Implicatures of Pyrrhonism

Speranza

As for Pyrrho, it may do to review Diogenes's Life,  with special emphasis
on how 'sceptic' applies to him and his  theses.

Diogenes expands on different people he would define as  'sceptic'. When
first describing Pyrrho, Diogenes does not use that  word:

Pyrrho, Diogenes says, "adopt[ed] a most noble philosophy, to  quote
Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension  of  judgement."

"[Pyrrho] denied that anything was honourable or  dishonourable, just or
unjust."

"And so, universally, [Pyrrho]  held that there is nothing really existent,
but custom and convention  govern human action; for no single thing is in
itself any more this than  that."

PIRRONE, as the Italians spell his name, Diogenes goes on, "led a  life
consistent with this doctrine, going out of his way for nothing,  taking no
precaution, but facing all risks as they came, whether carts,  precipices, dogs
or what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the  arbitrament of the
senses."

"But [Pyrrho] was kept out of harm's way by his friends who, as  Antigonus
of Carystus  tells us, used to follow close after him."

"But Aenesidemus says that it was only his philosophy that was based  upon
suspension of judgement,
and that he did not lack foresight in his  everyday acts. He lived to be
nearly ninety."

So there seems to be little  self-refuting about THAT.

When does Diogenes first use 'sceptic'? Answer:  Later on, in the same
chapter on PIRRONE, though.

PIRRONE's  followers, Diogenes says, "were called Pyrrhoneans"

but also 

"Sceptics" [σκεπτικοὶ]

"or inquirers because they were always  looking for a solution and never
finding one".

"σκεπτικὴ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ  σκέπτεσθαι ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε
εὑρίσκειν"

And why Diogenes may not say it, I  think it's fair that it was sceptics
themselves (like PIRRONE) who call  *themselves* sceptics.

So the etymological point is that a sceptic is  thus called because he is
an inquirer: always looking for a solution and never  finding one.

Where else does Diogenes uses 'sceptic'. In connection  with  TEODOSIO,
who, Diogenes says,

"in his Sceptic Chapters denies  that Scepticism should be called
Pyrrhonism."

Teodosio's  reason:

"If the movement of the mind in either direction is unattainable  by  us,
we shall never know for certain what Pyrrho really intended, and  without
knowing that, we cannot be called Pyrrhoneans."

"Besides  this (TEODOSIO says), there is the fact that Pyrrho was not the
founder of  Scepticism; nor had he any positive tenet; but a Pyrrhonean is
one who in  manners and life resembles Pyrrho."

OK. So Pirrone is out of the  question, Diogenes waxes poetic:

"Some call Homer the founder of the  Sceptic school."

"For to the same questions OMERO more than anyone else  is always giving
different answers at different times, and is never  definite or dogmatic 
about the answer."

And if you're not feeling  too epic, there's the SEVEN wise men, who
Diogenes would have as the Seven  Sceptics:

"The maxims of the Seven Wise Men, too, they call  sceptical."

This is an interesting use: 'sceptic' applies to the MAXIM,  rather than to
the MAN.

"For instance, "Observe the Golden Mean," and "A  pledge is a curse at
one's elbow," meaning that whoever plights his troth  steadfastly and trustfully
brings  a curse on his own  head."

"Sceptically minded, again, were Archilochus and  Euripides."

Here 'sceptic' is, as I prefer, an adverb, and applied, in  Diogenes's
case, to mind. Archilochous and Euripides were thus 'sceptically  minded'.

Archilochus says:

Man's soul, O Glaucus, son of  Leptines,
Is but as one short day that  Zeus sends down.

And  Euripides says:

Great God! how can they say poor mortal men
Have minds  and think? Hang  we not on thy will?
Do we not what it pleaseth thee to  wish?

--- utterances that Diogenes finds as coming from the  sceptically  minded.

"Furthermore, they find Xenophanes, Zeno of  Elea, and Democritus to be
sceptics."

"Xenophanes because he says,  Clear truth hath no man seen nor e'er shall
know."

Zenone "because  he would destroy motion, saying,

"A moving body moves neither where it  is nor where it is not"".

Democrito "because he rejects qualities,  saying, "Opinion says hot or
cold, but the reality is atoms and empty space,"  and  again, "Of a truth we
know nothing, for truth is in a  well.""

"The Sceptics, then, were constantly engaged in overthrowing the  dogmas of
all schools, but enuntiated none themselves."

I enjoyed  Diogenes's use of the past. As Harnish notes, the use of the
past  implicates a negation of the past: "I used to live in  Colorado"
(implicature cancelled: "In fact, I still do"). Since I would be  more than ready 
to cancel Diogenes's 'historical' implicature!

