uncertainty: in the end, its all about the converational
implciata and conversation as rational co-operation. Why does P2 should judge
that P1 is being more or less certain about what he is talking? Theres a
rationale for that. Our conversation does not consist of idle remarks. Grices
example: "The Chairman of the British Academy has a corkscrew in his
pocket. Urmsons example: "The king is visiting Oxford tomorrow. Why? Oh,
for no reason at all. As a philosophical psychologist, and an empiricist with
realist tendencies, Grice was obsessed with what he called (in a nod to the
Kiparskys) the factivity of know. Surely, Grices preferred collocation, unlike
surely Ryles, is "Grice knows that p." Grice has no problem in seeing
this as involving three clauses: First, p. Second, Grice believes that p, and
third, p causes Grices belief. No mention of certainty. This is the
neo-Prichardian in Grice, from having been a neo-Stoutian (Stout was obsessed,
as a few Oxonians like Hampshire and Hart were, with certainty). If the
three-prong analysis of know applies to the doxastic, Grices two-prong analysis
of intending in ‘Intention and UNcertainty,’ again purposively avoiding
certainty, covers the buletic realm. This does not mean that Grice, however
proud he was of his ignorance of the history of philosophy (He held it as a
badge of honour, his tuteee Strawson recalls), had read some of the
philosophical classics to realise that certainty had been an obsession of what
Ryle abusively (as he himself puts it) called Descartes and the Establishments
"official doctrine"! While ps true in Grices analysis of know is
harmless enough, there obviously is no correlate for ps truth in the buletic
case. Grices example is Grice intending to scratch his head, via his willing
that Grice scratches his head in t2. In this case, as he notes, the doxastic
eleent involves the uniformity of nature, and ones more or less relying that if
Grice had a head to be scratched in t1, he will have a head to be sratched in
t2, when his intention actually GETS satisfied, or fulfilled. Grice was never worried
about buletic satisfaction. As the intentionalist that Suppes showed us Grice
was, Grice is very much happy to say that if Smith intends to give Joness a
job, the facct as to whether Jones actually gets the job is totally irrelevant
for most philosophical purposes. He gets more serious when he is happier with
privileged access than incorrigibility in “Method.” But he is less strict than
Austin. For Austin, "That is a finch implies that the utterer KNOWS its a
finch. While Grice has a maxim, do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence (Gettiers analysandum) and a super-maxim, try to make your
contribution one that is true, the very phrasing highlights Grices
cavalier to this! Imagine Kant turning on his grave. "Try!?". Grice
is very clever in having try in the super-maxim, and a prohibition as the
maxim, involving falsehood avoidance, "Do not say what you believe to be
false." Even here he is cavalier. "Cf. "Do not say what you KNOW
to be false." If Gettier were wrong, the combo of maxims yields, "Say
what you KNOW," say what you are certain about! Enough for Sextus
Empiricus having one single maxim: "Either utter a phenomenalist
utterance, a question or an order, or keep your mouth shut!." (cf. Grice,
"My lips are sealed," as cooperative or helfpul in ways -- "At
least he is not lying."). Hampshire, in the course of some recent
remarks,l advances the view that self-prediction is (logically) impossible.
When I say I know that I shall do X (as against, e.g., X will happen to me, or
You will do X), I am not contemplating myself, as I might someone else, and
giving tongue to a conjecture about myself and my future acts, as I might be
doing about someone else or about the behaviour ofan animal -for that would be
tantamount (if I understand him rightly) to looking upon myself from outside,
as it were, and treating my own acts as mere caused events. In saying that I
know that I shall do X, I am, on this view, saying that I have decided to do X:
for to predict that I shall in certain circumstances in fact do X or decide to
do X, with no reference to whether or not I have already decided to do it - to
say I can tell you now that I shall in fact act in manner X, although I am, as
a matter of fact, determined to do the very opposite - does not make sense. Any
man who says I know myself too well to believe that, whatever I now decide, I
shall do anything other than X when the circumstances actually arise is in
fact, if I interpret Hampshires views correctly, saying that he does not
really, i.e. seriously, propose to set himself against doing X, that he does
not propose even to try to act otherwise, that he has in fact decided to let
events take their course. For no man who has truly decided to try to avoid X
can, in good faith, predict his own failure to act as he has decided. He may
fail to avoid X, and he may predict this; but he cannot both decide to try to
avoid X and predict that he will not even try to do this; for he can always
try; and he knows this: he knows that this is what distinguishes him from non-human
creatures in nature. To say that he will fail even to try is tantamount to
saying that he has decided not to try. In this sense I know means I have
decided and (Murdoch, Hampshire, Gardiner and Pears, Freedom and Knowledge, in
Pears, Freedom and the Will) cannot in principle be predictive. That, if I have
understood it, is Hampshires position, and I have a good deal of sympathy with
it, for I can see that self-prediction is often an evasive way of disclaiming
responsibility for difficult decisions, while deciding in fact to let events
take their course, disguising this by attributing responsibility for what
occurs to my own allegedly unalterable nature. But I agree with Hampshires
critics in the debate, whom I take to be maintaining that, although the
situation he describes may often occur, yet circumstances may exist in which it
is possible for me both to say that I am, at this moment, resolved not to do X,
and at the same time to predict that I shall do X, because I am not hopeful
that, when the time comes, I shall in fact even so much as try to resist doing
X. I can, in effect, say I know myself well. When the crisis comes, do not rely
on me to help you. I may well run away; although I am at this moment genuinely
resolved not to be cowardly and to do all I can to stay at your side. My
prediction that my resolution will not in fact hold up is based on knowledge of
my own character, and not on my present state of mind; my prophecy is not a
symptom of bad faith (for I am not, at this moment, vacillating) but, on the
contrary, of good faith, of a wish to face the facts. I assure you in all
sincerity that my present intention is to be brave and resist. Yet you would
run a great risk if you relied too much on my present decision; it would not be
fair to conceal my past failures of nerve from you. I can say this about
others, despite the most sincere resolutions on their part, for I can foretell
how in fact they will behave; they can equally predict this about me. Despite
Hampshires plausible and tempting argument, I believe that such objective
self-knowledge is possible and occur. From Descartes to Stout and back.
Stout indeed uses both intention and certainty, and in the same paragraph.
Stout notes that, at the outset, performance falls far short of intention. Only
a certain s. of contractions of certain muscles, in proper proportions and in a
proper order, is capable of realising the end aimed at, with the maximum of
rapidity and certainty, and the minimum of obstruction and failure, and corresponding
effort. At the outset of the process of acquisition, muscles are contracted
which are superfluous, and which therefore operate as disturbing
conditions. Grices immediate trigger, however, is Ayer on sure that, and
having the right to be sure, as his immediate trigger later will be Hampshire
and Hart. Grice had high regard for Hampshires brilliant Thought and
action. He was also concerned with Stouts rather hasty UNphilosophical,
but more scientifically psychologically-oriented remarks about assurance in
practical concerns. He knew too that he was exploring an item of the
philosophers lexicon (certus) that had been brought to the forum when Anscombe
and von Wright translate Witters German expression Gewißheit in Über
Gewißheit as Certainty. The Grecians were never sure about being sure. But
the modernist turn brought by Descartes meant that Grice now had to deal with
incorrigibility and privileged access to this or that P, notably himself (When
I intend to go, I dont have to observe myself, Im on the stage, not in the
audience, or Only I can say I will to London, expressing my intention to do so.
If you say, you will go you are expressing yours! Grice found Descartes
very funny ‒ in a French way. Grice is interested in contesting Ayer and other
Oxford philosophers, on the topic of a criterion for certainty. In so
doing, Grice choses Descartess time-honoured criterion of clarity and
distinction, as applied to perception. Grice does NOT quote
Descartes in French! In the proceedings, Grice distinguishes between two
kinds of certainty apparently ignored by Descartes: (a) objective
certainty: Ordinary-language variant: It is certain that p, whatever
it refers to, cf. Grice, it is an illusion; what is it? (b) Subjective
certainty: Ordinary-language variant: I am certain that p. I
being, of course, Grice, in my bestest days, of course! There are further
items on Descartes in the Grice Collection, notably in the last s. of topics
arranged alphabetically. Grice never cared to publish his views on
Descartes until he found an opportunity to do so when compiling his WOW. Grice
is not interested in an exegesis of Descartess thought. He doesnt care to give
a reference to any edition of Descartess oeuvre. But he plays with certain. It
is certain that p is objective certainty, apparently. I am certain that p is
Subjectsive certainty, rather. Oddly, Grice will turn to UNcertainty as it
connects with intention in his BA lecture. Grices interest in Descartes
connects with Descartess search for a criterion of certainty in terms of
clarity and distinction of this or that perception. Having explored the
philosophy of perception with Warnock, its only natural he wanted to give
Descartess rambles a second and third look! Descartes on clear and distinct
perception, in WOW, II semantics and metaphysics, essay, Descartes on clear and
distinct perception and Malcom on dreaming, perception, Descartes, clear and
distinct perception, Malcolm, dreaming. Descartes meets Malcolm, and vice
versa. Descartes on clear and distinct perception, in WOW, Descartes
on clear and distinct perception, Descartes on clear and distinct perception,
in WOW, part II, semantics and metaphysics, essay. Grice gives a short overview
of Cartesian metaphysics for the BBC 3rd programme. The best example,
Grice thinks, of a metaphysical snob is provided by Descartes, about
whose idea of certainty Grice had philosophised quite a bit, since it is in
total contrast with Moore’s. Descartes is a very scientifically minded philosopher, with very clear ideas about the proper direction for science. Descartes,
whose middle Names seems to have been Euclid, thinks that mathematics, and in
particular geometry, provides the model for a scientific procedure, or
method. And this determines all of Descartess thinking in two ways. First,
Descartes thinks that the fundamental method in science is the axiomatic
deductive method of geometry, and this Descartes conceives (as Spinoza morality
more geometrico) of as rigorous reasoning from a self-evident axiom (Cogito,
ergo sum.). Second, Descartes thinks that the Subjects matter of physical
science, from mechanics to medicine, must be fundamentally the same as the
Subjects matter of geometry! The only characteristics that the objects studied
by geometry poses are spatial characteristics. So from the point of view of
science in general, the only important features of things in the physical world
were also their spatial characteristics, what he called extensio, res extensa.
