According to S. N. Hampshire, Gilbert Ryle's distinction between categorical and hypothetical is confusing.
Ryle's general thesis is that there is no mental happeninq, i.e. to speak to of a person's soul is speak of certain ways in which some of the incidents of his " life are ordered.
This hinges largely on the distinction between an occurrence or special episode and a disposition.
As S. N. Hampshire indicates, in all cases, reduction of the categorical into hypotheticals is not possible.
Not only in the case of emotion, thrills, pangs but also in other various places the translation of perceptible behaviour is,as a matter of logic,a pure mistake.
The double distinction between categorical and hypothetical breaks down and produces confusion.
Ryle just has no logical criterion for such translation.
Hampshire remarks in this regard that, if the categorical-suppositional distinction is shown to be unworkable, and cannot be clearly formulated, the whole account of the relation between soul and body - overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of mind, they are those workings - collapses with it. It must be reformulated.
Thus Ryle's distinction between an occurrence or a special episode and a disposition is a pseudo-logical distinction.
In fact, an occurrence or special episode, and a disposition have totally separate logical status.
We cannot explain an occurrence of the soul in the light of overt behaviours completely.
Ryle thinks that a typical concept referring to the soul is a disposition and the statement in which this disposition occurs is a law-like proposition which have to be supported by observation of overt behaviours.
Ryle's analysis reveals that a statement about an occurrence of the soul is confirmed or rejected by interpretation of overt behaviours.
But this analysis is incomplete in the sense that it misleadingly denies the status of a categorical proposition.
One of the main confusions of Ryle's "Concept of Mind" comes from the use of distinction such as the the suppositional-categorical distinction which are borrowed from logic in the strict sense in order to make distinction which cannot be strictly logical.
Keywords: hypothetical-categorical distinction.
Keywords: supposition-? distinction.
According to this criticism a psychological report instead of being merely short hand version of a hypothetical (suppositional) conditional statements about possible behaviours have a proper place in the antecedent positions of conditionals about human conduct.
Ryle's idea of a "multi-track disposition" is another instance where we come accross a fresh difficulty.
We find Ryle drawing a distinction between a "single-track disposition" which is uniform and a "many-track disposition," the actualisation of which is infinitely heteroqeneous.
Grice is a cigarette smoker.
'Grice is a cigarette smoker' denotes a 'single-track disposition.'
The proposition refers to only one type of activity, i.e., the activity of smoking.
Grice is humble.
But the use of 'humble,' 'vain,' or 'greedy' denotes a "many-track disposition."
The proposition signifies not one but many diverse activities or behaviours in different situations.
Cf. D. Carr, 'The Logic of Knowing How and Ability', Mind, Vol. LXXXVLLL.
Ryle illustrates it with the example of gracing which stands for different activities like selling sugar, weighing tea, wraping up butter and so ,..._ on.
In a similar way the term 'vanity' or 'greedy' behaves in many ways.
An expression denoting a "many track disposition" is highly generic or determinable.
An expression denoting a "single-track disposition" is highly specific and determinate.
Real difficulty begins in case of multi-track disposition-words.
Such words are highly generic.
It serves as genus having heterogeneous episodes as its species.
But the question is:
How can a series of episodes which are different in character be all subsumed under a common genus?
How can in the absence of a relationship among these episodes they can all be taken to refer to a generic term?
What is the rule of construction by which the different hypotheticals can be grouped together?
Is it possible to have a definite meaning of a highly generic term?
Hampshire does not understand Ryle's use of the term 'generic' in this context.
In any ordinary language it would be absurd to say that 'hard' is a genus of which the properties of 'causing pain,' 'resisting deformation,' and giving out a sharp sound are species.
Ryle's distinctions of determinable and determinate are not correct.
He thinks that there are not two types of disposition,
cf. R. J. Spilsbury, 'Disposition and Phenomenology', Mind, July, 1953,
there is only one and this is determinate disposition.
We have nothing to do with determinable disposition.
All dispositions are determinate dispositions which are parasitic on similar occurrences or episodes of certain type.
Ryle's account of disposition is ambiguous and it is the initial difficulty of his philosophy.
The term 'disposition' has two kinds of implicata (a) semantic (use) implication and (b) genetic (ontoloqical) implication.
If the former is taken 'disposition' means how it is used and then Ryle's account is correct.