"And  though [the sceptics] would go so far as to bring forward and expound
the  dogmas of the others, they themselves laid down nothing definitely,
not  even the laying down of nothing."

This contrasts with Popper, who, speaks of a conjecture which is  itself conjectural, thus introducing a
distinction between object-language and  meta-language -- And cfr. Is Pyrrhonism self-refuting or irrefutable? 

Diogenes goes on:

"So much so that they even refuted their laying  down of nothing, saying,
for instance, "We determine nothing," since  otherwise they would have been
betrayed into determining; but we put  forward, say they, all the theories
for the purpose of indicating our  unprecipitate attitude, precisely as we
might have  done if we had actually  assented to them."

"Thus by the expression "We determine nothing" is  indicated their state of
even balance; which is similarly indicated by the  other expressions, "Not
more  (one thing than another)."

""Every  saying has its corresponding opposite," and the like."

"But "Not more  (one thing than another)" can also be taken positively,
indicating that two things are alike; for example, "The pirate is no more
wicked  than the  liar.""

"But the Sceptics meant it not positively but  negatively,  as when, in
refuting an argument, one says, "Neither had more  existence,  Scylla or the
Chimaera.""

"And "More so" itself is sometimes comparative,  as when we say that "Honey
is more sweet than grapes"; sometimes both  positive and negative, as when
we  say, "Virtue profits more than it  harms," for in this phrase we
indicate that  virtue profits and does not  harm."

"But the Sceptics even refute the statement "Not more (one thing  than
another).""

"For, as forethought is no more existent than  non-existent,  so "Not more
(one thing than another)" is no more existent  than not."

"Thus, as Timon says in the Pytho, the statement means just  absence of all
determination and withholding of assent."

"The other  statement, "Every saying, etc.," equally compels suspension  of
judgement."

"When facts disagree, but the contradictory  statements have exactly the
same weight, ignorance of the truth is the  necessary consequence."

"But even this statement has its corresponding  antithesis, so that after
destroying others it turns round and destroys  itself, like a purge which
drives  the substance out and then in its turn  is itself eliminated and 
destroyed."

Diogenes speaks of the  contradictions of the sceptics, which  may relate
to the point about  self-refutation.

Diogenes seems to defend the sceptic. He  writes:

"As to the CONTRADICTIONS in their [the sceptics's] doubts, they  would
first show the ways in which things gain credence, and then by the  same
methods they would destroy belief in them; for they say those things gain 
credence which  either the senses are agreed upon or which never or at  least
rarely change, as  well as things which become habitual or are  determined by law
and those which  please or excite wonder."

"They  showed, then, on the basis of that which is contrary to what 
induces  belief, that the probabilities on both sides are equal."

Diogenes then  goes to explain the ten modes "in which the subjects in
question appeared  to vary".

As if these were not enough, Diogenes has to bring Agrippa  in:

"But Agrippa and his school add to them five other modes,  resulting
respectively from disagreement, extension ad infinitum,  relativity, hypothesis
and reciprocal inference."

"The mode arising  from disagreement proves, with regard to any inquiry
whether in philosophy  or in everyday life, that it is full of the utmost
contentiousness and  confusion."

"The mode which involves extension ad infinitum refuses to  admit that what
is sought to be proved is firmly established, because one  thing furnishes
the ground for belief in another, and so on ad  infinitum."

"The mode derived from relativity declares that a thing can  never be
apprehended in and by itself, but only in connexion with something  else. Hence
all things are unknowable."

"The mode resulting from  hypothesis arises when people suppose that you
must take the most  elementary of things as of themselves entitled to
credence, instead of  postulating them: which is useless, because some one else will
adopt  the  contrary hypothesis."

"The mode arising from reciprocal inference is  found whenever that which
should be confirmatory of the thing requiring to  be proved itself has to
borrow  credit from the latter, as, for example, if  anyone seeking to
establish the  existence of pores on the ground that  emanations take place should
take this  (the existence of pores) as proof  that there are emanations."

After that,  Diogenes goes on to  characterise the sceptic.

The sceptics "would deny all
I.  demonstration,
II. criterion,
III. sign,
IV. cause,
V. motion, 
VI. the process of learning,
VII. coming into being, or that
VIII. there is anything good or bad by nature."

And he goes on  to expand on each topic.

