic  ‒ but philosophers should take that more seriously.  Grice tested the playmates of his children, aged 7 and 9, with Nothing can be green and red all over. Instead, Morley Bunker preferred philosophy undergrads. Aint that boring? To give examples: Summer follows Spring was judged analytic by Morley-Bunkers informants, as cited by Sampson, in Making sense (Clarendon) by highly significant majorities in each group of Subjectss, while We see with our eyes was given near-even split votes by each group. Over all, the philosophers were somewhat more consistent with each other than the non-philosophers. But that global finding conceals results for individual sentences that sometimes manifested the opposed tendency. Thus, Thunderstorms are electrical disturbances in the atmosphere is judged analytic by a highly significant majority of the non-philosophers, while a non-significant majority of the philosophers deemed it non-analytic or synthetic. In this case, it seems, philosophical training, surely not brain-washing, induces the realisation that well-established results of contemporary science are not necessary truths. In other cases, conversely, cliches of current philosophical education impose their own mental blinkers on those who undergo it: Nothing can be completely red and green all over is judged analytic by a significant majority of philosophers but only by a non-significant majority of non-philosophers. All in all, the results argue strongly against the notion that our inability to decide consistently whether or not some statement is a necessary truth derives from lack of skill in articulating our underlying knowledge of the rules of our language. Rather, the inability comes from the fact that the question as posed is unreal. We choose to treat a given statement as open to question or as unchallengeable in the light of the overall structure of beliefs which we have individually evolved in order to make sense of our individual experience. Even the cases which seem clearly analytic or synthetic are cases which individuals judge alike because the relevant experiences are shared by the whole community, but even for such cases one can invent hypothetical or suppositional future experiences which, if they should be realised, would cause us to revise our judgements. This is not intended to call into question the special status of the truths of logic, such as either Either it is raining or it is not. He is of course inclined to accept the traditional view according to which logical particles such as not and or are distinct from the bulk of the vocabulary in that the former really are governed by clear-cut inference rules. Grice does expand on the point.

Grice at Cornell, the Cornell Seminar, Grices Seminar at Cornell, 1966, The Grice Papers, s.  III , c. 5-f. 1, . : philosophy of action, Thomson Historically important in that they predate his Harvard James lectures which made of him a household Names in New-World philosophy. Harman cites a seminar by Grice on trying at Brandeis, 1962.

Grices three lectures on trying at Brandeis. Cf. his later remarks on trying (to cash a cheque) in Prolegomena at Harvard.

IMPLICATURE: Those without a philosophical background tend to ignore a joke by Grice! His echoing Kant in the James is a joke, in the sense that he is using Katns well-known to be pretty artificial quartet of ontological caegories to apply to a totally different phenomenon: the taxonomy of the maxims! In his earlier non-jocular attempts, he applied more philosophical concepts with a more serious rationale. His key concept, conversation as rational co-operation, underlies all his attempts. A pretty worked-out model is in terms then of this central, or overarching principle of conversational helpfulness (where conversation as cooperation need not be qualified as conversation as RATIONAL co-operation) and being structured by two contrasting sub-principles: the principle of conversational benevolence (which almost overlaps with the principle of conversational helpfulness) and the slightly more jocular principle of conversational self-love. There is something oxymoronic about self-love being conversational, and this is what leads to replace the two subprinciples by a principle of conversational helfpulness (as used in WoW:IV) simpliciter. His desideratum of conversational candour is key. The clash between the desideratum of conversational candour and the desideratum of conversational clarity (call them supermaxims) explains why I believe that p (less clear than p) shows the primacy of candour over clarity. The idea remains of an overarching principle and a set of more specific guidelines. Non-Oxonian philosophers would see Grices appeal to this or that guideline as ad hoc, but not his tutees! Grice finds inspiration in Joseph Butler’s sermon on benevolence and self-love. Sermon 9, Upon the love of our neighbour, preached on advent Sunday. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, Namesly, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.—Romans xiii. 9.  It is commonly observed, that there is a disposition in men to complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they live, as greater than that of former ones: which is usually followed with this further observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all times. Now, to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts of history: thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in some ages than in others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the distinction of the present, to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards to self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over all other principles; "or whether the contracted affection may not possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own end, private good?" Reprinted in revised form as Part I of WOW . Grice felt the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, Never contradict. Never explain) of the nuances about seem and cause (Causal theory of perception.). He had used Smiths My wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom as relying on a requirement of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice. Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. Variations on a theme by Grice. I wish to represent a certain subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants, as in a casual conversation. But at each stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to observe, viz.: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the co-operative principle. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to observe, viz.:  Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative Principle. Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants are. Less literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why logic and conversation? Logica had been part of the trivium for ages ‒ Although they called it dialectica, then. Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by Strawsons treatment of the formal devices in Introduction to Logical Theory, Grice targets these, in their ordinary-discourse counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his logic tutor – Strawson was following a P. P. E., and his approach to logic was practical. His philosophy tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit. Hum.the situation was different. He knew that the Categoriae and De Int.  of his beloved Aristotle were part of the Logical Organon which had been so influential in the history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile Strawsons observations with the idea that the formal devices reproduce some sort of explicatum, or explicitum, as identified by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica. In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The alleged divergence between the ordinary-language operators and their formal counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicata, then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal device and its alleged ordinary-language counterpart, while still assuming that U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation  ‒ the exchange of information and the institution of decisions  ‒ and judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and rational) if conducted under some form of principle of conversational helpfulness. The observation of a principle of  conversational helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness. In titling his seminar Logic and conversation, Grice is thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal Introduction to logical theory, that every Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he acknwoledges Grices difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the strength or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses an adjective that Grice will seldom do, pragmatic. On top, Strawson attributes the adjective to rule. For Grice, in Strawsons wording, there is this or that pragmatic rule to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a weaker conversational move. Strawsons Introduction was published before Grice aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it is Grices occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as generating implicata under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes it obvious that Grices interest is methodological, and not philological. He is not interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicatum, which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his expression does, a distinction apparently denied by Witters and all too frequently ignored by Austin. Logic and conversation, an Oxford seminar, 1964, implicatum, principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational implicature, conversational implicatum. Conversational Implicature Grices main invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his expression does. A distinction apparently denied by Witters, and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin. Grice is implicating that Austins sympathies were for the Subjectsification of Linguistic Nature. Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicatum, which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. I can very well mean that my tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering It is raining.Grice notes that since the object of the present exercise, is to provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of cases, why is it that a particular implicature is present, I would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this model should be: can it be used to construct an explanation of the presence of such an implicature, and is it more comprehensive and more economical than any rival? is the no doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give of such an implicature consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise: whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics, Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery questions in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever physician, who, when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for poison even from a serpent.qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti machiNamesntis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio compellit et de serpente conficivnt. If he lectured on Logic and Conversation on implicature, Grice must have thought that Strawsons area was central. Yet, as he had done in Causal theory and as he will at Harvard, Grice kept collecting philosophers mistakes. So its best to see Grice as a methodologist, and as using logic and conversation as an illustration of his favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a balance: surely logic and conversation is a topic of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all philosophers – unless they are Griceians! – to keep a broad unitarian view of philosophy as  avirtuous whole! Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. Destructive implicature to it: Mr. Puddle is our man in æsthetics implicates he is not good at it. What is important to Grice is that the mistakes of these philosophers (notably Strawson!) arise from some linguistic phenomena,or, since we must use singular expressions this or that linguistic phenomenon. Or as Grice puts it, it is this or that linguistic phenomenon which provides the material for the philosopher to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory of conversation as rational co-operation is posited – technically, as a way to explain (never merely describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf. never explain, never apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: Never contradict. Never explain.) these phenomena – his principle of conversational helpfulness and the idea of a conversational implicatum. The latter is based not so much on rationality per se, but on the implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly plays with, since his earlier semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But back to this or that linguistic phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle for providing this or that linguistic phenomenon that no philosopher would ever feel excited about, Grice himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a philosophical point with this or that linguistic phenomenon that would not be necessarily connected with philosophy. He rarely quotes authors, but surely the section in Causal theory where he lists seven philosophical theses (which are ripe for an implicatum treatment) would be familiar enough for anybody to be able to drop a Names to attach to each! At Harvard, almost every example Grice gives of this or that linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and sometimes he expands on his own view of them, just to amuse his audience – and show how committed to this or that thesis he was), but some are not unauthored. And they all belong to the linguistic turn: He quotes from Ryle (who thought he knew about ordinary language), Wittgenstein, Austin (he quotes him in great detail, from Pretending, Plea of excuses, and No modification without aberration,), Strawson (in Introduction to Logical theory and on Truth for Analysis), Hart (as I have heard him expand on this), Searle, and Benjamin . He implicates Hare (on good). Etc. When we mention the explicit/implicit distinction as source for the implicatum, we are referring to Grices own wording in Retrospective epilogue where he mentions an utterer as conveying in some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a gentler, more (midland or southern) English, way, via implicature, or implIciture, if you mustnt. Cf. Fowler: As a southern Englishman, Ive stopped trying teaching a northern Englishman the distinction between ought and shall. He seems to get it always wrong. It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His point would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of conversational helpfulness is in order allows Pirot-1 not just to convey in a direct explicit fashion that p, but in an implicit fashion that q, where q is the implicatum. The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of this or that implicata, to use Grices word (generate). Surely, He took off his boots and went to bed; I wont say in which order sounds hardly in the vein of conversational helpfulness – but provided Grice does not see it as logically incoherent, it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The point may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying, Viva Boole! Grices point about rationality is mentioned in his later Prolegomena, on at least two occasions. Rational behaviour is the phrase he uses (as applied first to communication and then to discourse) and in stark opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin. Grice is here less interested here as he will be on rationality, but coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a mutual one between decent chaps, as he puts it. His charming decent chap is so Oxonian. His tutee would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more!

