Implicatures of Pyrrhonism

Speranza



We should start with DIOGENES, that the Italians know so well via the Latin translation.


"Pyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus, as Diocles relates."

"According to Apollodorus in his Chronology, he was first a painter."

"Then he studied under Stilpo's son Bryson."

"Thus Alexander in his Successions of Philosophers."

"Afterwards PIRRONE joined Anaxarchus, whom he accompanied on his travels everywhere so that he even forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi."

"This led him to adopt a most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement."


He denied that anything was honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust.

And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself any more this than that.


PIRRONE led a life consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing, taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts, precipices, dogs or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses.

But he was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow close after him.

But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy that was based upon suspension of judgement, and that he did not lack foresight in his everyday acts.

He lived to be nearly ninety.

This is what Antigonus of Carystus says of Pyrrho in his book upon him.

At first he was a poor and unknown painter, and there are still some indifferent torch-racers of his in the gymnasium at Elis.

He would withdraw from the world and live in solitude, rarely showing himself to his relatives.

This he did because he had heard an Indian reproach Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good while he himself danced attendance on kings in their courts.

He would maintain the same composure at all times, so that, even if you left him when he was in the middle of a speech, he would finish what he had to say with no audience but himself, although in his youth he had been hasty.

Often, our informant adds, he would leave his home and, telling no one, would go roaming about with whomsoever he chanced to meet. And once, when Anaxarchus fell into a slough, he passed by without giving him any help, and, while others blamed him, Anaxarchus himself praised his indifference and sang-froid.

On being discovered once talking to himself, he answered, when asked the reason, that he was training to be good. In debate he was looked down upon by no one, for he could both discourse at length and also sustain a cross-examination, so that even Nausiphanes when a young man was captivated by him: at all events he used to say that we should follow Pyrrho in disposition but himself in doctrine; and he would often remark that Epicurus, greatly admiring Pyrrho's way of life, regularly asked him for information about Pyrrho; and that he was so respected by his native city that they made him high priest, and on his account they voted that all philosophers should be exempt from taxation.

Moreover, there were many who emulated his abstention from affairs, so that Timon in his Pytho^[92] and in his Silli^[93] says:^[94]

65. O Pyrrho, O aged Pyrrho, whence and how
Found'st thou escape from servitude to sophists,
Their dreams and vanities; how didst thou loose
The bonds of trickery and specious craft?
Nor reck'st thou to inquire such things as these,
What breezes circle Hellas, to what end,
And from what quarter each may chance to blow.

And again in the Conceits:^[95]

This, Pyrrho, this my heart is fain to know,
Whence peace of mind to thee doth freely flow,
Why among men thou like a god dost show?

Athens honoured him with her citizenship, says Diocles, for having slain the Thracian Cotys. 66. He lived in fraternal piety with his sister, a midwife, so says Eratosthenes in his essay On Wealth and Poverty, now and then even taking things for sale to market, poultry perchance or pigs, and he would dust the things in the house, quite indifferent as to what he did.

They say he showed his indifference by washing a porker. Once he got enraged in his sister's cause (her name was Philista), and he told the man who blamed him that it was not over a weak woman that one should display indifference. When a cur rushed at him and terrified him, he answered his critic that it was not easy entirely to strip oneself of human weakness; but one should strive with all one's might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word.

They say that, when septic salves and surgical and caustic remedies were applied to a wound he had sustained, he did not so much as frown. Timon also portrays his disposition in the full account which he gives of him to Pytho. Philo of Athens, a friend of his, used to say that he was most fond of Democritus, and then of Homer, admiring him and continually repeating the line

As leaves on trees, such is the life of man.^[96]

He also admired Homer because he likened men to wasps, flies, and birds, and would quote these verses as well:

Ay, friend, die thou; why thus thy fate deplore?
Patroclus too, thy better, is no more,^[97]

and all the passages which dwell on the unstable purpose, vain pursuits, and childish folly of man.^[98]
68. Posidonius, too, relates of him a story of this sort. When his fellow-passengers on board a ship were all unnerved by a storm, he kept calm and confident, pointing to a little pig in the ship that went on eating, and telling them that such was the unperturbed state in which the wise man should keep himself. Numenius alone attributes to him positive tenets. He had pupils of repute, in particular one Eurylochus, who fell short of his professions; for they say that he was once so angry that he seized the spit with the meat on it and chased his cook right into the market-place. 69. Once in Elis he was so hard pressed by his pupils' questions that he stripped and swam across the Alpheus. Now he was, as Timon too says, most hostile to Sophists.
Philo, again, who had a habit of very often talking to himself, is also referred to in the lines:^[99]

Yea, him that is far away from men, at leisure to himself,
Philo, who recks not of opinion or of wrangling.

Besides these, Pyrrho's pupils included Hecataeus of Abdera, Timon of Phlius, author of the Silli, of whom more anon, and also Nausiphanes of Teos, said by some to have been a teacher of Epicurus.

All these were called Pyrrhoneans after the name of their master, but Aporetics, Sceptics, Ephectics, and even Zetetics, from their principles, if we may call them such

Zetetics or seekers because they were ever seeking truth,

Sceptics or inquirers because they were always looking for a solution and never finding one,

Ephectics or doubters because of the state of mind which followed their inquiry, I mean, suspense of judgement, and finally Aporetics or those in perplexity, for not only they but even the dogmatic philosophers themselves in their turn were often perplexed.

Pyrrhoneans, of course, they were called from Pyrrho.

Theodosius in his Sceptic Chapters denies that Scepticism should be called Pyrrhonism; for if the movement of the mind in either direction is unattainable by us, we shall never know for certain what Pyrrho really intended, and without knowing that, we cannot be called Pyrrhoneans. Besides this (he says), there is the fact that Pyrrho was not the founder of Scepticism; nor had he any positive tenet; but a Pyrrhonean is one who in manners and life resembles Pyrrho.

Some call Homer the founder of the Sceptic school, for to the same questions he more than anyone else is always giving different answers at different times, and is never definite or dogmatic about the answer.

The maxims of the Seven Wise Men, too, they call sceptical; for instance, "Observe the Golden Mean," and "A pledge is a curse at one's elbow," meaning that whoever plights his troth steadfastly and trustfully brings a curse on his own head.

Sceptically minded, again, were Archilochus and Euripides, for Archilochus says:^[100]

Man's soul, O Glaucus, son of Leptines,
Is but as one short day that Zeus sends down.

And Euripides:^[101]

Great God! how can they say poor mortal men
Have minds and think? Hang we not on thy will?
Do we not what it pleaseth thee to wish?

72. Furthermore, they find Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus to be sceptics: Xenophanes because he says,^[102]

Clear truth hath no man seen nor e'er shall know

and Zeno because he would destroy motion, saying, "A moving body moves neither where it is nor where it is not"; Democritus because he rejects qualities, saying, "Opinion says hot or cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space," and again, "Of a truth we know nothing, for truth is in a well."^[103] Plato, too, leaves the truth to gods and sons of gods, and seeks after the probable explanation.^[104] Euripides says:^[105]

73. Who knoweth if to die be but to live,
And that called life by mortals be but death?

So too Empedocles:^[106]

So to these mortal may not list nor look
Nor yet conceive them in his mind;

and before that:^[107]

Each believes naught but his experience.

And even Heraclitus: "Let us not conjecture on deepest questions what is likely."^[108] Then again Hippocrates showed himself two-sided and but human. And before them all Homer:^[109]

Pliant is the tongue of mortals; numberless the tales within it;

and

Ample is of words the pasture, hither thither widely ranging;

and

And the saying which thou sayest, back it cometh later on thee,

where he is speaking of the equal value of contradictory sayings.

The Sceptics, then, were constantly engaged^[110] in overthrowing the dogmas of all schools, but enuntiated none themselves; and though they would go so far as to bring forward and expound the dogmas of the others, they themselves laid down nothing definitely, not even the laying down of nothing. So much so that they even refuted their laying down of nothing, saying, for instance, "We determine nothing," since otherwise they would have been betrayed into determining;^[111] but we put forward, say they, all the theories for the purpose of indicating our unprecipitate attitude, precisely as we might have done if we had actually assented to them. Thus by the expression "We determine nothing" is indicated their state of even balance; which is similarly indicated by the other expressions, "Not more (one thing than another),"

"Every saying has its corresponding opposite," and the like. But "Not more (one thing than another)" can also be taken positively, indicating that two things are alike; for example, "The pirate is no more wicked than the liar."

But the Sceptics meant it not positively but negatively, as when, in refuting an argument, one says, "Neither had more existence, Scylla or the Chimaera."

And "More so" itself is sometimes comparative, as when we say that "Honey is more sweet than grapes"; sometimes both positive and negative, as when we say, "Virtue profits more than it harms," for in this phrase we indicate that virtue profits and does not harm.

But the Sceptics even refute the statement "Not more (one thing than another)."

For, as forethought is no more existent than non-existent, so "Not more (one thing than another)" is no more existent than not. Thus, as Timon says in the Pytho, the statement means just absence of all determination and withholding of assent. The other statement, "Every saying, etc.,"^[112] equally compels suspension of judgement; when facts disagree, but the contradictory statements have exactly the same weight, ignorance of the truth is the necessary consequence. But even this statement has its corresponding antithesis, so that after destroying others it turns round and destroys itself, like a purge which drives the substance out and then in its turn is itself eliminated and destroyed.


