Grice's Modified Occam's Razor

Speranza

How Simple Can Grice Get? 

There has been some recent talk on 'complexity.’

This is in interesting vis-à-vis two things:

In the scientific method, parsimony is an epistemological, metaphysical or heuristic preference, not an irrefutable principle of logic or a scientific result. As a logicalprinciple, Occam's razor would demand that scientists accept the simplest possible theoretical explanation for existing data.

The fact that, when playing, H. P. Grice, an Oxford philosopher best known for his concoction, ‘implicature,’ once coined The Modified Ockham’s Razor, “Do not multiply senses beyond necessity.” “I would like to propose for acceptance a principle which I might call Modified Occam’s Razor: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Like many regulative principles, it would be a near platitude, and all would depend on what was counted as “necessity.” Still, like other regulative principles, it may guide.”

Eccles once joked about trialism, and I wonder if we can list tetralist philosophers. Some clues: “In the meantime, the death of Franz Joseph would probably lead to approaches to  tetralism.” “Unknowable; Epiphenomenic Cosmicism; Neutral monism; Something else (tetralism?). “We might as well be talking about spirit/perispirit/mind/body (tetralism).” And then of course there’s pentalism, hexalism, and so forth.

In that direction, I’m not sure what Eccles would say about W4, and so on.

REFERENCES:

Ackerman, R. Inductive simplicity. Philosophy of Science, 28 -- Argues against the claim that simplicity considerations play a significant role in inductive inference. Critiques measures of simplicity proposed by Jeffreys, Kemeny, and Popper. Akaike, H. Information theory and the extension of the maximum likelihood principle. In B. Petrov and F. Csaki (eds.), Second International Symposium on Information Theory. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado. -- Laid the foundations for model selection theory. Proves a theorem suggesting that the simplicity of a model is relevant to estimating its future predictive accuracy. Highly technical. Baker, A. Quantitative parsimony and explanatory power. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54 -- Builds on Nolan (1997), argues that quantitative parsimony is linked with explanatory power. Baker, A. Occam’s Razor in science: a case study from biogeography. Biology and Philosophy, 22  -- Argues for a “naturalistic” justification of Ockham’s Razor and that preferences for ontological parsimony played a significant role in the late 19^th century debate in bio-geography between dispersalist and extensionist theories. Barnes, E.C. Ockham’s razor and the anti-superfluity principle. Erkenntnis, 53 -- Draws a useful distinction between two different interpretations of Ockham’s Razor: the anti-superfluity principle and the anti-quantity principle. Explicates an evidential justification for anti-superfluity principle. Boyd, R. Observations, explanatory power, and simplicity: towards a non-Humean account. In R. Boyd, P. Gasper and J.D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. -- Argues that appeals to simplicity in theory evaluation are typically best understood as covert judgments of theoretical plausibility. Bunge, M. The weight of simplicity in the construction and assaying of scientific theories. Philosophy of Science, 28. -- Takes a skeptical view about the importance and justifiability of a simplicity criterion in theory evaluation. Carlson, E. The Gene: A Critical History. Philadelphia: Saunders. -- Argues that simplicity considerations played a significant role in several important debates in the history of genetics. Carnap, R. 1950. Logical Foundations of Probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chater, N. 1999. The search for simplicity: a fundamental cognitive principle. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 52A, 273-302. -- Argues that simplicity plays a fundamental role in human reasoning, with simplicity to be defined in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. Cohen, I.B. 1985. Revolutions in Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. A guide to Newton’s Principia. In I. Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy; A New Translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman. Berkeley: University of California Press. Crick, F. 1988. What Mad Pursuit: a Personal View of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books. -- Argues that the application of Ockham’s Razor to biology is inadvisable. Dowe, D, Gardner, S., and Oppy, G. 2007. Bayes not bust! Why simplicity is no problem for Bayesians. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58, 709-754. -- contra Forster and Sober (1994), argues that Bayesians can make sense of the role of simplicity in curve-fitting. Duhem, P. 1954. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Einstein, A. 1954. Ideas and Opinions. New York: Crown. -- Einstein’s views about the role of simplicity in physics. Fitzpatrick, S. 2009. The primate mindreading controversy: a case study in simplicity and methodology in animal psychology. In R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. New York: Cambridge University Press.-- Advocates a deflationary analysis of appeals to simplicity in debates over the cognitive capacities of non-human primates. Forster, M. 1995. Bayes and bust: simplicity as a problem for a probabilist’s approach to confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46, 399-424.--Argues that the Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning is inadequate because it cannot make sense of the role of simplicity in theory evaluation.-- Model selection in science: the problem of language variance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50, 83-102.-- Responds to criticisms of Forster and Sober (1994). Argues that AIC relies on a language invariant measure of simplicity. The new science of simplicity. In A. Zellner, H. Keuzenkamp and M. McAleer (eds.), Simplicity, Inference and Modelling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.--Accessible introduction to model selection theory. Describes how different procedures, including AIC, BIC, and MDL, trade-off simplicity and fit to the data. Forster, M. and Sober, E. 1994. How to tell when simpler, more unified, or less ad hoc theories will provide more accurate predictions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45, 1-35.--Explication of AIC statistics and its relevance to the philosophical problem of justifying preferences for simpler theories. Argues against Bayesian approaches to simplicity. Technical in places. Foster, M. and Martin, M. 1966. Probability, Confirmation, and Simplicity: Readings in the Philosophy of Inductive Logic. New York: The Odyssey Press.--Anthology of papers discussing the role of simplicity in induction. Contains important papers by Ackermann, Barker, Bunge, Goodman, Kemeny, and Quine. Friedman, M. 1974. Explanation and scientific understanding. Journal of Philosophy, LXXI, 1-19.--Defends a unification account of explanation, connects simplicity with explanatoriness. Galilei, G. 1962. Dialogues concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Berkeley: University of California Press.--Classic defense of Copernicanism with significant emphasis placed on the greater simplicity and harmony of the Copernican system. Asserts that nature does nothing in vain. Gauch, H. 2003. Scientific Method in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.--Wide-ranging discussion of the scientific method written by a scientist for scientists. Contains a chapter on the importance of parsimony in science.--Winning the accuracy game. American Scientist, 94, March-April 2006, 134-141.--Useful informal presentation of the concept of Ockham’s hill and its importance to scientific research in a number of fields. Gingerich, O. 1993. The Eye of Heaven: Ptolemy, Copernicus, Kepler. New York: American Institute of Physics. Glymour, C. 1980. Theory and Evidence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.--An important critique of Bayesian attempts to make sense of the role of simplicity in science. Defends a “boot-strapping” analysis of the simplicity arguments for Copernicanism and Newton’s argument for universal gravitation. Goodman, N. 1943. On the simplicity of ideas. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 8, 107-1. --Axiomatic measurement of simplicity. Journal of Philosophy, 52, 709-722. --The test of simplicity. Science, 128, October 31st 1958, 1064-1069.--Reasonably accessible introduction to Goodman’s attempts to formulate a measure of logical simplicity.--Recent developments in the theory of simplicity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 19, 429-446.--Response to criticisms of Goodman (1955).--Safety, strength, simplicity. Philosophy of Science, 28, 150-151.--Argues that simplicity cannot be equated with testability, empirical content, or paucity of assumption. --Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4^th edition). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Harman, G. 1999. Simplicity as a pragmatic criterion for deciding what hypotheses to take seriously. In G. Harman, Reasoning, Meaning and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.--Defends the claim that simplicity is a fundamental component of inductive inference and that this role has a pragmatic justification. Harman, G. and Kulkarni, S. 2007. Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.--Accessible introduction to statistical learning theory and VC dimension. Harper, W. 2002. Newton’s argument for universal gravitation. In I.B. Cohen and G.E. Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Newton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hesse, M. 1967. Simplicity. In P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, vol. 7. New York: Macmillan.--Focuses on attempts by Jeffreys, Popper, Kemeny, and Goodman to formulate measures of simplicity. --The Structure of Scientific Inference. London: Macmillan.—Defends the view that simplicity is a determinant of prior probability. Useful discussion of the role of simplicity in Einstein’s work. Holton, G. 1974. Thematic Origins of Modern Science: Kepler to Einstein. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.--Discusses the role of aesthetic considerations, including simplicity, in the history of science. Hoffman, R., Minkin, V., and Carpenter, B. 1997. Ockham’s Razor and chemistry. Hyle, 3, 3-28.--Discussion by three chemists of the benefits and pitfalls of applying Ockham’s Razor in chemical research. Howson, C. and Urbach, P. 2006. Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach (Third Edition). Chicago: Open Court.--Contains a useful survey of Bayesian attempts to make sense of the role of simplicity in theory evaluation. Technical in places. Jeffreys, H. 1957. Scientific Inference (2^nd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.--Defends the “simplicity postulate” that simpler theories have higher prior probability. --Theory of Probability. Oxford: Clarendon Press.--Outline and defense of the Bayesian approach to scientific inference. Discusses the role of simplicity in the determination of priors and likelihoods. Kelly, K. 2004. Justification as truth-finding efficiency: how Ockham’s Razor works. Minds and Machines, 14, 485-505.--Argues that Ockham’s Razor is justified by considerations of truth-finding efficiency. Critiques Bayesian, Akiakian, and other traditional attempts to justify simplicity preferences. Technical in places. --How simplicity helps you find the truth without pointing at it. In M. Friend, N. Goethe, and V.Harizanov (eds.), Induction, Algorithmic Learning Theory, and Philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer.--Refinement and development of the argument found in Kelly (2004) and Schulte (1999). Technical. --Simplicity, truth and probability. In P. Bandyopadhyay and M. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Statistics. Dordrecht: Elsevier.--Expands and develops the argument found in Kelly (2007). Detailed critique of Bayesian accounts of simplicity. Technical. Kelly, K. and Glymour, C. 2004. Why probability does not capture the logic of scientific justification. In C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Blackwell.--Argues that Bayesians can’t make sense of Ockham’s Razor. Kemeny, J. 1955. Two measures of complexity. Journal of Philosophy, 52, p722-733.--Develops some of Goodman’s ideas about how to measure the logical simplicity of predicates and systems of predicates. Proposes a measure of simplicity similar to Popper’s (1959) falsifiability measure. Kieseppä, I. A. 1997. Akaike Information Criterion, curve-fitting, and the philosophical problem of simplicity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48, p21-48.--Critique of Forster and Sober (1994). Argues that Akaike’s theorem has little relevance to traditional philosophical problems surrounding simplicity. Highly technical. Kitcher, P. 1989. Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world. In P. Kitcher and W. Salmon, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 13: Scientific Explanation, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.--Defends a unification theory of explanation. Argues that simplicity contributes to explanatory power. Kuhn, T. 1957. The Copernican Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.--Influential discussion of the role of simplicity in the arguments for Copernicanism. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kuipers, T. 2002. Beauty: a road to truth. Synthese, 131, 291-328.--Attempts to show how aesthetic considerations might be indicative of truth. Kyburg, H. 1961. A modest proposal concerning simplicity. Philosophical Review, 70, 390-395.--Important critique of Goodman (1955). Argues that simplicity be identified with the number of quantifiers in a theory. Lakatos, I. and Zahar, E. 1978. Why did Copernicus’s research programme supersede Ptolemy’s? In J. Worrall and G. Curie (eds.), The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers of Imre Lakatos, Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.--Argues that simplicity did not really play a significant role in the Copernican Revolution. Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.--Argues that quantitative parsimony is less important than qualitative parsimony in scientific and philosophical theorizing. Li, M. and Vitányi, P. 1997. An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and its Applications (2^nd edition). New York: Springer.--Detailed elaboration of Kolmogorov complexity as a measure of simplicity. Highly technical. Lipton, P. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation (2^nd edition). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.--Account of inference to the best explanation as inference to the “loveliest” explanation. Defends the claim that simplicity contributes to explanatory loveliness. Lombrozo, T. 2007. Simplicity and probability in causal explanation. Cognitive Psychology, 55, 232–257.--Argues that simplicity is used as a guide to assessing the probability of causal explanations. Lu, H., Yuille, A., Liljeholm, M., Cheng, P. W., and Holyoak, K. J. 2006. Modeling causal learning using Bayesian generic priors on generative and preventive powers. In R. Sun and N. Miyake (eds.), Proceedings of the 28^th annual conference of the cognitive science society, 519–524. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.--Argues that simplicity plays a significant role in causal learning. MacKay, D. 1992. Bayesian interpolation. Neural Computation, 4, 415-447.--First presentation of the concept of Ockham’s Hill. Martens, R. 2009. Harmony and simplicity: aesthetic virtues and the rise of testability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 40, 258-266.--Discussion of the Copernican simplicity arguments and recent attempts to reconstruct the justification for them. McAlleer, M. 2001. Simplicity: views of some Nobel laureates in economic science. In A. Zellner, H. Keuzenkamp and M. McAleer (eds.), Simplicity, Inference and Modelling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.--Interesting survey of the views of famous economists on the place of simplicity considerations in their work. McAllister, J. W. 1996. Beauty and Revolution in Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.--Proposes that scientists’ simplicity preferences are the product of an aesthetic induction. Mill, J.S. 1867. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. London: Walter Scott. Myrvold, W. 2003. A Bayesian account of the virtue of unification. Philosophy of Science, 70, 399-423. Newton, I. 1999. The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy; A New Translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman. Berkeley: University of California Press.--Contains Newton’s “rules for the study of natural philosophy”, which includes a version of Ockham’s Razor, defended in terms of the simplicity of nature. These rules play an explicit role in Newton’s argument for universal gravitation. Nolan, D. 1997. Quantitative Parsimony. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48, 329-343.--Contra Lewis (1973), argues that quantitative parsimony has been important in the history of science. Norton, J. 2000. ‘Nature is the realization of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas’: Einstein and canon of mathematical simplicity. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 31, 135-170.--Discusses the evolution of Einstein’s thinking about the role of mathematical simplicity in physical theorizing. A material theory of induction. Philosophy of Science, 70, p647-670.-- Defends a “material” theory of induction. Argues that appeals to simplicity in induction reflect factual assumptions about the domain of inquiry. Oreskes, N., Shrader-Frechette, K., Belitz, K. 1994. Verification, validation, and confirmation of numerical models in the earth sciences. Science, 263, 641-646.

