Speranza
It is now a commonplace that what a speaker means, asserts, or conveys by an utterance
of a sentence can go beyond what the sentence means (semantically expresses) in the
context of utterance.
It is, however, controversial which cases fit this description.
One such controversial case concerns quantifier domain restriction.
Suppose, standing
in my apartment after a party, I say to my wife dejectedly, ‘Every bottle is empty.’
What
is uncontroversial is that what I convey by this utterance is not that every bottle in the
universe is empty, but that every bottle in the apartment is empty.
What is controversial
is how this phenomenon should be explained.
On one view, the semantic strategy, the sentence ‘Every bottle is empty’ is contextsensitive;
it expresses a different proposition relative to different contexts of utterance.
This might be because, for example, the logical form of the sentence contains a variable
whose value is the domain of quantification, and the value of this variable varies with
contexts of utterance (Stanley and Szab´o (2000)).
According to an opposed pragmatic strategy, the sentence literally means (semantically
expresses) the false proposition that every bottle in the universe is empty; there is some
other non-semantic explanation of the fact that in this scenario I manage to convey the
restricted proposition that every bottle in the apartment is empty. There is considerable
intuitive support for the pragmatic strategy for handling these cases; it is true, after all,
that my wife could have replied by saying ‘Well, every bottle isn’t empty; our guests only
--- Thanks for helpful discussion to Steven Davis, Brendan Gillon, Michael Nelson, Scott Soames, and
two anonymous referees for Mind & Language.
Address for correspondence: Jeff Speaks, Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100
Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556.
----
drank all of the liquor in our apartment.’ There is certainly a sense in which this reply
is, even if not helpful, on target; the pragmatic strategy has a nice explanation of this in
terms of its claim that the original sentence is literally false.
One who endorses the pragmatic strategy must say how a proposition p can be conveyed
by an utterance of a sentence which, in the context, means something other than
p. According to a Gricean version of the pragmatic strategy, this explanation is given in
terms of certain rules governing conversation. Grice’s idea was that in some utterances,
one can convey a proposition by conversationally implicating it. One conversationally implicates
a proposition p by an utterance when (roughly) the following three conditions are
satisfied: (1) the speaker is presumed to be cooperative, in the sense that he is following
the maxims of conversation; (2) the assumption that the speaker thinks p is required to
bring his utterance into conformity with the conversational maxims; and (3) the speaker
thinks that the audience is capable of seeing both that (2) is true, and that the speaker
thinks that (2) is true (Grice, 1975, 30-1).1
In the present case, the utterance of a sentence
which means that every bottle (in the universe) is empty is an utterance of a sentence
which is obviously false, and so violates the Maxim of Quality. So, if we are to assume
that the speaker is being cooperative, we must assume that the speaker was trying to get
across some distinct, not obviously false proposition; it seems likely that this proposition
should be related to the obviously false one which was literally expressed by the sentence;
given the context, the obvious choice is the proposition that every bottle in the apartment
is empty.2
1 Conversational implicature and uses of language in thought
But there is a problem about applying the apparatus of conversational implicature in the
case of quantifier domain restriction: the phenomena to be explained can be generated in
cases of language use outside of conversations. The most important such cases concern
uses of language in thought. Suppose that my wife went to bed before the end of the party,
and that after the last guest leaves, I say dejectedly to myself, ‘Every bottle is empty.’
This case seems strikingly similar to the one described above, in which I use the same
sentence in conversation. It would be just as natural to describe the case as one in which
I said to myself that every bottle in the apartment was empty as it would be to give the
corresponding description of my utterance of the same sentence, in conversation, to my
wife. But despite this similarity, it does not seem open to the same explanation: sitting
alone after the party I was not engaged in a conversation, and hence was not subject
to the conversational maxims. And this seems to cast doubt on the original Gricean
explanation of the utterance to my wife; to the extent that the phenomena seem the
same, an explanation which rests on features specific to one is ad hoc.
Could a proponent of the Gricean explanation reply that thought is a kind of conversation
with oneself, and so is governed by the same maxims as multi-party conversations?
Not very plausibly. The Gricean says that my use of ‘Every bottle is empty’ in conversa-
1
In her excellent ‘Speaker Meaning, What Is Said, and What Is Implicated’, Jennifer Saul distinguishes
this definition of conversational implicature — Grice’s own — from related notions with which it is often
conflated, which she terms ‘utterer-implicature’ and ‘audience-implicature.’ The arguments which follow
against certain uses of conversational implicature to explain linguistic phenomena apply equally well to
these related notions.
2For similar explanations of implicatures by Grice, see his discussions of ‘X is a fine friend’ and ‘You
are the cream in my coffee’ (Grice, 1975, 34).