But if the latter implicatum is taken, Ryle's account is inadequate.
It seems that Ryle accepts also the latter implicatum of genetic explanation.
Ryle accuses the Cartesian dualist of thinking mind as a sort of ontological category substance.
He analysed what the Cartesians thought to be substances and their activities as proneness to activities of cartain type in certain circumstances.
He was accusing the Cartesians of elevating pronen~ss or potentialities into actualities.
Ryle's account is not merely an account of how we use "disposition," because he argues from his account of disposition to ontological conclusions, not merely a semantic conclusion.
A true account of generic disposition shows
W. Lyons, 'Ryle and Disposition', Philosophical Studies, Vol.24.
that dispositions are not just potentialities.
They are potentialities based on the existence of real facts.
The causal factor which is dominant in persons or things to which a disposition is attributed is called the structural or categorical basis of the disposition.
To refer to an actual property is to refer categorically rather than hypothetically.
Besides behaviour or circumstances, a third thing namely the structural basis is to be accounted for.
If this be done in a dispositional analysis, this will not eradicate the inner aspect.
Thus we can say that both in the semantic and genetic accounts of dispositions there are causal factors hidden or inwardly.
cf. Madden, "Causal powers," with R. H. of Oxford.
But to admit this is not necessarily to reinstate Cartesian dualism.
That is why,the categorical or the structural basis of human disposition may not turn out to be mental accurrences.
In the final analysis we find that Ryle's plea to reject the causal theory of purposive activity that involves the fallacy of infinite regress cannot be maintained.
Armstrong tries to show that there will be no regress if we disting u i s h be t we en the a c t s o f w i 11 and opera t i on s of w i ll.
An act is something that we do as opposed to something that merely happens.
An act springs from our will. Operations of will are mere happenings.
They have causes, but these causes do not lie in the will.
Both acts of will and operations of will are purposive, but not in the same sense.
Actions are purposive in the sense that they are caused by will.
Operations of will are purposive in the sense that - 201 - they cause actions.
Only acts of will are purposive in both senses.
So, according to Armstrong, there will be no regress when we say that actions a~e caused by operations of will.
Armstrong criticises Ryle's account of disposition also.
He terms Ryle's account of disposition as the phenomenalist or the operationalist account and opposes this with what he calls the realist account.
He identifies dispositions with their categorical basis.
He explains that to speak of an object having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has 22 some property (There exists a categorical basis).
The realist account is taken as t~e genetic account of disposition, where as the phenomenCUist account is the semantic account.
But we may say that both accounts are speaking with crossed purposes.
Thus it may be said that Ryle and Armstrong are not clear in their analysis of disposition.
Indeed the whole debate on ~isposition has been bedevilled by the unfortunate confusion.
This is the reason why Alston really suqqests that Ryle's account of disposition may well be the result of confusinq meaninq and reference.
It may be correct to say that the meaning of a disposition-term 'brittleness' can be explicated in terms of typical reactions and circumstances.
But the reference of the dispositional t0rm will
D.M.Armstronq, A Materialist Theory of Mind.
202 - be some internal eccurrence - its categorical base.
The entity referred to by a linguistic expression may have many properties not reflected in the meaning of that expression, and such that an account of the meaning of that expression will afford no basis for anticipating them.
If we deny disposition as something actual or categorical we face an absurd situation.
Ryle thinks that if we want to distinguish a soluble thing from an insoluble one, we can do that because of a property present in the one which is absent in another.
This can be done only with the help of certain hypotheticals.
But if this be the case how is it possible to distinguish one person from another?
What will be the point of difference between two things or persons if no categorical statements or actual characters are not explained?
Besides, infinite series of conditionals do not give a difinite meaning of expression~o
The denial of the actuality of expressions - statements seems to be incompatible with the learning of skills or abilities.
It is known that skills are learned gradually by practice.
But if every practice does not leave a positive impression how can it be carried forward in the next or how can we improve an acquired skill?
If there is nothing positive due to pr~ctice which can be sustained ana carried forward, every attempt in learning a skill will be a new attempt about the 23.
W.J.Alston, 'Dispositions and Occurrences', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1.
203 - learning of that skill.
Again, the rejection of disposition as something actual leads to queer consequences.
