Grice and the history of analytic philosophy

Speranza

Re: The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy.

During the course of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy developed into the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world -- notably in Oxford!



In the last two decades, it has become increasingly influential in the rest of the world, from continental Europe to America -- especially since Grice started lecturing there -- early 1960s at Brandeis, late 1960s, at Harvard -- finally settling in Berkeley -- "The Berkeley School of Griceian Analysis" -- Grice, Myro, ...

At the same time there has been deepening interest in the origins and history of analytic philosophy, as analytic philosophers examine the foundations of their tradition and question many of the assumptions of their predecessors.

Grice had one favourite: KANTOTLE.

Of course he would often quote from Oxonian predecessors: John Cook Wilson, Hardie (his tutor), Price, Prichard, Bradley, Ryle, ...


This has led to greater historical self-consciousness among analytic philosophers and more scholarly work on the historical contexts in which analytic philosophy developed.


This historical turn in analytic philosophy has been gathering pace since the 1990s, and the present volume is the most comprehensive collection of essays to date on the history of analytic philosophy.

It contains state-of-the-art contributions from many of the leading scholars in the field, all of the contributions specially commissioned.

The introductory essays discuss the nature and historiography of analytic philosophy, accompanied by a detailed chronology and bibliography.

Part One elucidates the origins of analytic philosophy, with special emphasis on the work of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein.

Grice would have something to say on each:

Frege he was no fan of. Michael Wrigley, a Leeds philospher, Trinity-College (Oxon) educated, once approached Grice on this. Wrigley was going to write his PhD dissertation on Frege. "I will mainly base my research on Dummett's "Frege: Philosophy of Language". "Have you read it?", Wrigley impolitely asked Grice. "I haven't -- and I hope I won't". (Ask Wrigley for further evidence).

Russell Grice loved, and there is a mimeo that has been cited by various people, including G. P. Bealer, "Definite descriptions in Russell and in the vernacular", (c) Grice.

Moore was Grice's favourite philosopher. With Austin, he would say, "Some (people) like Witters, but Moore's MY man".

And of course Witters, Grice claimed, never thought the distinction between 'say' and 'mean' and 'imply' was IMPORTANT enough!

---- (Plus he hardly distinguished what a speaker means from what an expression does, which is Grice's main point).

Part Two explains the development of analytic philosophy, from Oxford realism and logical positivism to the most recent work in analytic philosophy, and includes essays on ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy as well as on the areas usually seen as central to analytic philosophy, such as philosophy of language and mind.

Grice is, of course, as the Berkeley catalogue read for years, a "PHILOSOPHER of language". In those days, specialty was good, so it would read: "Specialty: Philosophy of Language". Seriously, Grice was interested in modelling conversation as a co-operative enteprise, and he thought that a converastional implicature was what philosophers needed to clarify their vocabulary.

Part Three explores certain key themes in the history of analytic philosophy.

----

---- and Beaney is a genius, so this handbook couldn't have had a better editor.