2
tion with my wife conveyed the restricted proposition that every bottle in the apartment
is empty in part because I thought that she was capable of seeing that the assumption
that I believed this and wanted to get it across by my utterance was required to make
my utterance conform with the norms governing conversation (clause 3 in the definition
of conversational implicature). But we cannot give the same explanation of my use of
‘Every bottle is empty’ in thought. Even if we grant that I count as the audience of my
own utterance here, we should ask: Is it really the case that I manage to use this sentence
to say to myself that every bottle in the apartment is empty only because I think that
I am capable of working out that the assumption that I believe this is needed to make
my utterance to myself consistent with the norms of conversation and, further, think that
I know that I am capable of working out that I think this? Even if I could have these
strange beliefs on an occasion, it hardly seems that they are required for me to use ‘Every
bottle is empty’ in thought to mean that every bottle in the apartment is empty.3
3So this argument is distinct from the familiar argument against Gricean analyses of speaker-meaning
in terms of audience-directed intentions which is based on the possibility of meaning something by an
utterance without having an audience. That argument relies on the controversial claim that one cannot
regard oneself as an audience in cases of ‘speaking to oneself’; the above argument does not rely on this
claim, but only on the claim that one can use sentences like ‘Every bottle is empty’ in thought without
having the bizarre beliefs which an explanation of such uses in terms of conversational implicature would
require. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
It’s also important to note that nothing hangs on the view that the conversational implicatures are
in this case generated by violations of the Maxim of Quality. As Kent Bach notes in ‘Quantification,
Qualification, and Context’, we can generate cases of quantifier domain restriction with obviously true
as well as obviously false sentences. In the present case, if I had uttered ‘Not every bottle is empty’,
I would have succeeded in conveying the restricted proposition that not every bottle in the apartment
is empty, despite the fact that the original sentence (according to the pragmatic strategy) expresses the
true proposition that not every bottle in the universe is empty. For this reason it seems right that the
most plausible version of the Gricean story about quantifier domain restriction takes my conveying the
proposition that every bottle in the apartment is empty to be an instance of ‘conversational impliciture’
generated by the utterance’s ‘obvious lack of relevant specificity’ rather than a conversational implicature
generated by its obvious falsity. But the argument against Gricean explanations above depends not on
which maxim is violated (truth vs. specificity) but rather the very idea that the fact that the speaker
means the relevant proposition p depends upon the speaker’s believing, of some maxim or other, that
the audience believes that the speaker’s thinking p is required to bring the speaker into conformity with
that maxim (whatever it is). So it seems as though the present objection works as well against a view
which explains my having conveyed the restricted proposition as a conversational impliciture as against
the more orthodox Gricean explanation in terms of Quality implicatures.
This argument against Bach rests on the view that conversational implicitures are generated by a
process similar to that which generates conversational implicatures: (i) by a speaker’s being presumed to
be cooperative, (ii) by the assumption that the speaker believes the proposition conveyed being needed
to bring the speaker’s utterance into conformity with some norm of conversation, and (iii) by the speaker
and the audience having the right sorts of beliefs about (ii). On this interpretation, the only difference
between conversational implicature and conversational impliciture is a difference between the norms of
conversation which generate the proposition conveyed. This interpretation is suggested by the discussion
in §4 of ‘Conversational Impliciture’, where he explains the difference between conversational implicature
and impliciture. Bach says that the point of contrast is that ‘Implicitures go beyond what is said, but
unlike implicatures, which are additional propositions external to what is said, implicatures are built out
of what is said.’ Bach does not mention, in addition to this difference, a difference of kind in the principles
which generate implicatures and implicitures. Further, Bach after all does call implicitures ‘conversational
implicitures’; so it’s reasonable to think that, as on the above interpretation, their generation, like the
generation of conversational implicatures, should have something to do with rules of conversation. (This
is also suggested by the contrast between implicature and impliciture as it is drawn in ‘Quantification,
Qualification, and Context.’ There Bach says that ‘the operative pragmatic anomaly here is not obvious
falsity but lack of relevant specificity’ (268). But if this is right, then the aspect of utterances which
generates implicitures — lack of specificity — must be on par with the aspects of utterances which
generate implicatures — i.e., prima facie violation of some conversational norm.) However, Bach never
explicitly endorses this view of how conversational implicitures are generated.
3
The argument suggested against the Gricean explanation of quantifier domain restriction
is simple: (i) quantifier domain restriction happens in uses of language in thought as
well as in communication, (ii) the phenomena appear to be the same, and hence deserve
a unified explanation, (iii) the Gricean explanation does not apply to cases of quantifier
domain restriction in uses of language in thought, therefore (iv) the Gricean explanation
fails to explain instances of quantifier domain restriction in communication as well.
2 Two tests for conversational implicature
A Gricean might challenge this argument by disputing (ii). Exactly what phenomenon
is supposed to occur in both uses of ‘Every bottle is empty’? Surely in conversation I
manage to communicate the restricted proposition that every bottle in the apartment is
empty; but it is not as though I am communicating anything when I use this sentence
in thought. To answer this challenge, we will have to be a bit more specific both about
the theoretical role of conversational implicature, and about the sense in which the above
uses of ‘Every bottle is empty’ in thought and communication are instances of the same
phenomenon.