UNCERTAINTY: In the end, its all about the converational implciata and conversation as rational co-operation. Why does Pirot 2 should judge that Pirot 1 is being more or less certain about what he is talking? Theres a rationale for that! Our conversation does not consist of idle remarks. Grices example: "The Chairman of the British Academy has a corkscrew in his pocket. Urmsons example: "The king is visiting Oxford tomorrow. Why? Oh, for no reason at all As a philosophical psychologist, and an empiricist with realist tendencies, Grice was obsessed with what he called (in a nod to the Kiparskys) the factivity of know. Surely, Grices preferred collocation, unlike surely Ryles, is "Grice knows that p." Grice has no problem in seeing this as involving three clauses: First, p. Second, Grice believes that p, and third, p causes Grices belief. No mention of certainty. This is the neo-Prichardian in Grice, from having been a neo-Stoutian (Stout was obsessed, as a few Oxonians like Hampshire and Hart were, with certainty). If the three-prong analysis of know applies to the doxastic, Grices two-prong analysis of intending in Intention and UNcertainty, again purposively avoiding certainty, covers the buletic realm. This does not mean that Grice, however proud he was of his ignorance of the history of philosophy (He held it as a badge of honour, his tuteee Strawson recalls), had read some of the philosophical classics to realise that certainty had been an obsession of what Ryle abusively (as he himself puts it) called Descartes and the Establishments "official doctrine"! While ps true in Grices analysis of know is harmless enough, there obviously is no correlate for ps truth in the buletic case. Grices example is Grice intending to scratch his head, via his willing that Grice scratches his head in t2. In this case, as he notes, the doxastic eleent involves the uniformity of nature, and ones more or less relying that if Grice had a head to be scratched in t1, he will have a head to be sratched in t2, when his intention actually GETS satisfied, or fulfilled. Grice was never worried about buletic satisfaction. As the intentionalist that Suppes showed us Grice was, Grice is very much happy to say that if Smith intends to give Joness a job, the facct as to whether Jones actually gets the job is totally irrelevant for most philosophical purposes. He gets more serious when he is happier with privileged access than incorrigibility in "Method in philosophical psychology." But he is less strict than Austin. For Austin, "Thats a finch implies that the utterer KNOWS its a finch. While Grice has a maxim, do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence (Gettiers analysandum)  and a super-maxim, try to make your contribution one that is true,  the very phrasing highlights Grices cavalier to this! Imagine Kant turning on his grave. "Try!?". Grice is very clever in having try in the super-maxim, and a prohibition as the maxim, involving falsehood avoidance, "Do not say what you believe to be false." Even here he is cavalier. "Cf. "Do not say what you KNOW to be false." If Gettier were wrong, the combo of maxims yields, "Say what you KNOW," say what you are certain about! Enough for Sextus Empiricus having one single maxim: "Either utter a phenomenalist utterance, a question or an order, or keep your mouth shut!." (cf. Grice, "My lips are sealed," as cooperative or helfpul in ways -- "At least he is not lying."). Hampshire, in the course of some recent remarks,l advances the view that self-prediction is (logically) impossible. When I say I know that I shall do X (as against, e.g., X will happen to me, or You will do X), I am not contemplating myself, as I might someone else, and giving tongue to a conjecture about myself and my future acts, as I might be doing about someone else or about the behaviour ofan animal -for that would be tantamount (if I understand him rightly) to looking upon myself from outside, as it were, and treating my own acts as mere caused events. In saying that I know that I shall do X, I am, on this view, saying that I have decided to do X: for to predict that I shall in certain circumstances in fact do X or decide to do X, with no reference to whether or not I have already decided to do it - to say I can tell you now that I shall in fact act in manner X, although I am, as a matter of fact, determined to do the very opposite - does not make sense. Any man who says I know myself too well to believe that, whatever I now decide, I shall do anything other than X when the circumstances actually arise is in fact, if I interpret Hampshires views correctly, saying that he does not really, i.e. seriously, propose to set himself against doing X, that he does not propose even to try to act otherwise, that he has in fact decided to let events take their course. For no man who has truly decided to try to avoid X can, in good faith, predict his own failure to act as he has decided. He may fail to avoid X, and he may predict this; but he cannot both decide to try to avoid X and predict that he will not even try to do this; for he can always try; and he knows this: he knows that this is what distinguishes him from non-human creatures in nature. To say that he will fail even to try is tantamount to saying that he has decided not to try. In this sense I know means I have decided and (Murdoch, Hampshire, Gardiner and Pears, Freedom and Knowledge, in Pears (ed.), Freedom and tAe Will (London,), 80-104) cannot in principle be predictive. That, if I have understood it, is Hampshires position, and I have a good deal of sympathy with it, for I can see that self-prediction is often an evasive way of disclaiming responsibility for difficult decisions, while deciding in fact to let events take their course, disguising this by attributing responsibility for what occurs to my own allegedly unalterable nature. But I agree with Hampshires critics in the debate, whom I take to be maintaining that, although the situation he describes may often occur, yet circumstances may exist in which it is possible for me both to say that I am, at this moment, resolved not to do X, and at the same time to predict that I shall do X, because I am not hopeful that, when the time comes, I shall in fact even so much as try to resist doing X. I can, in effect, say I know myself well. When the crisis comes, do not rely on me to help you. I may well run away; although I am at this moment genuinely resolved not to be cowardly and to do all I can to stay at your side. My prediction that my resolution will not in fact hold up is based on knowledge of my own character, and not on my present state of mind; my prophecy is not a symptom of bad faith (for I am not, at this moment, vacillating) but, on the contrary, of good faith, of a wish to face the facts. I assure you in all sincerity that my present intention is to be brave and resist. Yet you would run a great risk if you relied too much on my present decision; it would not be fair to conceal my past failures of nerve from you. I can say this about others, despite the most sincere resolutions on their part, for I can foretell how in fact they will behave; they can equally predict this about me. Despite Hampshires plausible and tempting argument, I believe that such objective self-knowledge is possible and occur. From Descartes to Stout and back. Stout indeed uses both intention and certainty, and in the same paragraph. Stout notes that, at the outset, performance falls far short of intention. Only a certain s. of contractions of certain muscles, in proper proportions and in a proper order, is capable of realising the end aimed at, with the maximum of rapidity and certainty, and the minimum of obstruction and failure, and corresponding effort. At the outset of the process of acquisition, muscles are contracted which are superfluous, and which therefore operate as disturbing conditions. Grices immediate trigger, however, is Ayer on sure that, and having the right to be sure, as his immediate trigger later will be Hampshire and Hart. Grice had high regard for Hampshires brilliant Thought and action.  He was also concerned with Stouts rather hasty UNphilosophical, but more scientifically psychologically-oriented remarks about assurance in practical concerns. He knew too that he was exploring an item of the philosophers lexicon (certus) that had been brought to the forum when Anscombe and von Wright translate Witters German expression Gewißheit in Über Gewißheit as Certainty. The Grecians were never sure about being sure. But the modernist turn brought by Descartes meant that Grice now had to deal with incorrigibility and privileged access to this or that pirot, notably himself (When I intend to go, I dont have to observe myself, Im on the stage, not in the audience, or Only I can say I will to London, expressing my intention to do so. If you say, You will go you are expressing yours! Grice found Descartes very funny ‒ in a French way. Grice is interested in contesting Ayer and other Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for certainty. In so doing, Grice choses Descartess time-honoured criterion of clarity and distinction, as applied to perception.  Grice does NOT quote Descartes in French! In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two kinds of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes: (a) objective certainty: Ordinary-language variant: It is certain that p, whatever it refers to. cf. Grice, its an illusion. What is it? (b) Subjectsive certainty: Ordinary-language variant: I am certain that p. I being, of course, Grice, in my bestest days, of course! There are further items on Descartes in the Grice Collection, notably in the last s. of topics arranged alphabetically. Grice never cared to publish his views on Descartes until he found an opportunity to do so when compiling his WOW . Grice is not interested in an exegesis of Descartess thought. He doesnt care to give a reference to any edition of Descartess oeuvre. But he plays with certain. It is certain that p is objective certainty, apparently. I am certain that p is Subjectsive certainty, rather. Oddly, Grice will turn to UNcertainty as it connects with intention in his British Academy lecture. Grices interest in Descartes connects with Descartess search for a criterion of certainty in terms of clarity and distinction of this or that perception.  Having explored the philosophy of perception with Warnock, its only natural he wanted to give Descartess rambles a second and third look! 1966, Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in WOW , part 2, eemantics and metaphysics, essay, Descartes on clear and distinct perception and Malcom on dreaming, perception, Descartes, clear and distinct perception, Malcolm, dreaming. Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice versa.  Descartes on clear and distinct perception,  in WOW , Descartes on clear and distinct perception, 1966, Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in WOW , part II, semantics and metaphysics, essay. Grice gives a short overview of Cartesian metaphysics for the BBC third programme. The best example, Grice thinks, of a metaphysical snob is provided by Descartes, about whose idea of certainty Grice had philosophised quite a bit, since its in total contrast with Moores! Descartes is a very scientifically minded philosopher, with very clear ideas about the proper direction for science.  Descartes, whose middle Names seems to have been Euclid, thinks that mathematics, and in particular geometry, provides the model for a scientific procedure, or method.  And this determines all of Descartess thinking in two ways. First, Descartes thinks that the fundamental method in science is the axiomatic deductive method of geometry, and this Descartes conceives (as Spinoza morality more geometrico) of as rigorous reasoning from a self-evident axiom (Cogito, ergo sum.). Second, Descartes thinks that the Subjects matter of physical science, from mechanics to medicine, must be fundamentally the same as the Subjects matter of geometry! The only characteristics that the objects studied by geometry poses are spatial characteristics. So from the point of view of science in general, the only important features of things in the physical world were also their spatial characteristics, what he called extensio, res extensa. Physical science in general is a kind of dynamic, or kinetic, geometry.   Here we have an exclusive preference for a certain type of scientific method, and a certain type of scientific explanation: the method is deductive, the type of explanation mechanical. These beliefs about the right way to do science are exactly reflected in Descartess ontology, one of the two branches of metaphysics; the other is philosophical eschatology, or the study of categories), and it is reflected in his doctrine, that is, about what really exists.  Apart from God, the divine substance, Descartes recognises just two kinds of substance, two types of real entity. First, there is material substance, or matter; and the belief that the only scientifically important characteristics of things in the physical world are their spatial characteristics goes over, in the language of metaphysics,into the doctrine that these are their only characteristics. Second, and to Ryles horror, Descartes recognizes the mind or soul, or the mental substance, of which the essential characteristic is thinking; and thinking itself, in its pure form at least, is conceived of as simply the intuitive grasping of   this or that self-evident axiom and this or that of its deductive consequence. These restrictive doctrines about reality and knowledge naturally call for adjustments elsewhere in our ordinary scheme of things. With the help of the divine substance, these are duly provided.  It is not always obvious that the metaphysicians scheme involves this kind of ontological preference, or favoritism, or prejudice, or snobbery this tendency, that is, to promote one or two categories of entity to the rank of the real, or of the ultimately real, to the exclusion of others, Descartess entia realissima. One is taught at Oxford that epistemology begins with the Moderns such as Descartes, which is not true. Grice was concerned with certain, which was applied in Old Roman times to this or that utterer: the person who is made certain in reference to a thing, certain, sure:  certi sumus periisse omnia, Cic. Att. 2, 19, 5: num quid nunc es certior? Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 191: posteritatis, i. e. of posthumous fame, Plin. Ep. 9, 3, 1: sententiæ, Quint. 4, 3, 8: judicii, Sen. Ep. 45, 9: certus de suā geniturā, Suet. Vesp. 25: damnationis, id. Tib. 61: exitii, Tac. A. 1, 27: spei, id. H. 4, 3: matrimonii, id. A. 12, 3: certi sumus, etc., Gell. 18, 10, 5. In class. prose mostly in the phrase certiorem facere aliquem (de aliquā re, alicujus rei, with a foll, acc. and inf., with a rel.-clause or absol.), to inform, apprise one of a thing: me certiorem face, Ter. Phorm. 4, 3, 69: ut nos facias certiores, Plaut. Curc. 5, 2, 32: uti se (sc. Cæsarem) de his rebus certiorem faciant, Cæs. B. G. 2, 2: qui certiorem me sui consilii fecit, Cic. Att. 9, 2, a, 2: Cæsarem certiorem faciunt, sese non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibere, Cæs. B. G. 1, 11: faciam te certiorem quid egerim, Cic. Att. 3, 11, 1. With subj. only: milites certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium, Cæs. B. G. 3, 5 fin. Pass.: quod crebro certior per me fias de omnibus rebus, Cic. Fam. 1, 7, 1; so Cæs. B. G. 1, 7; Sall. J. 104, 1: Cæsar certior factus est, tres jam copiarum partes Helvetios id flumen transduxisse, Cæs. B. G. 1, 12; so id. ib. 1, 21; 1, 41; 2, 1; Sall. J. 82, 2; Nep. Att. 12, 3: factus certior, quæ res gererentur, Cæs. B. C. 1, 15: non consulibus certioribus factis, Liv. 45, 21, 4. Also in posit., though rarely: fac me certum quid tibi est, Plaut. Ps. 1, 1, 16; 4, 6, 35; Verg. A. 3, 179: lacrimæ suorum Tam subitæ matrem certam fecere ruinæ, Ov. M. 6, 268.