Physical science in general is a kind of dynamic, or kinetic, geometry.
Here we have an exclusive preference for a certain type of scientific
method, and a certain type of scientific explanation: the method is deductive,
the type of explanation mechanical. These beliefs about the right way to do
science are exactly reflected in Descartess ontology, one of the two branches
of metaphysics; the other is philosophical eschatology, or the study of
categories), and it is reflected in his doctrine, that is, about what really
exists. Apart from God, the divine substance, Descartes recognises just
two kinds of substance, two types of real entity. First, there is material
substance, or matter; and the belief that the only scientifically important
characteristics of things in the physical world are their spatial
characteristics goes over, in the language of metaphysics, into the doctrine
that these are their only characteristics. Second, and to Ryle’s horror,
Descartes recognizes the mind or soul, or the mental substance, of which the
essential characteristic is thinking; and thinking itself, in its pure form at
least, is conceived of as simply the intuitive grasping of this or
that self-evident axiom and this or that of its deductive consequence. These
restrictive doctrines about reality and knowledge naturally call for adjustments
elsewhere in our ordinary scheme of things. With the help of the divine
substance, these are duly provided. It is not always obvious that the
metaphysicians scheme involves this kind of ontological preference, or
favoritism, or prejudice, or snobbery this tendency, that is, to promote one or
two categories of entity to the rank of the real, or of the ultimately real, to
the exclusion of others, Descartess entia realissima. One is taught at Oxford
that epistemology begins with the Moderns such as Descartes, which is not true.
Grice was concerned with “certain,” which was applied in Old Roman times to
this or that utterer: the person who is made certain in reference to a thing,
certain, sure. Lewis and Short have a few quotes: “certi sumus periisse omnia;”
“num quid nunc es certior?,” “posteritatis, i. e. of posthumous fame,”
“sententiæ,” “judicii,” “certus de suā geniturā;” “damnationis;” “exitii,”
“spei,” “matrimonii,” “certi sumus;” in the phrase “certiorem facere aliquem;”
“de aliquā re, alicujus rei, with a foll, acc. and inf., with a rel.-clause or absol.;”
“to inform, apprise one of a thing: me certiorem face: “ut nos facias certiores,”
“uti Cæsarem de his rebus certiorem faciant;” “qui certiorem me sui consilii
fecit;” “Cæsarem certiorem faciunt, sese non facile ab oppidis vim hostium
prohibere;” “faciam te certiorem quid egerim;” with subj. only, “milites
certiores facit, paulisper intermitterent proelium,” pass., “quod crebro
certior per me fias de omnibus rebus,” “Cæsar certior factus est, tres jam
copiarum partes Helvetios id flumen transduxisse;” “factus certior, quæ res
gererentur,” “non consulibus certioribus factis,” also in posit., though
rarely; “fac me certum quid tibi est;” “lacrimæ suorum tam subitæ matrem certam
fecere ruinæ,” uncertainty, Grice loved the OED, and its entry for will
was his favourite. But he first had a look to shall. For Grice, "I shall
climb Mt. Everest," is surely a prediction. The OED has it as “shall,” and defines
as a Germanic preterite-present strong verb. In Old English, it is “sceal,” and
which the OED renders as “to owe (money,” 1425 Hoccleve Min. Poems, The leeste
ferthyng þat y men shal. To owe (allegiance); 1649 And by that feyth I shal to
god and yow; followed by an infinitive, without to. Except for a few instances
of shall will, shall may (mowe), "shall conne" in the 15th c., the
infinitive after shall is always either that of a principal verb or of have or
be; The present tense shall; in general statements of what is right or
becoming, = ought, superseded by the past subjunctive should; in OE. the
subjunctive present sometimes occurs in this use; 1460 Fortescue Abs. and Lim.
Mon. The king shall often times send his judges to punish rioters and risers.
1562 Legh Armory; Whether are Roundells of all suche coloures, as ye haue
spoken of here before? or shall they be Namesd Roundelles of those coloures? In
OE. and occas. in Middle English used to express necessity of various kinds.
For the many shades of meaning in Old English see Bosworth and Toller), = must,
"must needs", "have to", "am compelled to", etc.;
in stating a necessary condition: = `will have to, `must (if something else is
to happen). 1596 Shaks. Merch. V. i. i. 116 You shall seeke all day ere you
finde them, & when you haue them they are not worth the search. 1605
Shaks. Lear. He that parts vs, shall bring a Brand from Heauen. c In
hypothetical clause, accompanying the statement of a necessary condition: = `is
to. 1612 Bacon Ess., Greatn. Kingd., Neither must they be too much broken of
it, if they shall be preserued in vigor; ndicating what is appointed or settled
to take place = the mod. `is to, `am to, etc. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L. What is he
that shall buy his flocke and pasture? 1625 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser. "Tomorrow
His Majesty will be present to begin the
Parliament which is thought shall be removed to Oxford; in commands or
instructions; n the second person, “shall” is equivalent to an imperative. Chiefly
in Biblical language, of divine commandments, rendering the jussive future of
the Hebrew and Vulgate. In Old English the imperative mode is used in the ten
commandments. 1382 Wyclif Exod. Thow shalt not tak the Names of the Lord thi
God in veyn. So Coverdale, etc. b) In expositions: you shall understand, etc.
(that). c) In the formula you shall excuse (pardon) me. (now "must").
1595 Shaks. John. Your Grace shall pardon me, I will not backe. 1630 R.
Johnsons Kingd. and Commw. 191 You shall excuse me, for I eat no flesh on
Fridayes; n the *third* person. 1744 in Atkyns Chanc. Cases (1782) III. 166 The
words shall and may in general acts of parliament, or in private constitutions,
are to be construed imperatively, they must remove them; in the second and
third persons, expressing the determination by the Griceian utterer to bring
about some action, event, or state of things in the future, or (occasionally)
to refrain from hindering what is otherwise certain to take place, or is
intended by another person; n the second person. 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley. If
you would rather not stay then, you shall go down to South Kensington Square
then; in third person. 1591 Shaks. Two Gent. Verona shall not hold thee. 1604
Shaks. Oth. If there be any cunning Crueltie, That can torment him much, It
shall be his. 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley xiv, `Oh, yes, sir, she shall come back,
said the nurse. `Ill take care of that. `I will come back, said Vere; in
special interrogative uses, a) in the *first* person, used in questions to
which the expected answer is a command, direction, or counsel, or a resolve on
the speakers own part. a) in questions introduced by an interrogative pronoun
(in oblique case), adverb, or adverbial phrase. 1600 Fairfax Tasso. What shall
we doe? shall we be gouernd still, By this false hand? 1865 Kingsley Herew. Where
shall we stow the mare? b) in categorical questions, often expressing indignant
reprobation of a suggested course of action, the implication (or implicature,
or entailment) being that only a negative (or, with negative question an
affirmative) answer is conceivable. 1611 Shaks. Wint. T. Shall I draw the
Curtaine? 1802 Wordsw. To the Cuckoo i, O Cuckoo! shall I call thee Bird, Or
but a wandering Voice? 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley `Are you driving, or shall I
call you a cab? `Oh, no; Im driving, thanks. c) In *ironical* affirmative in
exclamatory sentence, equivalent to the above interrogative use, cf. Ger. soll.
1741 Richardson Pamela, A pretty thing truly! Here I, a poor helpless Girl, raised
from Poverty and Distress, shall put on Lady-airs to a Gentlewoman born. d) to
stand shall I, shall I (later shill I, shall I: v. shilly-shally), to be at
shall I, shall I (not): to be vacillating, to shilly-shally. 1674 R. Godfrey
Inj. and Ab. Physic Such Medicines. that will not stand shall I? shall I? but
will fall to work on the Disease presently. b Similarly in the *third* person,
where the Subjects represents or includes the utterer, or when the utterer is
placing himself at anothers point of view. 1610 Shaks. Temp., Hast thou (which
art but aire) a touch, a feeling Of their afflictions, and shall not my selfe,
One of their kinde be kindlier moud then thou art? In the second and third person,
where the expected answer is a decision on the part of the utterer or of some
person OTHER than the Subjects. The question often serves as an impassioned repudiation
of a suggestion (or implicature) that something shall be permitted. 1450 Merlin
`What shal be his Names? `I will, quod she, `that it haue Names after my fader.