Palter, R. 1970. An approach to the history of early astronomy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 1, 93-133. Pais, A. 1982. Subtle Is the Lord: The science and life of Albert Einstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peirce, C.S. 1931. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol 6. C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. Burks (eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Plutynski, A. 2005. Parsimony and the Fisher-Wright debate. Biology and Philosophy, 20, 697-713.--Advocates a deflationary analysis of appeals to parsimony in debates between Wrightian and neo-Fisherian models of natural selection. Popper, K. 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.--Argues that simplicity = empirical content = falsifiability. Priest, G. 1976. Gruesome simplicity. Philosophy of Science, 43, 432-437.--Shows that standard measures of simplicity in curve-fitting are language variant. Raftery, A., Madigan, D., and Hoeting, J. 1997. Bayesian model averaging for linear regression models. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 92, 179-191. Reichenbach, H. 1949. On the justification of induction. In H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Rosencrantz, R. 1983. Why Glymour is a Bayesian. In J. Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.--Responds to Glymour (1980). Argues that simpler theories have higher likelihoods, using Copernican vs. Ptolemaic astronomy as an example. Rothwell, G. 2006. Notes for the occasional major case manager. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 75, 20-24.--Emphasizes the importance of Ockham’s Razor in criminal investigation. Sakamoto, Y., Ishiguro, M., and Kitagawa, G. 1986. Akaike Information Criterion Statistics. New York: Springer. Schaffner, K. 1974. Einstein versus Lorentz: research programmes and the logic of comparative theory evaluation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25, 45-78.--Argues that simplicity played a significant role in the development and early acceptance of special relativity. Schulte, O. 1999. Means-end epistemology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50, 1-31.--First statement of the claim that Ockham’s Razor can be justified in terms of truth-finding efficiency. Simon, H. 1962. The architecture of complexity. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 106, 467-482.--Important discussion by a Nobel laureate of features common to complex systems in nature. Sober, E. 1975. Simplicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.--Argues that simplicity can be defined in terms of question-relative informativeness. Technical in places. --The principle of parsimony. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 32, 145-156.--Distinguishes between “agnostic” and “atheistic” versions of Ockham’s Razor. Argues that the atheistic razor has an inductive justification. --Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution and Inference. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.--Defends a deflationary account of simplicity in the context of the use of parsimony methods in evolutionary biology. --Let’s razor Ockham’s Razor. In E. Sober, From a Biological Point of View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.--Argues that the use of Ockham’s Razor is grounded in local background assumptions. --What is the problem of simplicity? In H. Keuzenkamp, M. McAlleer, and A. Zellner (eds.), Simplicity, Inference and Modelling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --Simplicity. In W.H. Newton-Smith (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Blackwell.