EUDAIMONISM: While Grice claims to love Kantotle, he cannot hide his greater reverence, instilled early on at Corpus, for Aristotle. An Oxonian need not recite Kant in what during the Second World War was referred to as the Hun, and while Aristotle was a no-no at Clifton (koine!), Hardie made Grice loved him. With eudaemonia, found a perfect synthetic concept to balance his innate analytic tendencies. Grecian eudaemonism and Griceian eudaemonism. L and S are not too helpful. Theres εὐδαιμονία , Ion. -ιη, which they render not as happiness, but as prosperity, good fortune, opulence, h.Hom. 11.5, Pi. N.7.56, Hdt.1.5,32, Hp.Ep.11 (v.l.), etc.; χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐ. Th.2.97; of countries, Hdt.5.28, 7.220, etc.; “μοῖρ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας” Pi.P.3.84: pl., E.IA591 (anap.), Pl.Phd.115d. In a second  use it is indeed rendered as true, full happiness, “εὐ. οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐν χρυσῷ” Democr.171; εὐ. ψυχῆς, oκακοδαιμονίη, Id.170, cf. Pl. Def. 412d, Arist. EN1095a18, Zeno Stoic.1.46, etc. b. personified as a divinity, SIG985.8 (Philadelphia). Theres eudaemonia and theres kakodaemonia. Of course, Grices locus classicus is EN1095a18. Grice H. P. Grices fairy godmother. Cf. Austin on agathon and eudaimonia in Aristotles ethics. Agathon and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Aristotle is Austins response to an article on the meaning of Agathon in the Ethics of Aristotle, published by H. A. Pritchard in 1935. Pritchard argues that Aristotle regarded agathon to mean conducive to eudaimonia and, consequently, that Aristotle maintains that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire for eudaemonia. Austin finds fault with this view: first, agathon in Aristotle does not have a single sense, and a fortiori not the one Pritchard suggests. Secondly, if one had to summarise the SENSE of agathon in one phrase, being desired cannot fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides τό άγαθόν, even if Davidson would disagree. Revisiting Prichards essay of "Philosophy" may help. Prichard endeavours to specify what Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, it seems to mean simply that being desired or a persons ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim. In other contexts, αγαθον takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as a good. Prichard argues that by "αγαθον" Aristotle actually means (except in the Nicomachean Ethics) conducive to happiness, and holds that when a man acts deliberately, he does it from a desire to be happy. Prichard attributes this position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements inconsistent with this view of our ultimate aim. Grice took life seriously: philosophical biology! Philosophy of life is dated 1966 in P. G. R. I. C. E. Grice bases his thought on Ackrills Dawes Hicks essay for the B. A. who quotes extensively from Hardie. Grice also considers that serious student of Greek philosophy,  JAustin, in his essay on eudaimonia in Aristotle.  Grices fairy godmother. Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Greek eudaimonia means, is Namesly that eudaimonia is to be understood as the Names for that state or condition which ones good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for one. And my good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to me, solely by concern for my well-being or happiness. To change the idiom, eudæmonia is the general characterization of what a full-time and unhampered fairy godmother would secure for you. Grice is concerned with the specific system of ends that eudaimonia consists for for both Kant and Aristotle (or Kantotle for short). Grice borrows, but never returns, some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. Johns, Ackrill. Ackrills point is about the etymological basis for eudaimonia, from eudaimon, or good dæmon, as Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken quite literally. Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of eudaemonia to the agent. For Grice, as for Aristotle, and indeed Kant (Kantotle, in short), a telos and eudaemonia are related in subtle ways. For eudaemonia we cannot deal with just ONE end, but a system of ends (Although such a system may be a singleton). Grice specifies a subtle way of characterising end so that a particular ascription of an end may entail an ascription of eudaemonia. Grice follows the textual criticism of his former tutee, Ackrill, in connection with the Socratic point that eudaemonia IS literally related to the eudaemon. Warner has explored Grices concept of happiness, notably in P. G. R. I. C. E. Warner was especially helpful with Grices third difficult Carus lecture, a metaphysical defence of absolute value. Warner also connected with Grice in such topics as the philosophy of perception (seen in an evolutionary light) and the Kantotelian idea of happiness. In response to Warners overview of Grices oeuvre for the festschrift (that Warner co-authored with Grandy), Grice refers to the editors by the collective Names of Richards. While Grice felt he had to use happiness, he is always having Aristotles eudaimonia in mind! The implicata of Smith is happy are more complex than Kantotle thought! Austen knew! (You decide if youre happy! — Emma). Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life! Grice took life seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the Descartes paper in Studies (where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit, even if he implicates he is no Cartesian scholar – what Oxonian would?  ‒: it concerns certainty. And certainty was originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also Oxonian, in parts. Ayer was saying that to know is to assure that one is certain or sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play and explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and privileged access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is authoritative. And he plays with meaning, too when provoking Malcolm in a don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know? Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one means Strawsonian and otiose! (Tutees!). Grice loved to place himself in the role of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutees inabilities, a whole week long – until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday morning! Now, the logical form of certain is a trick. Grice would symbolize it as numbering of operators. If Pirot G ψs p, Pirot G ψs ψs p, and Pirot G ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesnt think so. Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver that lecture at London he chose intention and uncertainty as its topic, just to provoke. Not surprisingly, the Intention and uncertainty piece opens with the sceptics challenge. And he wont conclude that the intender is certain. Only that theres some good chance (p greater than 0.5) that what he intends will get through! When there is a will, there is a way, When there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing! Perhaps by know Moore means certain. Grice was amused by the fact that Moore thought that he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasnt. He uses Moores misuse of know – according to Malcolm – both in Causal theory and Prolegomena. And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptics implicature, 1946 above, with the two essays Scepticism and Common sense and Moore and Philosophers Paradoxes reprinted (one partially) in Studies. With regard to certainty, it is interesting to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with privileged access, but with incorrigibility. Do we not have privileged access to our own beliefs and desires? And, worse still, may it not be true that at least some of our avowals of our beliefs and desires are incorrigible? One of Grices problems is, as he puts it, how to accommodate privileged access and, maybe, incorrigibility. This or that a second-order state may be, in some fashion, incorrigible. On the contrary, for Grice, this or that lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged access. Note that while he is happy to allow privileged access to lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or second-order may, in some fashion, be said to count as an incorrigible avowal. It rains. Pirot judges it rains (privileged access). Pirot judges that Pirot judges that it rains (incorrigibile). The justification is conversational. It rains says the pirot, or expresses the pirot. Grice wants to be able to say that if a pirot expresses that p, the pirot judges₂ that p. If the pirot expresses that it rains, the pirot judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order, higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick with judging here. Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones. If pirot expresses !p, pirot ψ-s₂ that !p. His second-order, higher-order buletic state is incorrigibile (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a matter only of privileged access. 

ILLUSION: Hallucination is Grice’s topic.Malcolm argues in Dreaming and Skepticism and in his Dreaming that the notion of a dream qua conscious experience that occurs at a definite time and has definite duration during sleep, is unintelligible. This contradicts the views of philosophers like Descartes (and indeed Moore!), who, Malcolm holds, assume that a human being may have a conscious thought and a conscious experience during sleep. Descartes claims that he had been deceived during sleep. Malcolms point is that ordinary language contrasts consciousness and sleep. The claim that one is conscious while one is sleep-walking is stretching the use of the term. Malcolm rejects the alleged counter-examples based on sleepwalking or sleep-talking, e.g. dreaming that one is climbing stairs while one is actually doing so is not a counter-example because, in such a case, the individual is not sound asleep after all. If a person is in any state of consciousness, it logically follows that he is not sound asleep. The concept of dreaming is based on our descriptions of dreams after we have awakened in telling a dream. Thus, to have dreamt that one has a thought during sleep is not to have a thought any more than to have dreamt that one has climbed Everest is to have climbed Everest. Since one cannot have an experience during sleep, one cannot have a mistaken experience during sleep, thereby undermining the sort of scepticism based on the idea that our experience might be wrong because we might be dreaming. Malcolm further argues that a report of a conscious state during sleep is unverifiable. If Grice claims that he and Strawson saw a big-foot in charge of the reserve desk at the Bodleian library, one can verify that this took place by talking to Strawson and gathering forensic evidence from the library. However, there is no way to verify Grices claim that he dreamed that he and Strawson saw a big-foot working at the Bodleian. Grices only basis for his claim that he dreamt this is that Grice says so after he wakes up. How does one distinguish the case where Grice dreamed that he saw a big-foot working at The Bodleian and the case in which he dreamed that he saw a person in a big-foot suit working at the library but, after awakening, mis-remembered that person in a big-foot suit as a big-foot proper? If Grice should admit that he had earlier mis-reported his dream and that he had actually dreamed he saw a person in a big-foot suit at The Bodleian, there is no more independent verification for this new claim than there was for the original one. Thus, there is, for Malcolm, no sense to the idea of mis-remembering ones dreams. Malcolm here applies one of Witters ideas from his private language argument. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we cant talk about right. For a similar reason, Malcolm challenges the idea that one can assign a definite duration or time of occurrence to a dream. If Grice claims that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, one could verify this in the usual ways. If, however, Grice says he dreamt that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes, how is one to measure the duration of his dreamt run? If Grice says he was wearing a stopwatch in the dream and clocked his run at 3.4 minutes, how can one know that the dreamt stopwatch is not running at half speed (so that he really dreamt that he ran the mile in 6.8 minutes)? Grice might argue that a dream report does not carry such a conversational implicata. But Malcolm would say that just admits the point. The ordinary criteria one uses for determining temporal duration do not apply to dreamt events. The problem in both these cases (Grice dreaming one saw a bigfoot working at The Bodleian and dreaming that he ran the mile in 3.4 minutes) is that there is no way to verify the truth of these dreamt events — no direct way to access that dreamt inner experience, that mysterious glow of consciousness inside the mind of Grice lying comatose on the couch, in order to determine the facts of the matter. This is because, for Malcolm, there are no facts of the matter apart from the dreamers report of the dream upon awakening. Malcolm claims that the empirical evidence does not enable one to decide between the view that a dream experience occurs during sleep and the view that they are generated upon the moment of waking up. Dennett agrees with Malcolm that nothing supports the received view that a dream involves a conscious experience while one is asleep but holds that such issues might be settled empirically. Malcolm also argues against the attempt to provide a physiological mark of the duration of a dream, for example, the view that the dream lasted as long as the rapid eye movements. Malcolm replies that there can only be as much precision in that common concept of dreaming as is provided by the common criterion of dreaming. These scientific researchers are misled by the assumption that the provision for the duration of a dream is already there, only somewhat obscured and in need of being made more precise. However, Malcolm claims, it is not already there (in the ordinary concept of dreaming). These scientific views are making radical conceptual changes in the concept of dreaming, not further explaining our ordinary concept of dreaming. Malcolm admits, however, that it might be natural to adopt such scientific views about REM sleep as a convention. Malcolm points out, however, that if REM sleep is adopted as a criterion for the occurrence of a dream, people would have to be informed upon waking up that they had dreamed or not. As Pears observes, Malcolm does not mean to deny that people have dreams in favour of the view that they only have waking dream-behaviour. Of course it is no misuse of language to speak of remembering a dream. His point is that since the concept of dreaming is so closely tied to our concept of waking report of a dreams, one cannot form a coherent concept of this alleged inner (private) something that occurs with a definite duration during sleep. Malcolm rejects a certain philosophical conception of dreaming, not the ordinary concept of dreaming, which, he holds, is neither a hidden private something nor mere outward behaviour. Malcolms account of dreaming has come in for considerable criticism. Some argue that Malcolms claim that occurrences in dreams cannot be verified by others does not require the strict criteria that Malcolm proposes but can be justified by appeal to the simplicity, plausibility, and predictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a whole. Some argue that Malcolms account of the sentence I am awake is inconsistent. A comprehensive programme in considerable detail has been offered for an empirical scientific investigation of dreaming of the sort that Malcolm rejects. Others have proposed various counterexamples and counter arguments against Malcolms account of dreaming. Grices emphasis is in Malcolms easy way out with statements to the effect that implicata do or do not operate in dream reports. They do in mine! Grice considers, I may be dreaming in the two essays opening the Part II: Explorations on semantics and metaphysics in WOW .