1600 Shaks. A.Y.L.; What shall he haue that kild the Deare? 1737 Alexander
Pope, translating Horaces Epistle, And say, to which shall our applause belong,
this new court jargon, or the good old song? 1812 Crabbe Tales, Shall a wife
complain? In indirect question. 1865 Kingsley Herew, Let her say what shall be
done with it; as a mere auxiliary, forming, with present infinitive, the
future, and (with perfect infinitive) the future perfect tense. In Old English,
the notion of the future tense is ordinarily expressed by the present tense. To
prevent ambiguity, wile (will) is not unfrequently used as a future auxiliary,
sometimes retaining no trace of its initial usage, connected with the faculty
of volition, and cognate indeed with volition. On the other hand, sceal
(shall), even when rendering a Latin future, can hardly be said to have been ever
a mere future tense-sign in Old English. It always expressed something of its
original notion of obligation or necessity, so Hampshire is wrong in saying I
shall climb Mt. Everest is predictable. In Middle English, the present early
ceases to be commonly employed in futural usage, and the future is expressed by
shall or will, the former being much more common. The usage as to the
choice between the two auxiliaries, shall and will, has varied from time to
time. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, with Wallis, mere
predictable futurity is expressed in the *first* person by shall, in the second
and third by will, and vice versa. In oratio obliqua, usage allows either the
retention of the auxiliary actually used by the original utterer, or the substitution
of that which is appropriate to the point of view of the uttering reporting; in
Old English, ‘sceal,; while retaining its primary usage, serves as a tense-sign
in announcing a future event as fated or divinely decreed, cf. Those spots mean
measle. Hence shall has always been the auxiliary used, in all persons, for
prophetic or oracular announcements of the future, and for solemn assertions of
the certainty of a future event. 1577 in Allen Martyrdom Campion; The queene
neither ever was, nor is, nor ever shall be the head of the Church of England. 1601
Shaks. Jul. C. Now do I Prophesie. A Curse shall light vpon the limbes of men.
b In the first person, "shall" has, from the early ME. period, been
the normal auxiliary for expressing mere futurity, without any adventitious
notion. (a) Of events conceived as independent of the volition of the utterer. To
use will in these cases is now a mark of, not public-school-educated Oxonian,
but Scottish, Irish, provincial, or extra-British idiom. 1595 in Cath. Rec. Soc.
Publ. V. 357 My frend, yow and I shall play no more at Tables now. 1605 Shaks.
Macb. When shall we three meet againe? 1613 Shaks. Hen. VIII, Then wee shall
haue em, Talke vs to silence. 1852 Mrs. Stowe Uncle Toms C.; `But what if you
dont hit? `I shall hit, said George coolly; of voluntary action or its intended
result. Here I shall or we shall is always admissible except where the notion
of a present, as distinguished from a previous, decision or consent is to be
expressed, in which case ‘will’ shall be used. Further, I shall often expresses
a determination insisted on in spite of opposition. In the 16th c. and earlier,
I shall often occurs where I will would now be used. 1559 W. Cunningham
Cosmogr. Glasse, This now shall I alway kepe surely in memorye. 1601 Shaks.
Alls Well; Informe him so tis our will he should.-I shall my liege. 1885 Ruskin
On Old Road, note: Henceforward I shall continue to spell `Ryme without our
wrongly added h. c In the *second* person, shall as a mere future auxiliary appears
never to have been usual, but in categorical questions it is normal, e.g. Shall
you miss your train? I am afraid you will. d In the *third* person, superseded
by will, except when anothers statement or expectation respecting himself is
reported in the third person, e.g. He conveys that he shall not have time to
write. Even in this case will is still not uncommon, but in some contexts leads
to serious ambiguity. It might be therefore preferable, to some, to use ‘he
shall’ as the indirect rendering of ‘I shall.’ 1489 Caxton Sonnes of Aymon ii.
64 Yf your fader come agayn from the courte, he shall wyll yelde you to the
kynge Charlemayne. 1799 J. Robertson Agric. Perth, The effect of the statute
labour has always been, now is, and
probably shall continue to be, less productive than it might. Down to the
eighteenth century, shall, the auxiliary appropriate to the first person, is
sometimes used when the utterer refers to himself in the third person. Cf. the
formula: `And your petitioner shall ever pray. 1798 Kemble Let. in Pearsons
Catal. Mr. Kemble presents his respectful compliments to the Proprietors of the
`Monthly Mirror, and shall have great pleasure at being at all able to aid
them; in negative, or virtually negative, and interrogative use, shall often =
will be able to. 1600 Shaks. Sonn. lxv: How with this rage shall beautie hold a
plea. g) Used after a hypothetical clause or an imperative sentence in a
statementsof a result to be expected from some action or occurrence. Now (exc.
in the *first* person) usually replaced by will. But shall survives in literary
use. 1851 Dasent Jest and Earnest, Visit Rome and you shall find him [the Pope]
mere carrion. h) In clause expressing the object of a promise, or of an
expectation accompanied by hope or fear, now only where shall is the ordinary
future auxiliary, but down to the nineteenth century shall is often preferred
to will in the second and third persons. 1628 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser., He is
confident that the blood of Christ shall wash away his sins. 1654 E. Nicholas
in N. Papers, I hope neither your Cosen Wat. Montagu nor Walsingham shall be permitted to discourse with
the D. of Gloucester; in impersonal phrases, "it shall be well,
needful", etc. (to do so and so). (now "will"). j) shall be,
added to a future date in clauses measuring time. 1617 Sir T. Wentworth in
Fortescue Papers. To which purpose my late Lord Chancelour gave his direction
about the 3. of Decembre shallbe-two-yeares; in the idiomatic use of the future
to denote what ordinarily or occasionally occurs under specified conditions,
shall was formerly the usual auxiliary. In the *second* and *third* persons,
this is now somewhat formal or rhetorical. Ordinary language substitutes will
or may. Often in antithetic statements coupled by an adversative conjunction or
by and with adversative force. a in the first person. 1712 Steele Spect. In
spite of all my Care, I shall every now and then have a saucy Rascal ride by
reconnoitring under my Windows. b) in
the *second* person. 1852 Spencer Ess. After knowing him for years, you shall
suddenly discover that your friends nose is slightly awry. c) in the *third*
person. 1793 W. Roberts Looker-On, One man shall approve the same thing that
another man shall condemn. 1870 M. Arnold St. Paul and Prot. It may well happen
that a man who lives and thrives under a monarchy shall yet theoretically
disapprove the principle of monarchy. Usage No. 10: in hypothetical, relative,
and temporal clauses denoting a future contingency, the future auxiliary is
shall for all persons alike. Where no ambiguity results, however, the present
tense is commonly used for the future, and the perfect for the future-perfect.
The use of shall, when not required for clearness, is, Grice grants, apt to
sound pedantic by non Oxonians. Formerly sometimes used to express the sense of
a present subjunctive. a) in hypothetical clauses. (shall I = if I shall) 1680
New Hampsh. Prov. Papers, If any Christian shall speak contempteously of the
Holy Scriptures, such person shall be
punished. b) in relative clauses, where the antecedent denotes an as yet
undetermined person or thing: 1811 Southey Let., The minister who shall first
become a believer in that book will
obtain a higher reputation than ever statesman did before him. 1874 R. Congreve
Ess. We extend our sympathies to the unborn generations which shall follow us
on this earth; in temporal clauses: 1830 Laws of Cricket in Nyren Yng.
Cricketers Tutor, If in striking, or at any other time, while the ball shall be
in play, both his feet be over the popping-crease; in clauses expressing the
purposed result of some action, or the object of a desire, intention, command,
or request, often admitting of being replaced by may. In Old English, and
occasionally as late as the seventeenth century, the present subjunctive was
used exactly as in Latin. a) in final clause usually introduced by that. In
this use modern idiom prefers should (22 a): see quot. 1611 below, and the
appended remarks. 1879 M. Pattison Milton At the age of nine and twenty, Milton
has already determined that this lifework shall be an epic poem; in relative
clause: 1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. iv. 40: As Gardeners doe with Ordure hide those
Roots that shall first spring. The choice between should and would follows the
same as shall and will as future auxiliaries, except that should must sometimes
be avoided on account of liability to be misinterpreted as = `ought to. In
present usage, should occurs mainly in the first person. In the other persons
it follows the use of shall. III Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses. Usage
No. 24: with ellipsis of verb of motion: = `shall go; he use is common in OHG.
and OS., and in later HG., LG., and Du. In the Scandinavian languages it is
also common, and instances occur in MSw.] 1596 Shaks. 1 Hen. IV, That with our
small coniunction we should on. 1598 Shaks. Merry W. If the bottome were as
deepe as hell, I shold down; n questions, what shall = `what shall (it) profit,
`what good shall (I) do. Usage No. 26: with the sense `is due, `is proper, `is
to be given or applied. Cf. G. soll. Usage No. 27: a) with ellipsis of active
infinitive to be supplied from the context. 1892 Mrs. H. Ward David Grieve, `No,
indeed, I havnt got all I want, said Lucy `I never shall, neither; if I shall.
Now dial. 1390 Gower Conf. II. 96: Doun knelende on mi kne I take leve, and if
I schal, I kisse hire. 1390 Gower Conf., II. 96: I wolde kisse hire eftsones if
I scholde. 1871 Earle Philol. Engl. Tongue 203: The familiar proposal to carry
a basket, I will if I shall, that is, I am willing if you will command me; I
will if so required. 1886 W. Somerset Word-bk. Ill warn our Tomll do it vor ee,
nif he shall-i.e. if you wish. c) with generalized ellipsis in proverbial
phrase: needs must that needs shall = `he must whom fate compels. Usage No. 28:
a) with ellipsis of do (not occurring in the context). 1477 Norton Ord. Alch., O
King that shall These Workes! b) the place of the inf. is sometimes supplied by
that or so placed at the beginning of the sentence. The construction may be
regarded as an ellipsis of "do". It is distinct from the use
(belonging to 27) in which so has the sense of `thus, `likewise, or `also. In
the latter there is usually inversion, as so shall I. 1888 J. S. Winter Bootles
Childr. iv: I should like to see her now shes grown up. `So you shall. Usage
No. 29: with ellipsis of be or passive inf., or with so in place of this (where
the preceding context has is, was, etc.). 1615 J. Chamberlain in Crt. And Times
Jas.; He is not yet executed, nor I hear not when he shall. Surely he may not
will that he be executed. And then Grice turns to the auxiliary he prefers,
will. The OED has will, would. It is traced to Old English willan, pres.t.
wille, willaþ, pa. t. wolde. Grice was especially interested to check Jamess
and Prichards use of willing that, Prichards shall will and the will/shall
distinction; the present tense will; transitive uses, with simple obj. or obj.
clause; occas. intr. 1 trans. with simple obj.: desire, wish for, have a mind
to, `want (something); sometimes implying also `intend, purpose. 1601 Shaks.
