-- by JLS
---- for the GC
KANT scholars usually criticise Strawson's book -- but it's Griceain! Grice and Strawson would NEED to teach Kant at Oxford. Grice grew more and more of a Kantian while he left the 'cold shores' of Oxford (Strawon's odd expression -- never saw the shore --, but cfr. WindSOR, originally Wind-shore) to get to Berkeley. And trust Grice's reactionary bent to replicate the Kantianism in him.
While Strawson's "Kant" is all about the theoretical reason, Grice's Kant is all about the practical reason. But I trust Grice saw the bounds of sense even THERE?
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While I have only perused a few sections of Strawson's magnum hopeless on Kant, I feel it's mostly wrongheaded, as with most "analytical" readings of Kant. The APsters generally begin by dismissing transcendental idealism itself (if not Mind, for lack of a better term). So the readings are sort of like, well Kant may have had a few interesting things to say, that is, if we assume he was a psychologist of sorts, that Mind doesn't exist, that all of his metaphysical or theological speculations-- just refer to brain functions, etc. It doesn't get much more sophisticated than that (even with the "language" types) . Even Herr Scruton says something to that effect--
ReplyDeleteI think you may be right. You have to admit that there IS something paradoxical about the transcendental subject of ´apperception´. For Kant, it all transpires to "I say" (said, smugly, and transcendental). He actually thought the verb to go there was "think". "I think".
ReplyDeleteFor a Griceian, this requires some "construction" routine.
Grice is pretty serious about "transcendental arguments," though, which he re-dubs "metaphysical arguments". There are a few caveats. I analysed one in my PhD on "conversational reason: a critique".
A transcendental argument, in Kant, and Strawson, is about the condition of possibility. Sometimes pluarlised, "conditionS of possibility". Strawson (in "If and )") is willing to allow for
"WEAK" transcendental arguments.
These proves not the "existence" but the "appropriateness" of something. Of course one reduces to the other. A weak transcendental argument for the appropriateness of x is a strong transcendental argument for the existence of the appropriateness of x.
I played with this vis a vis Grice´s rather free use of "rational" versus "rational" in Way of Words -- he expands on this in "Aspects of reason" (2001) in a good move by a language type as he was ("I would hardly say that the price of the boots was irrational: only unreasonable").
This may relate to "do not lie". This is said by transcendental pragmaticist types (like Apel and Habermas -- Habermas quotes one Speranza in his "Pragmatics of Communication," MIT) to constitute a condition for the working of language.
But Grice has:
"Do not say what you believe to be false"
as a mere conversational maxim. It is a maxim like that which is reasonable or unreasonable, rational or irrational. How? Well, we need to consider the Point of "talking". "I would like", Grice, or words to the effect, notes, "to be able to say that observance of the conversational maxims is rational-reasonable along the following lines." "Anyone who cares about the goals of communication -- mutually influencing each other --" or words to that effect, SHOULD have an interest in engaging in talk exchanges where such maxims ARE operative."
This, Holdcroft and others have noted -- indeed, even my Auntie -- shows that an ureliable conversational move is not IMPOSSIBLE, but inappropriate. This proves that the transcendental point is a WEAK transcendental point: not directed towards the possibility or conditions of possibility of existence, but towards a mere qualification of whatever it is that we are wanting to justify.
Or something!
A transcendental argument, in Kant, and Strawson, is about the condition of possibility. Sometimes pluarlised, "conditionS of possibility".
ReplyDeleteI would perhaps alter slightly to "the conditions of experience". Possibility's the current jargon, tho'. Why, you hear some "modal" types who will say something like "X is necessarily possible, so it's likely; ergo, it's true!" The magic of pseudo-logic.
Habermas quotes one Speranza in his "Pragmatics of Communication," MIT
Impressive, sir. I attempted a bit of Habermas a few months ago, and actually enjoyed probably 25% of what I read...(mo' than the usual po-mo).
Now, must return to Arbeiten.
Thanks about the Habermas. Of course it was, honestly, a PhD requirement thing. I HAD to read Habermas! (I love him!). But seriously, I had to participate (sort of) into a seminar on Habermas -- and naturally enough, I said (to myself), "I'm going to make something out of this", so I learned German and traced back ALL the occurrences of Grice in Habermas's corpus: Theory of Communicative Action and Intentionalist Semantics. Then I had to attend, well, it WAS a pleasure, a seminar by Habermas himself. I had adapted his validity claims (four of them) into the veritable four categories of Grice via Kant. Habermas was somewhat reluctant to have his category of 'rightness' defined along Gricean lines!
ReplyDeleteBut my essay managed to quote Apel, Kemmerling, Meggle, and a few other German-speakers. Kemmerling had hosted Grice when Grice visited Bielefield, and Meggle is _VERY_ Griceian.
What I learned from my German adventure: That there is no equivalent of Gricean 'mean' in German! -- and that "Implikatur" is a Latinism.
I'll see if I can copy and paste what Grice says on "metaphysical argument" and return.
ReplyDeletePlus, Burton-Roberts indeed argued (and rightly -- unless I say it, by 'argue' I do mean, factively) that if you do say,
"S must be P" THEN, "S MAY be P". It's only an implicature that makes you think that's odd.