This the dogmatists answer by saying that they do [not merely] not deny the statement, but even plainly assert it. So they were merely using the words as servants, as it was not possible not to refute one statement by another; just as we^[113] are accustomed to say there is no such thing as space, and yet we have no alternative but to speak of space for the purpose of argument, though not of positive doctrine, and just as we say nothing comes about by necessity and yet have to speak of necessity. This was the sort of interpretation they used to give; though things appear to be such and such, they are not such in reality but only appear such. And they would say that they sought, not thoughts, since thoughts are evidently thought, but the things in which sensation plays a part.

Thus the Pyrrhonean principle, as Aenesidemus says in the introduction to his Pyrrhonics, is but a report on phenomena or on any kind of judgement, a report in which all things are brought to bear on one another, and in the comparison are found to present much anomaly and confusion. As to the contradictions in their doubts, they would first show the ways in which things gain credence, and then by the same methods they would destroy belief in them; for they say those things gain credence which either the senses are agreed upon or which never or at least rarely change, as well as things which become habitual or are determined by law and those which please or excite wonder.

They showed, then, on the basis of that which is contrary to what induces belief, that the probabilities on both sides are equal. Perplexities arise from the agreements between appearances or judgements, and these perplexities they distinguished under ten different modes in which the subjects in question appeared to vary. The following are the ten modes laid down.


The first mode relates to the differences between living creatures in respect of those things which give them pleasure or pain, or are useful or harmful to them. By this it is inferred that they do not receive the same impressions from the same things, with the result that such a conflict necessarily leads to suspension of judgement. For some creatures multiply without intercourse, for example, creatures that live in fire, the Arabian phoenix and worms; others by union, such as man and the rest.

Some are distinguished in one way, some in another, and for this reason they differ in their senses also, hawks for instance being most keen-sighted, and dogs having a most acute sense of smell. It is natural that if the senses, e.g. eyes, of animals differ, so also will the impressions produced upon them; so to the goat vine-shoots are good to eat, to man they are bitter; the quail thrives on hemlock, which is fatal to man; the pig will eat ordure, the horse will not.

The second mode has reference to the natures and idiosyncrasies of men; for instance, Demophon, Alexander's butler, used to get warm in the shade and shiver in the sun.

Andron of Argos is reported by Aristotle^[116] to have travelled across the waterless deserts of Libya without drinking. Moreover, one man fancies the profession of medicine, another farming, and another commerce; and the same ways of life are injurious to one man but beneficial to another; from which it follows that judgement must be suspended.

The third mode depends on the differences between the sense-channels in different cases, for an apple gives the impression of being pale yellow in colour to the sight, sweet in taste and fragrant in smell. An object of the same shape is made to appear different by differences in the mirrors reflecting it. Thus it follows that what appears is no more such and such a thing than something different.

The fourth mode is that due to differences of condition and to changes in general; for instance, health, illness, sleep, waking, joy, sorrow, youth, old age, courage, fear, want, fullness, hate, love, heat, cold, to say nothing of breathing freely and having the passages obstructed. The impressions received thus appear to vary according to the nature of the conditions. Nay, even the state of madmen is not contrary to nature; for why should their state be so more than ours? Even to our view the sun has the appearance of standing still. And Theon of Tithorea used to go to bed and walk in his sleep, while Pericles' slave did the same on the housetop.

The fifth mode is derived from customs, laws, belief in myths, compacts between nations and dogmatic assumptions. This class includes considerations with regard to things beautiful and ugly, true and false, good and bad, with regard to the gods, and with regard to the coming into being and the passing away of the world of phenomena. Obviously the same thing is regarded by some as just and by others as unjust, or as good by some and bad by others. Persians think it not unnatural for a man to marry his daughter; to Greeks it is unlawful. The Massagetae, acording to Eudoxus in the first book of his Voyage round the World, have their wives in common; the Greeks have not. The Cilicians used to delight in piracy; not so the Greeks. 84. Different people believe in different gods; some in providence, others not. In burying their dead, the Egyptians embalm them; the Romans burn them; the Paeonians throw them into lakes. As to what is true, then, let suspension of judgement be our practice.

The sixth mode relates to mixtures and participations, by virtue of which nothing appears pure in and by itself, but only in combination with air, light, moisture, solidity, heat, cold, movement, exhalations and other forces. For purple shows different tints in sunlight, moonlight, and lamplight; and our own complexion does not appear the same at noon and when the sun is low. 85. Again, a rock which in air takes two men to lift is easily moved about in water, either because, being in reality heavy, it is lifted by the water or because, being light, it is made heavy by the air. Of its own inherent property we know nothing, any more than of the constituent oils in an ointment.

The seventh mode has reference to distances, positions, places and the occupants of the places. In this mode things which are thought to be large appear small, square things round; flat things appear to have projections, straight things to be bent, and colourless coloured. So the sun, on account of its distance, appears small, mountains when far away appear misty and smooth, but when near at hand rugged. 86. Furthermore, the sun at its rising has a certain appearance, but has a dissimilar appearance when in mid-heaven, and the same body one appearance in a wood and another in open country. The image again varies according to the position of the object, and a dove's neck according to the way it is turned. Since, then, it is not possible to observe these things apart from places and positions, their real nature is unknowable.

The eighth mode is concerned with quantities and qualities of things, say heat or cold, swiftness or slowness, colourlessness or variety of colours. Thus wine taken in moderation strengthens the body, but too much of it is weakening; and so with food and other things.

87. The ninth mode has to do with perpetuity, strangeness, or rarity. Thus earthquakes are no surprise to those among whom they constantly take place; nor is the sun, for it is seen every day.^[117] This ninth mode is put eighth by Favorinus and tenth by Sextus and Aenesidemus; moreover the tenth is put eighth by Sextus and ninth by Favorinus.

The tenth mode rests on inter-relation, e.g. between light and heavy, strong and weak, greater and less, up and down. Thus that which is on the right is not so by nature, but is so understood in virtue of its position with respect to something else; for, if that change its position, the thing is no longer on the right. 88. Similarly father and brother are relative terms, day is relative to the sun, and all things relative to our mind. Thus relative terms are in and by themselves unknowable. These, then, are the ten modes of perplexity.

But Agrippa and his school add to them^[118] five other modes, resulting respectively from disagreement, extension ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis and reciprocal inference. The mode arising from disagreement proves, with regard to any inquiry whether in philosophy or in everyday life, that it is full of the utmost contentiousness and confusion. The mode which involves extension ad infinitum refuses to admit that what is sought to be proved is firmly established, because one thing furnishes the ground for belief in another, and so on ad infinitum. 89. The mode derived from relativity declares that a thing can never be apprehended in and by itself, but only in connexion with something else. Hence all things are unknowable. The mode resulting from hypothesis arises when people suppose that you must take the most elementary of things as of themselves entitled to credence, instead of postulating them: which is useless, because some one else will adopt the contrary hypothesis. The mode arising from reciprocal inference is found whenever that which should be confirmatory of the thing requiring to be proved itself has to borrow credit from the latter, as, for example, if anyone seeking to establish the existence of pores on the ground that emanations take place should take this (the existence of pores) as proof that there are emanations.^[119]

90. They would deny all demonstration, criterion, sign, cause, motion, the process of learning, coming into being, or that there is anything good or bad by nature. For all demonstration, say they, is constructed out of things either already proved or indemonstrable. If out of things already proved, those things too will require some demonstration, and so on ad infinitum; if out of things indemonstrable, then, whether all or some or only a single one of the steps are the subject of doubt, the whole is indemonstrable.^[120] If you think, they add, that there are some things which need no demonstration, yours must be a rare intellect, not to see that you must first have demonstration of the very fact that the things you refer to carry conviction in themselves. 91. Nor must we prove that the elements are four from the fact that the elements are four. Besides, if we discredit particular demonstrations, we cannot accept the generalization from them. And in order that we may know that an argument constitutes a demonstration, we require a criterion; but again, in order that we may know that it is a criterion we require a demonstration; hence both the one and the other are incomprehensible, since each is referred to the other. How then are we to grasp the things which are uncertain, seeing that we know no demonstration? For what we wish to ascertain is not whether things appear to be such and such, but whether they are so in their essence.

They declared the dogmatic philosophers to be fools, observing that what is concluded ex hypothesi is properly described not as inquiry but assumption, and by reasoning of this kind one may even argue for impossibilities. 92. As for those who think that we should not judge of truth from surrounding circumstances or legislate on the basis of what is found in nature, these men, they used to say, made themselves the measure of all things, and did not see that every phenomenon appears in a certain disposition and in a certain reciprocal relation to surrounding circumstances. Therefore we must affirm either that all things are true or that all things are false. For if certain things only are true [and others are false], how are we to distinguish them? Not by the senses, where things in the field of sense are in question, since all these things appear to sense to be on an equal footing; nor by the mind, for the same reason. Yet apart from these faculties there is no other, so far as we can see, to help us to a judgement. Whoever therefore, they say, would be firmly assured about anything sensible or intelligible must first establish the received opinions about it; for some have refuted one doctrine, others another.

But things must be judged either by the sensible or by the intelligible, and both are disputed. Therefore it is impossible to pronounce judgement on opinions about sensibles or intelligibles; and if the conflict in our thoughts compels us to disbelieve every one, the standard or measure, by which it is held that all things are exactly determined, will be destroyed, and we must deem every statement of equal value. Further, say they, our partner in an inquiry into a phenomenon is either to be trusted or not. If he is, he will have nothing to reply to the man to whom it appears to be the opposite;^[121] for just as our friend who describes what appears to him is to be trusted, so is his opponent. If he is not to be trusted, he will actually be disbelieved when he describes what appears to him.
94. We must not assume that what convinces us is actually true. For the same thing does not convince every one, nor even the same people always. Persuasiveness sometimes depends on external circumstances, on the reputation of the speaker, on his ability as a thinker or his artfulness, on the familiarity or the pleasantness of the topic.