(title) Twelfe Night, Or what you will. 1654 Whitlock Zootomia 44 Will what
befalleth, and befall what will. 1734 tr. Rollins Anc. Hist. V. 31 He that can
do what ever he will is in great danger of willing what he ought not. b intr.
with well or ill, or trans. with sbs. of similar meaning (e.g. good, health),
usually with dat. of person: Wish (or intend) well or ill (to some one), feel
or cherish good-will or ill-will. Obs. (cf. will v.2 1 b). See also
well-willing; to will well that: to be willing that. 1483 Caxton Gold. Leg. I
wyl wel that thou say, and yf thou say ony good, thou shalt be pesybly herde.
Usage No. 2: trans. with obj. clause (with vb. in pres. subj., or in
periphrastic form with should), or acc. and inf.: Desire, wish; sometimes
implying also `intend, purpose (that something be done or happen). 1548 Hutten
Sum of Diuinitie K viij, God wylle all men to be saued; enoting expression
(usually authoritative) of a wish or intention: Determine, decree, ordain,
enjoin, give order (that something be done). 1528 Cromwell in Merriman Life and
Lett. (1902) I. 320 His grace then wille that thellection of a new Dean shalbe emonges
them of the colledge; spec. in a direction or instruction in ones will or
testament; hence, to direct by will (that something be done). 1820 Giffords
Compl. Engl. Lawyer. I do hereby will and direct that my executrix..do excuse
and release the said sum of 100l. to him; figurative usage. of an abstract thing (e.g.
reason, law): Demands, requires. 1597 Shaks. 2 Hen. IV, Our Battaile is more
full of Namess then yours Then Reason will, our hearts should be as good. Usage
No. 4 transf. (from 2). Intends to express, means; affirms, maintains. 1602
Dolman La Primaud. Fr. Acad. Hee will that this authority should be for a
principle of demonstration. 2 With dependent infinitive (normally without
"to"); desire to, wish to, have a mind to (do something); often also
implying intention. 1697 Ctess DAunoys Trav. I will not write to you often,
because I will always have a stock of News to tell you, which..is pretty long
in picking up. 1704 Locke Hum. Und. The
great Encomiasts of the Chineses, do all to a man agree and will convince us
that the Sect of the Literati are Atheists. 6 In relation to anothers desire or
requirement, or to an obligation of some kind: Am (is, are) disposed or willing
to, consent to; †in early use sometimes = deign or condescend to.With the (rare
and obs.) imper. use, as in quot. 1490, cf. b and the corresponding negative
use in 12 b. 1921 Times Lit. Suppl. 10 Feb. 88/3 Literature thrives where
people will read what they do not agree with, if it is good. b In 2nd person,
interrog., or in a dependent clause after beg or the like, expressing a request
(usually courteous; with emphasis, impatient). 1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. i. 47
Will you shogge off? 1605 1878 Hardy Ret. Native v. iii, O, O, O,..O, will you
have done! Usage No. 7 Expressing voluntary action, or conscious intention
directed to the doing of what is expressed by the principal verb (without
temporal reference as in 11, and without emphasis as in 10): = choose to
(choose v. B. 3 a). The proper word for this idea, which cannot be so precisely
expressed by any other. 1685 Baxter Paraphr., When God will tell us we shall
know. Usage No. 8 Expressing natural disposition to do something, and hence
habitual action: Has the habit, or `a way, of --ing; is addicted or accustomed
to --ing; habitually does; sometimes connoting `may be expected to (cf. 15).
1865 Ruskin Sesame, Men, by their nature, are prone to fight; they will fight
for any cause, or for none; expressing potentiality, capacity, or sufficiency:
Can, may, is able to, is capable of --ing; is (large) enough or sufficient
to.†it will not be: it cannot be done or brought to pass; it is all in vain.
So, †will it not be? 1833 N. Arnott Physics, The heart will beat after removal
from the body. Usage No. 10 As a strengthening of sense 7, expressing
determination, persistence, and the like (without temporal reference as in 11);
purposes to, is determined to. 1539 Bible (Great) Isa. lxvi. 6, I heare ye
voyce of the Lorde, that wyll rewarde, etc; recompence his enemyes; emphatically.
Is fully determined to; insists on or persists in --ing: sometimes with mixture
of sense 8. (In 1st pers. with implication of futurity, as a strengthening of
sense 11 a. Also fig. = must inevitably, is sure to. 1892 E. Reeves Homeward
Bound viii. 239, I have spent 6,000 francs to come here..and I will see it! c
In phr. of ironical or critical force referring to anothers assertion or
opinion. Now arch. exc. in will have it; 1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI, This is a
Riddling Merchant for the nonce, He will be here, and yet he is not here. 1728
Chambers Cycl., Honey, Some naturalists will have honey to be of a different
quality, according to the difference of the flowers..the bees suck it from.
Also, as auxiliary of the future tense with implication (entailment rather than
cancellable implicatum) of intention, thus distinguished from ‘shall,’ v. B. 8,
where see note); in 1st person: sometimes in slightly stronger sense = intend
to, mean to. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L., To morrow will we be married. 1607 Shaks.
Cor., Ile run away Till I am bigger, but then Ile fight. 1777 Clara Reeve
Champion of Virtue, Never fear it..I will speak to Joseph about it. b In 2nd
and 3rd pers., in questions or indirect statements. 1839 Lane Arab. Nts., I will cure thee without giving thee to drink
any potion When King Yoonán heard his words, he..said.., How wilt thou do this?
c will do (with omission of "I"): an expression of willingness to
carry out a request. Cf. wilco. colloq. 1967 L. White Crimshaw Memorandum, `And
find out where the bastard was `Will do, Jim said. 13 In 1st pers., expressing
immediate intention: "I will" = `I am now going to, `I proceed at
once to. 1885 Mrs. Alexander At Bay, Very well; I will wish you good-evening. b
In 1st pers. pl., expressing a proposal: we will (†wule we) = `let us. 1798
Coleridge Nightingale 4 Come, we will rest on this old mossy bridge!, c
figurative, as in It will rain, (in 3rd pers.) of a thing: Is ready to, is on
the point of --ing. 1225 Ancr. R. A treou þet wule uallen, me underset hit mid
on oðer treou. 14 In 2nd and 3rd pers., as auxiliary expressing mere futurity,
forming (with pres. inf.) the future, and (with pf. inf.) the future pf. tense:
corresponding to "shall" in the 1st pers. (see note s.v. shall v. B.
8). 1847 Tennyson Princess iii. 12 Rest, rest, on mothers breast, Father will
come to thee soon. b As auxiliary of future substituted for the imper. in mild
injunctions or requests. 1876 Ruskin St. Marks Rest. That they should use their
own balances, weights, and measures; (not by any means false ones, you will
please to observe). 15 As auxiliary of future expressing a contingent event, or
a result to be expected, in a supposed case or under particular conditions
(with the condition expressed by a conditional, temporal, or imper. clause, or
otherwise implied). 1861 M. Pattison Ess. The lover of the Elizabethan drama will readily
recal many such allusions; b with pers.sSubjects (usually 1st pers. sing.),
expressing a voluntary act or choice in a supposed case, or a conditional
promise or undertaking: esp. in asseverations, e.g. I will die sooner than, I’ll
be hanged if, etc.). 1898 H. S. Merriman Rodens Corner. But I will be hanged if
I see what it all means, now; xpressing a determinate or necessary consequence
(without the notion of futurity). 1887 Fowler Deductive Logic, From what has
been said it will be seen that I do not agree with Mr. Mill. Mod. If, in a
syllogism, the middle term be not distributed in either premiss, there will be
no conclusion; ith the notion of futurity obscured or lost: = will prove or
turn out to, will be found on inquiry to; may be supposed to, presumably does.
Hence (chiefly Sc. and north. dial.) in estimates of amount, or in uncertain or
approximate statements, the future becoming equivalent to a present with
qualification: e.g. it will be = `I think it is or `it is about; what will that
be? = `what do you think that is? 1584 Hornby Priory in Craven Gloss. Where on
40 Acres there will be xiij.s. iv.d. per acre yerely for rent. 1791 Grose Olio
(1792) 106, I believe he will be an Irishman. 1791 Grose Olio. C. How far is it
to Dumfries? W. It will be twenty miles. 1812 Brackenridge Views Louisiana, The
agriculture of this territory will be very similar to that of Kentucky. 1876
Whitby Gloss. sThis word we have only once heard, and that will be twenty years
ago. 16 Used where "shall" is now the normal auxiliary, chiefly in
expressing mere futurity: since 17th c. almost exclusively in Scottish, Irish,
provincial, or extra-British use (see shall. 1602 Shaks. Ham. I will win for
him if I can: if not, Ile gaine nothing but my shame, and the odde hits. 1825
Scott in Lockhart Ballantyne-humbug. I expect we will have some good singing.
1875 E. H. Dering Sherborne. `Will I start, sir? asked the Irish groom. Usage
No. 3 Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses; n absol. use, or with ellipsis of
obj. clause as in 2: in meaning corresponding to senses 5-7.if you will is
sometimes used parenthetically to qualify a word or phrase: = `if you wish it
to be so called, `if you choose or prefer to call it so. 1696 Whiston The.