It has led Ryle to believe that 'vain' behaviour is not due to an element of vanity present in the agent.
It is due to some such thing as meeting the stranger, talking tall talks etc.
But to say so is to explain vanity more in terms of the stranger than in the terms of the agent himself.
If we examine reflexes we find that the actuality of disposition cannot be denied.
Reflexes are the actualisation of disposition of an organism to react to different stimuli in more definite ways.
Such an actualisation presupposes a stable nervous system in the organism.
It is in the interaction between the stimulus and the system which gives rise to manifestation of behaviour.
So we find that an enduring system is necessary for the actualisation of disposition, some stable property or properties within the human organisation should be required for the actualisation of disposition.
G.D.Jha in his book, A Study of Ryle's Theory of Mind. published by Visva-Bharati, West Benqal, 1961, p.8l,
states that stimulus acts on the nervous system to produce reflex-behaviour.
Circumstances shoulrl also act on the inner qualities to produce dispositional behaviours.
Ryle ignores the categorical basis of disposition and that is why his analysis of disposition is incomplete.
According to Ryle, disposition means a regular sequence of behaviour under appropriate conditions.
If it is said the
"X has a disposition."
it is to say that
"X has regularly behaved in a particular manner Y and is likely to behave in this way in future."
Disposition-words do not stand for drives, force or powers existing in the agent.
He reminds us that the concept of an occult process has been rejected by the physical sciences.
Why should it then at all continue in the theories of mind ?
But it may be pointed out that physical sciences have given up the idea of an existing force.
Ordinary language which is the basis of Ryle's anait lysis has not yet given up.
The phrase 'force of habit' ~ is very much in use to rlay as any other phrases.
Habit is our disposition.
Can we not treat disposition as force on the basis of this usage ?
Dispositions may be accepted to exist within us as a force which we experience when we want to do something against what we are disposed to do so.
In a situation like this we are not able to do easily what we want to do.
We feel as if something is preventing us.
We have tn develop a counter force against the resistance.
The resistance which we feel and the force which we apply to meet it clearly suggests that there is a force or drive in us to do thing in a certain manner which we want to break in the present case.
This is found in the case of a habitual smoker who wants to give up smoking.
He will require a strong will force to overcome the preexistinq force of the temptation for cigarette.
In view of all these consideration it is - 205 - defficult to believe with Ryle that a disposition is not an existino drive or force.
Thus we findAaron at the time of explaining the nature of disposition observes that it does not signify only a regular behaviour sequence.
hen ordinary men and scientists and philosophers speak of disposition they clearly mean more; rightly or wrongly they mean drives, forces or powers.
In a semilar manner W.Lynos explains that Ryle gives us a more or less adequate account of what the term 'disposition' may be taken to mean but he does not give us a satisfactory account of what dispositions are and how they give rise to behaviour.
Ryle's account is somewhat different from the account of a scientific psychologist.
Cf. Grice on philosophical psychology as based on a "folk-science."
That is why, a scientific psychologist deals with the nature of disposition and the causal processes that give rise to them but not about how 'disposition' is used.
The psychologist, rightly, looks for internal factors to explain the workings of dispositions and looks first for clearly isolatable physiological factors to explain dispositional behaviour patterns.
It is argued th~t Ryle's theory of disposition has a role in deciding about the character of mind, but not about the workings of mind.
This can be explained with the help of one or two illustrations given by Ryle.
When he gives 24. R. A a ron, The Theory of Universal, Clarendon Press,
W.Lyons, Op,cit., p. 56. - 206 -
us a criterion of intelligent activity he remarks that it is one which is the result of skill or disposition.
The shooting of a bull's eye by a marksman is an example of an intelligent activity, because the marksman has the ability or skill or DISPOSITION TO DO X it under different circumstances.
The corollary which can be drawn from this view is that some acts of successful shooting by a novice is not an intelligent activity as he is NOT DISPOSED to do it again and again, or able to do it again and again.
But in this case what the ability or disposition helps us to decide is that the SOUL of the marksman is superior to the mind of the novice.
It is on the account of superiority of the SOUL of the marksman that we call his action intelligent.
When the question arises of knowing the quality of one's SOUL and comparing that quality with that of ANOTHER PERSON, the concept of a disposition may help us.
When the question is about the working of ONE'S SOUL, the concept of a disposition can be almost of no help, or of no help at all.