Again, they would destroy the criterion by reasoning of this kind. Even the criterion has either been critically determined or not. If it has not, it is definitely untrustworthy, and in its purpose of distinguishing is no more true than false. If it has, it will belong to the class of particular judgements, so that one and the same thing determines and is determined, and the criterion which has determined will have to be determined by another, that other by another, and so on ad infinitum.

 In addition to this there is disagreement as to the criterion, some holding that man is the criterion, while for some it is the senses, for others reason, for others the apprehensive presentation. Now man disagrees with man and with himself, as is shown by differences of laws and customs. The senses deceive, and reason says different things. Finally, the apprehensive presentation is judged by the mind, and the mind itself changes in various ways. Hence the criterion is unknowable, and consequently truth also.

96. They deny, too, that there is such a thing as a sign. If there is, they say, it must either be sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible, because what is sensible is a common attribute, whereas a sign is a particular thing. Again, the sensible is one of the things which exist by way of difference, while the sign belongs to the category of relative. Nor is a sign an object of thought, for objects of thought are of four kinds, apparent judgements on things apparent, non-apparent judgements on things non-apparent, non-apparent on apparent, or apparent on non-apparent; and a sign is none of these, so that there is no such thing as a sign. A sign is not "apparent on apparent," for what is apparent needs no sign; nor is it non-apparent on non-apparent, for what is revealed by something must needs appear; 97. nor is it non-apparent on apparent, for that which is to afford the means of apprehending something else must itself be apparent; nor, lastly, is it apparent on non-apparent, because the sign, being relative, must be apprehended along with that of which it is the sign, which is not here the case. It follows that nothing uncertain can be apprehended; for it is through signs that uncertain things are said to be apprehended.^[122]

Causes, too, they destroy in this way. A cause is something relative; for it is relative to what can be caused, namely, the effect. But things which are relative are merely objects of thought and have no substantial existence. 98. Therefore a cause can only be an object of thought; inasmuch as, if it be a cause, it must bring with it that of which it is said to be the cause, otherwise it will not be a cause. Just as a father, in the absence of that in relation to which he is called father, will not be a father, so too with a cause. But that in relation to which the cause is thought of, namely the effect, is not present; for there is no coming into being or passing away or any other process: therefore there is no such thing as cause. Furthermore, if there is a cause, either bodies are the cause of bodies, or things incorporeal of things incorporeal; but neither is the case; therefore there is no such thing as cause. Body in fact could not be the cause of body, inasmuch as both have the same nature. And if either is called a cause in so far as it is a body, the other, being a body, will become a cause.

 But if both be alike causes, there will be nothing to be acted upon Nor can an incorporeal thing be the cause of an incorporeal thing, for the same reason. And a thing incorporeal cannot be the cause of a body, since nothing incorporeal creates anything corporeal. And, lastly, a body cannot be the cause of anything incorporeal, because what is produced must be of the material operated upon; but if it is not operated upon because it is incorporeal, it cannot be produced by anything whatever. Therefore there is no such thing as a cause. A corollary to this is their statement that the first principles of the universe have no real existence; for in that case something must have been there to create and act.
Furthermore there is no motion; for that which moves moves either in the place where it is or in a place where it is not. But it cannot move in the place where it is, still less in any place where it is not. Therefore there is no such thing as motion.

100. They used also to deny the possibility of learning. If anything is taught, they say, either the existent is taught through its existence or the non-existent through its non-existence. But the existent is not taught through its existence, for the nature of existing things is apparent to and recognized by all; nor is the non-existent taught through the nonexistent, for with the non-existent nothing is ever done, so that it cannot be taught to anyone.

Nor, say they, is there any coming into being. For that which is does not come into being, since it is; nor yet that which is not, for it has no substantial existence, and that which is neither substantial nor existent cannot have had the chance of coming into being either.

101. There is nothing good or bad by nature, for if there is anything good or bad by nature, it must be good or bad for all persons alike, just as snow is cold to all. But there is no good or bad which is such to all persons in common; therefore there is no such thing as good or bad by nature. For either all that is thought good by anyone whatever must be called good, or not all. Certainly all cannot be so called; since one and the same thing is thought good by one person and bad by another; for instance, Epicurus thought pleasure good and Antisthenes thought it bad; thus on our supposition it will follow that the same thing is both good and bad. But if we say that not all that anyone thinks good is good, we shall have to judge the different opinions; and this is impossible because of the equal validity of opposing arguments. Therefore the good by nature is unknowable.

The whole of their mode of inference can be gathered from their extant treatises. Pyrrho himself, indeed, left no writings, but his associates Timon, Aenesidemus, Numenius and Nausiphanes did; and others as well.

The dogmatists answer them by declaring that the Sceptics themselves do apprehend and dogmatize; for when they are thought to be refuting their hardest they do apprehend, for at the very same time they are asseverating and dogmatizing. Thus even when they declare that they determine nothing, and that to every argument there is an opposite argument, they are actually determining these very points and dogmatizing.

The others reply, "We confess to human weaknesses; for we recognize that it is day and that we are alive, and many other apparent facts in life; but with regard to the things about which our opponents argue so positively, claiming to have definitely apprehended them, we suspend our judgement because they are not certain, and confine knowledge to our impressions.^[124] For we admit that we see, and we recognize that we think this or that, but how we see or how we think we know not. 104. And we say in conversation that a certain thing appears white, but we are not positive that it really is white. As to our 'We determine nothing' and the like,^[125] we use the expressions in an undogmatic sense, for they are not like the assertion that the world is spherical. Indeed the latter statement is not certain, but the others are mere admissions. Thus in saying 'We determine nothing,' we are not determining even that."


Again, the dogmatic philosophers maintain that the Sceptics do away with life itself, in that they reject all that life consists in. The others say this is false, for they do not deny that we see; they only say that they do not know how we see. "We admit the apparent fact," say they, "without admitting that it really is what it appears to be." We also perceive that fire burns; as to whether it is its nature to burn, we suspend our judgement. 105. We see that a man moves, and that he perishes; how it happens we do not know. We merely object to accepting the unknown substance behind phenomena. When we say a picture has projections, we are describing what is apparent; but if we say that it has no projections, we are then speaking, not of what is apparent, but of something else. This is what makes Timon say in his Python that he has not gone outside what is customary. And again in the Conceits he says:^[126]

But the apparent is omnipotent wherever it goes;

and in his work On the Senses, "I do not lay it down that honey is sweet, but I admit that it appears to be so."

 Aenesidemus too in the first book of his Pyrrhonean Discourses says that Pyrrho determines nothing dogmatically, because of the possibility of contradiction, but guides himself by apparent facts. Aenesidemus says the same in his works Against Wisdom and On Inquiry. Furthermore Zeuxis, the friend of Aenesidemus, in his work On Two-sided Arguments, Antiochus of Laodicea, and Apellas in his Agrippa all hold to phenomena alone. Therefore the apparent is the Sceptic's criterion, as indeed Aenesidemus says; and so does Epicurus. Democritus, however, denied that any apparent fact could be a criterion, indeed he denied the very existence of the apparent. 107. Against this criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when the same appearances produce in us different impressions, e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any course; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they must both be said to appear;^[127] for things which are apparent are so called because they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like its shadow: so Timon and Aenesidemus declare. 108. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape,^[128] for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness.

