H. P. Grice on communication: concerted agency, cause, reason, and intention -- The Oxford Philosophical Society, 1948

It is obvious by Grice's cavalier attitude to cases like "Smoke means fire," that he is NOT interested in 'signs' as such!

It is obvious by the fact that he explicitly chooses the passage by Stevenson where he refers to 'conditioning,' that Grice is, to use his own terms, 'human agency' and 'communication.'

And it is obvious that, contra Ogden and Richards, who are continentally-oriented towards citing from Husserl, Grice's intention is totally psychologistic, as Husserl would have it!

Perhaps he heard Ayer talking too lightly about verifiability as a criterion of 'meaning,' that Grice thought of following Ewing's and Ogden's and Richard's advice (who loved Lady Welby) and read Peirce himself!

On top, he thought his tutees might enjoy this!

C. S. Peirce is a pioneer — or, as he himself puts it, “a back-woods-man”! — in the analysis of of meaning, or as Grice prefers, "communication." (Note Grice's reference to Stevenson on 'conditioning,' 'human agency,' and 'communication.')

Grice is concerned with Stevenson's reductionist tendencies: surely 'reason' need be involved, not just 'cause'. So, can we learn something from Peirce?

It is hardly surprising that what C. S. Peirce has to say, way way back, about meaning and communication is both complicated and obscure, as one would expect from a disciple of Occam!

Pierce’s oeuvre is that of a highly individual, subtle, acute — if perhaps not very systematic or disciplined — mind!

At Oxford, Peirce would NOT be called a philosopher -- but then Peirce seldom called 'himself' a philosopher!

Still, what Peirce, if not a philosopher, may have something interesting to say to a philosopher -- cfr. after all, Lady Welby!

Peirce’s oeuvre is punctualized by penetrating and suggestive observations, in crisp English. 

It's not unnatural that his favourite correspondant was Lady Welby!

Partly because many problems of Oxonian interest  — notably, "meaning," as now being overused by Freddie Ayer — may be traced back to — or at least found in — Pierce, and partly because Pierce's oeuvre is — at any rate, at Oxford — somewhat (if not very much) neglected, Grice proposes to consider some of the things that Peirce says about a "sign," to use his jargon, as a starting point for an analysis of “meaning.”

Mind that we'll go back to ENGLISH philosophers, as they feel they belong to the 'classical,' Graeco-Roman tradition, where 'semiosis' was high fashion!

Grice first considers Pierce’s analysis of the “sign” in general.

Grice then goes on to consider the three trichotomies Peirce proposes, to wit:

1) the 'icon'/'index'/'symbol' distinction, or triad

(In England we are more used to dichotomies, perhaps because we are Kantian at heart?)

2) the 'quali-sign'/'sin-sign'/'dici-sign' distinction, or triad.

3) the 'rheme'/'dicisign'/'argument' distinction, or triad.

For starters, Peirce applies “sign” to a broad variety of items — including a few which Grice certainly would *not*.

Grice's implicature to his tutee is: "And I expect you won't, either!"

This extension in the application of “sign” by Pierce should not necessarily, on principle, be condemned!

Only NOT on principle!

Peirce’s broad use of “sign” may help us to draw or lead our conceptual attention to an important *feature* which Peirce's variety of items share.

Or perhaps not. And remember we want to know what 'communication' of 'concerted human agency' is all about, so we shall underestimate Peirce's love for weathercocks and storms!

As a *selection* of items which Peirce calls a “sign,” Grice lists:

First example:

— the rolling gait of a sailor.

“The fact that he has a rolling gait MEANS that he is a sailor.”

Who is he?
I don't know.
Well, he has a rolling gait.
Then he is a sailor

Is he INTENTIONALLY doing that?

If so, we could say that

"By his rolling gait, the sailor MEANS that he is one."

Second example:

— a diagramme

What are you doing?
I'm drawing a map of High Street.
What for?
To guide my friend.

By drawing a diagramme, Peter means that his friend will need it!

Third example:

—a shout of ‘Hi!’.

He shouted 'hi'.
What did he mean?
What DOES he mean.
He means that he is happy to see me.

Fourth example:

— the demonstrative pronoun, ‘that.’

Which one do you like?
THAT
By uttering "that," Peter means that he likes the yellow one. 

Fifth example

— any significant sentence.

What did Tarski mean?
What does Tarski mean?
Well, by uttering 'Snow is white,' he surely means that grass is green, knowing him!

Sixth example:

— a weathercock pointing to the N. E.

What is the cock meaning?
That the wind is coming from the S. W. -- at least that is what the DESIGNER of the weathercock means.

Seventh example:

— a picture of something.

Mr X draws a picture of Mr. Z showing affectionate behaviour towards Mrs. Y and shows it to Mr. Y. 

By drawing the picture, Mr. X means that Mr. Y should know. 

Now, many of these seven items Grice would *not* 'ordinarily' call a “sign.”

That is because Peirce, as some of us should be on occasion, is an extra-ordinary philosopher.

It is important, for an understanding of what Peirce is doing when discussing “sign,” to realise that there is good reason to think that Peirce would have regarded these two expressions below as somewhat inter-changeable:

“s is a sign.”

“x has a meaning.”

In support of this, Grice feels he needs refer only to two passages:

In the first, Peirce argues that “meaning” is an irreducibly triadic relation:

R(s, o, i)

— the semiotic triad, where 's' stands for 'sign,', 'o' for 'object,' and 'i' for 'interpretant.'

Or as Grice prefers:

R(x, U, A)

where 'x' stands for anything, u for utterer and a for addressee.

Now, Peirce also claims that “sign” is an  irreducibly triadic relation:

R(s, o, i)

or

R(x, U, A)

“Every triadic relation involves *meaning*, as *meaning* is, obviously, a triadic relation”.

M(U, p, A)

Now, in *Grice's* idio-lect or usage, the expression

"x has a meaning" or "x means," or "by uttering x, U means that p"

is of somewhat wider applicability than

“s is a sign.”

"I don't use 'sign' often, and I hope you won't."

Not all of the items which Peirce lists under “sign” may be said to ‘mean’ — e.g. a picture, and possibly a diagramme. 

While the drawing agent may mean, it's obtuse to say that his diagramme 'means'.

While Leonardo meant that Mona is beautiful it is odd to say that "Mona Lisa" means that she is beautiful, or has a captivating smile. 

So, if Peirce is equalling or equating “x’s having a meaning” with “s’s being a sign,” Peirce is *extending* the use of ‘meaning’.

Grice proposes now to indicate the extent to which Peirce’s departs from *Grice's* use of “sign.”

It is convenient to separate *two* ranges of items.

The first range of items are those items of a linguistic — or quasi-linguistic — character; roughly speaking, those items by which an utterer U, notably a human agent, may use in making a communication, in communicating. 

Then there's a second range of items of a wholly *non*-linguistic character, such as the rolling gait of a sailor.

This is a rough-and-ready division, but it may may do for now.

Let us take, as we should, the NON-linguistic range first, the sailor's rolling gait. 

Within this range, what *Grice* would ordinarily call a “sign” (at any rate a sign ‘of ...,’ or ‘... that p’) would seem to be a so-called ‘natural’ sign, and thus outside the realm of reason-guided concerted human agency.

It it is, at first sight, tempting to assume, roughly, that, whenever the presence (or existence) of “x” is a ground for supposing the presence (or existence) of “y,” “x” is a *sign* of “y.”

Or as Hobbes says in "Computatio," y is a 'consequentia' of x.

But this would be wrong on a number of counts.

People may perhaps come to accept a particular villa as being *my* villa on the strength of its having a beautiful fountain — i. e., these people would recognise my villa by its beautiful fountain.

But it would be somewhat unnatural, odd, baffling, or 'extra-ordinary' to speak of the beautiful Bernini fountain as being a “sign” of my villa, or of the *fact* that my villa has a beautiful fountain as being a “sign” that the villa is mine.

Unless it's ME who's sculpted in the fountain!

One principle involved here may be stated by saying that — where “x” and “y” refer to two individuals — we do not 'ordinarily' speak of “x” as being the “sign” of “y,” unless we are prepared to allow also that this falls under some rule or generalisation, rather, to the effect that anything of a type X to which “x” belongs —

x ∈ X

— is generally, standardly, by custom, on principle, ceteris paribus, etc., associated with things of the type Y to which “y” belongs:

y ∈ Y

But we would not say that ANY villa which has a beautiful fountain is — always or usually — mine.

For one, I would not be lecturing you on Peirce if that were the case, perhaps! I would be holding a salon in Milan to do that! (Not far from my infinite villas!)

A different example suggests that some such principle, rule, criterion, generality, generalisation, etc., may not be the only one involved.

For though not only do we *not* speak of the presence of a feature by which we distinguish a particular individual bird from any other bird as a “sign” of the presence of that bird, we do *not* speak, either, of the feature by the aid of which we distinguish or recognize a particular kind of bird as  being a “sign” (but perhaps a “mark”) of the presence of a bird of that particular kind.

Let me give an example with Strawson and the robin.

We would, e. g., NOT speak of a bird’s having a pink beak as being a “sign” that the bird is a Lesser Nitwit.

And here of course Strawson *can* produce a rule, generalisation, or what have you:

“Any bird with a pink beak — plus certain unspecified further characteristics — is always — or usually or often — a Lesser Nitwit.”

We tend to differentiate, in ordinary language, between a feature, or "mark," by which we recognise something as being of a certain type X (by which we distinguish so-and-so’s) from a “sign.”

In such cases, a “mark” seems the appropriate expression, not a “sign.”

But that's perhaps I'm a Mercian at heart (Midlands, Mercians, those who left a 'mark' behind!). 

A "mark" most naturally 'distinguishes' this from that.

A "sign" most naturally 'indicates' this OR that.

But such a differentiation (a "mark" 'distinguishing' x from y, versus a "sign" 'indicating' x or y) does not always seem to be made by all of my friends!

And, in any case, one would desire some further account for the *basis* of the differentiation between “m” being a 'mark' that 'distinguishes' between x and y, and “s” being a 'sign' that 'indicates' x or y.

This account, I fear, I cannot supply at the moment.

For once, no philosopher I ever met ever showed the slightest interest in a conceptual analysis of a 'mark'!  (Whereas Aristotle is ALWAYS talking of 'semeion' in "Peri hermeneias"!)

Maybe some of the following examples may help to elucidate some principle or other.