"I am on the stage," as Grice puts it.
It is not the case that whether the novice presses the trigger mindfully or not can be decided with the help of the concept of his "disposition."
In a situation like this, it is not through his DISPOSITION, but through his AVOWAL that we may know whether he had or had not directed his action at the moment.
Again, the word 'intellLwnt' as predicated of an action may mean, according to G.D.Jha, directed action as opposed to a mechanical action, or it may mean well directed and careful action as apposed to the action of an idiot.
Cf. Grice on H. L. A. Hart on 'carefully.'
Ryle's disposition is helpful in accounting for well-directed and careful action.
Ryle's 'disposition', however, fails in case of simply directed, goal-oriented, or conscious, to use Locke's phrase, action.
The same explanation will also apply to heeding or minding.
But a 'disposition sometimes appear to be a good substitude for 'soul.'
Cf. Grice's funcctionalism in "Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre."
Even then it is necessary for Ryle to distinguish between human (agentive) and non-human (non-soul, inanimate) disposition.
An inanimate object (such as a lump of sugar) also have their disposition to behave in particular ways.
What is it then when we classify some disposition as physical, or bodily and others as psychological or soul-related?
Ryle does not give any suitable answer to this question.
That is the reason why Russell argues that a plain man would say that 'brittle' denotes a disposition of a body and 'intelligent' denotes a disposition of the soul.
In fact, the two adjectives apply to different kinds of stuff.
But it is not open to Ryle to say this and we do not quite know what he would say.
Though Ryle does not distinguish human disposition from non-human (or strictly, 'inanimate') disposition he makes a certain distinction within this or that disposition of the soul.
About the distinction of 'know' and 'believe' one refers to capacity and the other to tendency.
To know means to be able to get things right anrl to believe means to tend to act or react in certain ways.
Neither the capacity verb 'know' nor the tendency verb 'believe' refers in Ryle's opinion to any act or process conducted on the private stage of mind.
A dispositional concept is different from an activity concept and a process concept.
There are no cognitive acts or processes whatsoever.
The cognitive acts lead to infinite regress.
It is really absurd to ask how many
B.Russell, My Philosophical Development~ George Allen and Unwin
cognitive acts did he perform before breakfast?
Here we may say that the answer cannot be easily given.
It is not because there are no cognitive acts but because the QUESTION is more or less illegitimate.
In case of knowing,the cognitive acts are to be accounted for.
This means that they cannot be ignored.
The only difficulty is that we cannot know them by making them objects of our consciousness.
They are always subjects of consciousness or awareness.
They are known in relation to their objects, as knowing and believing cannot be abstracted from the known and believed.
The verb 'know' and 'believe' the·refore, do report an act of the soul in a certain way.
When we say that 'the sleeper knows French' we mean his ability or disposition to act in a certain way.
But when we say that we have just come to know how the incident occurs, we do not here mean any ability or disposition, but narrate the consequences.
In ordinary language the phrase 'knowing how' is often used when performance IS NOT involved.
Cf. Grice on 'trying.'
Ryle himself has noticed that a concept of heed, noticing, concentrating, caring, attending etc. are not fully explicable in dispositional line.
In the case of these concepts comprised under the head of 'minding' Ryle has to take recourse to the lanquage of 'mongrel-categorical' or 'semi-dispositional' concepts.
Ryle on the 'semi-dispositional' concept.
They are half-dispositional
J. Roland, 'On Knowing How and Knowing That', Philosophical Review,
and half-categorical or episodic which have both dispositional AND episodic references.
The episode-disposition distinction.
The proposition 'X' is reading r, carefully contains the heed concept 'carefully'.
Cf. Grice on 'carefully.'
But introducing the concept of mongrel-categorical for elucidating the meaning of heed concept Ryle,in fact, goes against his own theory.
He maintains firmly that mental concepts or inner happenings are occult ghostly processes which do not exist.
The so-called inner soul-oriented concepts are dispositional and not episodic.
The categorical statements about an event of the soul are to be reduced to the conditional statements about possible behaviours.
The logic of 'disposition' is different from the logic of 'episode.'
The dispositional expression versus the episodic expression.
.But when we have to explain the logic of heed verbs, the occurrence-disposition dichotomy, or the episode-disposition distinction creates a great problem.