I think that there are two ways to do this. The first involves the notion of speaker’s
meaning. One standard use of the mechanism of conversational implicature is to explain
how speakers can mean certain things by their utterances. On this picture, there are
several different ways for a speaker to mean p by an utterance. One way is for the
speaker to literally say p (in Grice’s sense); another is for the speaker to conversationally
implicate p.
4
If we accept this view of the role of conversational implicature, then what
are we trying to explain when we use conversational implicature to explain instances of
quantifier domain restriction? Presumably, we are trying to explain the fact that speakers
regularly use sentences of the form pAll Fs are Gq to mean propositions which would
literally be expressed by some sentence of the form pAll Fs which are also R are Gq. As
with any attempted explanation of some linguistic phenomenon, this explanation should
be judged, in part, by its generality; that is, by whether it can explain all, or almost
all, cases of speakers using quantified sentences in which the domain of quantification is
not explicitly restricted to mean restricted propositions such as the proposition, in our
example above, that every bottle in the apartment is empty. But by now it should be clear
that the proposed explanation fails this test. Speakers can mean things by using sentences
in thought, and the example above shows that speakers can, and standardly do, mean
restricted propositions (like the proposition that every bottle in the apartment is empty)
by using unrestricted quantified sentences (like ‘Every bottle is empty’) in thought.
The above argument does not count against a view, which is in many ways similar to Bach’s, on which
my conveying the restricted proposition is a phenomenon of ‘conceptual strengthening’ to be explained by
pragmatic principles which are not specific to uses of language in communication. More on this possibility
below.
4This view of how conversational implicature fits into a theory of speaker’s meaning is consistent with
the view that speakers can mean things which they neither strictly say nor conversationally implicate;
Saul (2002) (§1) argues convincingly that this is possible. This use of conversational implicature to
explain certain instances of speaker meaning fits less well with the view that speakers can conversationally
implicate things without meaning them. A plausible example of this is the utterance of a disjunction.
In many cases, it seems plausible that the agent will conversationally implicate that he does not know
which of the disjuncts is true without his meaning by his utterance that he does not know which of the
disjuncts is true.
4
This argument suggests the following test for when an instance of speaker meaning
can be explained as a conversational implicature:
Speaker Meaning/Implicature Principle
The fact that a sentence S may be used in conversation to mean p can be
explained as a conversational implicature only if S cannot be used by an
agent in thought to mean p.
This principle is justified by the theoretical role of conversational implicature described
above — namely, that it is one of several ways in which speakers can mean things by their
utterances, and so is used to explain some instances of speaker meaning — along with
standard requirements of generality on explanations of linguistic phenomena.
This way of running the arguments rests on the view that facts about what speakers
mean by their utterances constitute a class of linguistic phenomena which is such that
(i) it includes both uses of language in thought and in communication and (ii) a role
of conversational implicature is to explain some members of this class. A committed
Gricean might, therefore, respond to this argument by denying either that speakers can
mean things by using sentences in thought or that conversational implicature can be used
as an explanation of speaker meaning. Since the first seems implausible, let’s suppose
that the Gricean takes the latter course. One might think that conversational implicature
should be used, not to explain how speakers can mean certain things by their utterances,
but rather how they manage to communicate, convey, or assert certain things to their
audiences. And this might seem to block the above argument, since, although speakers
can mean things by sentences used in thought, speakers cannot use sentences in thought
to convey, communicate, or assert things.
While this is correct as far as it goes, it isn’t the end of the story. Just as certain
sorts of acts can only be performed by uses of language in communication, so certain
sorts of acts can only be performed by uses of language in thought; by using a sentence
in thought, an agent can make a judgement or think a thought. Further, there are clearly
some analogies between the communication-specific propositional attitudes of assertion
and communication and those specific to thought. In particular, it is often the case that
for some sentence S (or class of sentences) and proposition p (or class of propositions),
uttering S in conversation will typically count as the assertion of p, and using S in thought
will typically count as a judgement with content p. This is clearest when the sentence
is a simple, non-indexical one and the relevant proposition is the semantic content of
the sentence; but there are other cases as well. We’ve already seen an example: just as,
typically, the assertoric utterance in conversation of some unqualified quantified sentence
(‘Every bottle is empty’) will result in the assertion of some restricted proposition (e.g.,
that every bottle in the apartment is empty), so, typically, the use in thought of such an
unqualified sentence will count as the agent making a judgement, or thinking a thought,
whose content is such a restricted proposition.
But in the case of other sentences and propositions, this parallel does not hold. To
take a variant of one of Grice’s original examples, writing ‘The student has excellent
penmanship’ as the sole sentence in a letter of recommendation for graduate study in
philosophy will typically be a way of communicating (conveying) the proposition that the
student is not a very good candidate. But now consider uses of this sentence in thought.