ΠΥΡΡΩΝ
61	Πύρρων Ἠλεῖος Πλειστάρχου μὲν ἦν υἱός, καθὰ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἱστορεῖ· ὥς φησι δ' Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς (FGrH 244 F 39), πρότερον ἦν ζωγράφος, καὶ ἤκουσε Βρύσωνος τοῦ Στίλπωνος, ὡς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐν Διαδοχαῖς (FGrH 273 F 92), εἶτ' Ἀναξάρχου, ξυνακολουθῶν πανταχοῦ, ὡς καὶ τοῖς γυμνοσοφισταῖς ἐν Ἰνδίᾳ συμμῖξαι καὶ τοῖς Μάγοις. ὅθεν γενναιότατα δοκεῖ φιλοσοφῆσαι, τὸ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας καὶ ἐποχῆς εἶδος εἰσαγαγών, ὡς Ἀσκάνιος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης φησίν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτ' ἄδικον· καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν· οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον.
62	Ἀκόλουθος δ' ἦν καὶ τῷ βίῳ, μηδὲν ἐκτρεπόμενος μηδὲ φυλατ- τόμενος, ἅπαντα ὑφιστάμενος, ἀμάξας, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ κρημνοὺς καὶ κύνας καὶ ὅσα <τοιαῦτα> μηδὲν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐπιτρέπων. σώζεσθαι μέντοι, καθά φασιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρύστιον Ἀντίγονον (Wil., p. 36), ὑπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων παρακολουθούντων. Αἰνεσίδημος δέ φησι φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐποχῆς λόγον, μὴ μέντοι γ' ἀπροοράτως ἕκαστα πράττειν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἐνενή- κοντα ἔτη κατεβίω. Ἀντίγονος δέ φησιν ὁ Καρύστιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Πύρρωνος (Wil., p. 35) τάδε περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄδοξός τε ἦν καὶ πένης καὶ ζωγράφος. σώζεσθαί τε αὐτοῦ ἐν Ἤλιδι ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ
63	λαμπαδιστὰς μετρίως ἔχοντας. ἐκπατεῖν τε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρημάζειν, σπανίως ποτ' ἐπιφαινόμενον τοῖς οἴκοι. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἀκού- σαντα Ἰνδοῦ τινος ὀνειδίζοντος Ἀναξάρχῳ ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἕτερόν τινα διδάξαι οὗτος ἀγαθόν, αὐτὸς αὐλὰς βασιλικὰς θεραπεύων. ἀεί τ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καταστήματι, ὥστ' εἰ καί τις αὐτὸν καταλίποι μεταξὺ λέγοντα, αὑτῷ διαπεραίνειν τὸν λόγον, καίτοι κεκινημένον τε <***> ὄντα ἐν νεότητι. πολλάκις, φησί, καὶ ἀπεδήμει, μηδενὶ προειπών, καὶ συνερρέμβετο οἷστισιν ἤθελεν. καί ποτ' Ἀναξάρ- χου εἰς τέλμα ἐμπεσόντος, παρῆλθεν οὐ βοηθήσας· τινῶν δὲ αἰτιω- μένων, αὐτὸς Ἀνάξαρχος ἐπῄνει τὸ ἀδιάφορον καὶ ἄστοργον αὐτοῦ.
64	Καταληφθεὶς δέ ποτε καὶ αὑτῷ λαλῶν καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς τὴν αἰτίαν ἔφη μελετᾶν χρηστὸς εἶναι. ἔν τε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς κατεφρονεῖτο διὰ τὸ <καὶ δι>εξοδικῶς λέγειν καὶ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν· ὅθεν καὶ Ναυσιφάνην ἤδη νεανίσκον ὄντα θηραθῆναι. ἔφασκε γοῦν γίνεσθαι δεῖν τῆς μὲν διαθέσεως τῆς Πυρρωνείου, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν ἑαυτοῦ. ἔλεγέ τε πολλάκις καὶ Ἐπίκουρον θαυμά- ζοντα τὴν Πύρρωνος ἀναστροφὴν συνεχὲς αὐτοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ. οὕτω δ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος τιμηθῆναι ὥστε καὶ ἀρχιερέα καταστῆσαι αὐτὸν καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον πᾶσι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀτέλειαν ψηφίσασθαι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ ζηλωτὰς εἶχε πολλοὺς τῆς ἀπραγμοσύνης· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν οὕτως ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι καὶ ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις (PPF 9 B 48)·
65	Ὦ γέρον, ὦ Πύρρων, πῶς ἢ πόθεν ἔκδυσιν εὗρες λατρείης δοξῶν [τε] κενεοφροσύνης τε σοφιστῶν, καὶ πάσης ἀπάτης πειθοῦς τ' ἀπελύσαο δεσμά; οὐδ' ἔμελέν σοι ταῦτα μεταλλῆσαι, τίνες αὖραι Ἑλλάδ' ἔχουσι, πόθεν τε καὶ εἰς ὅ τι κύρει ἕκαστα. καὶ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς Ἰνδαλμοῖς (PPF 9 B 67. 1-2, 5)· τοῦτό μοι, ὦ Πύρρων, ἱμείρεται ἦτορ ἀκοῦσαι, πῶς ποτ' ἀνὴρ ὅτ' ἄγεις ῥᾷστα μεθ' ἡσυχίης μοῦνος ἐν ἀνθρώποισι θεοῦ τρόπον ἡγεμονεύων. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ πολιτείᾳ αὐτὸν ἐτίμησαν, καθά φησι Διοκλῆς,
66	ἐπὶ τῷ Κότυν τὸν Θρᾷκα διαχρήσασθαι. εὐσεβῶς δὲ καὶ τῇ ἀδελφῇ συνεβίω μαίᾳ οὔσῃ, καθά φησιν Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν τῷ Περὶ πλούτου καὶ πενίας (FGrH 241 F 23), ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς φέρων εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐπίπρασκεν ὀρνίθια, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ χοιρίδια, καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας ἐκάθαιρεν ἀδιαφόρως. λέγεται δὲ καὶ δέλφακα λούειν αὐτὸς ὑπ' ἀδιαφορίας. καὶ χολήσας τι περὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς, Φιλίστα δ' ἐκαλεῖτο, πρὸς τὸν ἐπιλαβόμενον εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἐν γυναίῳ ἡ ἐπίδειξις τῆς ἀδιαφορίας. καὶ κυνός ποτ' ἐπενεχθέντος διασοβηθέντα εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν αἰτιασάμενον, ὡς χαλεπὸν εἴη ὁλοσχερῶς ἐκδῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· διαγωνίζεσθαι δ' ὡς οἷόν τε πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, εἰ δὲ μή, τῷ γε λόγῳ.
67	Φασὶ δὲ καὶ σηπτικῶν φαρμάκων καὶ τομῶν καὶ καύσεων ἐπί τινος ἕλκους αὐτῷ προσενεχθέντων, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τὰς ὀφρῦς συναγαγεῖν. καὶ ὁ Τίμων δὲ διασαφεῖ τὴν διάθεσιν αὐτοῦ ἐν οἷς πρὸς Πύθωνα (PPF 9 B 79) διέξεισιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ Φίλων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, γνώριμος αὐτοῦ γεγονώς, ἔλεγεν ὡς ἐμέμνητο μάλιστα μὲν Δημοκρίτου, εἶτα δὲ καὶ Ὁμήρου, θαυμάζων αὐτὸν καὶ συνεχὲς λέγων (Il. Ζ 146), οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν· καὶ ὅτι σφηξὶ καὶ μυίαις καὶ ὀρνέοις εἴκαζε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. προφέρεσθαι δὲ καὶ τάδε (Il. Φ 106 sq.)· ἀλλά, φίλος, θάνε καὶ σύ· τίη ὀλοφύρεαι οὕτως; κάτθανε καὶ Πάτροκλος, ὅ περ σέο πολλὸν ἀμείνων· καὶ ὅσα συντείνει εἰς τὸ ἀβέβαιον καὶ κενόσπουδον ἅμα καὶ παιδαριῶδες τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
68	Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ τοιοῦτόν τι διέξεισι περὶ αὐτοῦ. τῶν γὰρ συμπλεόντων ἐσκυθρωπακότων ὑπὸ χειμῶνος, αὐτὸς γαληνὸς ὢν ἀνέρρωσε τὴν ψυχήν, δείξας ἐν τῷ πλοίῳ χοιρίδιον ἐσθίον καὶ εἰπὼν ὡς χρὴ τὸν σοφὸν ἐν τοιαύτῃ καθεστάναι ἀταραξίᾳ. μόνος δὲ Νουμήνιος καὶ δογματίσαι φησὶν αὐτόν. τούτου πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ μαθηταὶ γεγόνασιν ἐλλόγιμοι, ὧν Εὐρύλοχος· οὗ φέρεται ἐλάσσωμα τόδε. φασὶ γὰρ ὡς οὕτω παρωξύνθη ποτὲ ὥστε τὸν ὀβελίσκον ἄρας μετὰ τῶν κρεῶν ἕως τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐδίωκε
69	τὸν μάγειρον. καὶ ἐν Ἤλιδι καταπονούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ζητούντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἀπορρίψας θοἰμάτιον διενήξατο [πέραν] τὸν Ἀλ- φειόν. ἦν οὖν πολεμιώτατος τοῖς σοφισταῖς, ὡς καὶ Τίμων φησίν (PPF 9 B 49). Ὁ δὲ Φίλων τὰ πλεῖστα διελέγετο <ἑαυτῷ> ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τούτου φησὶν οὕτως (PPF 9 B 50)· ἢ τὸν ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων αὐτόσχολον αὐτολαλητὴν οὐκ ἐμπαζόμενον δόξης ἐρίδων τε Φίλωνα. Πρὸς τούτοις διήκουσε τοῦ Πύρρωνος Ἑκαταῖός τε ὁ Ἀβ- δηρίτης καὶ Τίμων ὁ Φλιάσιος ὁ τοὺς Σίλλους πεποιηκώς, περὶ οὗ λέξομεν, ἔτι τε Ναυσιφάνης <ὁ> Τήιος, οὗ φασί τινες ἀκοῦσαι Ἐπίκουρον. οὗτοι πάντες Πυρρώνειοι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, ἀπορητικοὶ δὲ καὶ σκεπτικοὶ καὶ ἔτι ἐφεκτικοὶ καὶ ζητητικοὶ ἀπὸ