“x — or U — means that, or communicates that, p” — is appropriate here.

But not:

"x is EVIDENCE that p."

We do not, in general, speak of “x” as being a “sign” of “y” when the existence (or occurrence) of “x” is a *constitutive*, essential, necessary, condition of the occurrence (or existence) of “y.”

E.g. 

Smith lost his temper; he is therefore, irascible.

I doubt if I should say that Smith having lost his temper is, on a particular occasion, a “sign” that Smith is irascible — though the fact that he lost his temper may be “evidence” that Smith is irascible.

After all, being irascible *consists* in or is analytically definitionally equivalent to having a tendency to lose one’s temper. Note the ending -ible. 

(Cf. Fogelin, “Meaning and evidence.”)

A slightly somewhat different sort of example may be given using what some philosophers call a 'value' term.

Smith's essay is well-reasoned, therefore, it's a good essay.

I would not want to say that the fact that Smith’s philosophical essay is a well-reasoned essay is a “sign” that it is a good essay, simpliciter.

Rather, it is, again, a constitutive, essential, necessary “mark” of a good philosohical essay to be well-reasoned.

We tend *not* to use “sign” either, at any rate without qualification, of “x,” if the presence of “x” leaves no room for doubt as to the presence of “y.”

In such cases we do use “... means ...” or “... shows ...”

Thus, we would not normally say of a particular envelope that its bearing a post-mark is a “sign” of its having been through the post.

In normal circumstances, the post-mark would be taken as *establishing*, unless it's a fake post-mark, that the envelope has been through the post.

However, if some *special* circumstance does create some suspicion to the effect that the post-mark is not genuine, we might be more ready to use “sign”!

In this connection, one may note that 

NON-FACTIVITY, i. e.

iii. x is a sign that p, but possibly ~p.

is legitimate.

In contrast,

FACTIVITY 

ii. x means (or shows) that p, but possibly ~p.

may not!

(I shall tell this to the Kiparskys).

We do not normally speak, either, of “x” being a “sign” of “y” if the existence of “x” is the *cause* (or *a* cause, or the explanation, or part of the explanation) of the existence of "y," now seen as an 'effect.'

One would hardly say

“The death of Smith is a 'sign' that his wife will be unhappy.”

And we do not say this even if we are *uncertain* whether Mrs. Smith will care!

One would hardly say:

“Smith’s catching bulimic plague is a sign that he will soon die.”

On the other hand, oddly, there seems to be no ban of speaking of the causal *effect* as the “sign” of the cause.

"Smoke is a sign of fire."

I withhold “... is evidence” here, too.

"Smoke is evidence of fire."

"Where there is smoke, there's fire."

I can however say “... means that p” or “... probably means that p.”

We would hardly say that the fact that the first ten people to arrive at the meeting are wearing gowns is a “sign” that the next person to arrive will be wearing a gown — even if I happen to think that this fact makes it pretty probable that he *will* be wearing a gown!

Premonition seems more appropriate.

We do NOT speak of a “sign,” either, in a specimen of what some philosophers  call an “analogical” argument or inference.

Nor, incidentally, do we speak of the above mentioned fact as being a “sign” that *everyone* at the meeting would be gowned.

Reflecting on these cases where we would withhold from using “sign,” it occurs to me that it might be worth considering whether there may not be a quite simple *positive* or substantive or substantial requirement for a “sign” which would exclude all the listed items from the status of being a “sign.”

One shot would be that, for “x” to be a “sign” of “y,” it is necessary — though maybe not sufficient — that “y” should *explain*, or provide an explanation for “x” — wholly or partially.

This requirement, if authentic, would eliminate each of the cited items from being a “sign.”

This 'explanatory' requirement also explains a further feature of our ordinary use of “sign,” e.g. why I might speak of the fact that Smith has a stoop as being a “sign” that Smith is an old man, but not as being a “sign” that Smith’s hair is grey, or that Smith has false teeth; for I would allow

“Smith has a stoop because he is an old man.”

But not:

“Smith has a stoop because his hair is grey and his teeth are false.”

The obvious difficulty about this requirement is that I often do speak or refer to, say, a present event as a *sign* (or premonition, or omen) of a future one; and — it may be asked — how can a future event *explain* or provide an explanation for a present one?

In answer to this, one must say that I certainly do say such things as

“The rope creaked *because* it was about to break.”

“Smith’s voice grew faint *because* he was about to die.”

An utterance such as those may raise a problem for the philosopher, but they seem legitimate, even ordinary, ways of talking.

Other requirements to be fulfilled by a “sign” have been suggested, e.g.

A “sign” must be more obvious (or more accessible) than its “significatum.”

A sign must be in spatio-temporal proximity to its “significatum.”

I am far from convinced that either requirement is legitimate.

That such a requirement may *seem* legitimate can be explained in terms of the plausibility it may have and may be explained by pointing that it is usually — though not always — fulfilled in the case of an item which does fulfill some other requirement for a “sign.”

As for the range of communicative — linguistic, or quasi-linguistic — items, the following seem to be the most obvious cases in which “sign” *is* applicable.

For any non-verbal — or nor wholly verbal — but conventional communication device, e.g.

—  the addition sign ‘+’

— the ampersand 'and'

“+” and “and”  might also be called, each, a "symbol."

It does not seem obvious, though, that every “symbol” could be called a “sign.”

— a road sign, e.g. a level-crossing sign.

— a shop-sign, e.g. a barber’s pole.
(Or Occam's example of the circle (circulus) of barrel outside a house signifying 'naturaliter' that the house sells beer -- "Circulus naturaliter significat vinum.")

— a conventional sign, such as a map.

— a gesture, a groan, or a frown, whether conventional or not, used as a 'communication' or communicative, intentional device.

In neither of the three cases do we naturally or ordinarily speak of the item (the frown, the groan, the scream) as a “sign of ...” or a “sign that ...”

One may speak, though, of each item as 'signifying that p,' which is, admittedly, cognate with 'sign.'

An action, normally, or at least usually, though not always, non-conventional, used as a communication device, e.g.

“Smith took Jones’s hand as a sign (or signal) that all was forgiven.”

“They shot down an aeroplane as a warning sign or alert that they would stand no nonsense.”

The natural phrase is however, not so much 'signify,' but ‘... as a sign,” and it may be followed by either a “that”-clause, or by "to," (as in "to the effect that...").

Any of these items may metaphorically, or figuratively, or in a transferred way, be called a 'gesture' (the handshake and the aeroplane falling). 

No doubt there are other categories of this class of “sign,” but these perhaps are enough for the moment.

Note particularly that an expression — or a phrase,  sentence, and even statement, or utterance, if not the uttering — is *not* a “sign”!

Some utterer U’s uttering an expression (or a sentence) may be a “sign” — e.g. of gullibility or intelligence.

But the U’s *uttering* is surely not a “sign” of what the expression (or phrase, or sentence) means, nor of what a statement asserts, or what U asserts by uttering x.

Similarly, U's utterance may express a belief, but it is not a 'sign,' against all Locke said, of his belief.

Peirce’s triadic analysis of a “sign” — S(s, o, i) — is both fascinating and obscure, or fascinatingly obscure if you want -- "obscurely fascinating"?

I hope that my attempt at simplifying the welter of Peirce's pronouncements does not prove too much of a travesty, but more of, shall we say, a rhapsody, upon which here are my variations. 

Pierce’s salient points may be summarised as follows:

To be a “sign” (i. e., for some s to “mean” some object o) is to stand in a triadic relation:

S(s, o, i)

Peirce’s initial move in attempting to show this is by claiming that, for a “sign” s to be a “sign”” is for “s” to be a sign of something — some object “o” — *to somebody* — some interpretant “i.”

The relation in question is not accidentally triadic but ‘genuinely’ so, by which Peirce means that this triad cannot be reduced or analysed into any complexus or complex of this or that dyadic relation.

Contrary to what one might expect, the three terms of the triad that is the sign-relation are not “sign” or “significans” (“s”), object signified, “significatum” (“o”) and a third for organism, but

1 — “sign” — significans

2 — “object,” or significatum, and

3 — what Peirce calls an “interpretant.”

The following expansion by W. B. Gallie in his essay on Peirce seems to fit at least some of what Peirce claims about a “sign.”

“s is a sign”

iff, i.e. 'if and only if,' as we at Oxford say:

“s 'evokes' —in some mind, soul, or organism — a response, or psychological attitude, stance, or state  — interpretant “i” — appropriate to object “o.””

Again, contrary to what one might expect, the *meaning* of “sign” s is not the object “o” or significatum, for which it stands, but rather its interpretant — or at least rather a certain sort of interpretant.

For s to be a “sign,” its interpretant “i” must be ‘mental’ (or psychic, or psychological, or soul-like) and so, according to Peirce, a thought (belief or desire) and so, again, a further “sign” — since all thought,  on Peirce’s view, consists in signs.

Further, the interpretant which is the meaning of the sign must be a “sign” of the same “object” as is the sign of which it is the “interpretant.”

Peirce: 

“A Sign, or Representamen, is a first which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a second, called its “Object,” as to be capable of determining a third, called its “Interpretant,” to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.”

“The triadic relation is genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations”.

As Gallie notes, any appropriate response to a sign is, in virtue of its very appropriatedness, capable of itself serving as a sign of the object originally signified.

As Gallie puts it, in the way in which what a “sign” signifies depends on the occurrence of an appropriate response on the part of an addressee, such a psychological response is necessary both to show what the “sign” signifies and indeed to show that it signifies anything at all”.

This is being ensued to be the case, given that the “interpretant” i — or response — is to be appropriate to o.

If the interpretant i is appropriate to o, the interpretant i is itself a sign of o.

This, of course, entails (in Moore's sense) that every “sign” generates an *infinite* series of interpretants, all of which have the same object o.

Peirce is perfectly willing to accept this infinitesimal consequence.

A qualification by Peirce mitigates the obvious objection that it would be logically (if not virtually) *impossible* for there to be an *infinite* series of *actual* (if not possible) psychological responses or interpretants.

Peirce allows that the interpretant “i” need not be an *actual*, but merely a *potential* or possible or intended psychological response on the part of the addressee  — i.e. one which *would* occur, given certain further,  in fact unfulfilled, if not unfulfillable, conditions.

I may now ask you what you think Peirce’s so-called theory of a “sign” is a theory of, in view of the obvious fact that “sign” is *not* used by Peirce in its everyday Oxonian fashion.