Ad I: NO DEMONSTRATION:

"For all demonstration, say they, is constructed out of things either
already proved  or indemonstrable. If out of things already proved, those things
too will  require some demonstration, and so on ad infinitum; if out of
things   indemonstrable, then, whether all or some or only a single one of
the steps  are  the subject of doubt, the whole is indemonstrable. If you
think, they  add, that  there are some things which need no demonstration,
yours must be  a rare  intellect, not to see that you must first have
demonstration of the  very fact  that the things you refer to carry conviction in
themselves. Nor  must we prove  that the elements are four from the fact that
the elements  are four. Besides, if  we discredit particular demonstrations,
we cannot 
accept the generalization from  them. And in order that we may know  that
an argument constitutes a  demonstration, we require a criterion; but  again,
in order that we may know that  it is a criterion we require a 
demonstration; hence both the one and the other  are incomprehensible,  since each is
referred to the other. How then are we to  grasp the things  which are
uncertain, seeing that we know no demonstration? For  what we  wish to ascertain
is not whether things appear to be such and such, but   whether they are so
in their
essence."

Ad II: NO  CRITERION.

"They declared the dogmatic philosophers to be fools,  observing that  what
is concluded ex hypothesi is properly described not as  inquiry but
assumption, and by reasoning of this kind one may even argue  for  impossibilities.
As for those who think that we should not judge of  truth from  surrounding
circumstances or legislate on the basis of what is  found in nature, these
men, they used to say, made themselves the measure  of all things, and did 
not see that every phenomenon appears in a certain  disposition and in a
certain reciprocal relation to surrounding  circumstances. Therefore we must
affirm  either that all things are true or  that all things are false. For if
certain  things only are true [and others  are false], how are we to
distinguish them? Not  by the senses, where  things in the field of sense are in
question, since all these things appear to  sense to be on an equal footing;
nor by the mind, for the  same reason. Yet  apart from these faculties there
is no other, so far as we can  see, to  help us to a judgement. Whoever
therefore,
they say, would be firmly   assured about anything sensible or intelligible
must first establish the   received opinions about it; for some have
refuted one doctrine, others  another.  But things must be judged either by the
sensible or by the  intelligible, and  both are disputed. Therefore it is
impossible to  pronounce judgement on opinions  about sensibles or
intelligibles; and if  the conflict in our thoughts compels us  to disbelieve every one,
the  standard or measure, by which it is held that all  things are exactly 
determined, will be destroyed, and we must deem every  statement of equal 
value. Further, say they, our partner in an inquiry into a  phenomenon is 
either to be trusted or not. If he is, he will have nothing to  reply to  the
man to whom it appears to be the opposite; for just as our friend  who 
describes what appears to him is to be trusted, so is his opponent. If he  is 
not to be trusted, he will actually be disbelieved when he describes  what 
appears to him. We must not assume that what convinces us is actually  true.
For  the same thing does not convince every one, nor even the same  people
always. Persuasiveness sometimes depends on external circumstances,  on the
reputation of  the speaker, on his ability as a thinker or his  artfulness,
on the familiarity  or the pleasantness of the topic. Again,  they would
destroy the criterion by reasoning of this kind. Even the  criterion has either
been critically determined  or not. If it has not, it  is definitely
untrustworthy, and in its purpose of  distinguishing is no  more true than false.
If it has, it will belong to the  class of particular  judgements, so that
one and the same thing determines and is  determined,  and the criterion which
has determined will have to be determined by   another, that other by
another, and so on ad infinitum."

Ad II: NO  CRITERION:

"In addition to this there is disagreement as to the  criterion, some
holding that man is the criterion, while for some it is the  senses, for others
reason, for others the apprehensive presentation. Now  man disagrees with man
and with himself, as is shown by differences of laws  and customs. The
senses  deceive, and reason says different things.  Finally, the apprehensive
presentation is judged by the mind, and the mind  itself changes in various
ways.  Hence the criterion is unknowable, and  consequently truth also."

Ad III: NO SIGN.

The sceptics "deny,  too, that there is such a thing as  a sign. If there
is, they say, it must  either be sensible or intelligible. Now  it is not
sensible, because what  is sensible is a common attribute, whereas a  sign is a
particular  thing. Again, the sensible is one of the things which exist  by
way of  difference, while the sign belongs to the category of relative. Nor
is a  sign an object of thought, for objects of thought are of four kinds, 
apparent  judgements on things apparent, non-apparent judgements on  things
non-apparent,  non-apparent on apparent, or apparent on  non-apparent; and
a sign is none of  these, so that there is no such thing  as a sign. A sign
is not "apparent on  apparent," for what is apparent  needs no sign; nor is
it non-apparent on  non-apparent, for what is  revealed by something must
needs appear; nor is it  non-apparent on  apparent, for that which is to
afford the means of apprehending  something  else must itself be apparent; nor,
lastly, is it
apparent on   non-apparent, because the sign, being relative, must be
apprehended along  with  that of which it is the sign, which is not here the
case. It follows  that  nothing uncertain can be apprehended; for it is through
signs that  uncertain  things are said to be apprehended."

