Speranza
The link
http://russell.mcmaster.ca/cpbr11p69.pdf
also points to Plato who
uses
"ho theos"
which I would translate, _literally_ as 'the
god''. In Latin, plain "deus"
should do, as per Pliny, cited below, in
connection with the Jupiter and
the thunderbolts).
Russell, and
Grice, were interested in logical variants for such locutions
as
"some" ("at least one") -- (Ex)
and
"the" (iota
operator, (ix))
And all this seems to be implicated by Russell's
ingenious question:
"E! God?"
(read "E shriek God?")
-- the
full utterance
“Yes. Before end Feb. E! God?”
which Edith Russell
notes was Russell's answer to Stanley Jackson, the
assistant editor of
"Illustrated", as to Jackson's question whether Russell
would contribute an
essay to the planned 'theological' series in that
magazine.
Now, as
Seidl notes, "God" may be correlated to what Grice (in the section
on
"Names and Descriptions" in Vacuous Names, repr. in the "Definite
Descriptions" compilation, MIT) and Evans ("Varieties of Reference") calls a
'dossier'
-- Grice uses "δ" -- the God [Jupiter?] strikes a
lightning, for example,
to use Seidl's illustration -- and Pliny's (N.H.,
on 'god', Book II, in the
first fragment cited below).
In a
conversation between A and B (say Dr. and Mrs. Hawking) there may (but
then
again there may not) be some overlap of some description that matches
their
use of
"God"
Mrs. Hawkings: "I'm C. of E.," says Mrs. Hawking.
And later in "The theory
of everything" [*NOW PLAYING*]
Mrs
Hawkings: "But this sentence of yours, "we shall understand the mind of
God"
-- grants his existence, doesn't it?"
(paraphrased).
Bertrand Russell: "Is there a God?" [1952] is published in The
Collected
Papers of Bertrand Russell, volume 11: Last Philosophical
Testament, 1943–
68.
The paper Russell hoped to see published in his lifetime, but
never did.
Seidl goes on:
"Russell notes the title of his paper as
(citation from the editor's
introduction)"
"E! God?"
"(“E!”,
which he read “E shriek”, was part of the notation for “unique
existence”
in Principia Mathematica (*14.02).)"
Indeed, with *14 starts the
discussion of _descriptions_, and 14.02
defining uniqueness as symbolised
by the iota operator, paraphrased by 'the'.
The existential
quantifier simpliciter is best rephrased by Grice as "some
(at least one)",
while something like the iota operator gets best
rephrased as "the". In
"Methods of Logic" (and elsewhere) Quine uses numerical
quantifiers that
relate "(12E) Apostles" -- there are twelve apostles.
(And it was via
Quine -- and Strawson's misreadings of Quine -- that got
Grice working on
this -- vide Strawson, "Introduction" to "Philosophical
Logic", Oxford
Readings in Philosophy, citing Quine and Grice).
The question, for
Russell (as motivated by the editor of "Illustrated" who
commissioned the
thing from him, but never cared to publish) is, then:
"Is there a
God?"
"E! God?"
The question PRESUPPOSES, implicates, or entails
that the proposition
behind it
E! God
if not given _true_ as
such (otherwise, what would the _point_ of the
question be) is what Russell
would call a "wff", a well-formed formula -- in
some semi-formal system,
and I see why it shouldn't. For Kant, perhaps it
shouldn't, since for him,
'existence' was NOT a predicate. Now Russell's
question, behind the
"E! God"
can be paraphrased not just as
"Is there a
God?"
but as
"Is there ONE God?"
with something like a
Quinean 'numerical quantifier' in mind, with the
proposition to prove
being, "There is ONE God". Monotheism, that is, and the
attending proof for
the existence of ONE god.
Russell, who wrote a History of Western
Philosophy, notes in that essay
that philosophical monotheism starts with
Plato (as opposed to religious
monotheism, which is a different
animal).
There are two references to Plato by Russell in "Is there a
God?".
The first as the originator of monotheism.
The second, as
the originator of a specific conception of God (or 'the
god', 'ho theos',
as Plato prefers) as not necessarily omnipotent, if my
reading of Russell
is correct.
The citation is not given by Russell, but by his editor. On
p. 768, a
reference is given to Plato's Timaeus 30a, which I
checked.
It reads: Plato:
"παρ᾽ ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα
ἀποδέχοιτ᾽ ἄν. βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι
κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ
κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας,
ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον. θέμις δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἦν οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν τῷ
ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ κάλλιστον."
Note first the use of "ho
theos" -- the God, versus "some" God (or other --
the Greeks had quite a few
-- a whole 'pan-theon'), "a God", and the more
correct "one
God".
Russell's first reference to Plato concerns Plato's philosophical
monotheism (as having predated Jewish monotheism, if I read Russell aright),
but no
specific citation is given.