One reply might be that Peirce’s "semeiotic" should be regarded as an attempt to elucidate, or rationally re-construct, or logically construct, or, as I prefer, analyse, some ordinary use of the concept of "meaning," 'signification,' or 'communication.'

On this view, we have to assume that Peirce takes the concept behind the expression “sign” — *and* the concept behind the expression "meaning," or, better, "to mean" — to have a somewhat wider broader application or use than it in fact has — e.g. a picture, or a map, is not ordinarily be said, at least at Oxford as such, to ‘mean’ this or that.

Now, it will undoubtedly be useful, if one is interested in a conceptual analysis of ‘meaning’, to take Peirce’s psychologist theory in this light, and I do not think he would complain!

I should also take note of the fact that, in talking about a “sign,” Peirce is talking about a very diverse collection of items, which, nevertheless, I, as does Peirce, feel it fairly natural to group together — even though there may be no obvious ready-made heading for the list he provides us with!

Sometimes I feel like using 'e' for expression of any 'vehicle' of 'meaning,' by which an utterer communicates to an addressee that p, or q. 

What Peirce says might help us to understand *why* we would readily list all those items together.

The items, it is claimed, have something in common, as Witters would say, 'a family resemblance.'

For such an item with a “meaning” (in the ordinary usage) form only a sub-class of Peirce’s “sign.”

Any condition required for “... is a sign of ...” in Peirce’s usage, constitutes a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for “... means that p.”

We should not *assume* that there is some one common general substantive or substantial character which each of the items of the list possesses.

The items of the list may merely be linked by, as I say, what Witters, they tell me, has called, metaphorically, a “family resemblance”.

Indeed, if one searches for one single character or feature shared by such items as a picture, a map, a sentence, and a weathercock, it may not be easy to pick on one!

The best I can suggest is that each item, x, is one from which something might be *learned*, inferred, or concluded about some further item, y.

Whether this delimits the class of Peirce’s “sign,” I am not sure!

I do not propose to spend long over Peirce’s claim that the ‘sign-relation’ — “meaning” —is a triadic (and irreducibly triadic at that) relation.

If all that is meant by Peirce is that a “sign” does not have meaning “in vacuo” — i. e., that if there were no addressee to respond to a sign, there would not be a sign with a meaning, perhaps no one would object -- surely not the addressee!

But Peirce clearly means more than this.

Peirce seems to mean, *inter alia*, that for a statement of the general logical form:

“x means y.”

M(x, y)

the response

‘To whom?’

is always appropriate and must have an answer.

If this is Peirce’s view, it seems patently false.

Some counter-examples come to (my) mind:

“The evolving of the earth means the emergence of life.”

“To whom?” sounds otiose!

Surely my father would object to "God" as a response.

Then, “Kant means that ...,”

— choosing some passage which you think has hitherto baffled every one!

"To whom?"

Surely, "to Kant" is equally otiose.

It may be misleading, in so far as it suggests that the “meaning” in general, and so, naturally, the meaning of a communication or communicative device, is to be thought of in terms of some addressee A, to which the sign or x or utterance or uttering of the utterance may be addressed — encourages a “causal” or causalist theory of “meaning,” in that the “meaning” is appropriate to a communication or communicative device itself, rather than, as I prefer, in terms of the *utterer* U, or user, of the communication or communicative device, which would encourage an ‘intention-based' semantic theory, alla good ole E. C. Ewing in “Meaninglessness.”

E. C. Ewing, you know what, is a genius!

(Scruton almost had him as his tutor!)

As I happen to prefer (indeed favour) an intention-based theory to a “causalisst” theory alla Stevenson, rather than introspectionist alla Ewing, I regard this fact about Peirce's insight as unfortunate.

A difficulty in Peirce’s theory relates to his very choice of somewhat crypto-technical labels, such as ‘object’ (rather than “significatum”) and ‘interpretant’.

First, though, a word or two about the “object” o of a “sign” s.

For Peirce, the object of a sign is *not* what the sign means!

Peirce thinks of the object in the sign-situation triad as that to which the addressee A’s response is to be appropriate.

Peirce adds that the “object” o is

“that with which the “sign” presupposes an acquaintance, in order to convey to some addressee A some further 'information' — “p” — about it.”

The adressee A has to be able to identify,  in order to comprehend or understand the sign (J. L. Austin's 'uptake') the 'information' or content “p” which is conveyed by the “sign,” and which is information *about* the object.

Here, Peirce gives the example of a man, looking at  the empty sea, who is told:

“That vessel carries no freight at all!”

cf. Strawson, "The present king of France visited the exhibition."

Roughly, to comprehend, understand (Austin's 'uptake') the 'information' (or is it 'mis-information'?) “p” so conveyed, the addressee A has to identify *what* vessel is being referred to, even if, as may be, there is no actual vessel present there.

Roughly, then, the object o is that to which the “sign” refers.

Peirce’s main trouble is with the third in the triad: the interpretant” “i.”

“The proper significant outcome/effect of a sign is the interpretant of the sign.”

The interpretant seems to be regarded by Peirce as both a “response” — in the broader usage of this expression — the making of which (or the *disposition* to make which) is a manifestation of *understanding* or comprehending or grasping the sign, i. e., taking it as a sign of, or referring to, some object or other — and as a further sign “s2” which develops or “elucidates” “s1” such that

s1 means s2.

Peirce seems here *conflating* two different conceptions of "meaning," which we may call "meaning to" versus "meaning by."

One is that a “sign” “meaning” this or that consists in its *referring*, alla Frege, to an object (Sinn und Bedeutung)

The other is that it is the interpretant, or addressee, that constitutes “meaning.”

(Something de Saussure embarrasingly elludes with his 'pair' -- cfr. Gardiner and how he rectifies the situation). 

On both views, a sign, meaning this or that, would consist in its being capable of *being understood*, grasped, comprehended -- the object of Austin's uptake.

On the first view, this ‘being understood’ or grasped or comprehended would consist in the sign’s capacity to produce in some addressee A some psychological response r —or disposition to do certain things, in the case of imperatives —, where “r” is of a kind appropriate to the object o of the sign “s.”

On the second view, the sign being capable of *being understood* or grasped or comprehended would consist in the addressee A giving, or being able to give, some “elucidation” of the sign — now s1 — in terms of s2.

A conflation of these two conceptions of “meaning” yields the view that to “understand” or comprehend or grasp a sign is to *respond* to the sign by giving — or being capable of giving, or acquiring a disposition to give — an elucidation of the sign s1 in terms of s2.

Now such account of “meaning” presents its fare of difficulties!

The first — as in any a ‘causalist’ theory — is, I suspect, that it may turn not to be very satisfactory (even if it may be hedged around) when the meaning of a communication or communicative device is considered.

I do not think that the verb “mean” in which utterances — or, actually, primarily, an utterer U — may be said to “mean” can be satisfactorily defined in terms of the psychological direcct response or reaction that the uttering of the utterance is intended to arouse or tend to arouse — “intends” to arouse, at most, by the addressee's recognition of the utterer's intention at most!

Another difficulty is, I suspect, that it would make a sign s1 “meaning” this or that as being roughly equivalent to being elucidated by a further sign s2.

This is open to an obvious objection as a “definition” of ‘meaning.’

It is proposed that a very *infinite* series of elucidations for a linguistic sign s1 can be provided, without its being the case that the sign s1 means anything.

Such would be the case if I invent a ‘nonsense’ language (call it Deutero-Esperanto), or basic Pirotese:

"Pirots karulise elatically."

"Glory" means "a knock-down argument."

"Impenetrability" means that we should change the topic."

"'Twas was brillig and the slithy toves did gyre."

In order to assert that a sign means anything (and to *know* or understand or comprehend or grasp what the sign means), the addressee has not merely to be able to relate the sign s to other signs, but at some stage to relate the use of the sign to some *non-linguistic* situations — to the world, as it were!

"What did he mean, 'pirots karulise elatically'?"

As a “definition” or even conceptual analysis of “meaning,” Peirce’s proposal would be objectionably and viciously circular.

Peirce would be trying to explain the meaning of a sign s1 in terms of, roughly, the existence of another sign s2 having the exact same meaning!

The conflation of these two conceptions of “meaning,” apart from any objection to any of the particular conflated items, seems philosophically, methodologically, and conceptually objectionable in that in so far as it concerns the implication that, for a psychological response “r” to be a manifestation of understanding, or grasping, comprehension, or knowledge, it must consist in giving (or being able to give) some elucidation or quasi-elucidation s2 of the original sign s1.

But, obviously, I can show to you that I understand or grasp or understand or come to know the meaning of a sign by the way I behave — as Peirce himself admits.

He gives the example of a soldier’s response to an order by the drill sargeant.

“The example of the imperative command, such as "Stop!" shows that it need not be of a ‘mental’ or psychological, mode of being, but that the mode may be roughly purely ‘muscular’ — where the soldier’s behaviour of stopping the march does not consist in providing any sort of ‘elucidation’ of the sign s1 — the drill sargeant's command — which the soldier is showing to understand, grasp or comprehend, by stoppping!

If Peirce makes a conflation about two conceptions of meaning, one or more of the following factors may have assisted him towards doing so.

One factor may be an alleged ambiguity of verbs like "interpret," comprehend, understand, grasp, or 'get an uptake.' Cf. Aristotle "De interpretatione," Peri hermeneias.

I can't blame Peirce: Aristotle hardly knew what 'peri hermeneias' was about!

“To interpret” or to understand or to grasp or to have an uptake may mean

‘to make sense of’, ‘to understand conceptually’

But “to interpret” may also be used for ‘explain the sense of’.

"How do you interpret his remark?"

Versus

"How to you understand his remark?"

The latter sounds odd. The former doesn't.

"Do you interpret his remark?" sounds silly.

Some haziness surrounds Peirce’s saying that the interpretant (psychological response “r” on the part of some addressee A) must be psychological, ‘mental,’ i. e. that it must be a “thought,” as Frege would have it, and so, a further sign s2.

That the response can be muscular is a neat thing for Peirce to say!

This might be understood as saying that the interpretant psychological response “r” must be a response which counts as ‘thinking’ — roughly, 'cogitating,' even if immediate, as the case of stopping almost immediately after he hears, "Stop!".

It may also amount to claiming that the interpretant's psychological response “r” must be characteristic of an organism with a soul (psyche) or mind (nous, with noetika and aesthetika), i.e. roughly must be a manifestation of intelligence, or of a certain order of intelligence — cf. Holloway, “Language and Intelligence.”