CONVERSATIONAL CANDOUR: It is all about confidence, you know. U U expects his addressee A will find him confident. Thus we find in Short and Lewis, confīdo, fĭsus sum, 3, I.v. n., wich they render as to trust confidently in something, and also, confide in, rely firmly upon, to believe, be assured of (as an enhancing of sperare, Cic. Att. 6, 9, 1; Nep. Milt. 1, 1; freq. and class. in prose and poetry); constr. with abl., acc. and inf., with dat., rarely with de, ut, or absol. Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. Urmson had developed this. Urmsons key phrase is "implied claim." Whenever an utterer makes a conversational contribution in a standard context, there is an implied claim to the utterer being trustworthy and reasonable.  What do Grice and Urmson mean by an "implied claim"? Its obvious enough, but they both loved to expand. Whenever an utterer U utters a sentence which can be used to convey truth or falsehood there is an implied claim to trustworthiness by the utterer, unless the situation shows that this is not so. The utterer is acting or reciting or incredulously echoing the remark of another, or flouting the expectation. This, Urmson thinks, may need an explanation.  Suppose that an utterer utters the sentence It will rain tomorrow or It rained yesterday, or Its raining in ordinary circumstances.  This act carries with it the claim that the utterer should be trusted and that it will rain tomorrow.  By this is meant that just as it is understood that no utterer will give an order unless he is entitled to give orders, so it is understood that no utterer will utter a sentence of a kind which can be used to make a statement unless he is willing to claim that that statement is true, and hence one would be acting in a misleading manner if one uttered the sentence if he was not willing to make that claim.  The predicate implies that , Grice and Urmson hasten to add, as Nowell-Smith, and Grant do, is being used in such a way that, if there is a an expectation that a thing ks be done in Circumstance C, the utterer implies that C holds if he does the thing. The point has often been made before, though not always in these terms, and it is, Urmson and Grice believe, in substance uncontroversial. Grice and Urmson wish to make the point that, when an utterer U deploys a hedge with an indicative sentence, there is not merely an implied claim that the whole statement is true but also that is true.  This is surely obvious in some cases. I believe it will rain. He is, I regret, too fast. You intend, I gather, to refuse. But Grice and Urmson think that a little thought shows that it is also true in the case of, say, I hear that he is ill in bed, He is, I hear, ill in bed. An utterer would not say these things if he did not accept the report on which the statement is based, and by saying it the utterer implies that he can be claimed to be trustworthy. Grice is more careful than Urmson here in that the primary buletic or doxastic claim is more crucially (even in a NON ceteris paribus way), expressed than merely implied, though. Vide, Way of Words, iii, on Moores paradox. The utterers implied or expressed claim to trustworthiness need not be very strong.  The whole point of a hedge is to modify or to weaken (if not, as Grice would have it, flout) the utterers claim to full trustworthiness which would be implied by the assertion.  But even if the utterer utters He is, I suppose, at home or  I guess that the penny will come down heads"  the utterer expresses, or for Urmson plainly implies, with however little reason, that this is what he accept as worth his addressees trust,  We our statements  In con as well as logical.  E.g. the utterer often have an emotional attitude to the fact he states, or it is likely to arouse emotion in his addresee.  To some extent, both by accident and by design our manner, intonation and choice of words betray the utterers attitude and prepares his addressee.  But this is imprecise and uncertain, and, in writing, is difficult to get right for all but the great stylist.  Again, content and manner give some clue to the addressee of how he is to understand the statement in relation to its logical context, but not infallibly.  Further, the utterer makes his statement sometimes with good, sometimes with moderate, sometimes with poor evidence.  Which of these situations the utterer is in need not be obvious to the addressee, and it would be cumbersome always to convey explicitly.  It is Grices and Urmsons contention that a hedge is one of the sets of devices that an utterer uses in order to deal with these matters, though not the only set.  By them the utterer primes his addressee to see the emotional significance, the logical relevance, and the reliability of his statement.  This the utterer does not by telling the addressee how he is moved or how he should be moved by the statement, nor by telling him how the utterers statement fits into the context, nor by describing the evidential situation, but by the use of warning, priming or orientating signals.  The utterer shows rather than states.  This is the contention which will now be somewhat elaborated. Suppose that an utterer goes to a mother in wartime as a messenger to inform her of the death of her son.  The utterer can, no doubt, merely say Madam, your son is dead.  But this would be abrupt and harsh, and the utterer would more probably say Madam, I regret that your son is dead. For anyone other than a great actor it is easier to steer a course between callousness and false sentiment as a stranger bearing news by the use of a hedge in this way than by means of intonation. Clearly the utterer is mainly bearing news, and the addition of "I regret" (not necessarily at the beginning of the sentence) shows without it being actually explicitly conveyed that it is being offered, and will be received as, sad news.  The utterer is not being a hypocrite, even within the excusable, conventional, limits of hypocrisy, if he personally has no feelings on the matter at all.  Messengers of that sort can rarely have much feeling in wartime about each case.  If, for the moment we turn to a less purely parenthetical use of the same verity we shall find that the essential point remains the same.  If, as a friend of the family, the utterer goes to the mother when the death is well known and says I much regret that your son is dead. He was a dear friend, then, no doubt, I am no longer mainly bearing news.  But I am still NOT describing my feelings.  It is rather that the signal is being made for its own sake as an act of sympathy, the indicative clause giving the occasion of my sympathy.  Regret and rejoice are two of the most obvious examples of verbs which give emotional orientation when used parenthetically. Another set of these hedges is used to signal how the statement is to be taken as fitting logically into the discussion.  I admit that he is able assigns the statement that he is able to the logical position of being support for the opposed position, or a part of the opposed position which will not be assailed one shows while saying that he is able that this is to be treated as an admission. Grice refers to this as a second-order meta-conversational device in Retrospective epilogue in Way of words, a non-central speech act (oppose, object, add, contrast central speech acts are stating and ordering, only.  One is forestalling a possible misapprehension.  But dont you see, that is part of my point.  One is not reporting the occurrence of "a bit of admitting", whatever that may be supposed to be.  The hedge in Smith was, I conclude, the murderer assigns to the statement the status of following from what has been said before, preventing it from being taken as, say, an additional fact to be taken into account. Cf. Grice, Smith is, therefore, the murderer and the conventional implicature of "therefore".  There is no specific activity of "concluding".  Other hedges which fulfil approximately similar tasks are  deduce, infer, presume, presuppose, confess, concede, maintain,  and assume. Another rough group is constituted by such hedges as know,  believe, guess, suppos, suspect, estimate, and, in a metaphorical use, feel.  Never sense but metaphorical use. Cf. Grices modified Occams razor, do not multiply senses beyond necessity, and Urmsons having learned the lesson (his earlier, On the two senses of probable"). This group is probably more controversial than the previous ones, and will require more explanation.  This, the belief and knowledge, the group which is used to indicate the evidential situation in which the statement is made (though not to describe that situation), and hence to signal degree of reliability is claimed for, and should be accorded to, the statement to which the hedged is conjoined.  Thus  I think that this is the right road to take is a weaker way of saying that this is the right road, indicating that one is just plumping and has no adequate evidence, so that the statement will be received with the right amount of caution. I know, on the other hand, shows that there is all the adequate evidence one could need. Some of these hedges can clearly be arranged in a scalar set showing the reliability of the conjoined statement according to the wealth of evidence,: know" "believe" "suspect" "guess," so that "I believe," being on the weak side of the scale, impliese "I do not know." An adverb can make the situation even plainer. I strongly believe, I rather suspect and so on. The utterer is, in fact, in a position where he can either make our statements neat, and leave it to the context and the general probabilities to show to the addressee how much credence he should give to the statement ; or, in addition to making the statement we can actually describe the evidential situation in more or less detail ; or give a warning such as, Dont rely on this too implicitly, but  or the utterer can employ the warning device of a parenthetical verb  "I believe it will rain."  If this is insufficient for any reason (perhaps it is an important matter), the addressee can ask why and get the description of the evidential situation.  More will have to be said about these verbs, but it will be convenient first to introduce another topic, and that is the one of adverbs corresponding to parenthetical verbs.  Grice and Urmson mention that parenthetical verbs are not the only device that an utterer has for warning his addressee how his statement is to be taken while making it.  It will perhaps make it clearer how a parenthetical verb is used if one of these other devices is briefly outlined.  We were taught at school that an adverb modifies a verb.  But this is inaccurate, for some adverbs are quite as loosely attached to whole sentences as are parenthetical verbs.  Examples are luckily, happily unfortunately consequently presumably admittedly certainly undoubtedly probably possibly otiosely and Speranzas favourite hopefully (Speranza _means_ hope).   Note that the position of these adverbs is variable in relation to the sentence as in the case of a parenthetical verbs.  We can say Unfortunately, he is ill, or He is, unfortunately, ill.  If the word modify is to be used the adverbs can perhaps be said to modify the whole statement to which it are attached.  But how does it modify them? Surely by giving a warning how they are to be understood, Luckily! , happily and unfortunately indicate the appropriate attitude to the statement, for example. Admittedly, consequently and presumably, among others, Indicate how to take the statement in regard to the context. Certainly, probably and possibly , among others, show how much reliability is to be ascribed to the statement. Perhaps it is worth saying, though the matter should be sufficiently obvious, that no importance should be attached to the grouping of verbs and adverbs into three sets which has been adopted.  It has been done purely for convenience in an outline exposition. There are differences between the members of each of my groups and the groups are not sharply divided. It is easy to think of verbs which might with equal reason be placed In either of two groups. Once again it must be said that our aim is to lay down general lines for the interpretation of parenthetical verbs, not to do full justice to any of them.  Provided that it is not construed as a list of synonyms, we can couple these adverbs with parenthetical verbs as follows. happily I rejoice unfortunately I regret consequently I deduce I infer presumably I presume admittedly  I admit  -"Certainly" compares to "I know, cf.. knowingly. Probably I believe, cf. Unbelievably, believably. This is not, Grice and Urmson repeat, a list of synonyms. Apart from questions of nuance of meaning the adverbs are more impersonal.  "Admittedly" suggests that what is said would be regarded by anyone as an admission whereas I admit shows only the way that the statement is to be regarded here, by the utterer.  Also it is not possible to say that every adverb has a verb corresponding to it which has more or less the same import, or vice versa. But it does seem that these adverbs and parenthetical play much the same role and have much the same grammatical relation to the statements which they accompany, and that, therefore, the comparison is illuminating in both directions. Now Grice and Urmson meet an objection which will certainly be made by some philosophers to this comparison. Grice and Urmson intend to meet the objection by a fairly detailed examination of the example which they themselves would most likely choose.  In doing this Grice and Urmson further explain the use of a parenthetical verbs.  The adverb is "Probably" and the verb is I believe. To say, that something is probable, my imaginary objector will say, is to imply that it is reasonable to believe, that the evidence justifies a guarded claim for the utterers trust or trustworthiness and the truth of the statement. But to say that someone believes something does not imply that it is reasonable for the utterer to believe it, nor that the evidence justifies the guarded or implied claim to factivity or truth which he makes.  Therefore, the objector will continue, the difference between the use of t believe and probably is not, as Grice and Urmson suggest, merely one of nuance and degree of impersonality. In one case reasonableness is implied in the other it is not. This objection is met by Grice and Urmson. They do so by making a general point. There is the utterers implied claim to reasonableness.  There is an implied claim to trust whenever a sentence is uttered in a standard context, and the meaning of this is explained.  Now Grice and Urmson add, to meet the sceptical objection about the contrast between probably and I believe that, whenever an utterer makes a statement in a standard context there is an implied claim to reasonableness. This contention must be explained alla Kant.  Cf. Strawson on the presumption of conversational relevance, and Nowell-Smith, and Grant, and Warnock.  And Austin. Grice on rational and reasonable in "Aspects of reason".   Unless we are acting or story-telling, or preface our remarks with some such phrase as I know Im being silly, but  or,  I admit it is unreasonable, but "  it is, Grice and Urmson think, a presupposition or expectation of communication or conversation that a communicator will not make a statement, thereby implying this trust, unless he has some  ground, however tenuous, for the statement.  To utter The King is visiting Oxford tomorrow or The President of the British Academy has a corkscrew in his pocket, and then, when asked why the utterer is uttering that, to answer Oh, for no reason at all would be to sin, theologically, against the basic conventions governing the use of discourse. Grice goes on to provide a Kantian justification for that, hence his amusing talk of maxims and stuff.   Therefore, Urmson and Grice think there is an implied or expressed claim to  reasonableness  which goes with all our statements, i.e. there is a mutual expectation that a communicator will not make a statement unless he is prepared to claim and defend its reasonablenesss. Cf. Grice on reasonable and rational, in "Aspects of reason" (the John Locke Lectures, Oxford).  They can return to the defence of their account of belief and probability. We can now say, with less risk of being misunderstood, that when an utterer utterer I believe, not know, that he is at home or Smith is, I believe (but not know), at home the utterer both implies (or expresses as Grice may prefer -- since implicate is too strong)  a guarded claim of his being trustworthy and reasonable re: the statement that Smith is at home.  Thus, if our sceptical objector points out that Probably he is at home, unlike I believe he is at home, implies, in the view of the utterer, the reasonableness and justifiability of the statement, we may answer that this is equally true of believe in the first person present. In such a form as I believe that Smith is at home. What our objector fails to do is to notice the vast array of situations in which believe is used. We will now single out some, but only some, of these uses. Jones says, Smith is, I believe, at home. Here Jones makes an implied guarded claim (that is the effect of adding I believe) to his being trustworthy and also an implied claim to his being reasonable re the statement Smith Is at home. This is the case already examined.  Williams, reports Jones, says Smith is, Jones believes, at home. This is oratio obliqua, reporting Jones parenthetical use of the verb.  Williams, by uttering the sentence, implies his and Joness being trustworthy and reasonable re: the statement that Jones has made the statement that Smith is at home. Jones thereby implying its truth and reasonableness with the conventional warning signal about the evidential situation. A third scenario is Smith, who has discovered that there has been a sudden railway stoppage, sees Jones making his habitual morning dash to the station, and says Jones believes that the trains are working. This is a new, and, however important, derivative, use of believe. Note that in this context Smith could not say, The trains, Jones believes, are working. But we can say, The trains, if Jones is to be believed, are working. who has probably not considered the matter at all is behaving in the way that someone who prepared to say either The trains are running or I believe that the trains are running would behave (no doubt he would be prepared to say one or other of these things if he considered the matter. We thus in a perfectly intelligible way, extend our use of  believe to those situations in which a person behaves as a person who has considered the evidence and was willing to say I believe would consistently behave.  In this case, but in this case alone, there is some point in saying that believe is used dispositionally.  But note that it is so used with reference to another use of believe.  It is also noteworthy that the verb cannot be so used in the first person present.  To say  I believe in this way is no more possible than to say I am under the delusion that  I believe is always used parenthetically, though not always purely so.  If one does recognizes that a belief that one has held is unreasonable, one either gives it up or is driven to saying I cant help believing. This is psychological history, and carries with it no claim to truth or reasonableness. Thus we see that Jones believes that p does not imply the reasonableness of "p" any more than It seems probable to Jones that p does. On the other hand, both "Probably p" and I believe that p do imply utterers reasonableness re: p. Thus, so far at least as we are concerned with the well-known objection about reasonableness, the parallel between probably (or certainly) and I believe (or I know) has stood the test without difficulty.  At the risk of digression we may pause to comment on the history of the analysis of knowledge and belief.  Of old, since Plato, philosophers have tried to find a primary occurrent use of believe as a psychological description. But since Austin, the impossibility of this has been amply demonstrated, and philosophers have resorted to a Ryle-inspired dispositional analysis, assuming that if the verb does not describe an occurrence it must describe a tendency to an occurrence.  There is some point in the traditionalist reply to this that belief is here analysed as being the behaviour, if any, which would consistently accompany itself. A recognition that in the analysis of belief the non-descriptive parenthetical use is primary seems to illuminate and resolve this dispute.  This is all that can here be said about belief. It far from exhausts even all the relevant considerations, but Grices and Urmsons aim is not to examine any one parenthetical verb exhaustively; rather it is to shed new light on them all by presenting them as a group. I want to say the main things which may be said about a set of verbs which are not normally considered together as an aid to the thorough examination of each which Grice or Urmson not undertake. Individually, none of these verbs can be exhaustively treated in their capacity as parenthetical verbs and Grice and Urmson must not be taken as suggesting that they can.  Further consideration of the third group. I guess has nowadays a colloquial use in which its significance is, at the best, very indeterminate -- or as Speranza would prefer, "otiose".   But in a stricter use it serves to warn that what is being said is a guess.  Suppose that one is asked Do you know who called this afternoon? One may answer No, but I guess that it was Mrs. Jones. Even here one is making an implied claim that it was Mr. Jones who called and that this is a reasonable thing to say.  If one had said I guess that it was Mr. Stalin one would have been making a clumsy joke and not really guessing at all.  It seems to Urmson and Grice  to be quite impossible that anyone should think that here I guess  reports a psychological state or a tendency or disposition o behave in any special way.  It is put in to show that one is making ones statement without any specific evidence, that it is, in fact, a guess.  What makes it a guess is not a psychological state nor a disposition to behave in any way, but, if it is a genuine guess, its being said without any specific evidence, and its being potentially silly or lucky, not well-based or ill- supported. Grice and Urmson cannot see that there is any essential difference between guess on the one hand and know, opine, and suspect, for example, on the other.specially   The epistemological situation is more complicated in the latter set of cases, and some of them have special quirks in their use, know being a notorious example, but that Is all. Each is essentially the same sort of verb.  It might be worth while to compare this view of knowledge with what Austin said in Other Minds,  P.A.S. Su20 (reprinted in L. L., II).  Much of Grices and Urmsons approach is suggested by this paper by Austin.  Among other, less immediately relevant, things, Austin distinguishes a class of performatory verbs and compares our use of know with our use of these verbs.  In particular, Austin compares it with guarantee.  But Austin is careful not to say that know is a performatory verb.  He also points out important differences between the guarantee and know. Grice and Urmson agree that the comparison which Austin makes between know and performatory verbs is just and illuminating. Parenthetical and performatory verbs have much in common as against ordinary descriptive verbs. Grice and Urmson are not therefore disagreeing with Austin, but trying to locate the verb to in a class which it was not his purpose to consider.  Grice and Urmson distinguish a set of parenthetical verbs and make some points about their parenthetical use in the first person of the present tense. Each occurs in the present perfect, not the continuous tense, though its use is different from that of the present perfect tense of verbs which have a present continuous tense.  Though, in a wide sense, a psychological verb, each is not psychologically descriptive.  Each functions rather like a certain class of adverbs to orient the addressee aright towards the statements with which each is associated. The ways in which they do this may be roughly indicated as being aids to placing the statements aright against the emotional, social, logical, and evidential background.  There is, as when the conjoined statements are used alone, an implied claim for the trustworthiness and reasonableness of the utterer re these associated statements.   But parenthetical verbs are not always used parenthetically.   In the first person present, to which use we have so far confined practically all our attention. We must now say something about their other uses. We may consider the positive analogy. In connexion with the point above, there is a positive analogy, though not a very tidy one.  The analogy seems to hold completely in the case of some verbs. One cannot say  I was believing, he is believing , I was knowing , he was knowing, I was suspecting, or he was suspecting. In the case of some other parenthetical verbs, we find a rare and anomalous imperfect tense. For example, we can say that you were admitting something if you were interrupted in the middle of a statement which you were making as an admission ; or again, we can say that someone is deducing the consequences of a set of premisses, while he is stating a succession of things as deductions. But these are not genuine exceptions. In the case of another set of these verbs an imperfect is not so strange. At the end of an argument which have been put forth someone might say, for example, All the while you were assuming (presupposing, accepting) that so and so. But this is not like the imperfect tense of ordinary verbs which report the continuance throughout a period of some occurrence. I was not throughout the period continuously doing an act of assumption which I carefully refrained from mentioning.  Rather I was arguing as a man would reasonably argue who was prepared to say,  I assume that so-and-so; that is to say, I was arguing in a way that required so and so as a premiss if the argument was to be valid. I ought, therefore, to be willing to state so-and-so as a premiss.  Thus here, too, the other use has to be understood In the light of the parenthetical use.  We must also note that, in general, these verbs can throughout be used in parenthesis. We can say Jones was, Smith admitted, able.  This seems to be so whenever the use is either definite oratio obliqua or, at any rate, a fair paraphrase.  Some verbs, such as deduce and admit, seem always to be used in this way.  But others, including, as we have already seen assume, presuppse s and are used, not of a man who has said, (I assume (believe, presuppose) , or words to that effect, but of a man who as a man reasonably would who was prepared to say that.  In such a use, which is a genuine descriptive use, the parenthetical Insertion (in a grammatical sense) of the verb seems to be impossible.  Continuing with the positive analogy, it seems to follow from the above that, except in some derivative uses, parenthetical verbs are not used as psychological descriptions in other parts of their conjugation any more than in the first person present. And even in these derivative uses, they seem to describe general behaviour rather than to be specifically mental.  The obvious negative analogy is, first, that the adverbs can only be used to correspond to the first person. But this negative analogy is only so in a very limited way. If the adverbs did correspond exactly to the whole conjugation of the verb, then the conjugation would appear to be otiose. But the adverbs can be systematically correlated with the whole conjugation of the parenthetical verbs with the aid of the verb to seem. Cf. Grices desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly conversational benevolence-cum-self-interest). Grice thinks that the principle of conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of conversational self-interest. The result is the overarching principle of conversational helpfulness. Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide by.  Grice follows some of Warnocks observations. The logical grammar of trust (and indeed candour) is subtle, especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation: giving and receiving information/influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is paramount. The explorations of trust had become an Oxonian hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but Williams, and others.  : trust, metaphysics, value. Trust as a corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness. The logical grammar of trust is an interesting one. Grice used to speak of candour. In a given conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is operating, the utterer U is assumed by the addressee A to be trustworthy. There are two dimensions for trust, which relate to the TWO goals which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures:  ‒ giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others. In both sub-goals, trust is key. In the doxastic realm, trust has to do, not so much with truth (with which the expression is cognate) but evidence. In the boulomaic realm, evidence becomes less crucial. Grice mentions attitudes of the boulomaic type that are not usually judged in terms of evidential support. However, in the boulomaic realm, utterer will be assumed as trustworthy if the conative attitudes he displays are sincere. Cf. decency. A cheater for Grice is not irrational, just repugnant!