Ryle had to maintain then that the logic of occurrence and disposition both meet in the heed concepts.
This obviously makes his original thesis weak.
It is essential to Ryle's argument to maintain that a 'dispositional' expression and an 'episodic' expression are of different logical types.
Ryle wants to maintain that when a man is said to be minding what he is doing, his minding is not over and above his overt activities.
It is not that the man is minding something at the ghostly level and working at the physical level.
But the point is that minding cannot go by itself.
It is a conscious direction which requires some objects on
28. T.D.Weldon, 'The Concept of Mind' (Discussion), Philosophy, July, 1950, p. 269. - 210 - which it 1s to be applied.
When a man is 'walking ' and 'humming' it is always possible to do the one without the other.
But minding cannot be continued without the activity of doing or reading.
Thus there is an important point of difference between walking and humming on the one hand and reading and minding on the other hand.
Ryle seems to overlook this point.
The complex activity of doing mindfully is not open to an outside, external, third-person observer.
The observer does not have an access to the soul of the agent to see directly the minding aspect of the complex activity.
He can observe, or sense, or perceive only the overt or the public part of the activity,i.e. the act of reading.
He can know that it is mindful INDIRECTLY only through certain tests.
When one has to decide whether someone else's action is heedful or not, one has to depend on these 'observational' tests. ("No concept without the behaviour that the concept is supposed to explain, or for which you have a concern about.")
But I do not (cannot?) need to appeal to external or IN-direct, observation, sensation, or perception in order to know whether my action is mindful or not.
So minding, noticing, caring, etc. in my own case is known or perceived DIRECTLY directly through the fact of my consciousness.
Rvle while talking about minding, heeding, etc.talks about minding of someone ELSE.
He seems to confuse the question.
'How do I know that *I* am minding my activity'?
with the question
'How do you know that *some one else* is minding his activity'?
If we state that minding in our own case is known from consciousness then Ryle will bring the charge of infinite regress against this.
He will argue that if minding is known from consciousness, the consicousness of minding must be known by another consciousness and so on.
Cf. Grice on soul progression and content internalisation.
He thus uses his - 211 - favourite argument of infinite regress against the traditional concept of heed by stating : '
"Doing something with heed does not consist in coupling an executive performance with a piece of theorising, investigating, serutinising, cognising or else doing something with heed would involve~ ' doing an infinite number of things with heeds."
But we find that it is not difficult to see that behind this infinite regress argument there is a mistaken notion of consciousness.
Ryle seems to understand that if there is consciousness it must be instantaneous or fragmentary.
It is only with such a notion of consciousness that it is possible to speak of going back from one consciousness to another and so on adinfinitum .
But Grice's soul is not a series of different bits of consciousness like walking which is a mere series of different steps.
If the regress is accepted as true, it does not mean that the activity of consciousness is thereby refuted.
The The argument has its destructive force when it defeats a purpose.
If to draw money from the bank the signature of the drawee is to be attested and the attested signature is again to be attested and so on adinfinitum the drawee cannot withdraw his money.
Infinite regress is harmful here and in cases like this.
But no such harm is done to consciousness even if regress is true there.
U.T. Place in 'The Concept of Heed' published in Gustafson's Essays in Philosophical Psychol~, Macmillan, 1964, p.220,
states that when Ryle uses 'a heed concept' we 29. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 131. - 212 - ~
mean by that we are not merely refering to the disposition "' in a manner appropriate to the presence of the thing in question and specifying how the disposition is actualised. f r.
But we are also re er1ng to an internal STATE (maybe even physicalistically describable -- as Grice has it in applying Prichard to his analysis of intending in terms of willing) of the indiviA dual.
This is a necessary and sufficuent condition of such a disposition.
He maintains also that there are not two things sensation and my consciousness of it in the way that there are two things a penny and my consciousness of the penny.
According to Place, the occurrence of a sensation entails someone's consciousness of that sensation.
The major problem of Ryle's theory of knowledge seems to be his failure to distinguish between task-verbs and achievement-verbs, between achievements and disposition.
This ultimately leads to some epistemological problemS•
Special co9nitive acts are postulated by Ryle to explain achievementwords.
He considers knowledge as an achievement.
It is also dispositional.
The trouble is that these characteristics exclude each other and so their joint attribution is selfcontradictory.