I think Peirce's prototype, as it should, was a human agent.

On the second interpretation, the statement that the interpretant must be psychological or ‘mental’ is at least plausible.

But of course, on this view, it need not be an individual piece of explicit cogitation.

On the first interpretation, if the original statement is true (and 'cogitation' or computatio as Hobbes would prefer consists precisely in using this or that sign), the interpretant would have to be a sign (linguistic or quasi-linguistic).

But, on this interpretation, the original statement does not seem to be true.

A failure to distinguish these two uses of “interpret” (to understand or to explain) might result in the acceptance of the statement (“the interpretant must be psychological or mental”) taken in the its usage because of its plausibility when taken in its second usage.

There is a shift between a wider or broader use of “sign” (to include such philosophical chimaeras as a ‘natural’ sign, as if a dark cloud could 'mean' rain!) and a narrower, more appropriate, use of “sign,” to include only a communication or communicative — linguistic or quasi-linguistic — device, deployed by a human agent in front of another, as per a conversation, say. 

“Meaning” happens to be cognate with “mind” and “mental” and Peirce was aware of this!

He should have stuck with 'psychological.'

If a response “r” to a sign “s” is appropriate to a certain object “o,” it is plausible to suggest that it would be a “natural” sign of that object "o," whatever that might mean!

There might then be a transition to supposing that the psychological response “r” would be a sign in the manner of that object o, and so an ‘elucidation’ of the original sign s1.

I suggest, as regard his general discussion of “meaning,” Pierce might be not too unfairly represented as having moved roughly as follows.

Peirce seems for starters to combine two conceptions of " ... means ...," without saying he is doing so.

Foul!

On both these conceptions of meaning, “s has a meaning” and “s is capable of *being understood*.”

Surely the only purpose for an utterer to use a communication device is to be understood. This is analytic!

But there are two possible exegeses of “being understood.”

s is understood by A = df (by definition, that is)

Some effect produces — or is capable, given certain conditions, of being produced — on an addressee A, where this effect is in some way appropriate to the object o of the sign.

Some explanation or “elucidation” must be given — or is capable of being given — by the addressee A of s.

This explanation (“definiens”) is what, in the case of a language such as English, if not Deutero-Esperanto, anyway, turns out to be called by Peirce the sign’s “logical” interpretant.

Peirce:

“A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant”.

So s has meaning seems to be in Peirce definitionally equivalent to:

The sign s is capable of producing an effect or response r on an interpreter or addressee A.

The sign is capable of being explained or ‘elucidated.’

If I am right, how then “... means ...” is being conceptually analysed?

It is natural to suppose the effect or response “r,” the “thought”, as Frege would have it, coupled with the view that all thought is in signs and “mostly of nature of language” might well lead to the claim that this thought is the interpretant of sign.

This deals with the extra act-process ambiguity of interpretation (= interpreting, result of interpretation). Cf. analysis,  definition.

The fact that any “sign” is explainable or elucidable is something that seems plausible and natural to want to hold it true, and a consequence of any analysis of ‘meaning.’

But this is different from what is being analysed by Peirce.

Peirce gets the knives about a regress of interpretants.

A series of interpretants which are signs must be ended or cut by a final “ultimate logical interpretant” which is not a sign — or at least “not a sign in the same way as that of which it is interpretant is sign.”

This final logical interpretant turns out to be a “habit” — and also a “significate effect of sign.”

Pierce feels the difficulty of being imprisoned in his own language.

We now seem to have Peirce running two lines, provided a special kind of rule to tie language to experience, and, at same time, saying that will not quite do since “it does not tell us of essential nature of effect on an interpreter brought about by semiosis of the sign.”

This semiosis is explained as an action or influence involving the well-known triad if sign, object, and interpretant.

Peirce: “the interpretants, or proper significate effects, of signs.”

There are reasons to be dissatisfied with an interpretant merely as a sign with further

interpretants which are signs.

There is some inadequacy in an actual interpretant to give as adequate full definitions rather than merely a working elucidation.

There may be a 'general' sign (i.e. that for an intellectual concept, say) and this must have, in the end, a general interpretant, i. e., a general meaning (cf. Locke on 'general' ideas). 

And, what is a habit, anyway?

In Peirce’s famous triad, a “sign” “s” is defined as something that stands, to some interpretant “i“, for some object “o” — in some respect or capacity.

Peirce, with his eye on this definition of “sign,” proceeds to provide three trichotomies of a “sign.”

Peirce's first trichotomy or triad depends, as a criterion, on the *status* of the “sign” itself.

A “sign” may be:

1 — a quality.

2 — an existent

3 — a law.

If the sign is a quality, Peirce calls the sign, naturally enough a "quali-sign," or 'quality-sign.'

If the sign is an existent, Peirce calls it a “sin-sign,” or token. Why?

If the sign is a law, Peirce calls it a “legi-sign,” or type. He is using Plato's version of "De legibus."

"Nomological" seems more appropriate.

Peirce explains fairly clearly how to apply “type” and "token," too. 

What I symbolise by 'x' (token) versus 'X' (type).

The following comments seem called for on what Peirce says:

In his description of a type, or “legi-sign,” Peirce seems to be both confused and struggling with an inadequate terminology of his own making!

Peirce is confused because, having said that a “legi-sign” is a law, he goes on to say that the law is usually established by men and that every conventional sign is a “legi-sign,” but not conversely.

Peirce seems to be confusing here a law as a rule for the *use* of a sign with the “sign” itself.

Peirce’s confusion may well be due to the inadequacy of his terminology, and to the fact that he was an amateur, and not a philosopher. (I love an amateur philosopher, don't get me wrong!)

What Peirce seems to be *trying* to say is that a “type” is an abstraction, or “logical construction,” or rational re-construction out of a more primitive “token.”

In this, he would be Russellian -- cf. Russell's Theory of Types.

Presumably, to say something about a “type,” in Pierce’s view, would be to say something general about a “token” — and, hence, perhaps, a “law”.

There is obviously something in this, but I am rather doubtful if Peirce has it quite right.

For example, the sentence:

“It is impossible for a ‘type’ to be visible on a paper or heard in any voice.”

suggests that a ‘token’ could, by contrast, in his curious phrase, be visible on a page, or perceived directly by the addressee, a sense-datum.

What Peirce seems to mean by this is that there this is a usage of ‘token’ in which a token is just a “mound of ink” or a part of the page, or a sound, or any physical manifestation of an utteratum that an utterer utters to convey some piece of information to his addressee.

Surely a communication device needs to be PHYSICAL.

Though the meaning of “token” fairly clearly has something to do with such things as mounds of ink, I am doubtful if this straightforward answer will quite do.

The type-token distinction applies to any sign.

Other examples would be the case of a map or a diagram.

Cf. the following question:

“Have you bought the latest Ordinance Survey map of Oxfordshire?”

A reply like:

“No, they have printed some more (issues, tokens) since I brought mine.”

would be inappropriate.

But a reply like:

“There are twenty ordinance survey maps in the building”.

would not be inappropriate — implying or implicating that the U needs not bring his copy or token or specimen, or issue.

The type-token distinction is useful in itself.

Does the type-token distinction, however, have any bearing on a search for different uses of “mean”?

The type-token distinction suggests an extremely important fact.

The meaning of an expression “e” is what is meant by an utterer U by uttering a token (rather than a type, which you cannot conceptually do) of “e.”

This correlates with a difference between a tenseless (“timeless”) use of the verb “mean,” that some display (but I don't) as in

“The expression “father” means “male parent.”

Then here is my preferred tensed (or 'applied,' as the platonist would have it) use of the verb “mean”:

“By “father,” utterer U meant, metaphorically, a Roman Catholic priest.”

Or

"By 'There's glory for you,' Humpty Dumpty means that there is a knockdown argument for Alice."

I am fairly sure Peirce at least to some extent has in view this distinction between particularised and genearlised, or applied and timeless uses of “ ... means ...”

Peirce’s phrase, when discussing a ‘token’ is:

“Such an event being *significant* only as occurring specifically, in a token sort of way, when and where it does”.

Peirce’s phrasing suggests that a single expression on a piece of paper in a drawer might still *not* count as a token!

Though the type-token distinction *is* important, I think it would be wrong to assume that it is always a ‘type’ that “means” something tenselessly or timelessly, whereas a ‘token’ means something in a particularised way, tensedly or appliedly.

We ordinarily speak of a ‘type’ meaning (in a tensed usage of “mean”) something in a certain *context*.

The “tensed” use of “mean” is not confined to token.

I can say:

“As Peter uses the expression, “bank” means something different each time!”

Or:

“As used by Peter, each “bank” means something different”.

Or, best:

"By uttering 'bank,' you never know what Peter means!"

Peirce's category of the “quali-sign” is, in a any case, a highly suspect one.

I do not propose to spend much time on it.

A “quali-sign” is defined as “a quality which is a sign”.

Peirce says:

“A sign cannot actually act as a “sign” until it is embodied.”

“But the embodiment has nothing to do with its ‘character’ as a sign”.

“It is the mere quality of an appearance, and, thus, it is not exactly the same throughout a second”.

“A single event which happens once, and whose identity is limited to that one happening, as the birth of Christ, or a single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being *significant* only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that expression on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I venture to call a token”.

“A “quali-sign” is a quality which is a sign.”

“A sign cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied.”

“But the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign”.

“The ‘quali-sign,’ on the other hand, has no identity.”

“A ‘quali-sign’ is the mere quality of an appearance and it is not exactly the same throughout a second.”

“Instead of identity, it has great similarity, and cannot differ much without being called quite another ‘quali-sign’.”

                                                 

A ‘quali-sign’ seems to be identical with what Peirce calls, elsewhere, a “tone.” Why?

Peirce gives an example of a “tone”:

“A tone is an indefinite significant character — such as the tone *of voice*.”

The sort of thing Peirce seems to be having in mind is a specific voice quality (timbre) by which I may recognise a person, or better, an opera singer!

But I do not know what this would mean with regard to Peitce’s example that the “embodiment” has nothing to do with its character as a sign.

Another example Peirce gives of a “quali-sign” is “a feeling of red.”

Presumably, “a feeling of red” means a sensation (Austin hates this expression) or sense-datum of red, regarded by Peirce as a “sign” of the presence of a red thing — such as a pillar box.