70	τοῦ οἷον δόγματος προσηγορεύοντο. ζητηικὴ μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφία ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντοτε ζητεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, σκεπτικὴ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ σκέπτεσθαι ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε εὑρίσκειν, ἐφεκτικὴ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τὴν ζήτησιν πάθους· λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐποχήν· ἀπορητικὴ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἀπορεῖν καὶ αὐτούς. Πυρρώνειοι δὲ ἀπὸ Πύρρωνος. Θεοδόσιος δ' ἐν τοῖς Σκεπτικοῖς κεφαλαίοις (fg. 308 Deichgra+ber) οὔ φησι δεῖν Πυρρώνειον καλεῖσθαι τὴν σκεπτικήν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕτερον κίνημα τῆς διανοίας ἄληπτόν ἐστιν, οὐκ εἰσόμεθα τὴν Πύρρωνος διάθεσιν· μὴ εἰδότες δὲ οὐδὲ Πυρρώνειοι καλοίμεθ' ἄν. πρὸς τῷ μηδὲ πρῶτον εὑρηκέναι τὴν σκεπτικὴν Πύρρωνα μηδ' ἔχειν τι δόγμα. λέγοιτο δ' ἂν Πυρ- ρώνειος ὁμοτρόπως.
71	Ταύτης δὲ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἔνιοί φασιν Ὅμηρον κατάρξαι, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων παρ' ὁντινοῦν ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως ἀπο- φαίνεται καὶ οὐδὲν ὁρικῶς δογματίζει περὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν. ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν σκεπτικὰ εἶναι, οἷον τὸ Μηδὲν ἄγαν, καὶ Ἐγγύα, πάρα δ' ἄτα· δηλοῦσθαι γὰρ τῷ βεβαίως καὶ πεπει- σμένως διεγγυωμένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν ἄτην. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ Εὐριπίδην σκεπτικῶς ἔχειν, ἐν οἷς Ἀρχίλοχος μέν φησι (fg. 68 D.)· τοῖος ἀνθρώποισι θυμός, Γλαῦκε Λεπτίνεω πάϊ, γίγνεται θνητοῖς ὁκοίην Ζεὺς ἐπ' ἡμέρην ἄγει. Εὐριπίδης δέ (Supp. 734-6)· τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα δρῶμέν τε τοιαῦθ' ἃν σὺ τυγχάνῃς θέλων.
72	Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Ξενοφάνης καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Ἐλεάτης καὶ Δημόκριτος κατ' αὐτοὺς σκεπτικοὶ τυγχάνουσιν· ἐν οἷς Ξενο- φάνης μέν φησι (DK 21 B 34. 1 sq.)· καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται εἰδώς. Ζήνων (DK 29 B 4) δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ἀναιρεῖ λέγων, "τὸ κινού- μενον οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι"· Δημό- κριτος (DK 68 B 117 et 125) δὲ τὰς ποιότητας ἐκβάλλων, ἵνα φησί, "νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν"· καὶ πάλιν, "ἐτεῇ δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια." καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς θεοῖς τε καὶ θεῶν παισὶν ἐκχωρεῖν, τὸν δ' εἰκότα λόγον ζητεῖν. καὶ Εὐριπίδην λέγειν (N2, fg. 638)·
73	τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν νομίζεται βροτοῖς; ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα (DK 31 B. 2. 7 sq.)· οὕτως οὔτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ' ἀνδράσιν οὔτ' ἐπακουστὰ οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά· καὶ ἐπάνω (DK 31 B 2. 5), αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος· ἔτι μὴν Ἡράκλειτον, "μὴ εἰκῆ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβαλ- λώμεθα" (DK 22 B 47)· καὶ Ἱπποκράτην ἔπειτα ἐνδοιαστῶς καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως ἀποφαίνεσθαι· καὶ πρὶν Ὅμηρον (Il. Υ 248-50), στρεπτὴ δὲ γλῶσσ' ἐστὶ βροτῶν, πολέες δ' ἔνι μῦθοι· καὶ ἐπέων δὲ πολὺς νομὸς ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα· καὶ ὁπποῖόν κ' εἴπῃσθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἐπακούσαις· τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν λέγων καὶ ἀντίθεσιν τῶν λόγων.
74	Διετέλουν δὴ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ τὰ τῶν αἱρέσεων δόγματα πάντα ἀνατρέποντες, αὐτοὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνονται δογματικῶς, ἕως δὲ τοῦ προφέρεσθαι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ διηγεῖσθαι μηδὲν ὁρί- ζοντες, μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο. ὥστε καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρίζειν ἀνῄρουν, λέγοντες οἷον Οὐδὲν ὁρίζομεν, ἐπεὶ ὥριζον ἄν· προφερόμεθα δέ, φασί, τὰς ἀποφάσεις εἰς μήνυσιν τῆς ἀπροπτωσίας, ὡς, εἰ καὶ νεύσαντας, τοῦτο ἐνεδέχετο δηλῶσαι· διὰ τῆς οὖν Οὐδὲν ὁρίζομεν φωνῆς τὸ τῆς ἀρρεψίας πάθος δηλοῦται· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καὶ τῆς Παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται καὶ τῶν
75	ὁμοίων. λέγεται δὲ τὸ Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καὶ θετικῶς, ὡς ὁμοίων τινῶν ὄντων· οἷον, Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ πειρατὴς κακός ἐστιν ἢ ὁ ψεύστης. ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν σκεπτικῶν οὐ θετικῶς ἀλλ' ἀναιρετικῶς λέγεται, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνασκευάζοντος καὶ λέγοντος, Οὐ μᾶλλον ἡ Σκύλλα γέγονεν ἢ ἡ Χίμαιρα. αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ Μᾶλλον ποτὲ μὲν συγκριτικῶς ἐκφέρεται, ὡς ὅταν φῶμεν μᾶλλον τὸ μέλι γλυκὺ ἢ τὴν σταφίδα· ποτὲ δὲ θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς, ὡς ὅταν λέγωμεν, Μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει· σημαίνομεν γὰρ
76	ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ, βλάπτει δ' οὔ. ἀναιροῦσι δ' οἱ σκεπτικοὶ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν "Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον" φωνήν· ὡς γὰρ οὐ μᾶλλόν ἐστι πρόνοια ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν. σημαίνει οὖν ἡ φωνή, καθά φησι καὶ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι (PPF 9 B 80), "τὸ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν, ἀλλ' ἀπροσθετεῖν." ἡ δὲ Παντὶ λόγῳ φωνὴ καὶ αὐτὴ συνάγει τὴν ἐποχήν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγμάτων διαφωνούντων τῶν δὲ λόγων ἰσοσθενούντων ἀγνωσία τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπακολουθεῖ· καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς μετὰ τὸ ἀνελεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ περιτραπεὶς ἀπόλλυται, κατ' ἴσον τοῖς καθαρτικοῖς, ἃ τὴν ὕλην προεκκρίναντα καὶ αὐτὰ ὑπεκκρίνεται καὶ ἐξαπόλλυται.
77	Πρὸς ὅ φασιν οἱ δογματικοὶ μὴ αἴρειν τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ προσεπισχυρίζειν. μόνον οὖν διακόνοις ἐχρῶντο τοῖς λόγοις· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἦν μὴ λόγῳ λόγον ἀνελεῖν· καθ' ὃν τρόπον εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τόπον μὴ εἶναι καὶ δεῖ πάντως τὸν τόπον εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ δογματικῶς, ἀποδεικτικῶς δέ· καὶ μηδὲν γίνεσθαι κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ δεῖ τὴν ἀνάγκην εἰπεῖν. τοιούτῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἐχρῶντο· οἷα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, μὴ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῇ φύσει, ἀλλὰ μόνον φαίνεσθαι· ζητεῖν τ' ἔλεγον οὐχ ἅπερ νοοῦσιν, ὅ τι γὰρ νοεῖται δῆλον, ἀλλ' ὧν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι μετίσχουσιν.
78	Ἔστιν οὖν ὁ Πυρρώνειος λόγος μήνυσίς τις τῶν φαινομένων ἢ τῶν ὁπωσοῦν νοουμένων, καθ' ἣν πάντα πᾶσι συμβάλλεται καὶ συγκρινόμενα πολλὴν ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ ταραχὴν ἔχοντα εὑρί- σκεται, καθά φησιν Αἰνεσίδημος ἐν τῇ εἰς τὰ Πυρρώνεια ὑπο- τυπώσει. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσιν ἀντιθέσεις προαποδεικνύντες καθ' οὓς τρόπους πείθει τὰ πράγματα, κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀνῄρουν τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν πίστιν· πείθειν γὰρ τά τε κατ' αἴσθησιν συμφώνως ἔχοντα καὶ τὰ μηδέποτε ἢ σπανίως γοῦν μεταπίπτοντα τά τε συνήθη καὶ τὰ νόμοις διεσταλμένα καὶ <τὰ> τέρποντα καὶ τὰ
79	θαυμαζόμενα. ἐδείκνυσαν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς πείθουσιν ἴσας τὰς πιθανότητας. Αἱ δ' ἀπορίαι κατὰ τὰς συμφωνίας τῶν φαινομένων ἢ νοου- μένων ἃς ἀπεδίδοσαν ἦσαν κατὰ δέκα τρόπους, καθ' οὓς τὰ ὑποκείμενα παραλλάττοντα ἐφαίνετο. τούτους δὲ τοὺς δέκα τρόπους [καθ' οὓς] τίθησιν. Ὧν πρῶτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ζῴων πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀλγηδόνα καὶ βλάβην καὶ ὠφέλειαν. συνάγεται δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ μὴ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν προσπίπτειν φαντασίας καὶ τὸ διότι τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάχῃ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἐπέχειν· τῶν γὰρ ζῴων τὰ μὲν χωρὶς μίξεως γίνεσθαι, ὡς τὰ πυρίβια καὶ ὁ Ἀράβιος φοῖνιξ