PRINCIPLE OF CONVERSATIONAL HELPFULNESS: A set of seven lectures, entitled as follows. Lecture 1, Prolegomena; Lecture 2: Logic and Conversation; Lecture 3: Further notes on logic and conversation; Lecture 4: Indicative conditionals; Lecture 5: Us meaning and intentions; Lecture 6: Us meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning; and Lecture 7: Some models for implicature. I hope they dont expect me to lecture on James! Grice admired James, but not vice versa. Grice entitled the set as being Logic and Conversation. That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and Harman, The Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is indicated below. In the first, Grice manages to quote from Witters. In the last, he didnt!  The original set consisted of seven lectures. To wit: Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on logic and conversation, Indicative Conditionals, Us meaning and intentions, Us meaning, sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicature. They were pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an implicatum had been introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information, influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a conversation that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted along the lines set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In Prolegomena he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a disregard for the implicatum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor, Senses are not to be muliplied beyond necessity. In Indicative conditionals he tackles Strawson on if as not representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell. The next two lectures, Us meaning and intentions and Us meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning refine his earlier, more austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the lectures with an exploration on the relevance of the implicatum to philosophical psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had become enamoured with the s. and would love to give it a continuous perusal. The set is indeed grandiose. It starts with a Prolegomena to set the scene: He notably quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of justifies the general title. In the second lecture, Logic and Conversation, he expands on the principle of conversational helpfulness and the explicitum/implicatum distinction – all very rationalist! The third lecture is otiose in that he makes fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The fourth lecture, on Indicative conditionals, is indeed on MOST of the formal devices he had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather than the quantifiers and the iota operator, with which he deals in Presupposition and conversational implicature, since, as he notes, they refer to reference). This lecture is the centrepiece of the set. In the fifth lecture, he plays with mean, and discovers that it is attached to the implicatum or the implicitum. In the sixth lecture, he becomes a nominalist, to use Bennetts phrase, as he deals with dog and shaggy in terms of this or that resultant procedure. Dont ask me what they are! Finally, in Some models for implicature, he attacks the charge of circularity, and refers to nineteenth-century explorations on the idea of thought without language alla Wundt. I dont think a set of James lectures had even been so comprehensive!