Ad IV: NO  CAUSE.

"Causes, too," the sceptics "destroy in this way. A  cause is  something
relative; for it is relative to what can be caused, namely,  the  effect. But
things which are relative are merely objects of thought and  have  no
substantial existence. Therefore a cause can only be an object  of 
thought; inasmuch as, if it be a cause, it must bring with it that of  which it  is
said to be the cause, otherwise it will not be a cause. Just  as a father,
in  the absence of that in relation to which he is called  father, will not
be a father, so too with a cause. But that in relation to  which the cause
is thought  of, namely the effect, is not present; for  there is no coming
into being or passing away or any other process: therefore  there is no such
thing as cause.  Furthermore, if there is a cause, either  bodies are the
cause of bodies, or  things incorporeal of things  incorporeal; but neither is
the case; therefore  there is no such thing as  cause. Body in fact could
not be the cause of body,  inasmuch as both have  the same nature. And if
either is called a cause in so far  as it is a  body, the other, being a body,
will become a cause. But if both be  alike  causes, there will be nothing to
be acted upon Nor
can an incorporeal   thing be the cause of an incorporeal thing, for the
same reason. And a  thing  incorporeal cannot be the cause of a body, since
nothing incorporeal  creates  anything corporeal. And, lastly, a body cannot
be the cause of  anything  incorporeal, because what is produced must be of
the material  operated upon; but  if it is not operated upon because it is
incorporeal,  it cannot be produced by  anything whatever. Therefore there is
no such  thing as a cause. A corollary to  this is their statement that the
first 
principles of the universe have no real  existence; for in that case 
something must have been there to create and act. 

Ad V: NO MOTION.

"Furthermore there is no motion; for that which moves moves either in the 
place  where it is or in a place
where it is not. But it cannot move in  the place where  it is, still less
in any place where it is not. Therefore  there is no such thing  as motion.

Ad VI: NO LEARNING.

The  sceptics "used also to deny the possibility of learning. If anything
is taught,  they say, either the existent is taught through its existence or
the   non-existent through its non-existence. But the existent is not taught

through  its existence, for the nature of existing things is apparent  to
and recognized  by all; nor is the non-existent taught through the 
nonexistent, for with the  non-existent nothing is ever done, so that it  cannot be
taught to anyone."

Ad VII: NO COMING INTO BEING.

"Nor,  say [the sceptics], is there any  coming into being. For that which
is does  not come into being, since it is; nor  yet that which is not, for
it has no  substantial existence, and that which is  neither substantial nor
existent  cannot have had the chance of coming into being  either."

Finally,  ad VIII: NO GOOD OR BAD.

"There is nothing good or bad by nature, for if  there is anything good or
bad by nature, it must be good or bad for all  persons alike, just as snow
is cold to all. But there is no good or bad which is  such to all persons in
common;  therefore there is no such thing as  good or bad by nature. For
either all that  is thought good by anyone  whatever must be called good, or
not all. Certainly  all cannot be so  called; since one and the same thing is
thought good by one  person and bad  by another; for instance, Epicurus
thought pleasure good and  Antisthenes  thought it bad; thus on our supposition
it will follow that the same  thing  is both good and bad. But if we say
that not all that anyone thinks good   is good, we shall have to judge the
different opinions; and this is  impossible  because of the equal validity of
opposing arguments. Therefore  the good by  nature is unknowable."

Diogenes dwells on the  dogmatists' reaction:

"The dogmatists answer them by declaring that the  Sceptics themselves  do
apprehend and dogmatize."

And would thus  self-contradict.

"for when they are thought to be refuting their hardest  they do apprehend,
for at the very same time they are asseverating and  dogmatizing."

"Thus even when they declare that they determine nothing,  and that to
every argument there is an opposite argument, they are actually  determining
these very  points and dogmatizing."

Diogenes is fair  enough to allow the sceptic to respond on this  issue:

"The  [sceptics] reply."

"We confess to human weaknesses; for we recognize  that it is day and that
we are alive, and many other apparent facts in life; but  with regard to the
things about which our opponents argue so positively,  claiming to have
definitely apprehended them, we suspend our judgement  because they are not
certain, and confine knowledge to our impressions. For  we admit that we see,
and  we recognize that we think this or that, but how  we see or how we
think we know  not. And we say in conversation that a  certain thing appears
white,
but we are  not positive that it really is  white. As to our 'We determine
nothing' and the  like, we use the  expressions in an undogmatic sense, for
they are not like the  assertion  that the world is spherical. Indeed the
latter statement is not  certain,  but the others are mere admissions. Thus in
saying 'We determine  nothing,'  we are not determining even that."