80	καὶ εὐλαί· τὰ δ' ἐξ ἐπιπλοκῆς, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὕτως, τὰ δ' οὕτως συγκέκριται· διὸ καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει δια- φέρει, ὡς κίρκοι μὲν ὀξύτατοι, κύνες δ' ὀσφρητικώτατοι. εὔλογον οὖν τοῖς διαφόροις τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς διάφορα καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα προσπίπτειν· καὶ τῇ μὲν αἰγὶ τὸν θαλλὸν εἶναι ἐδώδιμον, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ πικρόν, καὶ τὸ κώνειον ὄρτυγι μὲν τρόφιμον, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ θανάσιμον, καὶ ὁ ἀπόπατος ὑὶ μὲν ἐδώδιμος, ἵππῳ δ' οὔ. Δεύτερος ὁ παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεις καὶ τὰς ἰδιοσυγ- κρισίας· Δημοφῶν γοῦν ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου τραπεζοκόμος ἐν σκιᾷ
81	ἐθάλπετο, ἐν ἡλίῳ δ' ἐρρίγου. Ἄνδρων δ' ὁ Ἀργεῖος, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης (fg. 103 Rose), διὰ τῆς ἀνύδρου Λιβύης ὥδευεν ἄποτος. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἰατρικῆς, ὁ δὲ γεωργίας, ἄλλος δ' ἐμπορίας ὀρέγεται· καὶ ταὐτὰ οὓς μὲν βλάπτει, οὓς δὲ ὠφελεῖ· ὅθεν ἐφεκτέον. Τρίτος <ὁ> παρὰ τὰς τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων διαφοράς. τὸ γοῦν μῆλον ὁράσει μὲν ὠχρόν, γεύσει δὲ γλυκύ, ὀσφρήσει δ' εὐῶδες ὑποπίπτει. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ μορφὴ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν κατόπτρων ἀλλοία θεωρεῖται. ἀκολουθεῖ οὖν μὴ μᾶλλον εἶναι τοῖον τὸ φαινόμενον ἢ ἀλλοῖον.
82	Τέταρτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαθέσεις καὶ κοινῶς παραλλαγάς, οἷον ὑγίειαν νόσον, ὕπνον ἐγρήγορσιν, χαρὰν λύπην, νεότητα γῆρας, θάρσος φόβον, ἔνδειαν πλήρωσιν, μῖσος φιλίαν, θερμασίαν ψύξιν· παρὰ τὸ πνεῖν παρὰ τὸ πιεσθῆναι τοὺς πόρους. ἀλλοῖα οὖν φαίνεται τὰ προσπίπτοντα παρὰ τὰς ποιὰς διαθέσεις. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ μαινόμενοι παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνοι ἢ ἡμεῖς; καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὸν ἥλιον ὡς ἑστῶτα βλέπομεν. Θέων δ' ὁ Τιθοραιεὺς ὁ στωικὸς κοιμώμενος περιεπάτει ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ καὶ Περικλέους δοῦλος ἐπ' ἄκρου τοῦ τέγους.
83	Πέμπτος <ὁ> παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς ἐθνικὰς συνθήκας καὶ δογματικὰς ὑπο- λήψεις. ἐν τούτῳ περιέχεται τὰ περὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, περὶ ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν, περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῶν φαινομένων πάντων. τὸ γοῦν αὐτὸ παρ' οἷς μὲν δίκαιον, παρ' οἷς δὲ ἄδικον· καὶ ἄλλοις μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἄλλοις δὲ κακόν. Πέρσαι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον ἡγοῦνται θυγατρὶ μίγνυ- σθαι, Ἕλληνες δ' ἔκθεσμον. καὶ Μασσαγέται μέν, ὥς φησι καὶ Εὔδοξος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῆς Περιόδου (fg. 14 Brandes), κοινὰς ἔχουσι τὰς γυναῖκας, Ἕλληνες δ' οὔ· Κίλικές τε λῃστείαις
84	ἔχαιρον, ἀλλ' οὐχ Ἕλληνες. θεούς τ' ἄλλοι ἄλλους ἡγοῦνται· καὶ οἱ μὲν προνοεῖσθαι, οἱ δ' οὔ. θάπτουσι δ' Αἰγύπτιοι μὲν ταρι- χεύοντες, Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ καίοντες, Παίονες δ' εἰς λίμνας ῥι- πτοῦντες· ὅθεν περὶ τἀληθοῦς ἡ ἐποχή. Ἕκτος ὁ παρὰ τὰς μίξεις καὶ κοινωνίας, καθ' ὃν εἰλικρινῶς οὐδὲν καθ' αὑτὸ φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ σὺν ἀέρι, σὺν φωτί, σὺν ὑγρῷ, σὺν στερεῷ, θερμότητι, ψυχρότητι, κινήσει, ἀναθυμιάσεσιν, ἄλλαις δυνάμεσιν. ἡ γοῦν πορφύρα διάφορον ὑποφαίνει χρῶμα ἐν ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ λύχνῳ. καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον χρῶμα ἀλλοῖον ὑπὸ τῇ
85	μεσημβρίᾳ φαίνεται καὶ <ὅτε> ὁ ἥλιος <δύνει>· καὶ ὁ ἐν ἀέρι ὑπὸ δυοῖν κουφιζόμενος λίθος ἐν ὕδατι ῥᾳδίως μετατίθεται, ἤτοι βαρὺς ὢν καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος κουφιζόμενος ἢ ἐλαφρὸς [ὢν] καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος βαρυνόμενος. ἀγνοοῦμεν οὖν τὸ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὡς ἔλαιον ἐν μύρῳ. Ἕβδομος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀποστάσεις καὶ ποιὰς θέσεις καὶ τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς τόποις. κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι μεγάλα μικρὰ φαίνεται, τὰ τετράγωνα στρογγύλα, τὰ ὁμαλὰ ἐξοχὰς ἔχοντα, τὰ ὀρθὰ κεκλασμένα, τὰ ὠχρὰ ἑτερόχροα. ὁ γοῦν ἥλιος παρὰ τὸ διάστημα μικρὸς φαίνεται· καὶ τὰ ὄρη
86	πόρρωθεν ἀεροειδῆ καὶ λεῖα, ἐγγύθεν δὲ τραχέα. ἔτι ὁ ἥλιος ἀνίσχων μὲν ἀλλοῖος, μεσουρανῶν δ' οὐχ ὅμοιος. καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα ἐν μὲν ἄλσει ἀλλοῖον, ἐν δὲ ψιλῇ γῇ ἕτερον· καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν παρὰ τὴν ποιὰν θέσιν, ὅ τε τῆς περιστερᾶς τράχηλος παρὰ τὴν στροφήν. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐκ ἔνι ἔξω τόπων καὶ θέσεων ταῦτα κατα- νοῆσαι, ἀγνοεῖται ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν. Ὄγδοος ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας αὐτῶν ἢ θερμότητας ἢ ψυχρό- τητας ἢ ταχύτητας ἢ βραδύτητας ἢ ὠχρότητας ἢ ἑτεροχροιότητας. ὁ γοῦν οἶνος μέτριος μὲν ληφθεὶς ῥώννυσι, πλείων δὲ παρίησιν· ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ τροφὴ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.
87	Ἔνατος ὁ παρὰ τὸ ἐνδελεχὲς ἢ ξένον ἢ σπάνιον. οἱ γοῦν σεισμοὶ παρ' οἷς συνεχῶς ἀποτελοῦνται οὐ θαυμάζονται, οὐδ' ὁ ἥλιος, ὅτι καθ' ἡμέραν ὁρᾶται. τὸν ἐνατὸν Φαβωρῖνος (FHG iii. 583) ὄγδοον, Σέξτος δὲ καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος δέκατον· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν δέκατον Σέξτος ὄγδοόν φησι, Φαβωρῖνος δὲ ἔνατον. Δέκατος ὁ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλλα σύμβλησιν, καθάπερ τὸ κοῦφον παρὰ τὸ βαρύ, τὸ ἰσχυρὸν παρὰ τὸ ἀσθενές, τὸ μεῖζον παρὰ τὸ ἔλαττον, τὸ ἄνω παρὰ τὸ κάτω. τὸ γοῦν δεξιὸν φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστι δεξιόν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον σχέσιν
88	νοεῖται· μετατεθέντος γοῦν ἐκείνου, οὐκέτ' ἔσται δεξιόν. ὁμοίως καὶ πατὴρ καὶ ἀδελφὸς ὡς πρός τι καὶ ἡμέρα ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ πάντα ὡς πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν. ἄγνωστα οὖν τὰ πρός τι [ὡς] καθ' ἑαυτά. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ δέκα τρόποι. Οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἀγρίππαν τούτοις ἄλλους πέντε προσεισάγουσι, τόν τ' ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας καὶ τὸν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλοντα καὶ τὸν πρός τι καὶ τὸν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας ὃ ἂν προτεθῇ ζήτημα παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἢ τῇ συνηθείᾳ, πλείστης μάχης καὶ ταραχῆς πλῆρες ἀποδεικνύει· ὁ δ' εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλων οὐκ ἐᾷ βεβαιοῦσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον, διὰ τὸ ἄλλο ἀπ' ἄλλου τὴν πίστιν λαμβάνειν καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον.
89	ὁ δὲ πρός τι οὐδέν φησι καθ' ἑαυτὸ λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἑτέρου. ὅθεν ἄγνωστα εἶναι. ὁ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τρόπος συνίσταται, οἰομένων τινῶν τὰ πρῶτα τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτόθεν δεῖν λαμβά- νειν ὡς πιστὰ καὶ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι· ὅ ἐστι μάταιον· τὸ ἐναντίον γάρ τις ὑποθήσεται. ὁ δὲ δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπος συνίσταται ὅταν τὸ ὀφεῖλον τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος εἶναι βεβαιωτικὸν χρείαν ἔχῃ τῆς ἐκ τοῦ ζητουμένου πίστεως, οἷον εἰ τὸ εἶναι πόρους τις βεβαιῶν διὰ τὸ ἀπορροίας γίνεσθαι, αὐτὸ τοῦτο παραλαμβάνοι πρὸς βεβαίωσιν το<ῦ> ἀπορροίας γίνεσθαι.