Could an agent, just by saying to himself ‘The student has excellent penmanship’, make
the judgement (think the thought) that the student is not a very good candidate for
graduate school? It seems not. Someone could, of course, say this sentence to himself; but,
5
setting aside the case where one really is just interested in the student’s penmanship, this
only makes sense if the agent in question has already made the judgement, or entertained
the thought, that the student is not a very good candidate. The use of ‘The student has
excellent penmanship’ cannot itself be a way of making this judgement, or thinking this
thought.5
This is a point of disanalogy with the sentence ‘Every bottle is empty’ and the proposition
that every bottle in the apartment is empty. In that case, we had a parallel between
communication and thought: the sentence could be used in conversation to convey a certain
proposition, and could be used in thought to think that very same proposition. But
in the case of ‘The student has excellent penmanship’, this parallel is absent. This needs
some explanation: why, in the case of some sentence/proposition pairs, is there a parallel
between uses of the sentence in communication to convey that proposition and uses of
the sentence in thought to judge that proposition, but not in others? This question has
an obvious and natural answer: the explanation of why utterances of ‘The student has
excellent penmanship’ (in the relevant contexts) convey the proposition that the student
is not a good candidate for graduate study should be given in terms of principles specific
to uses of language in conversation, whereas the corresponding explanation in the case of
‘Every bottle is empty’ should not.
This is based on the same sort of unexceptional requirement of generality on explanations
invoked above. Where we have a parallel between thought and conversation of the
sort noted with respect to ‘Every bottle is empty’ and the proposition that every bottle
in the apartment is empty, it seems clear that we should have a unified explanation of
this phenomenon. This leads us to the following principle:
Communication/Implicature Principle
The fact that a sentence S may be used in conversation to communicate (convey,
assert) p can be explained as a conversational implicature only if S cannot
be used by an agent in thought to judge (think) p.
Above I noted that a committed Gricean could respond to the argument from the Speaker
Meaning/Implicature Principle by disavowing any attempt to explain facts about what
speakers mean by their utterances in terms of conversational implicature. The natural
retreat is to the view that conversational implicature is fit to explain not what speakers
mean by their utterances, but rather what speakers convey (communicate, assert) by
their utterances. The Communication/Implicature Principle is designed to show that this
retreat position does not provide a satisfactory response to the argument.
If principles like Speaker Meaning/Implicature and Communication/Implicature are
correct, they provide a powerful tool for the evaluation of attempts to explain various linguistic
phenomena using conversation-specific Gricean principles. They straightforwardly
show that attempts to explain quantifier domain restriction in terms of such principles
are incorrect. Parallel argument shows that Russell’s theory of descriptions cannot be
squared with intuitions about the truth-values of sentences involving incomplete descriptions
by claiming that these intuitions are tracking the truth-values of propositions which
are conversationally implicated by uses of such sentences.6
5Obviously, matters are different if one says to oneself something like ‘The only good thing I can
say about this student is that he has excellent penmanship.’ But no one would think of explaining the
use of this sentence to say that the student is not very good by means of the theory of conversational
implicature.
6For an independent argument for this conclusion, see Soames (2005). I should note that I have in
6
3 Millianism, substitution failures, and conversational implicature
These principles can also be used to show that certain combinations of views about proper
names must be wrong. A Millian about proper names holds that the semantic content of a
simple proper name is the object to which the name refers. As is well-known, Millians face
an obvious problem: if the meaning of a simple name is its referent, then any two names
with the same referent must also have the same meaning. But then it seems unavoidable
that the Millian will have to treat pairs of sentences like ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ as having the same meaning. This has seemed to many to be
implausible, for reasons including the following:
(i) Pairs of sentences like these differ in their content since, for example, in the above
case, the former sentence is trivial and uninformative, whereas the latter is nontrivial
and informative.
(ii) Pairs of sentences like these are not substitutable in propositional attitude contexts;
for example, it might be that ‘John believed that Hesperus is Hesperus’ is true,
whereas ‘John believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is false.
One response sometimes offered on behalf of Millianism is that both (i) and (ii) are
false, and that our tendency to think that they are true rests on our tendency to confuse
propositions which sentences are standardly used to conversationally implicate with the
propositions which are the semantic contents of those sentences. On this view, the only
interesting differences between sentences which differ only in the substitution of coreferential
names are differences in what those sentences are used by speakers to conversationally
implicate.7
What sorts of propositions might uses of sentences involving names standardly implicate?
Here there are a number of options. One might hold that a sentence like
Hesperus is Phosphorus.
is standardly is used to implicate a meta-linguistic proposition, such as that expressed by
The referent of ‘Hesperus’ is the referent of ‘Phosphorus.’
or a descriptively enriched proposition, like that expressed by
Hesperus, the brightest star visible in the evening, is Phosphorus, the brightest
star visible in the morning.
Similarly, a Millian of the sort we are considering might hold that a belief ascription like
mind here our intuitions about attributive uses of incomplete descriptions; referential uses of incomplete
descriptions are not instances of this sort of quantifier domain restriction, and require a different
treatment. See below for a discussion of the referential/attributive distinction.