Ryle explicitly introduces the episodic character of achievement-words.
They signify occurrences.
He stresses also equally that dispositional statements do not narrate any incidents; by holding that to clarify a word as dispositional is to say at least that it does not indicate any episode.
He does not even suggest that 'know' is a hybrid word which is both episodic and dispositional.
Thus we see that Ryle is not at all clear about his own theory of knowledge.
It knowledge is interpreted as dispositional how can it be achievement at the same time ?
Scheffler criticises Ryle by stating that Ryle is perfectly clear and explicit in classifying 'know' as a dispositional word with- ~ out any qualification.
He is also perfectly straight forward ~ in calling achievement words 'genuine episodic words'.
It follows that 'know' cannot be both an achie!vement-word and dispositional word.
Ryle's total account is thus literally . . t t 30 1ncons1s ent, or 'silly,' as Grice prefers.
In discussing the various ways in which we use the word 'know' Austin (and Urmson, in Parentheticals) unlike Ryle puts forward the theory that knowing is a performative word.
The statement '1 know that S is P' is usually understood to assert that I am in a mental state in relation to'S is P'. This doc~rine Austin argues rests on the discriptive fallacy which supposes that words are used only to describe.
To claim to know is not to describe my mental state.
It is to take a plunge that is to give others my authority, my word. In his article •other ~ our Mind~'Austin seems to bring~an analogy between 'know statements' and 'promise-statements'. ~terences like 'I pronise' are performatives in that the saying of 'I promise' is the performances of a promise itself.
It actually does what is seems to say, what the speaker is doing. Austin points out that 'I know' is not just reporting a fact about myself, 30.
Israel Scheffler, 'On Ryle's Theory of Propositional Knowledge', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.LXV, No.22, 1968, p.728. - 214 - it is giving one's warrant to something.
He says : ''But now when 'I say, I promise' a new plunge is taken : I have not merely announced my intention, but by using this formula (performing this rituals), I have bound myself to others, and asked my reputation, in a new way.
Similarly~saying 'I know' is taking a new plunge'
Finally, we find that the official myth- 'the cogito' of the Cartesian Philosophy cannot be replaced by Ryle's knowledge how or disposition.
We cannot reduce 'my soul' to simply my ability or proneness to do certain sorts of thing.
Indeed ability or proneness may be just those dispositions which allow me to do a thing unconsciously and without heed to di • • d' I 32 . snu ss-my m1n
A.J.Ayer remarks that what Ryle has succeeded in doing is to reduce the empire of the mind over a considerable area.
This is an important achievement and one that is brilliantly effected, but it does not fulfil Ryle's proposed intention of entirely exorcising the ghost in the machine.
The movements of the ghost have been curtailed but it still walks and some of us are still haunted by it. 33
Hecently Rickman arguing against Ryle maintains that it is not at all possible to exercise Descartes' ghost in ........._ the body machine and to for sake the dualism thereby. The ..J 31.
J.L.Austin, Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, 1961, London, p. 67. 32.
R.H.King, 'Professor Ryle and the Concept of Mind', ~n.aLof Philosog__l"}y...._,Vol.XLVII, 1951, p.293. 3 3.
A. J. Ayer, 'An Honest Ghost' , ln Wood and Pitcher ed. Ryle, Macmillan and Co., 1971, p. 74. - 215 - privileged access - the official legend cannot be explained away by Ryle's theory of knowledge which abolished all references to inner activities of mind in the case of knowing.
Moreover, souls cannot be compared with the ghost.
A ghost is a superstition, a soul is not.
Cf. Germann geist -- spirit. And the idea of the holy ghost (or 'goat,' as in "Four weddings and a funeral.")
So while Ryle is interested to expel Descarte's ghost in the body machine Rickman is rather anxious to exorcise 'Ryle's ghost in the machine'.
He states : n '
As I turn to my preferred alternative, dualism, it is still necessary to exercise a particular ghost- Ryle's ghost in the machine'•.
In a word we want to conclude by saying that Ryle in his attempt to do away with all links to mechanical and para-mechanical explanations of knowledge fails to give us ~ satisfactory account of his own dispositional analysis of the same.
H.P.Rickman, 'Exorcising the Ghost in the Machine', Philosophy, Vol.63, No.246, p. 489.
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