For Griceness Sake

Speranza

We see that in "Notes for Categories with Strawson" (The H P Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, University of California, Berkeley), Grice plays with language.

He uses the examples of

"Socrates" as a proper name so-called, "nomen proprium"

and

"mercy" as an abstract name, so called.

The notes explore the difference in grammatical distribution, shall we say, between substantial nouns (like "Socrates") and non-substantial nouns (like "mercy"). The idioms suggest that 'mercy' can be both referred to and predicated, whereas 'Socrates' can only be referred to.

In Latin, the distribution is subtler.

In Greek, we need the article, say, "to agathon", bonum, the good.

The house is clean.
Domus pulchrum.
Cleanliness is good. Pulchrum bonum est.

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It would seem that, although both substantials and non-substantials can occupy subject position, substantials must be seen as the primary occupiers of the subject slot because they CANNOT occur as predicates.

But cfr. Snydd, "predicating proper names".

"He is no Socrates".

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Robbing Peter to Pay Paul.

Paul ---> Paulness
Peter ---> Peterness
Grice ---- Griceanity.

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To demonstrante this point, Grice goes on to distinguish between establishing existence by referring to, and by predicating expressions. (Recall that Searle's DPhil Oxon, under Strawson, was on "Reference and predication").

The distinction between establishing existence by referring to and by predicating expressions is established by means of a comparison between two short dialogues.

CONVERSATION I.

Conversation I is perfectly acceptable. Evidence is successfully offered for the EXISTENCE OF A UNIVERSAL ("Disinterestedness") by predicating it of a particular ("Banbury"):

A: Banbury is really disinterested.
B: Disinterested people do not exist; real disinterestedness does not exist.
A: Yes, they do. Yes, it does. Bunbury is really didisinterested.

In second-order predicate calculus:

(F)GF

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CONVERSATION II.

In contrast, descriptive statements do not guarantee the existence of their subjects, but rather stand in a "special relation" (expression Grice's) to statements of existence.

This "special relation" is, Grice and Strawson note, elsewhere called 'presupposition'. It seems that at this stage, at least, Grice is prepared to endorse Strawson's response to Russell. The following conversation is thus 'NOT LINGUISTICALLY IN ORDER' (expression Grice's):

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.
B: There is no such person as Bunbury.
A: Yes, there is. He is really disinterested.

Producing a sentence in which something ('disinterested') is predicated of a substantial subject ('Bunbury') is NOT enough to guarantee the existence of that subject.

Grice and Strawson note at this point that the situation would be quite different if 'in the next room' were substituted into A's response.

A: Bunbury is really disinterested.
B: There is no such person as Bunbury.
A: Yes, there is. He is in the next room.

Here, A's choice of predicate ("in the next room") does MORE than just offer a description of Bunbury. The choice of the predicate points to a way of verifying Bunbury's existence.

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And so on.