---- There is a second round here, as  reported by Diogene:

"Again, the dogmatic philosophers maintain that  the Sceptics do away with
life itself,  in that they reject all that life  consists in."

There may be a self-contradiction here between the  theoretical and the
practical.

"The [sceptics] say this is false,  for they do not deny that we see;  they
only say that they do not know how  we see. "We admit the apparent fact," 
say they, "without admitting that it  really is what it appears to be." We
also perceive that fire burns; as to  whether it is its nature to burn, we
suspend our  judgement. We see that a  man moves, and that he perishes; how it
happens we  do not know. We merely  object to accepting the unknown
substance behind  phenomena. When we say a  picture has projections, we are
describing what is  apparent; but if we say  that it has no projections, we are
then speaking, not of  what is apparent,  but of something else. This is what
makes Timon say in his Python that he  has not gone outside what is
customary. And again in the Conceits  he says:  But the apparent is omnipotent
wherever it goes; and in his work On  the  Senses, "I do not lay it down that
honey is sweet, but I admit that it   appears to be so.""

Diogenes goes on, and focuses on the possibility  of  contradition, or fear
of contradiction:

"Aenesidemus too in the  first book of his Pyrrhonean Discourses says that
Pyrrho determines nothing  dogmatically, because of the possibility of 
contradiction, but guides  himself by apparent facts."

"Aenesidemus says the same in his works  Against Wisdom and On  Inquiry."

"Furthermore Zeuxis, the friend of  Aenesidemus, in his work On Two-sided
Arguments, Antiochus of Laodicea, and  Apellas in his Agrippa all hold to
phenomena alone."

"Therefore the  apparent is the Sceptic's criterion, as indeed  Aenesidemus
says."

"And so does Epicurus. Democritus, however,  denied that any apparent fact
could be a criterion, indeed he denied the  very existence of the  apparent."

"Against this criterion of  appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge
that, when the same appearances  produce in us different impressions, e.g. a
round or  square tower, the  Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or
other, will  be unable to  take any course; if on the other hand, say they,
he follows either  view,  he is then no longer allowing equal value to all
apparent facts."

"The  Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they
must  both be said to appear; for things which are apparent are so called 
because  they appear."

"The end to be realized they hold to be  suspension of judgement, which
brings with it tranquillity like its shadow:  so Timon and Aenesidemus 
declare."

"For in matters which are for us  to decide we shall neither choose this
nor shrink from that; and things which  are not for us to decide but happen of
necessity, such as hunger, thirst  and pain, we cannot escape, for they are
not to be removed by force of  reason. And when the dogmatists argue that
he may thus  live in such a  frame of mind that he would not shrink from
killing and eating  his own  father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies
that he will be able so  to  live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it
is a question of  arriving  at the truth, but not in matters of life and
the taking of  precautions.  Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from
a thing by  habit and may  observe rules and customs. According to some
authorities the  end proposed by the  Sceptics is insensibility; according to
others,  gentleness."

For the record, the use of the verb 'inquire' to _label_ the  sceptics,
while now conventional, was possibly hyperbolic or figurative  back in the  day.

Autenrieth notes the verb, as used by Homer,  merely means "to take a  view"

σκέπτομαι , imp. σκέπτεο, aor.  ἐσκέψατο, part. σκεψάμενος
: take a view,  look about; ἐς, μετά τι, αἴ κεν,  at or after
something, -to see whether, etc.,  Il. 17.652; trans., look out  for, Il. 16.361.

-- while the first paraphrasis in Liddell/Scott, is "look about carefully, 
spy."

And as Etymology Online shows, it is cognate with 'scope':

http://etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=skeptic&searchmode
=none

"Greek "skeptikos" (plural Skeptikoi "the Skeptics, followers of Pyrrho"), 
noun use of adjective meaning "inquiring, reflective" (the name taken by
the  disciples of the Greek philosopher Pyrrho, who lived c.360-c.270 B.C.E.),
related to "skeptesthai", "to reflect, look, view," cognate with  English
"scope", from Italian "scopo", from Latin "scopus", from Greek  "skopos",
from metathesized form of Indo-European *"spek-yo-", from root  *"spek-", to
observe. Further cognates include Sanskrit "spasati", sees;  Avestan
"spasyeiti",  spies; Greek "skopein", behold, look, consider,"  Latin "specere", to
look at; Old High German "spehhon", to spy, and German  "spähen", to spy."