PRINCIPLE OF CONVERSATIONAL HELPFULNESS: This is Grice at his methodological best. He was aware that the type of philosophying he was about to criticise wass a bit dated, but whats wrong with being old-fashioned? While this may be seen as a development of his views on implicature at that seminal Oxford seminar, it may also be seen as Grice popularising the views for a New-World, non-Oxonian audience. A discussion of Oxonian philosophers of Grices play group, notably Austin, Strawson, Hart, and Hare. He adds himself for good measure (The causal theory of perception). Philosophers, even at Oxford, have to be careful with the attention that is due to general principles of discourse. Grice quotes philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle, and some interpreters or practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin and Searle. He even manages to quote from Witterss Philosophical investigations, on seeing a banana as a banana. There are further items in the Grice collection that address Austins manoeuvre, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs and cans, : conditional, power.  Two of Grices favourites. He opposed Strawsons view on if. Grice thought that if was the horseshoe of Whitehead and Russell, provided we add an implicatum to an entailment. The can is merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice! Ifs and cans, : Austin, intention, disposition. Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of free will. Pears had noted that conversational implicature may account for the conditional perfection (if yields iff). Cf. Ayers on Austin on if and can. Recall that for Grice the most idiomatic way to express a disposition is with the Subjectsive mode, the if, and the can ‒ The ice can break. Cf. the mistake: It is not the case that what you must do, you can do. The can-may distinction is one Grice played with too. As with will and shall, the attachment of one mode to one of the lexemes is pretty arbitrary and not etymologically justified ‒ pace Fowler on it being a privilege of this or that Southern Englishman as Fowler is. If he calls it Prolegomena, he is being jocular. Philosophers Mistakes would have been too provocative. Benjamin, or rather Broad, erred, and so did Ryle, and Ludwig Witters, and my friends, Austin (the mater that wobbled), and in order of seniority, Hart (I heard him defend this about carefully – stopping at every door in case a dog comes out at breakneck speed), Hare (To say good is to approve), and Strawson (Introduction to Logical theory: To utter if p, q is to implicate some inferrability, To say true! is to endorse – Analysis). If he ends with Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes Searle from an essay in British philosophy in Lecture I, and from an essay in Philosophy in America in Lecture V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas oilmens club example! We may think of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a meta-linguistic botanizer: his hobby was to collect philosophers mistakes, and he catalogued them. In Causal theory he produces his first list of seven. The pillar box seems red to me. One cannot see a dagger as a dagger. Moore didnt know that the objects before him were his own hands. What is actual is not also possible. For someone to be called responsible, his action should be condemnable. A cause must be given only of something abnormal or unusual (cf. ætiology). If you know it, you dont believe it. In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated. Examples A (the use of an expression, by Ryle, Wittgenstein, Austin, Hart, and Benjamin), Examples B (Strawson on and, or, and especially if), and Examples C (Strawson on true and Hare on good – the performative theories). But even if his taxonomy is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving other examples as he goes on to discuss how to assess the philosophical mistake. Cf. his elaboration on trying, I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque, Trying to cash a cheque, you mean. Or cf. his remarks on remember, and There is an analogy here with a case by Wittgenstein. In summary, he wants to say. Its the philosopher who makes his big mistake. He has detected, as Grice has it, some conversational nuance. Now he wants to exploit it. But before rushing ahead to exploit the conversational nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected in his exercise of linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know with clarity what type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that the nuance depends on a general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general, and most likely rational) governing discourse – that participants in a conversation should be aware of, and not on some minutiæ that has been identified by the philosopher making the mistake, unsystematically, and merely descriptively, and taxonomically, but without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy. The fact that he directs this to his junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest are all Grices seniors! The point is of philosophical interest, rather than other. And he keeps citing philosophers, Tarski or Ramsey, in the third James leture, to elaborate the point about true in Prolegomena. He never seems interested in anything but an item being of philosophical interest, even if that means HIS and MINE! On top, he is being Oxonian: Only at Oxford my colleagues were so obsessed, as it has never been seen anywhere else, about the nuances of conversation. Only they were all making a big mistake in having no clue as to what the underlying theory of conversation as rational co-operation would simplify things for them – and how! If I introduce the explicatum as a concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned! Is Grices intention epagogic, or diagogic in Prolegomena? Is he trying to educate Strawson, or just delighting in proving Strawson wrong? We think the former. The fact that he quotes himself shows that Grice is concerned with something he still sees, and for the rest of his life will see, as a valid philosophical problem. If philosophy generated no problems it would be dead.

CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE:Grice loved an implicatum. An elaboration of his Oxonian seminar on Logic and conversation. Theres a principle of conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational candour and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis for a conversational implicatum, as his term of art goes. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of conversational helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an implicatum is conversational in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicatum is rationally calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or stance that the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part of the sense and never an entailment of this or that piece of philosophical vocabulary, in Davidson and Harman, the logic of Grammar, also in Cole and Morgan, repr. in a revised form in Grice, logic and conversation, the second James lecture, : principle of conversational helpfulness, implicatum, cancellability. While the essay was also reprinted by Cole and Morgan, Grice always cited it from the Davidsons and Harmans two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter Grice through this essay.  Philosophers usually get first acquainted with his In defence of a dogma, or Meaning. In Logic and Conversation, Grice re-utilises the notion of an implicatum and the principle of conversational helpfulness that he had introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. Grices idea is that the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information, to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helfpulness. Grices point is methodological. He is not at all interested in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts in media res, and skips Grices careful list of Oxonian examples of disregard for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum (roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent, conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by a few philosophers leaving them confused. I dont know what Davidson and Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in The logic of grammar. I mean: its obviously in media res. Grice starts with the logical devices, and never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought The logic of grammar must be left puzzled! He had to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion. Oxonian philosophers would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from unpublished material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and thats why he got all his Grice wrong! And so did Strawson in If and the horseshoe. Even Walker responding to Cohen is relying on memory. Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar. At Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking implicature in Mind, and Pears was talking conversational implicature in Ifs and cans. And Platts was dedicating a full chapter to Causal Theory of Perception. It seems the Oxonian etiquette was to quote from Causal Theory. It was obvious that Grices implication excursus had to read implicature! In a few dictionaries of philosophy, such as Hamlyns, under implication, a reference to Grices locus classicus Causal theory is made – Passmore quotes from Causal theory in Hundred years of philosophy. Very few Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted The logic of grammar, though. At Oxford, Grices implicata remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a few. And philosophers would NOT cite a cajoled essay in the references.