Earth. Gravity depends entirely on the constant and efficacious, and, if you
will, the supernatural and miraculous Influence of Almighty God. 1876 Ruskin
St. Marks Rest. Very savage! monstrous! if you will. b In parenthetic phr. if
God will (†also will God, rarely God will), God willing: if it be the will of
God, `D.V.In OE. Gode willi&asg.ende (will v.2) = L. Deo volente. 1716
Strype in Thoresbys Lett. Next week, God willing, I take my journey to my
Rectory in Sussex; fig. Demands, requires (absol. or ellipt. use of 3 c). 1511
Reg. Privy Seal Scot. That na seculare personis have intrometting with thaim uther
wais than law will; I will well: I assent, `I should think so indeed. (Cf. F.
je veux bien.) Usage No. 18: with ellipsis of a vb. of motion. 1885 Bridges
Eros and Psyche Aug. I will to thee oer the stream afloat. Usage No. 19: with
ellipsis of active inf. to be supplied from the context. 1836 Dickens Sk. Boz,
Steam Excurs., `Will you go on deck? `No, I will not. This was said with a most
determined air. 1853 Dickens Bleak Ho. lii, I cant believe it. Its not that I
dont or I wont. I cant! 1885 Mrs. Alexander Valeries Fate vi, `Do you know that
all the people in the house will think it very shocking of me to walk with you?..
`The deuce they will!; With generalized ellipsis, esp. in proverbial saying
(now usually as in quot. 1562, with will for would). 1639 J. Clarke Paroem. 237
He that may and will not, when he would he shall not. c With so or that
substituted for the omitted inf. phr.: now usually placed at the beginning of
the sentence. 1596 Shaks. Tam. Shr. Hor. I promist we would beare his charge of
wooing Gremio. And so we wil. d Idiomatically used in a qualifying phr. with
relative, equivalent to a phr. with indef. relative in -ever; often with a
thing as subj., becoming a mere synonym of may: e.g. shout as loud as you will
= `however loud you (choose to) shout; come what will = `whatever may come; be
that as it will = `however that may be. 1732 Pope Mor. Ess. The ruling Passion,
be it what it will, The ruling Passion conquers Reason still. 20 With ellipsis
of pass. inf. A. 1774 Goldsm. Surv. Exp. Philos. The airs force is compounded
of its swiftness and density, and as these are encreased, so will the force of
the wind; in const. where the ellipsis may be either of an obj. clause or of an
inf. a In a disjunctive qualifying clause or phr. usually parenthetic, as
whether he will or no, will he or not, (with pron. omitted) will or no, (with
or omitted) will he will he not, will he nill he (see VI. below and
willy-nilly), etc.In quot. 1592 vaguely = `one way or another, `in any case.
For the distinction between should and would, v. note s.v. shall; in a
noun-clause expressing the object of desire, advice, or request, usually with a
person as subj., implying voluntary action as the desired end: thus
distinguished from should, which may be used when the persons will is not in
view. Also (almost always after wish) with a thing as Subjects, in which case
should can never be substituted because it would suggest the idea of command or
compulsion instead of mere desire. Cf. shall; will; willest; willeth; wills; willed
(wIld); also: willian, willi, wyll, wille, wil, will, willode, will, wyllede,
wylled, willyd, ied, -it, -id, willed; wijld, wilde, wild, willid, -yd, wylled,willet,
willed; willd(e, wild., OE. willian wk. vb. = German “willen.” f. will sb.1, 1
trans. to wish, desire; sometimes with implication of intention: = will. 1400
Lat. and Eng. Prov. He þt a lytul me 3euyth to me wyllyth optat longe lyffe.
1548 Udall, etc. Erasm. Par. Matt. v. 21-24 Who so euer hath gotten to hymselfe
the charitie of the gospell, whyche wylleth wel to them that wylleth yll. 1581
A. Hall Iliad, By Mineruas helpe, who willes you all the ill she may. A. 1875
Tennyson Q. Mary i. iv, A great party in the state Wills me to wed her; To
assert, affirm: = will v.1 B. 4. 1614 Selden Titles Hon. None of this excludes
Vnction before, but only wils him the first annointed by the Pope. 2 a to
direct by ones will or testament (that something be done, or something to be
done); to dispose of by will; to bequeath or devise; to determine by the will;
to attempt to cause, aim at effecting by exercise of will; to set the mind with
conscious intention to the performance or occurrence of something; to choose or
decide to do something, or that something shall be done or happen. Const. with
simple obj., acc. and inf., simple inf. (now always with to), or obj. clause;
also absol. or intr. (with as or so). Nearly coinciding in meaning with will
v.1 7, but with more explicit reference to the mental process of volition. 1630
Prynne Anti-Armin. 119 He had onely a power, not to fall into sinne vnlesse he
willed it. 1667 Milton P.L. So absolute she seems..that what she wills to do or
say, Seems wisest. 1710 J. Clarke tr. Rohaults Nat. Philos. If I will to move
my Arm, it is presently moved. 1712 Berkeley Pass. Obed. He that willeth the
end, doth will the necessary means conducive to that end. 1837 Carlyle Fr. Rev.
All shall be as God wills. 1880 Meredith Tragic Com. So great, heroical,
giant-like, that what he wills must be. 1896 Housman Shropsh. Lad xxx, Others,
I am not the first, Have willed more mischief than they durst; intr. to
exercise the will; to perform the mental act of volition. 1594 Hooker Eccl.
Pol. To will, is to bend our soules to the hauing or doing of that which they
see to be good. 1830 Mackintosh Eth. Philos. Wks.. But what could induce such a
being to will or to act? 1867 A. P. Forbes Explan. Is this infinitely powerful
and intelligent Being free? wills He? loves He? c trans. To bring or get (into,
out of, etc.) by exercise of will. 1850 L. Hunt Table-t. (1882) 184 Victims of
opium have been known to be unable to will themselves out of the chair in which
they were sitting. d To control (another person), or induce (another) to do
something, by the mere exercise of ones will, as in hypnotism. 1882 Proc. Soc.
Psych. Research I. The one to be `willed would go to the other end of the
house, if desired, whilst we agreed upon the thing to be done. 1886 19th Cent. They
are what is called `willed to do certain things desired by the ladies or
gentlemen who have hold of them. 1897 A. Lang Dreams & Ghosts iii. 59 A
young lady, who believed that she could play the `willing game successfully
without touching the person `willed; to express or communicate ones will or
wish with regard to something, with various shades of meaning, cf. will, v.1
3., specifically: a to enjoin, order; to decree, ordain, a) with personal obj.,
usually with inf. or clause. 1481 Cov. Leet Bk. 496 We desire and also will you
that vnto oure seid seruaunt ye yeue your aid. 1547 Edw. VI in Rymer Foedera, We
Wyll and Commaunde yowe to Procede in the seid Matters. 1568 Grafton Chron., Their
sute was smally regarded, and shortly after they were willed to silence. 1588
Lambarde Eiren. If a man do lie in awaite to rob me, and (drawing his sword
upon me) he willeth me to deliver my money. 1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI We doe no
otherwise then wee are willd. 1596 Nashe Saffron Walden P 4, Vp he was had and.willed
to deliuer vp his weapon. 1656 Hales Gold. Rem. The King in the Gospel, that
made a Feast, and..willed his servants to go out to the high-ways side. 1799
Nelson in Nicolas Disp., Willing and requiring all Officers and men to obey
you; 1565 Cooper Thesaurus s.v. Classicum, By sounde of trumpet to will
scilence. 1612 Bacon Ess., Of Empire. It is common with Princes (saith Tacitus)
to will contradictories. 1697 Dryden Æneis i. 112 Tis yours, O Queen! to will
The Work, which Duty binds me to fulfil. 1877 Tennyson Harold vi. i, Get thou
into thy cloister as the king Willd it.; to pray, request, entreat; = desire v.
6. 1454 Paston Lett. Suppl. As for the questyon that ye wylled me to aske my
lord, I fond hym yet at no good leyser. 1564 Haward tr. Eutropius. The Romaines
sent ambassadoures to him, to wyll him to cease from battayle. 1581 A. Hall
Iliad, His errand done, as he was willde, he toke his flight from thence. 1631
[Mabbe] Celestina. Did I not will you I should not be wakened? 1690 Dryden
Amphitryon i. i, He has sent me to will and require you to make a swinging long
Night for him; fig. of a thing, to require, demand; also, to induce, persuade a
person to do something. 1445 in Anglia. Constaunce willeth also that thou doo
noughte with weyke corage. Cable and Baugh note that one important s. of
prescriptions that now form part of all our grammars -- that governing the use
of will and shall -- has its origin in this period. Previous to 1622 no grammar
recognized any distinction between will and shall. In 1653 Wallis in his
Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae states in Latin and for the benefit of Europeans
that Subjectsive intention is expressed by will in the first person, by shall
in the second and third, while simple factual indicative predictable futurity
is expressed by shall in the first person, by will in the second and third. It
is not until the second half of the eighteenth century that the use in
questions and subordinate clauses is explicitly defined. In 1755 Johnson, in
his Dictionary, states the rule for questions, and in 1765 William Ward, in his
Grammar, draws up for the first time the full set of prescriptions that
underlies, with individual variations, the rules found in later tracts. Wards
pronouncements are not followed generally by other grammarians until Lindley
Murray gives them greater currency in 1795. Since about 1825 they have often been
repeated in grammars, v. Fries, The periphrastic future with will and shall.
Will qua modal auxiliary never had an s. The absence of conjugation is a very
old common Germanic phenomenon. OE 3rd person present indicative of willan (and
of the preterite-present verbs) is not distinct from the 1st person present
indicative. That dates back at least to CGmc, or further if one looks just as
the forms and ignore tense and/or mood). Re: Prichard: "Prichard wills
that he go to London. This is Prichards example, admired by Grice ("but I
expect not pleasing to Maucaulays ears"). The -s is introduced to indicate
a difference between the modal and main verb use (as in Prichard and Grice) of
will. In fact, will, qua modal, has never been used with a to-infinitive. OE
uses present-tense forms to refer to future events as well as willan and
sculan. willan would give a volitional nuance; sculan, an obligational nuance.