7This is a view more often ascribed to Millians than defended by them. Contrary to what is often
said, classic defenses of Millianism such as Salmon (1986, 1989, 1990); Soames (1988) do not contain any
commitment to the view that the differences between sentences which differ only in the substitution of
coreferential names are to be explained via conversational implicature. They do claim that the differences
between any two such sentences will be pragmatic rather than semantic; but the assimilation of this to
the view discussed in the text rests on the assumption that the only pragmatic principles are Gricean
conversational principles, which is hardly obvious. More on this below. For a statement of Millianism
which does rely explicitly on the kind of use of conversational implicature argued against above, see
Ludwig (1996), §5.
7
John does not believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
is standardly used to implicate the propositions expressed by any of the following ascriptions:
John does not believe that the referent of ‘Hesperus’ is the referent of ‘Phosphorus.’
John does not believe that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true.
John does not believe that Hesperus, the brightest star visible in the evening,
is Phosphorus, the brightest star visible in the morning.
But the kind of argument given above against a Gricean treatment of quantifier domain
restriction is enough to show that Millianism plus a Gricean explanation of differences in
informativeness and intuitions about the truth values of attitude ascriptions cannot be
the whole story.
Consider first the difference in informativeness between ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus.’ This difference in informativeness cannot be explained by
differences in what uses of these two sentences conversationally implicate, since uses of
these two sentences in thought also differ in informativeness, and, as we have seen, uses
of sentences in thought do not conversationally implicate anything at all. It is not just
when John is talking to other people that it seems to him that ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is
trivial and true, and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is substantial and false.
Much the same point applies to apparent substitution failures in propositional attitude
contexts. Our intuitions about the difference in truth-value between ‘John believes
that Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘John believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’ cannot be
explained in terms of the fact that, for example, a use of the former in conversation would
implicate the true proposition that John believes that ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is true,
whereas a use of the latter in conversation would implicate the false proposition that
John believes that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true. I might be too polite to voice my
doubts about John’s lack of astronomical knowledge out loud, and still think to myself,
‘John doesn’t know that Hesperus is Phosphorus.’ But this use of the sentence, for the
reasons given above, doesn’t conversationally implicate anything at all.
Put in a form which makes explicit use of the Speaker Meaning/Implicature and
Communication/Implicature Principles, the point is as follows. (I use identity sentences
and descriptively enriched propositions for illustration; but the point could be made with
any of the candidates for pragmatically conveyed propositions listed above.)
• Just as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ can often be used in conversation by speakers to
mean that Hesperus, the brightest star visible in the evening, is Phosphorus, the
brightest star visible in the morning, so the sentence can often be used by speakers
in thought to mean that Hesperus, the brightest star visible in the evening,
is Phosphorus, the brightest star visible in the morning. So (by Speaker Meaning/Implicature)
the former fact about speaker meaning cannot be explained as a
conversational implicature.
• Just as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ can often be used in conversation by speakers
to convey (communicate, assert) that Hesperus, the brightest star visible in the
evening, is Phosphorus, the brightest star visible in the morning, so the sentence can
often be used by speakers in thought to judge (think) that Hesperus, the brightest
8
star visible in the evening, is Phosphorus, the brightest star visible in the morning.
So (by Communication/Implicature) the former fact about what the sentence is used
to convey or communicate cannot be explained as a conversational implicature.
So the Millian cannot explain our intuitions about informativeness and substitution failures
in terms of a pragmatic theory which is limited to Gricean conversational principles.8
4 Generalized vs. particularized conversational implicatures
This is a good place to consider an important objection to the kind of argument developed
above. Proponents of Gricean explanations of quantifier domain restriction, or of apparent
substitution failures of names in propositional attitude contexts, might note that
Grice distinguished between particularized and generalized conversational implicatures
(Grice, 1975, 37-38). On this view, a generalized conversational implicature arises from a
pattern of particularized conversational implicatures. This might seem to help with the
cases under discussion because it provides a way to view uses of language in thought as
derivative from uses of language in communication. For example, a proponent of Gricean
explanations of quantifier domain restriction might, using this distinction, hold that uses
of quantified sentences in thought carry generalized conversational implicatures of the
sorts of restricted propositions mentioned above, and hold that this is explained by the
fact that uses of these sentences in conversation are typically particularized conversation
implicatures of these restricted propositions.
To see why this claim is implausible, it is useful to compare it with Grice’s example
of a generalized conversational implicature. Grice suggested that sentences of the form
p. . . an X . . . q carry a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that ‘the X
does not belong to or is not otherwise connected with some identifiable person’ (Grice
(1975)). Whether or not this claim is plausible, it has one important virtue: it identifies
a class of sentences based on their possession of a certain structural feature, and, given
a sentence which has that feature, provides a way to arrive at the proposition which is
said to be a generalized implicature of that sentence. It seems clear that any plausible
candidates for generalized conversational implicatures must have this characteristic. After
all, generalized implicatures are supposed to arise independently of special features of the
context of utterance; it’s precisely this feature which makes them plausibly applicable to
uses of language in thought.