MODIFIED OCCAM’S RAZOR: Grice loved a razor. The essay had circulated since the Harvard days, and it was also reprinted by Peter Cole in his Pragmatics for Academic Press. Personally, I prefer dialectica.  ‒ Grice. This is the third James lecture at Harvard. It is particularly useful for Grices introduction of his razor, M. O. R., or Modified Occams Razor, jocularly expressed by Grice as: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. An Englishing of the Ockhams Latinate, Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem. But what do we mean sense. Surely Occam was right with his Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem. We need to translate that alla linguistic turn. Grice jokes: Senses are not be multiplied beyond necessity. He also considers irony, stress (supra-segmental fourth-articulatory phonology), and truth, which the Grice Papers have under a special f. in the s. V . Three topics where the implicatum helps. He is a scoundrel may well be the IMPLICATUM of He is a fine friend. But cf. the pretense theory of irony. Grice, being a classicist, loved the etymological connection. With Stress, he was concerned with anti-Gettier uses of emphatic know: I KNOW. (Implicatum: I do have conclusive evidence). Truth (or  is true) sprang from Grices attention to that infamous Bristol symposium between Austin and Strawson. Cf. Moores paradox. Grice wants to defend Austins correspondence theory against Strawsons performative approach. If  is true implicates someone previously affirmed this, that does not mean a ditto implicatum is part of the entailment of a  is true utterance. 1967, 1978. Further notes on logic and conversation, in Cole, repr. in a revised form, Modified Occams Razor, irony, stress, truth. The preferred citation should be Grice 1967:III.  This is originally the third James lecture, in a revised form. In that lecture, Grice introduced the M. O. R., or Modified Occams Razor. Senses are not be multiplied beyond necessity. The point is that entailment-cum-implicatum does the job that multiplied senses should not do! The Grice Papers contains in a different f. the concluding section for that lecture, on irony, stress, and truth. Grice went back to the Modified Occams razor, but was never able to formalise it! It is, as he concedes, almost a vacuous methodological thingy! It is interesting that the way he defines the alethic value of true alrady cites satisfactory. I shall use, to Names such a property, not true but factually satisfactory. Grices sympathies dont lie with Strawsons Ramsey-based redundance theory of truth, but rather with Tarskis theory of correspondence. He goes on to claim his trust in the feasibility of such a theory. It is, indeed, possible to construct a theory which treats truth as (primarily) a property, not true but factually satisfactory. One may see that point above as merely verbal and not involving any serious threat. Lets also assume that it will be a consequence, or theorem, of such a theory that there will be a class C of utterances (utterances of affirmative Subjects-predicate sentences [such as snow is white or the cat is on the mat of the dog is hairy-coated such that each member of C designates or refers to some item and indicates or predicates some class (these verbs to be explained within the theory), and is factually satisfactory if  the item belongs to the class. Let us also assume that there can be a method of introducing a form of expression, it is true that /it is buletic that  and linking it with the notion of factually or alethic or doxastic satisfactory, a consequence of which will be that to say it is true that Smith is happy will be equivalent to saying that any utterance of class C which designates Smith and indicates the class of happy people is factually satisfactory (that is, any utterance which assigns Smith to the class of happy people is factually satisfactory. Mutatis mutandis for Let Smith be happy, and buletic satisfactoriness. The move is Tarskian. The two standard truth definitions are at first glance not definitions of truth at all, but definitions of a more complicated relation involving assignments of objects to variables: a satisfies the formula F, (where the symbol F is a placeholder for a Names of a particular formula of the object language). In fact satisfaction reduces to truth in this way: aa satisfies the formula FF if and only if taking each free variable in FF as a Names of the object assigned to it by aa makes the formula FF into a true sentence. So it follows that our intuitions about when a sentence is true can guide our intuitions about when an assignment satisfies a formula. But none of this can enter into the formal definition of truth, because taking a variable as a Names of an object is a semantic notion, and Tarskis truth definition has to be built only on notions from syntax and set theory (together with those in the object-language); In fact Tarskis reduction goes in the other direction: if the formula FF has no free variables, to say that FF is true is to say that every assignment satisfies it. The reason why Tarski defines satisfaction directly, and then deduces a definition of truth, is that satisfaction obeys recursive conditions in the following way. if FF is a compound formula, to know which assignments satisfy FF, its enough to know which assignments satisfy the immediate constituents of FF. Here are two typical examples: The assignment a satisfies the formula  F and GG if and only if aa satisfies FF and aa satisfies GG. The assignment aa satisfies the formula For all xx, GG if and only if for every individual ii, if bb is the assignment that assigns ii to the variable xx and is otherwise exactly like aa, then bb satisfies GG. We have to use a different approach for atomic formulas. But for these, at least assuming for simplicity that LL has no function symbols, we can use the metalanguage copies #(R)#(R) of the predicate symbols RR of the object language. Thus The assignment aa SATSIFIES the formula R(x,y)R(x,y) if and only if #(R)(a(x),a(y))#(R)(a(x),a(y)). Warning: the expression ## is in the meta-meta-language, not in the meta-language MM. We may or may not be able to find a formula of MM that expresses ## for predicate symbols; it depends on exactly what the language LL is.). Subjects to this or that mild reservation, Tarskis definition of satisfaction is compositional, meaning that the class of assignments which satisfy a compound formula FF is determined solely by the syntactic rule used to construct FF from its immediate constituents and the classes of assignments that satisfy these immediate constituents. This is sometimes phrased loosely by saying that satisfaction is defined recursively. But this formulation misses the central point, that the above do not contain any syntactic information about the immediate constituents. Compositionality explains why Tarski switches from true to satisfied. You cant define whether For all x,Gx,G is true in terms of whether GG is true, because in general GG has a free variable xx and so it isnt either true or false. The reservation is that Tarskis definition of satisfaction in Tarskis essay doesnt in fact mention the class of assignments that satisfy a formula FF. Instead, as we saw, he defines the relation aa satisfies FF, which determines what that class is. This is probably the main reason why some people (including Tarski himself in conversation have preferred NOT to describe the definition as compositional. But the class format, which is compositional on any reckoning, does appear in an early variant of the truth definition in Tarskis essay on definable sets of real numbers. Tarski had a good reason for preferring the format aa satisfies FF in his essay, viz. that it allowed him to reduce the set-theoretic requirements of the truth definition. He spells out these requirements carefully. Compositionality first appears in an essay by Putnam. In talking about compositionality, we have moved to thinking of Tarskis definition as a semantics, i.e. a way of assigning meanings to formulas. Here we take the meaning of a sentence to be its truth value. Compositionality means essentially that the meanings assigned to formulas give at least enough information to determine the truth values of sentences containing them. One can ask conversely whether Tarskis semantics provides only as much information as we need about each formula, in order to reach the truth values of sentences. If the answer is yes, we say that the semantics is fully abstract (for truth). One can show fairly easily, for any of the standard languages of logic, that Tarskis definition of satisfaction is in fact fully abstract. As it stands, Tarskis definition of satisfaction is not an explicit definition, because satisfaction for one formula is defined in terms of satisfaction for other formulas. So to show that it is formally correct, we need a way of converting it to an explicit definition. One way to do this is as follows, using either higher order logic or set theory. Suppose we write SS for a binary relation between assignments and formulas. We say that SS is a satisfaction relation if for every formula G, SG, S meets the conditions put for satisfaction of GG by Tarskis definition. E.g., if GG is G1G1 and G2G2, SS should satisfy the following condition for every assignment aa: S(a, G) if and only if S(a, G1) and S(a, G2).S (a, G) if and only if S(a, G1) and S(a, G2). We can define satisfaction relation formally, using the recursive clauses and the conditions for atomic formulas in Tarskis recursive definition. Now we prove, by induction on the complexity of formulas, that there is exactly one satisfaction relation SS. There are some technical subtleties, but it can be done. Finally we define aa satisfies FF if and only if: there is a satisfaction relation SS such that S (a, F) S (a, F). It is then a technical exercise to show that this definition of satisfaction is materially adequate. Actually one must first write out the counterpart of Convention TT for satisfaction of formulas, but I leave this to the reader. The remaining truth definition in Tarskis essay  – the third as they appear in the essay – is really a bundle of related truth definitions, all for the same object-language LL but in different interpretations. The quantifiers of LL are assumed to range over a particular class, call it AA; in fact they are second order quantifiers, so that really they range over the collection of subclasses of AA. The class AA is not Namesd explicitly in the object language, and thus one can give separate truth definitions for different values of AA, as Tarski proceeds to do. So for this section of the paper, Tarski allows one and the same sentence to be given different interpretations; this is the exception to the general claim that his object language sentences are fully interpreted. But Tarski stays on the straight and narrow: he talks about truth only in the special case where AA is the class of all individuals. For other values of AA, he speaks not of truth but of correctness in the domain AA. These truth or correctness definitions dont fall out of a definition of satisfaction. In fact they go by a much less direct route, which Tarski describes as a purely accidental possibility that relies on the specific peculiarities of the particular object language. There is no hope of giving a definition of satisfaction by recursion on the complexity of formulas. The remedy is to note that the explicit form of Tarskis truth definition in Section 2.1 above didnt require a recursive definition; it needed only that the conditions on the satisfaction relation SS pin it down uniquely. For Henkins first style of language this is still true, though the reason is no longer the well-foundedness of the syntax. For Henkins second style of language, at least in Hintikkas notation (independence friendly logic), the syntax is well-founded, but the displacement of the quantifier scopes means that the usual quantifier clauses in the definition of satisfaction no longer work. How can we analyze satisfaction? The answer to this question is in some ways reminiscent to our answer of how to construct a theory of truth for a language with only finitely many sentences. So see how, first suppose that our language has only three Namess and three predicates, Bob, Jane, and Nancy and is nice, is mean, and is lazy. We can then give the following analysis, indeed, definition, of satisfaction. An item I satisfies predicate p ≡df [(p=is nice and i is nice) ∨ (n=is mean and i is mean) ∨ (n=is lazy and i is lazy)] There is an analogy between the material-adequacy constraint which Tarski set on the theory of truth, and similar constraints which we should expect a definition of satisfaction to meet. Just as a theory of truth should imply every instance of S is 1 in L iff S so we should expect our theory of satisfaction to imply every instance of the following schema. I satisfies is F in L iff i is F. We arrive at Tarskis first-order definition as a definition of satisfaction which makes no use of concepts other than those employed in the object-language itself. By stress, Grice means suprasegmental phonology, but he was too much of a philosopher to let that jargon affect him! 