However, it seems difficult, anyway, to come up with examples of a “quali-sign” which can not be reduced to a ‘legi-sign’ or a ‘sin-sign.’

A possible, if far-fetched, candidate might be “white” as a symbol of purity, or 'red' as a symbol of scandal, or 'green' as the symbol of 'hope.'

Peirce’s two other trichotomies are said to depend on a different criterion: the relation of “sign” to its “object,”  i.e. depending on whether, roughly, a sign has character as sign depends on

1 — the sign being AS or LIKE or SIMILAR TO its object (“icon”) — as in a picture of Mona Lisa which resembles Mona Lisa, or 'miaow,' resembling the sound cats make.

or

2 — existentially related to the object (“index”) (e.g. “smoke means fire," or "smoke means smoked salmon)

or

3 — the sign being specially related to the object and the interpretant: a “symbol,” e.g. a conventional sign, as the red cross is the symbol of St. George, and by transference, Genoa, and England (The English were trading with the Genoans a lot then). 

Peirce’s third trichotomy is

1 — according as the interpretant or addressee represents it as sign of possibility: 

“rheme,” e.g. general expression.

(Austin was inspired by this with his 'rhetic' act). 

2 — as “sign of fact” (“dici-sign,” e.g. an indicative sentence, such as "It is raining") or

3 — “sign of reason” (an “argument” — self-explanatory, as in "My wife is in the kitchen; therefore, she is in the kitchen or in the garden.")

The examples I have given are from a language, such as English, or Deutero-Esperanto, or Humpty-Dumpty, or basic Pirotese.

However, this third trichotomy is designed to apply to any sign.

trichotomies

Trichotomy I:

1 quali-sign, or quality sign.

2 sinsign, or existent sign.

2 legi-sign, or nomological sign

Trichotomy II:

1 — icon — or roughly “picturing” or resembling sign.

2 — index — or roughly “indicating or pointing” sign.

3 — symbol — or roughly “conventional sign”

Trichotomy III:

1 — rheme — or roughly “word-like” sign.

2 — dici-sign — or roughly “telling” sign. (Peirce doesn't seem to have realised that 'in-DEX' and "DICI" are cognate!)

3 — argument — telling that or to) —no explanation needed. 

No ambiguity cases?

“An *indefinite* significant character, such as a tone of voice, can neither be called a Type nor a Token.”

“I propose to call such a Sign a Tone”.

“A Quali-sign, e. g., a feeling or sense-datum of ‘red,’ is any quality in so far as it is a sign, as in a traffic light."

I will set out these in some detail — beginning with the rheme-dicisign-argument trichotomy or triad.

While my interest is in analysing “... means ...”, I must inquire any light Peirce hung through on words allied to “mean” or indeed on any philosophical point reasonably germane to the subject.

“A Rheme is a sign which, for its interpretant is good."

Does this mean anything different from ‘interpretation’?

"A rheme is a sign of qualitative possibility, i. e., is understood as representing such and such a kind of possible object.”

“A rheme may afford some information; but it is not interpreted as doing so.”

Other things are said by Peirce about a rheme, but I do not think I will precisely assist you if I quoted from him!

Examples of Rhemes

— a (type or token) such ‘camel’ (and any general expression)— signifying an animal one finds in Egypt.

— the expression “this” (type or token)

— any Icon (e.g. a picture or map or diagram)

— a spontaneous cry (a very queer one)

— “Hullo!”

There are some obvious deficiencies here!

The use of “qualitative” seems to cut out from being a rheme a relation expression (“about”, “beyond”) or an adverb (“slowly”, “speedily”).

But Peirce would not want the “qualitative possibility” to exclude any descriptive expression.

More importantly, what Peirce says about a Rheme excludes one of his examples (“this”) from being a Rheme.

The expression “this” is neither a ‘quality’ expression nor a ‘descriptive’ expression, as Peirce himself is well aware.

We must then not regard Peirce as insisting on the “qualitative,” however interpreted (e.g. to cover every descriptive expression).

What can we take Peirce to be claiming a Rheme is?

Just any sign (i.e. roughly anything that means something, or that has a meaning), provided it is not a dici-sign (i.e. ‘telling’) or an argument; that is, though it does “mean” something, it claims or tells nothing, nor 'expresses' anything?

This I think is part of what Peirce is saying but only in part.

And then, Peirce ignores “possibility” altogether.

Even this is of some interest, for, given my purpose of analysing “... means ...”), it suggests (what may be obvious but overlooked) that the use of ‘... means ...,” as applied to a sentence (a ‘complete utterance’) is different from that in which ‘mean’ applies to an utterance part (an ‘incomplete utterance’).

Cf. Humpty Dumpty's

'glory'
'There's glory for you!'

What more may Peirce be saying?

‘A possibility’ is a ‘possibility that p.’

Consider Peirce’s example of “camel” — or “Wolf!”

In what way can ‘camel’ (or ‘wolf’) be a “sign” of a possibility *that* there are camels/wolves (that something is a camel/wolf)?

Not in the way of asserting or informing an addressee A that

a) there are camels/wolves.

Or

b) that it is possible *that* there are camels/wolves.

No assertion, by definition, can be made by a rheme.

Peirce may be trying to say what perhaps was not much more satisfactorily said by those philosophers (e.g. Russell) who, when discussing an expression referring to a universalium (Aristotle's 'kath'holou') we should take as an example not ‘red’ (or strictly ‘redness’), but

“x is red.”

— i. e., a sentential "function":

(Ex)Rx

A few points might be made interpretating this.

An expression like ‘red’, ‘camel’ is subject to type- or *category*-rules.

To explain these type- or category-rules is to explain how an expression may fit significantly in a sentential linguistic context.

You can not know the meaning of an expression — except perhaps “gavagai” — without knowing how to obey the type or category rules.

In the beginning there were no parts of speech.

Then Plato noticed 'noun' and 'verb' (onoma and rhema).

Aristotelian ended up with TEN parts of speech, surely!

How important is it that any explanation of the meaning of an expression consists in explaining the “meaning” (or the "sense," to use Fregean jargon) of a sentence containing it?

That implies that ‘mean’ is applicable to an utterance-part or expression “a posteriori” to a complete sentence.

The “meaning” of an utterance-PART ('glory') is to be analysed in terms of the meaning of the complete utterance ("There's glory for you!")

If so, this is important.

There are those philosophers who find it a mystery, like Stevenson, in one place, how it is that expressions with separate meaning “coalesce” to form a complexus with a meaning of its own (the utterance of a sentence): as if the meaning of the utterance of a sentence is a sort of curious quasi-chemical compound out of the meanings of the expressions in it. Stevenson even calls it the Principle of Compositionality!

Thus, Stevenson:

“One of the most difficult problems that a meaning-theory includes is that of explaining how each separate expression, each one with its own meaning, can combine to yield a sentence-meaning.”

“It is feasible perhaps to take each expression as having a “disposition” to affect cognition, just as a full utterance of a sentence does.”

"Glory" can occur in sentences like "There's glory for you."

“The problem reduces, then, to one of explaining the interplay of the “disposition” of each expression, now taken conjointly, or syntactically in concatenation:

THERE + IS + GLORY + FOR + YOU

Stevenson refers to the analogy of giving magnets a relation between individual and group tendencies.

This suggest that a Rheme ought to be on interpretation of definition a sign which something which means something (a sign) and though not itself a ‘telling’ or ‘claiming’ sign (dici-sign), nevertheless can function as constituent in ‘telling’ or ‘claiming’ sign a dici-sign, plus the sense of ‘mean’ applicable to Rheme explainable in terms of that applicable to a dic-isign.

But, if this so, a spontaneous cry (as Peirce says ‘sign' (indexical because it directs attention of the utterer U) is a very odd example of a Rheme.

It is certainly supposedly not a dici-sign in Peirce’s sense — in so far as its direction of attention.

This certainly does not seem to give any applicability of “mean” to it.

I doubt if there is any application from possibility of occurring in a ‘telling’ ‘complex’ sign.

The most a rheme can mean is “not a dic-isign” — i.e. only the negative part applies, and as Aristotle advices, "Avoid negative definitions."

And this is a queer example altogether, anyway.

Does the fact that if I sit on drawing pins and shout, thereupon people look at me?

Does the mere fact that the utterer U’s shout makes the addressee A look at the utterer U render the utterer U’s shout a “sign” (of the utterer U!)?

I feel inclined to say: No.

There may of course well be a non-linguistic rheme.

Peirce suggests any icon.

This I am not sure of.

But what about a conventional sign such as a map, a note such as “("♩ in musical notation, a naval flag (signalling), a black dot (meaning a town) in a map?

A rather malleable, elastic use of ‘rheme’ may have to be allowed.

But some of these items are rather like an expression in some respects.

In respect to language, however, sometimes there seems to be yet a different use of rheme.

“A dici-sign necessarily involves, as a part of it, a rheme, to describe which fact it is interpreted as indicating”.

A rheme seems to be not an expression but as it were a sentence “frame” (with a 'gap sign' for any expression e.g. a demonstrative — used to refer to an individual).

There is no suggestion that a “dici-sign” contains more than one “rheme.”

The rheme then is

— any sign which, though not a dici-sign, has a ‘meaning’ explainable in terms of ‘mean’ as applied to a dici-sign possible appearance as constituent of a dici-sign (and therefore of ‘mean’ as applied to a dicisign) e.g. any expression.

— a sentence “frame” with a 'gap sign' for a ‘referring’ expression.

— any sign which is not a dici-sign or an argument.

The right and general way of distinguishing a dici-sign from another sign is by the fact that a dici-sign is that which is informative or gives information to some addressee.

But this is clearly only an approximation to Peirce’s doctrine.

For, by this account, only an indicative sentence,  among all sentences, would be a dic-isign.

Let me first quote a passage from Peirce which supplements the first rough account of the meaning of ‘dic-isign’:

“A symbol is, by nature, in the ‘indicative’, or as it should be called the “declarative” mode.”

“Of course, they can go to the expression of any other mode, since we may declare assertion to be doubtful, or a mere interrogation, or an imperative requisite.”

"By a rheme, much the same as, a maturer version of, a dici-sign, I mean a sign which is equivalent to a grammatical sentence, whether it be Interrogative, Imperative, or Assertory," i.e. assertoric, or alethic. 

This no doubt, as Peirce indicates, represents a development of the notion of a Dic-isign.