Its difficult to find an example of weorthan used to express the future, but
that doesnt mean it didnt happen. In insensitive utterers, will has very little
of volition about it, unless one follows Walliss observation for for I
will vs. I shall. Most probably use ll, or be going to for the future. Davidson, Intending,
R. Grandy and Warner, PGRICE. “Uncertainty,” “Aspects.” “Conception,” Davidson
on intending, intending and trying, Brandeis.”Method,” in “Conception,” WOW .
Hampshire and Hart. Decision, intention, and certainty, Mind, Harman, Willing
and intending in PGRICE. Practical reasoning. Review of Met. 29. Thought, Princeton, for functionalist approach
alla Grice’s “Method.” Principles of reasoning. Rational action and the extent
of intention. Social theory and practice. Jeffrey, Probability kinematics, in
The logic of decision, cited by Harman in PGRICE. Kahneman and Tversky,
Judgement under uncertainty, Science, cited by Harman in PGRICE. Nisbet and Ross,
Human inference, cited by Harman in PGRICE. Pears, Predicting and deciding.
Prichard, Acting, willing, and desiring, in Moral obligations, Oxford ed. by
Urmson Speranza, The Grice Circle Wants
You. Stout, Voluntary action. Mind 5, repr in Studies in philosophy and
psychology, Macmillan, cited by Grice, “Uncertainty.” Urmson, ‘Introduction’ to
Prichard’s ‘Moral obligations.’ I shant but Im not certain I wont – Grice.
How uncertain can Grice be? This is the Henriette Herz BA lecture, and as such
published in The Proceedings of the BA. Grice calls himself a
neo-Prichardian (after the Oxford philosopher) and cares to quote from a few
other philosophers ‒ some of whom he was not necessarily associated
with: such as Kenny and Anscombe, and some of whom he was, notably
Pears. Grices motto: Where there is a neo-Prichardian willing, there is a
palæo-Griceian way! Grice quotes Pears, of Christ Church, as the philosopher he
found especially congenial to explore areas in what both called philosophical
psychology, notably the tricky use of intending as displayed by a few
philosophers even in their own circle, such as Hampshire and Hart in Intention,
decision, and certainty. The title of Grices lecture is meant to provoke
that pair of Oxonian philosophers Grice knew so well and who were too ready to
bring in certainty in an area that requires deep philosophical
exploration. This is the Henriette Herz Trust annual lecture. It
means its delivered annually by different philosophers, not always Grice! Grice
had been appointed a FBA earlier, but he took his time to deliver his
lecture. With your lecture, you implicate, Hi! Grice, and indeed Pears,
were motivated by Hampshires and Harts essay on intention and certainty in
Mind. Grice knew Hampshire well, and had actually enjoyed his Thought and
Action. He preferred Hampshires Thought and action to Anscombes Intention.
Trust Oxford being what it is that TWO volumes on intending are published in
the same year! Which one shall I read first? Eventually, neither ‒ immediately.
Rather, Grice managed to unearth some sketchy notes by Prichard (he calls
himself a neo-Prichardian) that Urmson had made available for the Clarendon Press
‒ notably Prichards essay on willing that. Only a Corpus-Christi genius like
Prichard will distinguish will to, almost unnecessary, from will that, so
crucial. For Grice, wills that , unlike
wills to, is properly generic, in that p, that follows the that-clause,
need NOT refer to the Subjects of the sentence. Surely I can will that Smith
wins the match! But Grice also quotes Anscombe (whom otherwise would not count,
although they did share a discussion panel at the American Philosophical
Association) and Kenny, besides Pears. Of Anscombe, Grice borrows (but
never returns) the direction-of-fit term of art, actually Austinian. From
Kenny, Grice borrows (and returns) the concept of voliting. His most congenial
approach was Pearss. Grice had of course occasion to explore disposition
and intention on earlier occasions. Grice is especially concerned with a
dispositional analysis to intending. He will later reject it in
“Uncertainty.” But that was Grice for you! Grice is especially interested
in distinguishing his views from Ryles over-estimated dispositional account of
intention, which Grice sees as reductionist, and indeed eliminationist, if not
boringly behaviourist, even in analytic key. The logic of dispositions is
tricky, as Grice will later explore in connection with rationality, rational
propension or propensity, and metaphysics, the as if operator). While Grice
focuses on uncertainty, he is trying to be funny. He knew that Oxonians like
Hart and Hampshire were obsessed with certainty. I was so surprised that
Hampshire and Hart were claiming decision and intention are psychological
states about which the agent is certain, that I decided on the spot that
that could certainly be a nice topic for my BA lecture! Grice granted that in
some cases, a declaration of an intention can be authorative in a certain
certain way, i. e. as implicating certainty. But Grice wants us to consider:
Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt. Everest. Surely he cant be certain
hell succeed. Grice used the same example at the APA, of all
places. To amuse Grice, Davidson, who was present, said: Surely thats
just an implicature! Just?! Grice was almost furious in his British
guarded sort of way. Surely not just! Pears, who was also present,
tried to reconcile: If I may, Davidson, I think Grice would take it that,
if certainty is implicated, the whole thing becomes too social to be
true. They kept discussing implicature versus entailment. Is
certainty entailed then? Cf. Urmson on certainly vs. knowingly, and believably.
Davidson asked. No, disimplicated! is Grices curt reply. The next
day, he explained to Davidson that he had invented the concept of
disimplicature just to tease him, and just one night before, while musing in
the hotel room! Talk of uncertainty was thus for Grice intimately associated
with his concern about the misuse of know to mean certain, especially in the
exegeses that Malcolm made popular about, of all people, Moore! V. Scepticism
and common sense and Moore and philosophers paradoxes above, and Causal theory
and Prolegomena for a summary of Malcoms misunderstanding Moore! Grice manages
to quote from Stouts Voluntary action and Brecht. And he notes that not all
speakers are as sensitive as they should be (e.g. distinguishing modes, as
realised by shall vs. will). He emphasizes the fact that Prichard has to be
given great credit for seeing that the accurate specification of willing should
be willing that and not willing to. Grice is especially interested in proving
Stoutians (like Hampshire and Hart) wrong by drawing from Aristotles
prohairesis-doxa distinction, or in his parlance, the buletic-doxastic
distinction. Grice quotes from Aristotle. Prohairesis cannot be opinion/doxa.
For opinion is thought to relate to all kinds of things, no less to eternal
things and impossible things than to things in our own power; and it is
distinguished by its falsity or truth, not by its badness or goodness, while
choice is distinguished rather by these. Now with opinion in general perhaps no
one even says it is identical. But it is not identical even with any kind of
opinion; for by choosing or deciding, or prohairesis, what is good or bad we
are men of a certain character, which we are not by holding this or that
opinion or doxa. And we choose to get or avoid something good or bad, but we
have opinions about what a thing is or whom it is good for or how it is good
for him; we can hardly be said to opine to get or avoid anything. And choice is
praised for being related to the right object rather than for being rightly
related to it, opinion for being truly related to its object. And we choose
what we best know to be good, but we opine what we do not quite know; and it is
not the same people that are thought to make the best choices and to have the
best opinions, but some are thought to have fairly good opinions, but by reason
of vice to choose what they should not. If opinion precedes choice or
accompanies it, that makes no difference; for it is not this that we are
considering, but whether it is identical with some kind of opinion. What, then,
or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things we have mentioned?
It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be an object of
choice. Is it, then, what has been decided on by previous deliberation? At any
rate choice involves a rational principle and thought. Even the Names seems to
suggest that it is what is chosen before other things. His final analysis of G
intends that p is in terms of, B1, a buletic condition, to the effect that G
wills that p, and D2, an attending doxastic condition, to the effect that G
judges that B1 causes p. Grice ends this essay with a nod to Pears and an open
point about the justifiability (other than evidential) for the acceptability of
the agents deciding and intending versus the evidential justifiability of the
agents predicting that what he intends will be satisfied. It is important to
note that in his earlier Disposition and intention, Grice dedicates the first
part to counterfactual if general. This is a logical point. Then as an account
for a psychological souly concept ψ. If G does A, sensory input, G does B, behavioural
output. No ψ without the behavioural output that ψ is meant to explain. His
problem is with the first person. The functionalist I does not need a black
box. The here would be both incorrigibility
and privileged access. Pology only explains their evolutionary import. Refs.:
The main source is his BA lecture on ‘uncertainty,’ but using the keyword
‘certainty’ is useful too. His essay on Descartes in WoW is important, and
sources elsehere in the Grice Papers, such as the predecessor to the
“Uncertainty” lecture in “Disposition and intention,” also his discussion of
avowal (vide references above), incorrigibility and privileged access in “Method,”
repr. in “Conception,” BANC
universalium: Grice holds a set-theoretical approach to the
universalium. Grice is willing to provide always a set-theoretical
extensionalist (in terms of predicate) and an intensionalist variant in terms
of property and category. Grice explicitly uses ‘X’ for utterance-type
(WOW:118), implying a distinction with the utterance-token. Grice gets engaged
in a metabolical debate concerning the reductive analysis of what an
utterance-type means in terms of a claim to the effect that, by uttering
x, an utterance-token of utterance-type X, the utterer means that p. The
implicature is x (utterance-token). Grice is not enamoured with the type/token
or token/type distinction. His thoughts on logical form are provocative. f
you cannot put it in logical form, it is not worth saying. Strawson
infamously reacted with a smile. Oh, no: if you CAN put it in logical form, it
is not worth saying. Grice refers to the type-token distinction when he uses x
for token and X for type. Since Bennett cares to call Grice a
meaning-nominalist we should not care about the type X anyway. He expands on
this in Retrospective Epilogue. Grice should have payed more attention to the
distinction seeing that it was Ogdenian. A common mode of estimating the
amount of matter in a printed book is to count the number of words. There will
ordinarily be about twenty thes on a page, and, of course, they count as twenty
words. In another use of the word word, however, there is but one word the in
the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on
a page, or be heard in any voice. Such a Form, Peirce, as cited by Ogden and
Richards, proposes to term a type. A single object such as this or that word on
a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, Peirce ventures to
call a token. In order that a type may be used, it has to be embodied in a
token which shall be a sign of the type, and thereby of the object the type
signifies, and Grice followed suit. Refs.: Some of the sources are given under
‘abstractum.’ Also under ‘grecianism,’ since Grice was keen on exploring what
Aristotle has to say about this in Categoriae, due to his joint research with Austin,
Code, Friedman, and Strawson. Grice also has a specific Peirceian essay on the
type-token distinction. BANC
utilitarianism:
ultimately, Grice’s meta-ethics, like Hare’s, Nowell-Smith’s, Austin’s,
Hampshire’s, and Warnock’s derives into a qualified utilitarianism, with
notions of agreeableness and eudaemonia being crucial. Grice well knows that
for Aristotle pleasure is just one out of the three sources for phulia; the
others being profit, and virtue. As an English utilitarian, or English
futilitarian, Grice plays with Griceian pleasures. Democritus, as Grice
remarks, seems to be the earliest philosopher to have categorically embraced a
hedonistic philosophy. Democritus claims that the supreme goal of life is
contentment or cheerfulness, stating that joy and sorrow are the distinguishing
mark of things beneficial and harmful. The Cyrenaics are an ultra-hedonist
Grecoam school of philosophy founded by Aristippus. Many of the principles of
the school were set by his grandson, Aristippus the Younger, and Theodorus. The
Cyrenaic school is one of the earliest Socratic schools. The Cyrenaics teach
that the only intrinsic ‘agathon’ is pleasure ‘hedone,’ which means not just
the absence of pain, but a positively enjoyable momentary sensation. A physical
pleasure is stronger than a pleasure of anticipation or memory. The Cyrenaics
do, however, recognize the value of social obligation, and that pleasure may be
gained from altruism. The Cyrenaic school dies out within a century, and is
replaced by Epicureanism. The Cyrenaics are known for their sceptical
epistemology. The Cyrenaics reduce logic to a basic doctrine concerning the
criterion of truth. The Cyrenaics think that one can only know with certainty
his immediate sense-experience, e. g., that he is having a sweet sensation. But
one can know nothing about the nature of the object that causes this sensation,
e.g., that honey is sweet. The Cyrenaics also deny that we can have knowledge
of what the experience of others are like. All knowledge is immediate
sensation. Sensation is a motion which is purely subjective, and is painful,
indifferent or pleasant, according as it is violent, tranquil or gentle.