90	Ἀνῄρουν δ' οὗτοι καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ κριτήριον καὶ σημεῖον καὶ αἴτιον καὶ κίνησιν καὶ μάθησιν καὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ φύσει τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀπόδειξις, φασίν, ἢ ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένων σύγκειται χρημάτων ἢ ἐξ ἀναποδείκτων. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀποδεδειγμένων, κἀκεῖνα δεήσεταί τινος ἀποδείξεως κἀντεῦθεν εἰς ἄπειρον· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀναποδείκτων, ἤτοι πάντων ἢ τινῶν ἢ καὶ ἑνὸς μόνου δισταζομένου, καὶ τὸ ὅλον εἶναι ἀναπό- δεικτον. εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ, φασίν, ὑπάρχειν τινὰ μηδεμιᾶς ἀποδείξεως δεόμενα, θαυμαστοὶ τῆς γνώμης, εἰ μὴ συνιᾶσιν ὅτι εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πρῶτον, ὡς ἄρ' ἐξ αὑτῶν ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, ἀποδείξεως χρή.
91	οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ τέτταρα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ τοῦ τέτταρα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα βεβαιωτέον. πρὸς τῷ, καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀποδείξεων ἀπιστουμένων ἄπιστον εἶναι καὶ τὴν γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν. ἵνα τε γνῶμεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, κριτηρίου δεῖ· καὶ ὅτι ἔστι κριτήριον, ἀποδείξεως δεῖ· ὅθεν ἑκάτερα ἀκατάληπτα ἀναπεμπόμενα ἐπ' ἄλληλα. πῶς ἂν οὖν καταλαμβάνοιτο τὰ ἄδηλα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀγνοουμένης; ζητεῖται δ' οὐκ εἰ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' εἰ καθ' ὑπόστασιν οὕτως ἔχει. Εὐήθεις δὲ τοὺς δογματικοὺς ἀπέφαινον. τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ὑπο- θέσεως περαινόμενον οὐ σκέψεως ἀλλὰ θέσεως ἔχει λόγον. τοιούτῳ
92	δὲ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀδυνάτων ἔστιν ἐπιχειρεῖν. τοὺς δ' οἰομένους μὴ δεῖν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ περίστασιν κρίνειν τἀληθὲς μηδ' ἐκ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν νομοθετεῖν, ἔλεγον αὐτοὺς μέτρα τῶν πάντων ὁρίζειν, οὐχ ὁρῶντας ὅτι πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον κατ' ἀντιπερίστασιν καὶ διάθεσιν φαίνεται. ἤτοι γοῦν πάντ' ἀληθῆ ῥητέον ἢ πάντα ψευδῆ. εἰ δ' ἔνιά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, τίνι διακριτέον; οὔτε γὰρ αἰσθήσει τὰ κατ' αἴσθησιν πάντων ἴσων αὐτῇ φαινομένων, οὔτε νοήσει διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἄλλη δὲ παρὰ ταύτας εἰς ἐπίκρισιν δύναμις οὐχ ὁρᾶται. ὁ οὖν, φασί, περί τινος διαβεβαιούμενος αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ πρότερον ὀφείλει τὰς περὶ τούτου δόξας καταστῆσαι· οἱ
93	μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ ταῦτα ἀνῃρήκασι. δεῖ δ' ἢ δι' αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ κριθῆναι, ἑκάτερα δὲ ἀμφισβητεῖται. οὐ τοίνυν δυνατὸν τὰς περὶ αἰσθητῶν ἢ νοητῶν ἐπικρῖναι δόξας· εἴ τε διὰ τὴν ἐν ταῖς νοήσεσι μάχην ἀπιστητέον πᾶσιν, ἀναιρεθήσεται τὸ μέτρον ᾧ δοκεῖ τὰ πάντα διακριβοῦσθαι· πᾶν οὖν ἴσον ἡγήσονται. ἔτι, φασίν, ὁ συζητῶν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον πιστός ἐστιν ἢ οὔ. εἰ μὲν οὖν πιστός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἕξει λέγειν πρὸς τὸν ᾧ φαίνεται τοὐναντίον· ὡς γὰρ αὐτὸς πιστός ἐστι τὸ φαινόμενον λέγων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἐναντίος· εἰ δ' ἄπιστος, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπιστηθήσεται τὸ φαινόμενον λέγων.
94	Τό τε πεῖθον οὐχ ὑποληπτέον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ πείθειν οὐδὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχές. γίνεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἡ πιθανότης, παρὰ τὸ ἔνδοξον τοῦ λέγοντος ἢ παρὰ τὸ φροντιστικὸν ἢ παρὰ τὸ αἱμύλον ἢ παρὰ τὸ σύνηθες ἢ παρὰ τὸ κεχαρισμένον. Ἀνῄρουν δὲ καὶ τὸ κριτήριον λόγῳ τοιῷδε. ἤτοι κέκριται καὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἢ ἄκριτόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄκριτόν ἐστιν, ἄπιστον καθέστηκε καὶ διημάρτηκε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους· εἰ δὲ κέκριται, ἓν τῶν κατὰ μέρος γενήσεται κρινομένων, ὥστ' ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κρίνειν καὶ κρίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ κεκρικὸς τὸ κριτήριον ὑφ'
95	ἑτέρου κριθήσεται κἀκεῖνο ὑπ' ἄλλου καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. πρὸς τῷ καὶ διαφωνεῖσθαι τὸ κριτήριον, τῶν μὲν τὸν ἄνθρωπον κριτή- ριον εἶναι λεγόντων, τῶν δὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἄλλων τὸν λόγον, ἐνίων τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν διαφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῶν διαφόρων νόμων καὶ ἐθῶν. αἱ δ' αἰσθήσεις ψεύδονται, ὁ δὲ λόγος διάφωνος. ἡ δὲ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ὑπὸ νοῦ κρίνεται καὶ ὁ νοῦς ποικίλως τρέπεται. ἄγνωστον οὖν ἐστι τὸ κριτήριον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀλήθεια.
96	Σημεῖόν τε οὐκ εἶναι· εἰ γάρ ἐστι, φασί, σημεῖον, ἤτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν· αἰσθητὸν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν κοινόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ἴδιον. καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν <τῶν> κατὰ διαφοράν, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον τῶν πρός τι. νοητὸν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἤτοι φαινόμενόν ἐστι φαινομένου ἢ ἀφανὲς ἀφανοῦς ἢ ἀφανὲς φαινομένου ἢ φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρ' ἐστὶ σημεῖον. φαινόμενον μὲν οὖν φαινομένου οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ τὸ φαινόμενον οὐ δεῖται σημείου· ἀφανὲς δ' ἀφανοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον ὑπό τινος·
97	ἀφανὲς δὲ φαινομένου οὐ δύναται, καθότι δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τὸ ἑτέρῳ παρέξον ἀφορμὴν καταλήψεως· φαινόμενον δ' ἀφανοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅτι τὸ σημεῖον τῶν πρός τι ὂν συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι ὀφείλει τῷ οὗ ἐστι σημεῖον, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀδήλων ἂν καταλαμβάνοιτο· διὰ γὰρ τῶν σημείων λέγεται τὰ ἄδηλα κατα- λαμβάνεσθαι. Ἀναιροῦσι δὲ τὸ αἴτιον ὧδε· τὸ αἴτιον τῶν πρός τι ἔστι· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ αἰτιατόν ἐστι· τὰ δὲ πρός τι ἐπινοεῖται μόνον, ὑπάρχει
98	δ' οὔ· καὶ τὸ αἴτιον οὖν ἐπινοοῖτο ἂν μόνον, ἐπεὶ εἴπερ ἐστὶν αἴτιον, ὀφείλει ἔχειν τὸ οὗ λέγεται αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔσται αἴτιον. καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ πατήρ, μὴ παρόντος τοῦ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται πατήρ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πατήρ, οὑτωσὶ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον· οὐ πάρεστι δὲ πρὸς ὃ νοεῖται τὸ αἴτιον· οὔτε γὰρ γένεσις οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτ' ἄλλο τι· οὐκ ἄρ' ἐστὶν αἴτιον. καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστιν αἴτιον, ἤτοι σῶμα σώματός ἐστιν αἴτιον ἢ ἀσώματον ἀσωμάτου· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων· οὐκ ἄρ' ἐστὶν αἴτιον. σῶμα μὲν οὖν σώματος οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον, ἐπείπερ ἀμφότερα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν. καὶ εἰ τὸ ἕτερον αἴτιον λέγεται παρ' ὅσον ἐστὶ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν σῶμα ὂν αἴτιον γενήσεται.
99	κοινῶς δ' ἀμφοτέρων αἰτίων ὄντων, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ πάσχον. ἀσώματον δ' ἀσωμάτου οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· ἀσώματον δὲ σώματος οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἀσώματον ποιεῖ σῶμα. σῶμα δ' ἀσωμάτου οὐκ ἂν εἴη αἴτιον, ὅτι τὸ γενό- μενον τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης ὀφείλει εἶναι· μηδὲν δὲ πάσχον διὰ τὸ ἀσώματον εἶναι οὐδ' ἂν ὑπό τινος γένοιτο· οὐκ ἔστι τοίνυν αἴτιον. ᾧ συνεισάγεται τὸ ἀνυποστάτους εἶναι τὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχάς· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ δρῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν· καὶ ἐν ᾧ μέν ἐστι τόπῳ οὐ κινεῖται, ἐν ᾧ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ κινεῖται· οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν κίνησις.