IMPLICATUM: This is truth-functional Grice. For substitutional-quantificational Grice we have to wait for his treatment of the. In Prolegomena, Grice had quoted verbatim from Strawsons infamous idea that there is a SENSE of inferrability with if. While the lecture covers much more than if (He only said if; Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that! the title was never meant to be original. Grice in fact provides a rational justification for the three connectives (and, or, and if) and before that, the unary functor not. Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, 1971, Not and If, Sinton on Grice on denials of indicative conditionals, not, if. Strawson had elaborated on what he felt was a divergence between Whiteheads and Russells horseshoe, and if. Grice thought Strawsons observations could be understood in terms of entailment + implicatum (Robbing Peter to Pay Paul). But problems, as first noted to Grice, by Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicatum within the operation of, say, negation. Analogous problems arise with implicata for the other earlier dyadic functors, and and or, and Grice looks for a single explanation of the phenomenon.  The qualification indicative is modal. Ordinary language allows for if utterances to be in modes other than the imperative. Counter-factual, if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical, Subjectsive is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a cavalier to the problem: Surely it wont do to say You couldnt have done that, since you were in Seattle, to someone who figuratively tells you hes spend the full summer cleaning the Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the centerpiece of the lectures. Grice takes good care of not, and, or, and concludes with the if of the title. For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook Wilson in Statement and Inference. And they all connect with rationality. So he is using material from his Oxford seminars on the principle of conversational helpfulness. Plus Cook Wilson makes more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The last bit, citing Kripke and Dummett, is meant as jocular. What is important is the teleological approach to the operators, where a note should be made about dyadicity. In Prolegomena, when he introduces the topic, he omits not (about which he was almost obsessed!). He just gives an example for and (He went to bed and took off his dirty boots), one for or (the garden becomes Oxford and the kitchen becomes London, and the implicatum is in terms, oddly, of ignorance: My wife is either in Town OR Country,making fun of Town AND Country), and if. His favourite illustration for if is Cock Robin: If the Sparrow did not kill him, the Lark did! This is because Grice is serious about the erotetic, i.e. question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to things, but he manages to bring Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just to impress! Most importantly, he introduces the square brackets! Hell use them again in Presupposition and Conversational Implicature and turns them into subscripts in Vacuous Namess. This is central. For he wants to impoverish the idea of the implicatum. The explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is syntactic-cum-pragmatic import. The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable, and as he knows: what the eye no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for!  The modal implicatum. Since Grice uses indicative, for the title of his third James lecture (Indicative Conditionals) surely he implicates subjunctive  ‒ i.e. that someone might be thinking that he should give an account of indicative*-cum-Subjectsive* if. This relates to an example Grice gives in Causal theory, that he does not reproduce in Prolegomena. Grice states the philosophical mistake as follows. What is actual is not also possible. Grice seems to be suggesting that a Subjectsive conditional would involve one or other of the modalities, he is not interested in exploring. On the other hand, Mackie has noted that Grices conversationalist hypothesis (Mackie quotes verbatim from Grices principle of conversational helpfulness) allows for an explanation of the Subjectsive if that does not involve Kripke-type paradoxes involving possible worlds, or other. In Causal Theory, Grice notes that the issue with which he has been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or dicta which would he thinks need to be examined in order to see whether or not they are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which Grice has been discussing to be amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An examples which occurs to me is the following. What is actual is not also possible. I must emphasise that I am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter more generally, the position adopted by Grices objector seems to Grice to involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one contemporary mode of philosophizing. He is not condemning that kind of manoeuvre. He is merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably clear what sort of nuances they are. If was also of special interest to Grice for many other reasons. He defends a dispositional account of intending that in terms of ifs and cans. He considers akrasia conditionally. He explored the hypothetical-categorical distinction in the buletic mode. He was concerned with therefore as involved with the associated if of entailment. 

COMMUNICATION: This is Grice’s reply to Popular Ogden. They want to know what the meaning of meaning is? Heres Grices Oxononian response, with a vengeance! Grice is not an animist nor a mentalist, even modest.  While he allows for natural phenomena to mean (smoke means fire), meaning is best ascribed to some utterer, where this meaning is nothing but the intentions behind his utterance. This is the fifth James lecture. Grice was careful enough to submit it to The Philosophical Review, since it is a strictly philosophical development of the views expressed in Meaning which Strawson had submitted on Grices behalf to the same Review and which had had a s. of responses by various philosophers. Among these philosophers is Strawson himself in Intention and convention in the the theory of speech acts, also in The Philosophical Review. Grice quotes from very many other philosophers in this essay, including: Urmson, Stampe, Strawson, Schiffer, and Searle. Strawson is especially relevant since he started a s. of alleged counter-examples with his infamous example of the rat-infested house. Grice particularly treasured Stampes alleged counter-example involving his beloved bridge! Avramides earns a D. Phil Oxon. on that, under Strawson! This is Grices occasion to address some of the criticisms  ‒ in the form of alleged counter-examples, typically, as his later reflections on epagoge versus diagoge note  ‒ by Urmson, Strawson,and other philosophers associated with Oxford, such as Searle, Stampe, and Schiffer. The final analysandum is pretty complex (of the type that he did find his analysis of I am hearing a sound complex in Personal identity  ‒ hardly an obstacle for adopting it), it became yet another target of attack by especially New-World philosophers in the pages of Mind, Nous, and other journals, This is officially the fifth James lecture. Grice takes up the analysis of meaning he had presented way back at the Oxford Philosophical Society. Motivated mainly by Urmsons and Strawsons attack in Intention and convention in speech acts, that offered an alleged counter-example to the sufficiency of Grices analysis, Grice ends up introducing so many intention that he almost trembled. He ends up seeing meaning as a value-paradeigmatic concept, perhaps never realisable in a sublunary way. But it is the analysis in this particular essay where he is at his formal best. He distinguishes between protreptic and exhibitive utterances, and also modes of correlation (iconic, conventional). He symbolises the utterer and the addressee, and generalises over the type of psychological state, attitude, or stance, meaning seems to range (notably indicative vs. imperative). He formalises the reflexive intention, and more importantly, the overtness of communication in terms of a self-referential recursive intention that disallows any sneaky intention to be brought into the picture of meaning-constitutive intentions. By uttering x the utterer U means that ψ_b-d p iff (Ǝφ) (Ǝf) (Ǝc): I. The utterer U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has φ will think that (i) x has f  (ii) f is correlated in way c with ψ-ing that p (iii) (Ǝφ): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will think, via thinking (i) and (ii), that U ψ-s that p (iv) in view of (3), U ψ-s that p; and II (operative only for certain substituends for ψ_b-d) U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has φ, he will, via thinking (iv), himself ψ that p; and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will both (i) rely on E in coming to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p and (ii) think that (Ǝ φ): U intends x to be such that anyone who has φ will come to ψ (or think that U ψ-s) that p without relying on E. Grice thought he had dealt with Logic and conversation enough! So he feels of revising his Meaning. After all, Strawson had had the cheek to publish Grices Meaning and then go on to criticize it in Intention and convention in speech acts. So this is Grices revenge, and he wins! He ends with the most elaborate theory of mean that an Oxonian could ever hope for. And to provoke the informalists such as Strawson (and his disciples at Oxford – led by Strawson) he pours existential quantifiers like the plague! He manages to quote from Urmson, whom he loved! No word on Peirce, though, who had originated all this! His implicature: Im not going to be reprimanted in informal discussion about my misreading Peirce at Harvard! The concluding note is about artificial substitutes for iconic representation, and meaning as a human institution. Very grand.

COMMUNICATION: This is Grices metabolical projection of utterers meaning to apply to anything OTHER than utterers meaning, notably a token of the utterers expression and a TYPE of the utterers expression, wholly or in part. Its not like he WANTS to do it, he NEEDS it to give an account of implicatum. The phrase utterer is meant to provoke. Grice thinks that speaker is too narrow. Surely you can mean by just uttering stuff! This is the sixth James lecture, as published in The Foundations of Language. As it happens, it became a popular lecture, seeing that Searle selected this from the whole set for his Oxford reading in philosophy, The philosophy of language. It is also the essay cited by Chomsky in his influential John Locke lectures. Chomsky takes Grice to be a behaviourist, even along Skinners lines, which provoked a reply by Suppes, later reprinted in P(hilosophical) G((rounds of) R(ationality:) I(ntentions,) C(ategories,) E(nds) (In The New World, the H. P. was often given in a more simplified form.). Grice wants to keep on playing. In Meaning, he had said x means that p is surely reducible to utterer U means that p. In this lecture, he lectures us as to how to proceed. In so doing he invents this or that procedure: some basic, some resultant. When Chomsky reads the reprint in Searles Philosophy of Language, he cries: Behaviourist! Skinnerian! It was Suppes who comes to Grices defence. Surely the way Grice uses expressions like resultant procedure are never meant in the strict behaviourist way. Suppes concludes that it is much fairer to characterise Grice as an intentionalist. Published in The Foundations of Language, ed. by Staal, Repr.in Searle, The Philosophy of Language, Oxford, the sixth James Lecture, Foundations of Language, resultant procedure, basic procedure. Staal asked Grice to publish the sixth James lecture for a newish periodical publication of whose editorial board he was a member. The fun thing is Grice complied! This is Grices shaggy-dog story. He does not seem too concerned about resultant procedures. As hell later say, Surely I can create Deutero-Esperanto and become its master! For Grice, the primacy is the idiosyncratic, particularized utterer in this or that occasion. He knows a philosopher craves for generality, so he provokes the generality-searcher with divisions and sub-divisions of mean. But his heart does not seem to be there, and he is just being overformalistic and technical for the sake of it. I am glad that Putnam, of all people, told me in an aside, Youre being too formal, Grice. I stopped with symbolism since!

IMPLICATURE: A rather obscure exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice is aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible vicious circle in trying to define category of expression in terms of a category of representation. He does not provide a solution to the problem which hell take up in his Method in philosophical psychology, in his role of President of the American Philosophical Association. It is THE IMPLICATURE behind the lecture that matters, since Grice will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, its all rational enough. Theres a pirot, in a situation, say of danger – a bull ‒. He perceives the bull. The bulls attack causes this perception. Bull! the Pirot₁ G1 screams, and causes in Pirot₂ G2 a rearguard movement. So where is the circularity? Some pedants would have it that Bull cannot be understood in a belief about a bull which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he brought back implicature, which had become obliterated in the lectures, back to title position! But it is also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly rationalist models for implicature. He had played with a model, and an explanatory one at that, for implicature, in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a principle of conversational helpfulness, a desideratum of conversational clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour, and two sub-principles: a principle of conversational benevolence, and a principle of conversational self-interest! Surely Harvard could be spared of the details!