“A dici-sign is not an assertion, but is a sign CAPABLE, perhaps by paraphrase, of being asserted.”

“But an assertion is a dici-sign.”

“The act of an assertion is not a pure act of signification.”

“The act of an assertion is an exhibition of the fact that the utterer U subjects himself to the penalities visited on a liar or dishoneset man if the proposition asserted is not true.”

“The Replica or Token of a dicent symbol is a Dicent Sin-sign Token of a peculiar kind.”

“This is easily seen to be true when the information the Dicent Symbol conveys is an actual fact.”

“When that information is or gets to be a real law, rather, it is not true in the same fullness.”

Peirce unfortunately goes on to say that a Dicent Sin-sign cannot convey any information about a law.

I am really not concerned with Peircean “scholarship,” charming as it miht be, but with what we can get from him here at Oxford.

I shall thus ignore this, which is due I think to a persistent assumption that general information may only be conveyed by a type — not a token.

This is connected with Peirce’s description of a type as a law.

The important point is the emphasis on the difference between a Type and a Token Dici-sign.

We can provide some examples of dicent signals signs:

— an indicative sentence.

— a weather cock (+ natural signs usually) +

— a photograph

— a combination of an icon and an index — e.g. a painting of the Mona Lisa.

I do not propose here to talk about the application of the ‘dici-sign’ outside of language.

I reserve this for the time, should that time arise, when we include Peirce’s other two trichotomies of a “sign.”

There is something funny (if not amusing, necessarily) about putting a weather cock and a picture in the same basket.

Peirce is, I think, saying that a dicent (or a rheme at least— amended dicent) need not be indicative.

Imperatives (such as the sargent's "Stop!"), etc., count as well.

But Peirce seems to be saying something more; something expressed by some other philosophers when they say that the same *proposition* (or phrastic) may be object of this or that psychological "attitude" (neustic).

ψp

The door is closed, yes.
The door is closed, please.

A clear way of saying something like this is found indeed in R. M. Hare (“Imperative sentences,” “Mind,” 49). He charmingly confesses that for his Oxon. disseration he used dictum and dictor for phrastic and neustic. He'll later add 'tropic' and 'clistic.'

Peirce:

“The proposition need not to be asserted or

judged.”

“A proposition may be contemplated as a “sign” capable of being asserted or denied.”

Cited by Ogden/Richards.

   

Hare’s purpose, however, is no doubt different from Peirce’s!

There are a few points which I think Peirce is getting at, with varying degrees of clearness, that are connected with a distinction we may want to draw between

— what a sentence S means (in general; timeless ‘means’; if you like, the meaning of (type) sentence) and

— what an *utterer* U commit himself to by the use of an utterance of that sentence S — if you like, connect this with, or state it in terms of, token sentences.

In a discussion of these points, the expression ‘sentence’ should be taken to be “non-misleadingly indicative sentence.”

The type of sentence I am talking about is the indicative sentence, and no such consideration as whether it really has e.g. an imperative “force” is relevant — though the point I am making I think applies just as much to the realm of an imperative or optative sentence (!p) as much as it applies to an indicative sentence (⊢p).

In what follows here I am under great general debt to P. F. Strawson who first pointed out to me the importance of the kind of distinctions here to be made, and applied it himself in interesting cases (such as a “description” like “the king of France”) and from which I’ve learnt a great deal.

I cannot however suppose assume that Strawson would like my methods!

Things having meaning:

— items with meaning independent on communication. (Possibilities):

— items with ‘natural’ meaning.

All ‘information’ is a sign of ‘dicent.’

— cases where “x means y” and the connection is a purely regulative, inferential, natural concomitance (e.g. “smoke 'means' fire.”)

— likeness or resemblance between x and y absent (e.g. “smoke 'means' fire.”)

— likeness or resemblance between x and y present — e.g. a photograph.

— cases where “x means y” and the concomitance is not purely natural, but dependent on a human decision, practice, or convention — e.g. “That tie knot means (or what meant by the tailor) he is the groom in the wedding.”

b. Items with meaning dependent on communication. Possibilities:

—‘rhemes’(words, etc.)

incomplete utterances

(e.g. ‘rhematic’)

— descriptive

— logical

— referring/indicating

— complete utterance

— those with conventional meaning.

— linguistic

— non-linguistic — e.g. a diagramme, a map, etc.

— those with non-conventional meaning.

This list is of course not meant to be exhaustive, inevitable, accurate, or even clear, but that’s an Oxford seminar for you!

     

One point concerns what Peirce is quite clearly I think getting at in the quotation.

Peirce obviously has in mind cases such as following:

— a case in which the utterer (a nun, say) says a sentence — “God exists.” — to herself, contemplatively.

— a case where the utterer U says the sentence aloud, ‘assertively,’ in company, with other nuns, ssay.

There may be a difference between what the sentence the utterer U uses means and what the utterer commits himself to.

In both cases, the meaning of the sentence is the same: "God exists" = "God is a spatio-temporal continuant.")

But while in the first case the utterer U commits himself (perhaps) to nothing at all, in the second case he does!

But a difference between a committal and non-committal of utterer U is not a difference of meaning (ambiguity, polysemy)  in the sentence.

I think this point can quite well be made with. regard to such a pair of cases, but for my simplicity (and indeed extension of Peirce), I shall suppose we are concerned with two different ‘public’ utterances of the same sentence.

Suppose I find the sentence

“On the first day of January of 1938, the whole of the French Riviera was in a state of panic.”

a) in a history book by Trevelyan.

b) in a novel by Somerset Maugham

If I put an “x” in the margin of a history book, I shall no doubt be a nuisance, but if I do so in the margin of the novel, I shall be a fool or an idiot as well.

It is inappropriate to criticise a statement in a novel (of the kind in question) on the grounds of truth or falsity, although you sometimes FEEL like so doing in Somerset Maugham's case!

Nevertheless, the sentence has one and only one meaning (i. e., it is in no way ambiguous, or polysemous), nor has any private (special, real) meaning been attached to it by either utterer U1 and U2.

But whereas the historian — Trevelyan, our U1 — has committed himself, the novelist Somerset Maugham — our U2 — has not!

This example does however reveal a distinction in the use of ‘mean.’

The sentence s means just one area: the Riviera.

The historian Trevelyan, our U1, says s and presumably means what he said.

The novelist Somerset Maugha, our U2, said/wrote s but did NOT "quite" mean it. 

Cf. spoken cases “An Englishman, a Scotsman, and an Irishman ...”

We have to neglect the fact that there is a difference between

— saying something which means that p.

and

— saying something and meaning it.

Or conveying explicitly "You're the cream in my coffee" and meaning it (via disimplicature).

This neglect of the notion of assertion (or self-committal) may lead to some queer views about sentences in works of fiction.

Seeing that ‘true’ and ‘false’ cannot appropriately be applied (though they can be in some sentences in ordinary life), we may want to say that we have here this or that *level* or stratum (as Waismann would have it) of language, a special sort of ambiguity, or polysemy, or open texture, or we might want to assimilate it to some ‘systematic’ ambiguity.

I have heard something like this been suggested — indeed by Waissman, but he was translating from his vernacular German!

Or, if we are very very old-fashioned, most ‘likely’ to say s, and we are not being happy about saying s, we might lean to a fictional world in which a fictional sentence *is* true! (In Apollodorus's Bibliotheca, it is true that Pegasus flies). 

But a novelist like Somerset Maugham talks since quite *unambiguously*; only he does not assert!

A different point Is I think what Peirce is rather dimly groping after, and it concerns the distinction between

— what a sentence s means.

and

— what *an utterer U* means by uttering the sentence.

This is becoming very much my own rhapsody on a mere *theme* by Peirce!

But I think it is pretty important!

This point concerns the distinction between

— what a sentence s means.

and

— what an utterer U of sentence s commits himself to — i. e., what information the sentence s is used by to convey.

They are not the same though they may well coincide!

Only in a limit or borderline case would an utterer U not commit himself to anything ("You're the cream in my coffee," a total disimplicature). 

But what an utterer U commits himself to cannot be identified with what the sentence s U utters means!

This may often be represented as a distinction between

— what s means.

—what s meant.

—what utterer U means by s.

An obvious case is where s, as uttered by U, has a special meaning, this difference depending on the utterer U’s use of some descriptive expression in s.

“He was caught in the grip of a vyse.”

A carpenter's tool or something like a sin?

This may be too obvious to need clarification, but great perplexities may arise from ignoring — as Witters always and Austin often do — this kind of distinction!

My idea of implicature or implicatum is meant to remedy Peirce’s travesty!

Or cf. Hare’s example in “The language of morals” about the use of “good” by a somewhat “fossilised Indian Army officer” — as he disrespectfully calls him!

This is of course a localised habit of use, not an individual occasion (“particularised”) use.

Peirce is not here talking about this sort of distinction.

I put it in for completeness!

Suppose I find on p. 10 of a book I am reading the sentence

“Smith is a widower.”

And on p. 40 sentence,

“Smith lost his wife”.

I think it would be not incorrect to say that the sentence

“Smith is a widower.”

as used on p. 10, and the sentence

“Smith lost his wife.”

as used on p. 40, have the same meaning (mean the same); or perhaps to make things quite clear, “the sentences as such, have the same meaning”.

Nevertheless, if there is some question as to whether the “Smith” in each case is the same person, and it turns out to be that a different person is meant, I think we might well say:

“The author did NOT here (i.e. in the two places) mean the same by them because he was referring to different people: Smith-1 and Smith-2.

Cf. The prime minister is a great man.

Wilson?

It is clear that, when in conversation, we get at cross purposes because of muddles about the reference of a referring expression, we can start to clear up by saying:

“Oh, but we did not *mean* the same thing!”

I think it is this sort of things that Peirce has in mind.

And I think it is not incorrect to say that, where people use type-sentences which have the same meaning, they may nevertheless mean different things (because of difference of reference or denotata); i.e. they commit what they commit themselves to, and the information the sentence used to convey, may differ in different cases of use of 2 (type) sentences, even though the sentences (as such) have the same meaning.

Some type-sentences (unambiguous, monoguous, monosemous) may be used to convey different information on different occasions.

But there is another side to the coin equally obvious when pointed out, but perhaps even more overlooked.

Sentences with *different* meanings may be used to convey the *same* information!

E.g.

An utterer U utters

“I have a pain.”

Some other utterer, U2, to convey the same information, utters:

“He has a pain.”

No one would want to deny that, as such, these sentences have different meanings!