Further, sensation is entirely individual and can in no way be described as
constituting absolute objective knowledge. Feeling, therefore, is the only
possible criterion of knowledge and of conduct. The way of being affected is alone
knowable. Thus the sole aim for everyone should be pleasure. Cyrenaicism
deduces a single, universal aim for all which is pleasure. Furthermore, feeling
is momentary and homogeneous. It follows that past and future pleasure have no
real existence for us, and that in present pleasure there is no distinction of
kind. Socrates speaks of the higher pleasure of the intellect. The Cyrenaics
denies the validity of this distinction and say that bodily pleasure (hedone
somatike), being more simple and more intense, is preferable. Momentary
pleasure, preferably of a physical kind, is the only good for a human. However,
an action which gives immediate pleasure can create more than their equivalent
of pain. The wise person should be in control (egcrateia) of pleasure rather
than be enslaved to it, otherwise pain results, and this requires judgement to
evaluate this or that pleasure of life. Regard should be paid to law and
custom, because even though neither law nor custom have an intrinsic value on
its own, violating law or custom leads to an unpleasant penalty being imposed
by others. Likewise, friendship and justice are useful because of the pleasure
they provide. Thus the Cyrenaics believe in the hedonistic value of social
obligation and altruistic behaviour. Epicureanism is a system of philosophy
based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an atomic materialist, following in the
steps of Democritus and Leucippus. Epicurus’s materialism leads him to a
general stance against superstition or the idea of divine intervention.
Following Aristippus, Epicurus believes that the greatest good is to seek
modest, sustainable pleasure in the form of a state of tranquility and freedom
from fear (ataraxia) and absence of bodily pain (aponia) through knowledge of
the workings of the world and the limits of desire. The combination of these
two states, ataraxia and aponia, is supposed to constitute happiness in its
highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism, insofar as it
declares pleasure as the sole intrinsic good, its conception of absence of pain
as the greatest pleasure and its advocacy of a simple life make it different
from hedonism as it is commonly understood. In the Epicurean view, the highest
pleasure (tranquility and freedom from fear) is obtained by knowledge,
friendship and living a virtuous and temperate life. Epicurus lauds the
enjoyment of a simple pleasure, by which he means abstaining from the bodily
desire, such as sex and the appetite, verging on asceticism. Epicurus argues
that when eating, one should not eat too richly, for it could lead to
dissatisfaction later, such as the grim realization that one could not afford
such delicacies in the future. Likewise, sex could lead to increased lust and
dissatisfaction with the sexual partner. Epicurus does not articulate a broad
system of social ethics that has survived but had a unique version of the
golden rule. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living
wisely and well and justly, agreeing neither to harm nor be harmed, and it is
impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living a pleasant life.
Epicureanism is originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the
main opponent of Stoicism. Epicurus and his followers shun politics. After the
death of Epicurus, his school is headed by Hermarchus. Later many Epicurean
societies flourish in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era, such
as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes and Ercolano. The poet Lucretius is
its most known Roman proponent. By the end of the Roman Empire, having
undergone attack and repression, Epicureanism has all but died out, and would
be resurrected in the seventeenth century by the atomist Pierre Gassendi. Some
writings by Epicurus have survived. Some scholars consider the epic poem “De
natura rerum” by Lucretius to present in one unified work the core arguments
and theories of Epicureanism. Many of the papyrus scrolls unearthed at the
Villa of the Papyri at Herculaneum are Epicurean texts. At least some are
thought to have belonged to the Epicurean Philodemus. Cf. Barnes on
epicures and connoiseurs. Many a controversy arising out of this or that value
judgement is settled by saying, ‘I like it and you don’t, and that s the end of
the matter.’ I am content to adopt this solution of the difficulty on matters such
as food and drink. Even here, though, we admit the existence of epicures and
connoisseurs.Why are we not content to accept the same solution on every matter
where value is concerned? The reason I am not so content lies in the fact that
the action of one man dictated by his approval of something is frequently
incompatible with the action of another man dictated by his approval of
something. This is obviously philosophical, especially for the Grecian
hedonistic Epicureians made popular by Marius and Walter Pater at Oxford. L and
S have "ἡδονή,” also “ἁδονά,” or in a chorus in tragedy, “ἡδονά,”
ultimately from "ἥδομαι,” which they render it as “enjoyment, pleasure,”
“prop. of sensual pleasure.” αἱ τοῦ σώματος or περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡ.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα
ἡ. Plato, Republic, 328d; σωματικαὶ ἡ. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1151a13; αἱ περὶ
πότους καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡ. Plato, Republic, 389e; but also ἀκοῆς ἡ; ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ
εἰδέναι ἡ. Pl. R. 582b; of malicious pleasure, ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, ἐπὶ
ταῖς λοιδορίαις ἡ.; ἡδονῇ ἡσσᾶσθαι, ἡδοναῖς χαρίζεσθαι, to give way to
pleasure; Pl. Lg. 727c; κότερα ἀληθείη χρήσομαι ἢ ἡδονῆ; shall I speak truly or
so as to humour you? εἰ ὑμῖν ἡδονὴ τοῦ ἡγεμονεύειν; ἡ. εἰσέρχεταί τιϝι εἰ, “one
feels pleasure at the thought that …” ; ἡδονὴν ἔχειν τινός to be satisfied with;
ἡδονὴν ἔχει, φέρει; ἡδονὴ ἰδέσθαι (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι), of a temple; δαίμοσιν πρὸς
ἡδονήν; ὃ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡ.; πρὸς ἡ.
Λέγειν, “to speak so as to please another”; δημηγορεῖν; οὐ πρὸς ἡ. οἱ ἦν τὰ
ἀγγελλόμενα; πάντα πρὸς ἡ. ἀκούοντας; later πρὸς ἡδονῆς εἶναί τινι; καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν
κλύειν; καθ᾽ ἡδονήν ἐστί μοι; καθ᾽ ἡ. τι δρᾶν, ποιεῖν; καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ τὰ
πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἐστί τινι, it is a pleasure or delight to another;
ἐν ἡδονῇ ἔχειν τινάς, to take pleasure in them; ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, oοἱ λυπηροί;
μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑφ᾽ ἡδονῆς; ὑπὸ τῆς ἡ; ἡδονᾷ with pleasure; a pleasure; ἡδοναὶ
τραγημάτων sweetmeats; plural., desires after pleasure, pleasant lusts. In
Ionic philosophers, taste, flavour, usually joined with χροιή. Note that
Aristotle uses somatike hedone. As a Lit. Hum. Oxon., and especially as a
tutee of Hardie at Corpus, Grice is almost too well aware of the centrality of
hedone in Aristotles system. Pleasure is sometimes rendered “placitum,” as in “ad
placitum,” in scholastic philosophy, but that is because scholastic philosophy
is not as Hellenic as it should be. Actually, Grice prefers “agreeable.” One of
Grices requisites for an ascription of eudaemonia (to have a fairy godmother)
precisely has the system of ends an agent chooses to realise to be an agreeable
one. One form or mode of agreeableness, Grice notes, is, unless counteracted,
automatically attached to the attainment of an object of desire, such
attainment being routinely a source of satisfaction. The generation of such a
satisfaction thus provides an independent ground for preferring one system of
ends to another. However, some other mode of agreeableness, such as e. g. being
a source of delight, which is not routinely associated with the fulfilment of
this or that desire, could discriminate, independently of other features
relevant to such a preference, between one system of ends and another. Further,
a system of ends the operation of which is especially agreeable is stable not
only vis-à-vis a rival system, but also against the somewhat weakening effect
of ‘egcrateia,’ incontinence, or akrasia, if you mustn’t. A disturbing
influence, as Aristotle knows from experience, is more surely met by a
principle in consort with a supporting attraction than by the principle alone. Grices
favourite hedonistic implicatum was “please,” as in “please, please me,” by The
Beatles. While Grice claims to love Kantotle, he
cannot hide his greater reverence for Aristotle, instilled early on at Corpus. An
Oxonian need not recite Kant in what during the Second World War was referred
to as the Hun, and while Aristotle was a no-no at Clifton (koine!), Hardie
makes Grice love him. With eudaemonia, Grice finds a perfect synthetic futilitarian
concept to balance his innate analytic tendencies. There is Grecian eudaemonism
and there is Griceian eudaemonism. L and S are not too helpful. They have
“εὐδαιμονία” (Ion. –ιη), which they render not as happiness, but as “prosperity,
good fortune, opulence;” “χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐ.;” of countries; “μοῖρ᾽
εὐδαιμονίας.” In a second use, the expression is indeed rendered as “true,
full happiness;” “εὐ. οὐκ ἐν βοσκήμασιν οἰκεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐν χρυσῷ; εὐ. ψυχῆς,
oκακοδαιμονίη, cf. Pl. Def. 412d, Arist. EN 1095a18, sometimes personified as a
divinity. There is eudaemonia and there is kakodaemonia. Of course, Grice’s
locus classicus is EN 1095a18, which is Grice’s fairy godmother, almost. Cf.