100	Ἀνῄρουν δὲ καὶ μάθησιν. εἴπερ, φασί, διδάσκεταί τι, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν τῷ εἶναι διδάσκεται ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ μὴ εἶναι. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὂν τῷ εἶναι διδάσκεται-ἡ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων φύσις πᾶσι φαίνεται καὶ γινώσκεται-οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὂν τῷ μὴ ὄντι· τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὄντι οὐδὲν συμβέβηκεν, ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸ διδάσκεσθαι. Οὐδὲ μὴν γένεσίς ἐστι, φασίν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν γίνεται, ἔστι γάρ, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑφέστηκε· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὑφεστὼς μηδ' ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι εὐτύχηκε.
101	Φύσει τε μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· εἰ γάρ τί ἐστι φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, πᾶσιν ὀφείλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν, ὥσπερ ἡ χιὼν πᾶσι ψυχρόν· κοινὸν δ' οὐδὲν πάντων ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν ἐστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὑπό τινος δοξαζόμενον ῥητέον ἀγαθὸν ἢ οὐ πᾶν· καὶ πᾶν μὲν οὐ ῥητέον, ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑφ' οὗ μὲν δοξάζεται ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἡ ἡδονὴ ὑπὸ Ἐπικούρου, ὑφ' οὗ δὲ κακόν, ὑπ' Ἀντισθένους. συμβήσεται τοίνυν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν τ' εἶναι καὶ κακόν. εἰ δ' οὐ πᾶν λέγομεν τὸ ὑπό τινος δοξαζόμενον ἀγαθόν, δεήσει ἡμᾶς διακρίνειν τὰς δόξας· ὅπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστι διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν τῶν λόγων. ἄγνωστον οὖν τὸ φύσει ἀγαθόν.
102	Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸν ὅλον τῆς συναγωγῆς αὐτῶν τρόπον συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀπολειφθεισῶν συντάξεων. αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ὁ Πύρρων οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπεν, οἱ μέντοι συνήθεις αὐτοῦ Τίμων καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος καὶ Νουμήνιος καὶ Ναυσιφάνης καὶ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι. Οἷς ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ δογματικοί φασιν αὐτοὺς καταλαμβάνε- σθαι καὶ δογματίζειν· ἐν ᾧ γὰρ δοκοῦσι διελέγχειν καταλαμβάνον- ται· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κρατύνουσι καὶ δογματίζουσι. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε φασὶ μηδὲν ὁρίζειν καὶ παντὶ λόγῳ λόγον ἀντικεῖσθαι, αὐτὰ
103	ταῦτα καὶ ὁρίζονται καὶ δογματίζουσι. πρὸς οὓς ἀποκρίνονται, Περὶ μὲν ὧν ὡς ἄνθρωποι πάσχομεν, ὁμολογοῦμεν· καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι ζῶμεν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ φαινο- μένων διαγινώσκομεν· περὶ δ' ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ διαβεβαιοῦνται τῷ λόγῳ, φάμενοι κατειλῆφθαι, περὶ τούτων ἐπέχομεν ὡς ἀδήλων, μόνα δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ὁρῶμεν ὁμολογοῦ- μεν καὶ τὸ ὅτι τόδε νοοῦμεν γινώσκομεν, πῶς δ' ὁρῶμεν ἢ πῶς νοοῦμεν ἀγνοοῦμεν· καὶ ὅτι τόδε λευκὸν φαίνεται διηγηματικῶς
104	λέγομεν, οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι εἰ καὶ ὄντως ἐστί. περὶ δὲ τῆς Οὐδὲν ὁρίζω φωνῆς καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων λέγομεν ὡς οὐ δογμάτων· οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ὅμοια τῷ λέγειν ὅτι σφαιροειδής ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἄδηλον, αἱ δ' ἐξομολογήσεις εἰσί [τὸ μὲν ἄδηλον]. ἐν ᾧ οὖν λέγομεν μηδὲν ὁρίζειν, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὁρίζομεν. Πάλιν οἱ δογματικοί φασιν καὶ τὸν βίον αὐτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντ' ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐξ ὧν ὁ βίος συνέστηκεν. οἱ δὲ ψεύδεσθαί φασιν αὐτούς· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὁρᾶν ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πῶς ὁρᾶν ἀγνοεῖν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον τιθέμεθα, οὐχ ὡς καὶ τοιοῦτον ὄν. καὶ ὅτι τὸ πῦρ καίει αἰσθανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικὴν ἐπέχο-
105	μεν. καὶ ὅτι κινεῖταί τις βλέπομεν, καὶ ὅτι φθείρεται· πῶς δὲ ταῦτα γίνεται οὐκ ἴσμεν. μόνον οὖν, φασίν, ἀνθιστάμεθα πρὸς τὰ παρυφιστάμενα τοῖς φαινομένοις ἄδηλα. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε τὴν εἰκόνα ἐξοχὰς λέγομεν ἔχειν, τὸ φαινόμενον διασαφοῦμεν· ὅταν δ' εἴπω- μεν μὴ ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐξοχάς, οὐκέτι ὃ φαίνεται ἕτερον δὲ λέγομεν· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί (PPF 9 B 81) φησι μὴ ἐκβεβη- κέναι τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἰνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει (PPF 9 B 69), ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντῃ σθένει οὗπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ αἰσθήσεών (PPF 9 B 74) φησι, "τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι, τὸ δ' ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ."
106	Καὶ Αἰνεσίδημος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Πυρρωνείων λόγων οὐδέν φησιν ὁρίζειν τὸν Πύρρωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν. ταὐτὰ δὲ λέγει κἀν τῷ Κατὰ σοφίας κἀν τῷ Περὶ ζητήσεως. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ζεῦξις ὁ Αἰνεσιδήμου γνώριμος ἐν τῷ Περὶ διττῶν λόγων (fg. 281 Deichgra+ber) καὶ Ἀντίοχος ὁ Λαοδικεὺς καὶ Ἀπελλᾶς ἐν τῷ Ἀγρίππᾳ τιθέασι τὰ φαινόμενα μόνα. ἔστιν οὖν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς καὶ Αἰνεσίδημός φησιν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος. Δημόκριτος
107	δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων, τὰ δὲ μὴ εἶναι. πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον τῶν φαινομένων οἱ δογματικοί φασιν ὅτι ὅτ' ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν διάφοροι προσπίπτουσι φαντασίαι, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ πύργου ἢ στρογγύλου ἢ τετραγώνου, ὁ σκεπτικὸς εἰ μὲν οὐδετέραν προ- κρινεῖ, ἀπρακτήσει· εἰ δὲ τῇ ἑτέρᾳ κατακολουθήσει, οὐκέτι τὸ ἰσοσθενές, φασί, τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀποδώσει. πρὸς οὓς οἱ σκεπτι- κοί φασιν ὅτι ὅτε προσπίπτουσιν ἀλλοῖαι φαντασίαι, ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν φαίνεσθαι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ φαινόμενα τιθέναι ὅτι φαίνεται. τέλος δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοί φασι τὴν ἐποχήν, ᾗ σκιᾶς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία, ὥς φασιν οἵ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ
108	Αἰνεσίδημον. οὔτε γὰρ τάδε ἑλούμεθα ἢ ταῦτα φευξόμεθα ὅσα περὶ ἡμᾶς ἐστι· τὰ δ' ὅσα μή ἐστι περὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην, οὐ δυνάμεθα φεύγειν, ὡς τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν καὶ ἀλγεῖν· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ λόγῳ περιελεῖν ταῦτα. λεγόντων δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν ὡς δυνήσεται βιοῦν ὁ σκεπτικὸς μὴ φεύγων τό, εἰ κελευσθείη, κρεουργεῖν τὸν πατέρα, φασὶν οἱ σκεπτικοὶ περὶ τῶν δογματικῶν ὡς δυνήσεται βιοῦν ζητήσεων ἀπέχων, οὐ περὶ τῶν βιωτικῶν καὶ τηρητικῶν· ὥστε καὶ αἱρούμεθά τι κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν καὶ φεύγομεν καὶ νόμοις χρώμεθα. τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπάθειαν ἄλλοι δὲ τὴν πραότητα τέλος εἰπεῖν φασι τοὺς σκεπτικούς.