--Evidence and Evolution. New York: Cambridge University Press. Solomonoff, R.J. 1964. A formal theory of inductive inference, part 1 and part 2. Information and Control, 7, 1-22, 224-254. Suppes, P. 1956. Nelson Goodman on the concept of logical simplicity. Philosophy of Science, 23, 153-159.

Swinburne, R. 2001. Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.--Argues that the principle that simpler theories are more probably true is a fundamental a priori principle. Thagard, P. 1988. Computational Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.--Simplicity is a determinant of the goodness of an explanation and can be measured in terms of the paucity of auxiliary assumptions relative to the number of facts explained. Thorburn, W. 1918. The myth of Occam’s Razor. Mind, 23, 345-353.--Argues that William of Ockham would not have advocated many of the principles that have been attributed to him.van Fraassen, B. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wallace, C. S. and Dowe, D. L. 1999. Minimum Message Length and Kolmogorov Complexity. Computer Journal, 42(4), 270–83. Walsh, D. 1979. Occam’s Razor: A Principle of Intellectual Elegance. American Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 241-244. Weinberg, S. 1993. Dreams of a Final Theory. New York: Vintage.--Argues that physicists demand simplicity in physical principles before they can be taken seriously. White, R. Why favour simplicity? Analysis, 65 -- Attempts to justify preferences for simpler theories in virtue of such theories having higher likelihoods. Zellner, A, Keuzenkamp, H., and McAleer, M. Simplicity, Inference and Modelling. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- Collection papers by statisticians, philosophers, and economists on the role of simplicity in scientific inference and modelling.