Austin on agathon and eudaimonia in Aristotle’s ethics, unearthed by Urmson and
Warnock, a response to an essay by Prichard in “Philosophy” on the meaning of
agathon in Aristotle’s ethics. Pritchard argues that Aristotle regards “agathon”
to mean conducive to “eudaemonia,” and, consequently, that Aristotle maintains
that every deliberate action stems, ultimately, from the desire for eudaemonia.
Austin finds fault with this. First, agathon in Aristotle does not have a
single usage, and a fortiori not the one Pritchard suggests. Second, if one has
to summarise the usage of “agathon” in one phrase, “being desired” cannot
fulfil this function, for there are other objects of desire besides “τό
άγαθόν,” even if Davidson would disagree. Prichard endeavours to specify what
Aristotle means by αγαθον. In some contexts, “agathon” seems to mean simply that
being desired or an ultimate or non‐ultimate end or aim of a person. In other
contexts, “αγαθον” takes on a normative quality. For his statements to have
content, argues Prichard, Aristotle must hold that when we pursue something of
a certain kind, such as an honour, we pursue it as “a good.” Prichard argues
that by "αγαθον" Aristotle actually means, except in the Nicomachean
Ethics, conducive to eudaemonia, and holds that when a man acts deliberately,
he does it from a desire to attain eudaemonia. Prichard attributes this
position to Plato as well, despite the fact that both thinkers make statements
inconsistent with this view of man’s ultimate aim. Grice takes life seriously:
philosophical biology. He even writes an essay entitled “Philosophy of life,”
listed is in PGRICE. Grice bases his thought on his tutee Ackrill’s Dawes Hicks
essay for the BA, who quotes extensively from Hardie. Grice also reviews that “serious
student of Greek philosophy,” Austin, in his response to Prichard, Grice’s
fairy godmother. Much the most plausible conjecture regarding what Grecian
eudaimonia means is that eudaemonia is to be understood as the name for that
state or condition which one’s good dæmon would, if he could, ensure for one.
One’s good dæmon is a being motivated, with respect to one, solely by concern
for one’s eudaemonia, well-being or happiness. To change the idiom, eudæmonia
is the general characterisation of what a full-time and unhampered fairy
godmother would secure for one. Grice is concerned with the specific system of
ends that eudaemonia consists for Ariskant. Grice borrows, but never returns,
some reflections by his fomer tuttee at St. Johns, Ackrill. Ackrills point is
about the etymological basis for eudaemonia, from eudaemon, the good dæmon, as
Grice prefers. Grice thinks the metaphor should be disimplicated, and taken literally.
Grice concludes with a set of ends that justify our ascription of eudaemonia to
the agent. For Grice, as for Kantotle, telos and eudaemonia are related in
subtle ways. For eudaemonia we cannot deal with just one end, but a system of
ends, although such a system may be a singleton. Grice specifies a subtle way
of characterising end so that a particular ascription of an end may entail an
ascription of eudaemonia. Grice follows the textual criticism of his tutee Ackrill,
in connection with the Socratic point that eudaemonia is literally related to
the eudaemon. In PGRICE Warner explores Grice’s concept of eudaemonia. Warner
is especially helpful with the third difficult Carus lecture by Grice, a
metaphysical defence of absolute value. Warner connects with Grice in such
topics as the philosophy of perception seen in an evolutionary light and the
Kantotelian idea of eudaemonia. In response to Warner’s overview of the oeuvre of
Grice for the festschrift that Warner co-edited with Grandy, Grice refers to
the editors collectively as Richards. While he feels he has to use “happiness,”
Grice is always having Aristotle’s eudaemonia in mind. The implicatum of Smith
is ‘happy’ is more complex than Kantotle thinks. Austen knew. For Emma, you decide
if youre happy. Ultimately, for Grice, the rational life is the happy life. Grice
took life seriously: philosophical biology! Grice is clear when reprinting the
Descartes essay in WOW, where he does quote from Descartes sources quite a bit,
even if he implicates he is no Cartesian scholar – what Oxonian would? It
concerns certainty. And certainty is originally Cantabrigian (Moore), but also
Oxonian, in parts. Ayer says that to know is to assure that one is certain or
sure. So he could connect. Grice will at various stages of his development play
and explore this authoritative voice of introspection: incorrigibility and
privileged access. He surely wants to say that a declaration of an intention is
authoritative. And Grice plays with meaning, too when provoking Malcolm in a
don recollection: Grice: I want you to bring me a paper tomorrow. Strawson: You
mean a newspaper? Grice: No, a philosophical essay. Strawson: How do you know?
Are you certain you mean that? Grice finds not being certain about what one
means Strawsonian and otiose. Tutees. Grice loved to place himself in the role
of the philosophical hack, dealing with his tutees inabilities, a whole week
long – until he could find refreshment in para-philosophy on the Saturday
morning. Now, the logical form of certain is a trick. Grice would symbolize it
as numbering of operators. If G ψs p, G ψs ψs p, and G ψs ψs ψs p, and so ad infinitum. This is a bit like certainty. But
not quite! When he explores trust, Grice considers something like a backing for
it. But does conclusive evidence yield certainty? He doesnt think so.
Certainty, for Grice should apply to any psychological attitude, state or
stance. And it is just clever of him that when he had to deliver his BA lecture
he chooses ‘intention and uncertainty’ as its topic, just to provoke. Not surprisingly,
the “Uncertainty” piece opens with the sceptics challenge. And he will not
conclude that the intender is certain. Only that theres some good chance (p ˃0.5)
that what he intends will get through! When there is a will, there is a way, when
there is a neo-Prichardian will-ing, there is a palæo-Griceian way-ing! Perhaps
by know Moore means certain. Grice was amused by the fact that Moore thought
that he knew that behind the curtains at the lecture hall at the University of
Wisconsin at Madison, there was a window, when there wasnt. He uses Moores
misuse of know – according to Malcolm – both in Causal theory and Prolegomena.
And of course this relates to the topic of the sceptics implicature, above,
with the two essays Scepticism and Common sense and Moore and Philosophers
Paradoxes repr. partially in WOW. With regard to certainty, it is interesting
to compare it, as Grice does, not so much with privileged access, but with
incorrigibility. Do we not have privileged access to our own beliefs
and desires? And, worse still, may it not be true that at least some of our
avowals of our beliefs and desires are incorrigible? One of Grices
problems is, as he puts it, how to accommodate privileged access and,
maybe, incorrigibility. This or that a second-order state may be, in
some fashion, incorrigible. On the contrary, for Grice, this or that
lower-order, first-order judging is only a matter for privileged
access. Note that while he is happy to allow privileged access to
lower-order souly states, only those who are replicated at a higher-order or
second-order may, in some fashion, be said to count as an incorrigible avowal.
It rains. P judges it rains (privileged access). P judges that P judges that it
rains (incorrigible). The justification is conversational. It rains says the P,
or expresses the P. Grice wants to be able to say that if a P expresses that p,
the P judges2 that p. If the P expresses that it rains, the P
judges that he judges that it rains. In this fashion, his second-order,
higher-order judging is incorrigible, only. Although Grice may allow for it to
be corrected by a third-order judging. It is not required that we should stick
with judging here. Let Smith return the money that he owes to Jones. If P
expresses !p, P ψ-s2 that !p. His second-order, higher-order
buletic state is incorrigible (if ceteris paribus is not corrected by a
third-order buletic or doxastic state). His first-order buletic state is a
matter only of privileged access. For a study of conversation as rational
co-operation this utilitarian revival modifies the standard exegesis of Grice
as purely Kantian, and has him more in agreement with the general Oxonian
meta-ethical scene. Refs.: Under ‘futilitarianism,’ we cover Grice’s views on
‘pleasure’ (he has an essay on “Pleasure,”) and “eudaemonia” (He has an essay
on ‘happiness’); other leads are given under ‘grecianism,’ since this is the Grecian
side to Grice’s Ariskant; for specific essays on ‘pleasure,’ and ‘eudaimonia,’ the
keywords ‘pleasure’ and ‘happiness’ are useful. A good source is the essay on
happiness in “Aspects,” which combines ‘eudaemonia’ and ‘agreebleness,’ his
futilitarianism turned Kantotelian. BANC.
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