You may think this is all trivial and obvious; but often overlooked. 

Cf. brilliant A. E. Duncan-Jones, an Oxonian, on ‘Fugitive propositions’ in “Analysis.”

But it all has, I think, a number of less obvious applications of considerable interest.

Though this not arising directly from Peirce having got so far, I think I must briefly show why I said

— what the utterer U commits oneself to by using s.

and

— the information s used to convey.

is not identical.

Take a very obvious case:

“Smith has not left off beating his wife.”

Suppose this is said to me, and suppose I know Smith has *never* stopped beating his wife.

Would I say that U said is false?

It is obviously not true.

I may reply,

“That is true!”

Some other utterer, say, Strawson, may avoid giving a direct answer and say e.g.

“The question whether Smith has left off beating his wife does not arise, since he never started.”

Have we then a case, as Strawson suggests, to which the law of excluded middle does not apply?

I don't think so! We can presuppose and we can implicate. In the affirmative, it's entailment, in the negative, it's implicature (and cancellable, since non-factive)

This depends to *what* the utterer applies the Law of the Excluded Middle.

In this case, I suggest the reason why we do not apply true or false to statement in question is because can be set out as follows:

The information which utterer U uses s to convey is about the process consisting of Smith’s not beating his wife, and is to the effect that this is going on.

But since some process was allegedly *presupposed*, that there was such a process was *presupposed* (implied, conversationally implicated, taken for granted).

It was *not* part of the information being conveyed explicitly or primarily. It has 'common-ground' status, rather.

Nevertheless, U might not commit himself to there have been such a process.

The utterer cannot say:

“Smith has left off beating his wife, but he did not start.”

— but U2 can utter:

“Smith has not left beating his wife because he did not start.”

I distinguish then what an utterer U commit to (i.e. that Smith had beaten his wife, but no longer does so) from the information that s is used to convey (i.e. about the said process and so, that it is no longer going on).

If we want to *preserve*, as I do, The Law of The Excluded Middle, it would seem that the obvious thing to do is to say that it does not state or assert (but implicates, in a cancellable) that information.

A sentence used to convey some information may be true or false.

What an utterer U commits to must also be true or false.

I suggest we cast a great doubt about the use of ‘proposition.’

A sentence express some proposition — or dictum, or dictor, to use R. M. Hare’s jargon.

A sentence s expresses proposition p iff

— s means that p.

— U commits to p.

— s is uttered by u to give some information to addressee A.

One of Peirce’s trichotomies or triads of the “sign” is

1 — icon

2 — index

3 — symbol

Very roughly, we might distinguish any of these three classes as follows:

A sign s is an icon in virtue of its likeness to an object o.

A sign s is an “index” in virtue of a causal (temporal or spatio-temporal) connection with an object

A s sign is a “symbol” in virtue of a convention.

Peirce says that this the icon-index-symbol trichotomy or triad is in respect of or under the criterion of the relation of the sign s to its object o.

But the icon-index-symbol trichotomy or triad also seems to serve as an elucidation of expressions such as “in some respect or capacity” or “ground of representation.”

There is evidence that this applies not only the verb ‘mean,’ but also to ‘sign of ...,’ ‘sign that ...,’ ‘indicates,’ etc.

It seems appropriate in ordinary usage to some of Peirce’s cases examples of an “index.”

It is important to distinguishing some features constitutive of an “index.”

“An “index” is a “sign,” or representation, which refers to an “object,” o, not so much because of any similarity or analogy with it, nor because it is associated with general characters which that object o happens to possess, as because it is in dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the individual object o, on the one hand, but, on the other hand, with the senses or memory of the addressee for whom it serves as a “sign,” while demonstrative and personal.”

“An “index” may be distinguished from another sign or representation by three characteristic marks."

An index has no significant resemblance to its object o.

An index refers to an individual, or a single collections of units or single continua.

An index direct the addressee’s attention to its objects by blind compulsion.

“An “index” is a sign which would, at once, lose the characters which makes it a sign if its object is removed.”

“An index does NOT lose that character if there is no  addressee.”

“A piece of mould with a bullet hole in it is an “index” of a shot.”

“Without the shot, there would be no hole.”

“But there *is* a hole, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not.”

“A genuine Index and its Object o must both be existent individuals.”

The salient features of an index seem to be:

An index would lose its charact

Both the index and its object are individuals.

An index would lose character which makes it a sign were there no object, but not were there no "interpretant.”

Here we can fairly clearly substitute ‘interpreter,’ or addressee.

An “index” to an object o not so much because of similarity or analogy (hence the contrast with an “icon”) nor by asseveration (? = “just makes me think is so-and-so.”

“I always associate you with that symphony because we heard it together.”

The association is due to a dynamical (causal or spatio-temporal) connetion with an object o.

An “index” directs the addressee’s attention to an object o, and does so by ‘blind compulsion.’

An index asserts nothing.

In this, an index connects with the imperative mood.

Some examples:

That man’s rolling gait is an index of that man is being a sailor.

The position of that weathercock is an index of the direction of the wind.

The compass of that sundial (or clock) is an index of the time of day.

Letters vici names. a said to b that c’s etc.

That yardstick is an index of one yard.

A demonstrative pronoun and a personal pronoun (like “I”).

An expression connected with a “quantified variable,” such as “any,” “all,” “no,” “some,” “something,” “a,” “a few;” “nearly all,” “allied’ ‘a few’; ‘nearly all’ etc.

The index and its object are each an individual.

Peirce appears to go against this so far as it concerns the index, when he classifies a demonstrative pronoun like “this” as an “indexical legisign.”

Peirce also classifies a personal pronoun and a demonstrative pronoun as, each, a “sub-index,” describing it as “a sign which is rendered such” principally by an actual connection with its object.”

A subindex is not an index because a sub index is not an individual.

Peirce seems to use be Using “index” so that nothing but an individual can be an index, but surely a non-individual can be ‘indexical’.

The point is, of course, that one can give some rule general for the use of a word like ‘this’, or ‘I.’

But this rule would, of course, be a rule governing the use of the pronoun in a particular concept, or context, a condition governed by its having a reference in such a context..

Moreover, although I may give a general explanation of some of its use, I should be very chary in general of saying, e.g., that ‘I’ or “this” means such and such.

In general, if asked what ‘this’ means, I should turn the question.

“It is a demonstrative pronoun.”

An index can be used like a legi-sign (type) in a general statement like:

A black cloud 'means; rain.

As regards the object being an individual, this seems to depend on how we interpret ‘object.’

It seems clear that whenever we use a word like “this.”

Consider for a moment such an index as a particular black cloud.

A black cloud 'means' rain.

Cf.

That cloud 'means' rain.

“Those spots 'mean' measles.”

Smoke 'means' fire.

That smoke 'means' fire.

That smoke indicates a fire somewhere.

There are signs of mice here.

All these end with substantives.

All can be replaced by a ‘that’-clause.

I cannot think of any examples of a natural sign where this cannot be done.

If ‘object’ being an individual is held to support this can’t be done in some cases, it is wrong to say that the object must be an individual.

I cannot say, after finding a fire:

“That fire is what the smoke indicated.”

What I learn from a black cloud is always no doubt something about some specific individual, or set of individuals.

A similar point seems to apply with regards to some fact (e.g. the fact that ... can be put in, at any rate in singular ‘mean’ etc. statements).

Perhaps then a defining characteristic of this type at any rate of index this statement about its ‘meaning’ etc. ... appropriate sense must be expandable of both as regards subject and predicate into that clauses with some spatio-temporal restriction, to distinguish them from cases like “The fact that...”

How then This would however seem to about an object or the same that item that class to abut some individual or set of individuals, more or less indefinitely.

Consider together

— “... refers to object because of dynamical connection with object”

— “... would lose character which makes it sign were there no object but not were there no interpretant.”

— “... directs attention to object by blind compulsion.”

It seems fairly clear that, in connection with some of Peirce’s examples, these descriptions read very oddly indeed (e.g. demonstratives) but in connection with others not so oddly.

Let us consider the more favourable cases, e. g. what would obviously count as a natural sign.

What first is force of “refers to object because of dynamical connection” “would lose character which makes it sign if no object”.

The dynamical connection must obviously be a *causalist* connection, which may (but only may) include spatial connection in any very obvious way (e.g. exceptional sounds from weather may be indices (mean/indicate/be signs of/telling about) namely indices of behaviour of wood cuttings).

An index may have spatial but no a *causalist* connection (e.g. “landmark” which would I think fit under the head of indices)

Let us consider only a *causalist* connection.

Peirce’s remarks about the bullet hole (which means that a bullet has passed through, or was a sign of a bullet having passed through) is unfortunate.

For, obviously, there might have been a hole without a bullet.

Someone might have bred it.

I suggest that what Peirce is saying is then that for a sign to be index, it is logically necessary both that its object should exist and that there should be causal connection between sign and object.

The presence of a sign of certain such and such kind is thus causally connected with an object causally necessary for the production of the effect on an interpreter or addressee which constitutes being interpreted.

For the position of weathercock to mean or be an index to someone of the direction of wind:

The wind must, by itself, be in required direction.

Being so must be causally connected with the position of the weathercock.

The position of the weathercock linked in this way with the direction of wind is causally necessary required (meaning) for the production of the effect by the sign on interpreter or addressee as being interpreted as sign.

What follows of course strenghtens the causalist necessity bond about ‘blind compulsion’ adds something to the second condition; something more than mere not just that weathercock + causalist link known to be there.

It looks as if this is all that has to be there, or at least that something else is not required — e.g. contribution from interpreter.

As far as the second condion goes, clearly that the direction of the wind should actually be as indicated is not causally required for production of effect on interpreter.

Most that can be required is GENERAL causal connection of weathercock with the direction of the wind, and the interpreter’s knowledge of these.

The addressee might obviously be mistaken about the general causal connection.

The addresssee may think there is one when there is not.

Of course the direction of the wind must be as indicated, if interpretation is to be “correct.”

What is causally required is the position of the weathercock, plus some interpreter’s *belief* in a general causal connection.

Let us analyse Peirce’s “index” in terms of the verb “to mean.”

Peirce may be understood as saying that, in some appropriate use of “mean,” the position of the weathercock 'means' that the position of the wind is north-east.

This entails that the direction of the wind is north-east.

It also entails that there is a causal connection that holds between the direction of the wind and the position of the weathercock.

This seems right and useful.