This second reference, with the
citation provided by Russell's editor,
rather, expands a stronger argument
pursued by Plato, aimed, to use Russell's
wording, to a view that "the god"
("ho theos") is not omnipotent, but
merely
"doing his
best"
even
"in spite of great difficulties", to use Rusell's
colloquial idiom (which
pervades throughout the essay).
And Russell
brings in Plato just to prove that this idea is hardly "new in
the history
of thought", since Plato had held it some _time_ ago! Now, the
English
translation for Timaeus 30a, referred to by the editor of
Russell's "Is
there a God?" runs:
[30a] For God [Greek "ho theos"] desired that, so far
as possible, all
things should be good and nothing evil; wherefore, when He
took over all that
was visible, seeing that it was not in a state of rest
but in a state of
discordant and disorderly motion, He brought it into
order out of disorder,
deeming that the former state is in all ways better
than the latter. For Him
who is most good it neither was nor is permissible
to perform any action
save what is most fair. As He reflected, therefore,
He perceived that of such
creatures as are by nature visible...
A
more line-by-line rendition should go more or less like:
βουληθεὶς ------
desired
γὰρ -------------- thus
ὁ θεὸς ------------- God
ἀγαθὰ μὲν
πάντα ------ on the one hand, good all
φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι ----- on the
other hand, bad nothing be.
κατὰ δύναμιν οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν
παραλαβὼν οὐχ
ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς
καὶ ἀτάκτως εἰς
τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας
ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο τούτου πάντως ἄμεινον.
θέμις δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἦν
οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν τῷ ἀρίστῳ δρᾶν ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ
κάλλιστον.
"For God desired that, so far as possible,
all things
should be good and nothing evil.
Wherefore, when God took over all that was
visible,
seeing that it was NOT in a state of [perfect] *rest*
but in a
state of discordant and disorderly motion,
God brought it into
*order* [TAXIS]
out of _disorder_, deeming that the former state
[TAXIS] is in *all* ways
_better_ than the latter. For God, who is most
good, it neither was nor
is permissible to perform any action
save
what is most fair [KALLISTON, most beautiful].
For the record the
reference to Pliny uses 'deus' simpliciter (I use the
Loeb English
translation): "I deem it a mark of human weakness to seek to
discover the
shape and form of God." "others cheat in the very Capitol and
swear false
oaths by Jupiter who wields the thunderbolts" ["alii in Capitolio
fallunt
ac fulminantem periurant Iovem"]" (*).
Finally, the reference to
Whitehead's and Russell's Principia Mathematica,
given by the editor to
Russell's "Is there a God?", happens for the record
to have been selected
by
Wikipedia!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principia_Mathematica
✸14:
Descriptions:
"A description is
a phrase of the form
"the
term y which satisfies φŷ,"
where φŷ is some function satisfied by
ONE AND ONLY ONE
argument."
Wikipedia notes:
"[Whitehead's and Russell's] original typography [in Principia
Mathematica] employs an "x" with a circumflex rather than "ŷ". This
continues below.)
From this, Principia Mathematica" employs two new
symbols, a forward "E"
and an inverted iota "ɿ".
And it is this
more specific within *14 that the editor to Russell's "Is
there a God?"
gives:
"Here is an example", Wikipedia notes, which is precisely the
proposition
cited by the editor:
✸14.02. E ! ( ɿy) (φy) .=: ( Ǝb):φy
. ≡y . y = b Df.
This has the meaning:
"The y satisfying φŷ
exists."
which holds when, and ONLY when "φŷ" is satisfied by ONE value
of "y" and
by no other value."
(PM 1967 edition, pp. 173–174). And
which is given as a 'definition' in
terms of
"=".
* For the record, Pliny concludes
that section by providing HIS own
'dossier' for 'God' as it
were:
God = the power of Nature
deus = naturae
potentia
("God cannot cause twice ten not to be twenty, or do many things
on similar
lines: which facts unquestionably demonstrate the power of
NATURE" --
well, he is writing what he calls "Historia Naturalis" -- "and
proves that it
is THIS [the power of nature, "naturae potentia"] that we
mean by the word
'God'." [deus] "ut bis dena viginti non sint aut multa
similiter efficere
non posse: per quae declaratur haut dubie naturae
potentia, idque esse quod
deum vocemus.")
Further
references:
Grice, H. P. "Names and descriptions", a section of his "Vacuous
Names",
repr. in Ostertag, "Definite descriptions", MIT -- Grice remarks on
various
readings of (Ex) occurring in a previous section.
Grice, H. P.
"Aristotle on the multiplicity of being".
Grice, H. P. "Definite descriptions
in Russell and in the vernacular".
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
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