8Metaphorical uses of language are a more difficult case. On the one hand, in some cases it seems to
be possible to use metaphorical language in thought to mean something, or judge something, other than
the literal meaning of the sentence used metaphorically. For example, I might make the judgement that
someone is difficult to control by saying to myself, ‘So-and-so is a loose cannon.’ Cases like this indicate
that attempts to explain metaphorical uses of language via conversational implicature or some related
device — e.g., Martinich (1984) — are incorrect. On the other hand, it is not clear that all examples of
metaphor fit into this category. Consider Grice’s example, ‘You are the cream in my coffee.’ It is not
obvious that I could use this to make a judgement about my regard for you; rather, if I use this sentence
in thought, this seems only to be intelligible against the background of such a judgement. Moreover,
there seems to be something right about Grice’s idea that I can use ‘You are the cream in my coffee’ to
communicate my regard for you partly because an utterance of this in conversation involves flouting a
conversational maxim. Perhaps this indicates that oft-used metaphors, like ‘is a loose cannon,’ should be
treated differently than comparatively rare ones. If the latter are treated as conversational implicatures,
then the former may be a case in which the notion of generalized conversational implicature (discussed
below) has application. This would explain why the former but not the latter can be used in thought to
make judgements. As Steven Davis has pointed out to me, similar issues seem to arise with ironic uses
of language.
9
But the cases discussed above clearly do not have this feature. Take sentences involving
two distinct coreferential names m and n. Can we say anything about what generalized
implicatures will be carried by uses of, for example, sentences of the form pA believes
that . . . m . . . q and pA believes that . . . n . . . q, just in virtue of their having this form? It
seems not. The same goes for cases of quantifier domain restriction. Given a sentence of
the form pAll Fs are Gsq, can we say anything about what generalized implicature will
be carried by every use of the sentence? Again, it seems not; some uses will carry no implicature,
and when there is one, it will be dependent on particular features of the context
of utterance, and not just on the form of the sentence. For this reason, the proponent of
the Gricean explanations criticized above cannot get around the arguments by appealing
to generalized rather than particularized conversational implicatures.
5 The referential/attributive distinction and conversational
implicature
One might worry, however, that the argument to this point proves too much. Surely,
after all, conversational implicature should have some role to play in a worked-out theory
of language; but it may seem that, if we accept the Speaker Meaning/Implicature and
Communication/Implicature Principles, we’ll have the materials to argue against the use
of conversational implicature to explain any linguistic phenomenon.
This worry is misguided; the framework developed above for evaluating Gricean explanations
of linguistic phenomena can support as well as refute claims that a certain kind
of linguistic phenomenon is best explained as a conversational implicature. To see this,
consider the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions.
A powerful case has been made that this distinction is to be explained, not by complicating
the semantics of definite descriptions, but rather by adopting a uniform Russellian
semantics along with a Gricean pragmatic story sufficient to explain our intuitions about
referential uses of sentences involving definite descriptions as tracking facts about what
speakers mean by their utterances of sentences which go beyond what the sentences uttered
mean.9 As suggested above, we can evaluate this claim by asking: can we get
referential uses of definite descriptions in thought, as well as in communication?
The clearest way to test this is by considering a case of misdescription, in which a
speaker uses a description pthe Fq to pick out some object which, as it turns out, fails to
satisfy the description. Suppose, to adapt Donnellan’s example, that one person at a party
says to another, as both look at a man in the corner with a martini glass in hand, ‘The
man in the corner drinking a martini is interesting.’ Suppose that the man in the corner,
John, has water in his glass. As above, we have an uncontroversial phenomenon — that
the speaker succeeded in conveying to his audience that that man, John, is interesting
— and two competing sorts of explanations of this phenomenon. As above, the two
explanations are, first, a semantic explanation, according to which the reference of ‘the
man in the corner drinking a martini’ on this occasion of use is John, despite the fact that
he is not drinking a martini, and, second, a pragmatic explanation, which claims that the
speaker has succeeded in conveying the proposition about John by uttering a sentence
which means something else.
In the case of quantifier domain restriction, our two tests for conversational implicature
9See especially Kripke (1979). For a more explicit explanation of how the Gricean explanation might
work in this case, see Neale (1990), Ch. 3.
10
counted against a Gricean version of the pragmatic explanation; in this case, we get a
different verdict. Above we saw that agents can use sentences like ‘Every bottle is empty’
in thought to judge that every bottle in the room is empty; and this counts against Gricean
explanations of uses of this sentence to convey this proposition. But can an agent use
a sentence like ‘The man in the corner drinking a martini is interesting’ to make the
judgement that that man, John, is interesting? It seems not; indeed, the choice of this
sentence in conversation to convey this thought is only intelligible against the background
of the prior judgements that John is interesting, and that John is the man in the corner
drinking a martini. Since this kind of use of the sentence relies on those background
beliefs or judgements, use of the sentence in thought can’t itself be a vehicle for making
these judgements.
