"the existence of a universal requires ... the actuality of the item" (Grice on Met. 1003a7)

Speranza

In some online discussion in Phil-Logic, Jones has brought up an interesting issue.

Jones writes:

"Grice mentions in ['Aristotle on the multiplicity of being'] that he reads a certain passage in the metaphysics [Met. 1003a7] as asserting that (in Grice's words):

"the existence of a universal requires not just the
possibility but the actuality of an item which
instantiates that universal ..."

Jones comments:

"if this were the case, and if the variables in the propositional forms were taken as varying over universals, then we would be talking only of "non-empty" terms, perhaps supporting the Robin Smith line."

---- I append the main body of Jones's commentary below.

---


Jones:

"[DOB] disputes that something I took from Maritain was (as I
said) "something like" what Maritain actually said.
I don't care to enter into a debate about what is or is not
"something like" another thing, but I am happy to point out
the points in Maritain that provoked my concern.
There are two separate issues for me which arise from the
passage in question.
The first is that, contrary to my previous opinion obtained
by considering Aristotelian texts to which I was referred by
Drake, Maritain denies that all affirmative propositions have
"existential import" (i.e. entail the existence of something
which satisfies the subject predicate).
The second point is that he says that in the case that the
affirmation of existence is absent (i.e. in propositions in
necessary matter), the proposition nevertheless "bears upon"
(which possibly means asserts) "possible or ideal
existence".
In paraphrasing this I used the concept of consistency of
predicates, which Drake does not understand.
Possibly this idea does not appear in Aristotle (though it
would be rather surprising).
It is an elementary idea in modern logic.
To say that a predicate is consistent has two distinct
meanings according as we are speaking of a language in which
one speaks of the world or a more purely logical language.
In the latter to say that a predicate is consistent is
simply to say that is it true of something.
However in the former to say that a predicate is consistent
is to say that it is possible that it might be true of
something.
I used the term in the latter sense. and in that sense it
corresponds directly to Maritain's observation which I
understood as asserting that a universal proposition in
essential matter asserts the "possible existence" of its
subject, i.e. that the subject term is "consistent" in the
second of the two above usages.

D. O'B.:

"No, he doesn't say that an essential predication of the
> form "Some A are B" may be true even if there is no A,
> provided only that there is some possible A. That's a
> pidgin version providing a much too vague approximation.
> He says:
> "From the point of view of matter we must distinguish
> between propositions in necessary matter, that is, those
> in which the Pr. Is essential to the S. (in which case
> we say that the S. has supposition naturalis) and
> propositions in contingent matter, that is, those
> wherein the Pr. Is accidental to the S. (the S. has a
> supposition accidentalis). In the first case the
> proposition expresses an eternal truth and affirms only
> the relation (of identification) between the object of
> thought signified by the Pr. and the object of thought
> signified by the S. (habitudinem praedicati ad
> subjectum)."

Jones: This part of your quote corresponds to my first issue:

D.O.B.:

"> Thus it does not require the actual
> existence of the subject to be true (non requiritur
> existential subjecti ut preaedicatum verificetur de
> subject) and not necessarily and itself an "existential"
> sense.""

Jones: "You do not quote the part in which he talks about "possible
existence" though you do discuss it.
Both of these matter cause difficulties for someone who wishes
to assess the syllogistic as a formal system, since in doing
so an important consideration is validity of the syllogisms
which cannot be determined without a grasp of the truth
conditions of the relevant propositional forms.
What Maritain tells us is that the truth conditions are not
determined solely by the form of the proposition, since the
question of whether a proposition is in essential or
accidental matter also enters into the conditions.
This seems to make the validity of syllogisms not a purely
formal matter, questions of interpretation enter into it.
The second point is also of concern because it seems to
bring modal considerations into the question even for non-
modal syllogisms.
Perhaps in the literature all these matters are
satisfactorlly resolved, but I am nevertheless now in a
state of not having any understanding of the syllogism on
the basis of which I could agree that the supposedly valid
syllogisms really are valid."

It is at this point that Jones brings in the extra point by Grice.

"A further point in connection with the

disagreement among contemporary scholars on

whether Aristotle assumes that
terms are non-empty (the article on SEP

by Robin Smith still
gives that interpretation) arises in the paper by Grice in
connection with which this issue about Maritain arose."

"Grice mentions in that paper that he reads a certain passage
in the metaphysics as asserting that (in Grice's words):
"... the existence of a universal requires not just the
possibility but the actuality of an item which
instantiates that universal ..."
Which he takes to be enunciated in Metaphysics IV, ii,
1003a7.
I don't see it myself, but if this were the case, and if the
variables in the propositional forms were taken as varying
over universals, then we would be talking only of "non-
empty" terms, perhaps supporting the Robin Smith line."

Cheers.