The point is clearer in cases where we have a more complicated description which is
less directly connected with what I am perceiving at the time of the utterance. Suppose
that we are having a conversation at a party with my friend Tom, who is wearing a blue
and green striped sweater. Later, it is discovered that someone’s wallet was stolen at the
party. Since I know that Tom has a history of doing things like this, I say to you, ‘I
bet that the man we were talking to at the party in the blue and green striped sweater
stole the wallet.’ Here I might I use ‘the man we were talking to at the party in the blue
and green striped sweater’ referentially, to single out Tom, and therefore might use the
sentence in conversation with you to say of Tom that he stole the wallet. But it does not
seem to me that I could use this sentence in thought to judge of Tom that he stole the
wallet. Referential use of the description seems to require the temporally prior judgement
that Tom stole the wallet.10
10It must be conceded that matters are not so clear in other cases. An anonymous reviewer suggested
the following: a man walks into a party and sees a woman in what he takes to be a red dress, and says
to himself, ‘I want to talk to the woman in the red dress.’ In saying this he expresses a desire — but
what desire? It is natural, in at least some ways of filling out the case, to credit the speaker with a desire
which would be fulfilled just in case the man talks to that woman — whether or not her dress is, as it
appears to be, red. But doesn’t that indicate that this use of a description in thought — ‘the woman
in the red dress’ — is referential, rather than attributive? And doesn’t this show that referential uses of
definite descriptions can occur in thought as well as in communication?
I am inclined to think that it does not. I suggest that we think of this case as an instance of the following
phenomenon: often, when someone asserts, judges, or bears some other attitude to two propositions p
and q, and r is an obvious consequence of p and q which the speaker knows to be an obvious consequence
of those propositions, and r is relevant to the purposes at hand, we are inclined to count the speaker as
having asserted (judged, claimed) r as well. Suppose that someone says (asserts, judges) that the Reds
are the baseball team from Cincinnati and that the baseball team from Cincinnati is the first professional
baseball team; it does not seem wrong to describe them as having said (asserted, judged) that the Reds
are the first professional baseball team. (It does not matter for my purposes whether we are correct in
these sorts of attitude ascriptions, just that we are inclined to make them.)
Now, cases like the example of the party are most plausible when the description which seems to be
used referentially expresses some property F which the speaker perceives the relevant object to have at or
near the time of the ascription. Given this, we assume that the speaker has the background de re belief
of the object o that it is F. But if the speaker has the background belief that o is F and says to himself
that the F is G, this is enough to explain why we are inclined to take the speaker as having made the
de re judgement that o is G. After all, the proposition that o is G is an obvious (and, in the above case,
relevant) consequence of the propositions that o is F and that the F is G. So we do not, on this view,
need the hypothesis that the description is used referentially in order to account for the intuitions that
the speaker has said (claimed, judged) of that woman that he wants to dance with her.
Some evidence for this way of viewing the matter is given by the fact that our intuitions are dependent
on the speaker having the relevant perceptual belief. Suppose that in the example above the man who
walks into the party does not believe of the woman that she is wearing a red dress — even if it appears
red, or is in fact red. Then can we imagine the man making saying to himself ‘I want to talk to the
woman in the red dress’ as a way of making the de re judgement that he wants to talk to that woman? I
11
In this sense, referential uses of definite descriptions are like the example of ‘The
student has excellent penmanship’ discussed above. Just as this sentence can be used
in communication (in certain contexts) to convey the thought that the student is not fit
for graduate study but not in thought to think this proposition, so sentences involving
definite descriptions can be used in communication (in certain contexts) to convey singular
propositions about objects which may or may not satisfy the description, but cannot be
used in thought to think these propositions.11 The phenomenon of referential usage
of definite descriptions is one which occurs only in uses of language in communication.
Therefore, our two tests for conversational implicature above do not rule out the claim that
referential uses of definite descriptions are to be explained via the theory of conversational
implicature, or some similar account.
We can put the point in a stronger fashion. We have observed that some linguistic
phenomena can, and others cannot, occur in uses of language in thought. It is reasonable
to think that this deserves some explanation; more specifically, it is reasonable to think
that if some linguistic phenomenon — such as, for example, referential uses of definite
descriptions — cannot occur in uses of language in thought, then an account of that
phenomenon should be given in terms of principles governing conversation. For if this account
of the phenomenon in question made no use of conversation-specific facts, it would
be a mystery why it cannot occur in uses of language in thought. This suggests that the
sort of argument sketched above works in both directions. Just as the possibility of the
occurrence of some phenomenon in thought shows that it cannot be explained via conversational
implicature, so the impossibility of some phenomenon’s occurring in thought
shows that it must be explained via conversational implicature (or some set of principles
similarly specific to communication).12
suggest that we cannot — even though it is easy to imagine such a situation in which he would use that
sentence in communication to assert, convey, or communicate the de re proposition that he wants to talk
to that woman.
11This way of putting the point makes use of the Communication/Implicature Principle; we can make
an analogous argument using the Speaker Meaning/Implicature Principle.
12This might seem to conflict with the previous conclusion that uses of incomplete definite descriptions,
like other cases of quantifier domain restriction, cannot be explained via conversational implicature —
after all, aren’t many referential uses of definite descriptions also uses of incomplete definite descriptions?
This conflict is only apparent. The distinction between definite descriptions which are incomplete and
those which are not is a distinction between those descriptions which are satisfied by more than one thing
and those which are not. The distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions
marks out a distinction in the intentions of users of those descriptions. On one plausible view, it is the
distinction between — for simple sentences of the form pThe f is gq — cases in which there is some object o
such that the speaker means by his utterance of such a sentence that o is G (referential) and cases in which
no such object-dependent proposition is meant (attributive). (The characterization is from Neale (1990),
§3.5.) But then it is clear that the referential/attributive distinction is orthogonal to the distinction
between definite descriptions which are and are not incomplete, and an incomplete definite description
(like virtually any definite description) may be used either attributively or referentially. Either sort of use
of an incomplete definite description can be used to pose a challenge to Russell’s theory of descriptions.
A problematic attributive use of an incomplete description might be the use of ‘the car’ in ‘The car is
around the corner’; a problematic referential use might be the example of ‘The man drinking a martini’
discussed above. The present point can then be put by saying that these two classes of cases should be
handled differently: the problem posed (for a Russellian theory of descriptions) by certain attributive
uses of incomplete definite descriptions cannot be explained by appeal to conversational implicature (for
the reasons given above in the discussion of quantifier domain restriction), though the problem posed
by referential uses of incomplete description should be explained via conversational implicature (or some
similar conversation-specific principles).
12
6 Semantics, pragmatics, and conversational implicature
Does this argument show that linguistic phenomena which can occur in uses of language in
thought — such as quantifier domain restriction — must be accounted for via the semantic,
rather than the pragmatic, strategy? This only follows if the pragmatic mechanisms
for generating propositions conveyed are limited to conversation-specific facts, such as a
speaker’s beliefs about what the conversational maxims require in a certain case, or a
speaker’s beliefs about his audience. But there seems to be no reason for thinking that
pragmatic mechanisms must take this shape. Indeed, if one is convinced by arguments that
quantifier domain restriction must be a pragmatic rather than a semantic phenomenon,13
then the above can be construed as an argument for the conclusion that there must be
pragmatic principles which both (i) can explain how the utterance of a sentence which,
in the context, means p can convey some distinct proposition q, and (ii) are not couched
in terms specific to conversations or uses of language in communication, so that they can
also explain how by saying to oneself some sentence which, in the context, means p, one
can think, judge, or say to oneself some distinct proposition q.
This might seem like an abuse of terminology; isn’t pragmatics, by definition, the study
of uses of language in communication? On some conceptions of the semantics/pragmatics
divide, this may be so. But the present point can be made without appealing to any
particular view of what should or should not fall under the label ‘pragmatics.’ Suppose
that we begin with some reasonably intuitive view of semantic content (i.e., the meaning
of a sentence in a given context), such as the view that the semantic content of a sentence
is what the various literal uses of that sentence have in common.14 Given such a view, we
can then note that in many cases what a speaker means by an utterance of a sentence will
go beyond the semantic content of that sentence in the context, and we will then want to
come up with principles which explain this sort of phenomenon. The present point is just
that one plausible moral of the above argument is that these principles cannot be limited
to Gricean principles which have to do with norms of conversation (or audience-directed
intentions, or any sort of facts specific to communicative uses of language), since some of
these principles will have to explain linguistic phenomena which can occur in thought as
well as in communication.
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame
13Bach makes a plausible case that instances of ‘so-called’ quantifier domain restriction should be
assimilated to other cases of implicit qualification in his ‘Quantification, Qualification, and Context’, §§1-
2. Soames (2005) argues that quantifier domain restriction in the case of incomplete definite descriptions
cannot be explained semantically.
14On one way of making this more precise, the semantic content of a sentence is a proposition (or part
of a proposition) p which is such that, for every literal use of that sentence, some proposition is asserted
which either is identical to p or is an enrichment of p. For one way of working this out, see Soames
(forthcoming).
13
References
Kent Bach, 1994. Conversational Impliciture. Mind and Language 12:124–162.
Kent Bach, 2000. Quantification, Qualification, and Context: A Reply to Stanley and Szab´o.
Mind and Language 15:262–283.
Steven Davis (editor) 1991. Pragmatics: A Reader. Oxford University Press.
Paul Grice, 1975. Logic and Conversation. In Grice (1989), 22–40.
Paul Grice, 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P.
Saul Kripke, 1979. Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference. In Definite Descriptions: A
Reader, edited by Gary Ostertag, 225–256. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kirk A. Ludwig, 1996. Singular Thought and the Cartesian Theory of Mind. Noˆus 30:4:434–460.
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Scott Soames, 2005. Why Incomplete Definite Descriptions do not Defeat Russell’s Theory of
Descriptions. Teorema 24(3).
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say often differs from what our words literally mean. In Asserting, Meaning, and Implying,
edited by Martin Hackl and Robert Thornton.
Jason Stanley and Zolt´an Gendler Szab´o, 2000. On Quantifier Domain Restriction. Mind and
Language 15:219–261.
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