Compare other uses of ‘mean.’

A conversation at bus stop as bus goes:

A: Those three rings of the bell mean that the bus is full!

B: But *is* it full?

This seems all right for ‘means’, but doesn’t seem to hold for the other words in terms of which possible to interpret index — e.g. Peirce’s own word ‘indicate’ and allied words.

I certainly can say

“The position of the weathercock is an indication that the direction of wind is north-east, but actually it is south-east!”

I think (though I am not at all happy) I can say:

“The position ___ indicated that ___, but actually it was not!”

I do not think I can say (though again I am doubtful)

“The position ___ was a sign that ___, but actually it was not!”

But case obviously clear for that

“x means p” (in this use) entails p.

For other words, an analogous “entailment” alla Moore does not hold or remain uncertain.

What does ‘directs attention by blind compulsion’ and ‘would not lose character if not interpreted’ add?

Does this tell us anything to identify a natural sign?

First, it is not true that all signs which we should count to classify with weathercock (i.e. natural sign) direct by blind compulsion, if this means that that interpreter does not have to think in order to interpret.

A sign may be just “hard to read”!

And a conventional sign (a symbol) which Peirce wants to distinguish in virtue of the *absence* of this ‘blind compulsion’ to say don’t work by blind compulsion may be very easy to read.

Peirce is right in that it is a feature which distinguishes “non-natural” “meaning” from “natural” “meaning”, that a certain sort of special contribution is required for the interpreter.

A difficulty for Peirce’s general triadic view of “meaning” supported by his remarks about character of sign is not lost if there is no interpreter.

In the use of ‘mean’ appropriate to the weathercock, the it doesn’t see that

‘x means that p’

requires to be expanded to any form involving “means to someone”.

It does I think entail something about “meaning to someone”, but only in very timid way.

“x means p” seems to entail

“if x meant to someone that p, he would be correct.”

Or

If anyone interpreted x to mean p, he would be correct.

But this is like

“It is raining”

entails:

If anyone believes it is raining he is right.

— which obviously does not help to explain the meaning of ‘it is raining’.

As for the “icon”’s main features

An icon refers to object o that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own which it possesses just the same whether or not object exists.

Anything is an icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and it is used as a sign of it.

Icon is a sign which would possess character which renders it significant even though object had no existence.

Here Peirce makes a Reference to “algebraical icons.”

A great distinguishing property of the icon is that, by direct observation of it, other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction.

e.g. a map would be example.

You can plot places by being at distance from a given place and the measure e.g. distances between them.

This is of importance to Peirce’s theory of inference.

Every symbol replaceable by icons (? image or picture: verifiability business)

Examples of icon:

A Picture

An Architect or an artist drawing for work

Donkey (?) icon of zebras (if I agree by analogy from resemblance of zebras to donkeys, that zebras likely to be obstinate).

A Map

A diagram

A Mental image

A Mathematical or a physical formula

An Icon is distinguished into ‘images’ (simple likeness)

‘diagrams’ (analogy of relations)

metaphor (I think this is meant to cover donkey/

zebra case)

Formulae do not really conform to test without further benefit.

I do not derive a new truth from a formula by inspecting it, but by deriving things from it according to  some rule.

Much of what Peirce has to say about the nature of the relevant inferential processes (or diagrams) is of interest.

A Photograph is not an icon because of the “physical forcing” of conformity to original.

“Anything whatever, be it quality, existent individual, or law, is an Icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing and used as a sign of it”.

As for Peirce’s Symbol, the great emphasis on symbols as of conventional nature.

Symbols must be general in meaning, because general in nature-type.

“Symbols connected with object by virtue of idea of symbol-using mind without which no such connection would exist.”

“Symbol ‘man’ general mode of succession of three sounds or representamens of sounds which becomes sign only in fact that a habit or acquired law will cause replicas of it to be interpreted as meaning a man or men.”

“A Symbol is a sign which would lose the character that renders it a sign if there were no interpretant.”

“Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of being understood to have that signification.”

Symbols words + sentences (type)

Sometimes combination of icon and index.

Symbol

— would lose the character which renders it sign if no interpretant

— e.g. speech utterance, which signifies what it does only by virtue of being understood to have that signification.

— general mode (case of word ‘man’ in this case sentence (the use of) a general mode of succession of three sounds — /m/ /a/ /n/ — or representamens of sounds [writing “m-a-n”] which becomes a sign only in the fact that a habit, or acquired law, will cause replicas of it to be interpreted as meaning a man or men.

The obvious contrast here is with icons and indices, most notably indices (no blind compulsion).

Again (cf. index) does render = logically ‘makes’ it sign causally ‘makes’

“The symbol is connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the symbol-using mind, without which no such connection would exist”.

“It is a general mode of succession of three sounds or representamens of sounds, which becomes a sign only in the fact that a habit, or acquired law, will cause replicas of it to be interpreted as meaning a man or men”.

“A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant.”

“Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification”.

If ‘logically makes,’ Peirce is saying that it is logically impossible for p to be sign (symbol) if no interpretant.

Cf. in case of speech utterance, when it looks as if Peirce is saying that a “speech utterance cannot signify (to someone) without being understood to

signify it.”

But this looks as if it only amounts to saying “a symbol cannot be interpreted without being interpreted”.

True, but of course not peculiar to a symbol.

Is Peirce saying that the peculiarity of a symbol is that, for a token symbol to be interpreted, it is causally necessary that the interpreter should have know what a general proposition to the effect that type symbol means such and such?

But again, this does not seem peculiar to symbols.

Surely, to interpret a particular occurrence of a sentence, it is at least causally (perhaps logically) requisite that the interpreter should know something general about what sentence (or sentence of such and such a kind in such cases) means or probably means.

It’s no good trying to avoid this by saying that to interpret a token of a symbol, the interpreter has to know what type of symbol in general means (in use of ‘mean’ appropriate to ‘symbol’).

This may be true, but obviously of no use for distinguishing a symbol — and with it special use of ‘mean’ attached to symbols.

Let us use “mean” to analyse this use.

Peirce would be saying

“x is symbol (i.e. meanss something)

iff

— an interpretation (= knowing what x means in particular occasions is dependent on knowing what interpreter’s knowing what x means-s in general.

This seems to suggest that distinguishing peculiarity of symbols (i.e. something which means-s) is that the interpretation of occurrence (the token) of x depends on the interpreter’s having some habit.

This is not unlike what Stevenson says about an “elaborate process of conditioning.”

But it seems in fact impossibly crude and probably much cruder than Peirce thought because of his assumption that the interpreter’s conditioning is irrelevant to the functioning of an index.

Peirce might mean something like this:

A sign s is a symbol s

iff

for s on a given occasion to produce whatever reaction it is which constituted the interpretation of s (being taken to mean this or that), it is necessary that the interpreter or addressee A should know or believe that s (type) in general produces a reaction of that kind.

e.g. to take a rocket to mean distress, I must know or believe that that is how it would usually be taken.

Not so in

“Smoke 'means' fire.”

But, although this a fair line for getting at an important distinction in at least two main uses of “mean,” it cannot do as I stated it.

You might have an ultra-timid race which would *never* take smoke to mean fire when assured that others so look it.

This would not mean that smoke has a different sort of ‘meaning’ for them.

More next week.

Enjoy your weekend!

Which are the salient features of Peirce’s three trichotomies of “sign” that excite special comment?

One salient feature is having a demonstrative pronoun such as “this,” along with a weathercock, under the heading, “Index”!

Admittedly, this is different from crypto-techical “first dicent rhematic” and “second ‘dicent” — but still rather queer!

An icon is said be a non-assertive, i. e. a non-dicent rhema.

A symbol excludes a demonstrative, a diagram and any icon.

Yet, an icon and an index (picture + gesture, picture + name) is allowed to constitute a symbol (and presumably also a dicent).

A symbol has to be ‘general’ in meaning.

An icon may be a portrait, an artist’s ‘cartoon’, a map, a diagram — as well as a “logical icon.”

The distinguishing feature of an icon is said to be that “by direct observation of it, other truths concerning its object o can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction”

A rhema may be a picture (and an argument of rhematic indices) and an expression, i.e., things whose sign status has nothing to do with occurrence in dicent signs, together with things whose sign status *is* dependant on the occurrence in a dicisign.

It is clear that nearly all the oddities of Peirce’s classification spring from his trying to make a single heading do more than one classificatory job at a time, together with one or two rather perverse assimilations.

Further, one very important (I think the fundamental) classification of the sign (and distinction of uses of ‘meaning’) has been gained by the classification, even if Peirce was unaware of it.

It emerges from time to time in Peirce’s comments on his classification, and that is the distinction between

A sign which owes its having a meaning to its (roughly) constituting (or capacity to constitute) a communication [or to their function in what constitutes a communication] and

A sign whose meaning is NOT a matter of its communicative or communication-function — e.g. a ‘natural’ sign.

Although he is aware of this distinction, Peirce does not bring it to the fore, and, consequently, it is never investigated.

Rather, it is mixed up with other distinctions which seem to be posterior to it from the point of view of the explanatory procedure, e.g. the distinctions between a conventional and a non-conventional sign, or between a linguistic and a non-linguistic sign, or between a descriptive and a referring, or indicating, sign.

Take ‘Symbol’ to begin with.

Peirce’s account of the meaning of a symbol [e.g. “conventional signs, or one depending upon habit, inborn or acquired”] seems either an attempt to confine the symbol to conventional signs (with not very satisfactory explanation of conventional signs) or else extend meaning of the symbol to such extent as to consider pretty well any sign [depends on meaning of his ‘or’].

Anyway, Peirce’s emphasis on ‘conventional’ nature of symbols is pretty heavy.

Then it is recognized that e.g. a diagram has highly conventional character; but nevertheless a diagram does not count as a symbol because “we can get more information by direct observation”.

This seems not a bad attempt to distinguish certain conventional or semi-conventional non-linguistic notational devices from linguistic ones (also conventional).

Again, we find it recognized that an icon and index (Peirce’s example is bad, but a personal picture and pointing would do) recognized as symbol.

Here we do seem to have recognition of a distinction between symbol (here roughly device for communication, whether conventional or not) and other signs.

Perhaps this distinction would have been recognized more clearly, if Peirce had not assumed that an icon per se cannot be a dicisign.

Peirce’s motives are good (namely the recognition that, for information to be conveyed, we must must have, in addition to a device for saying revealing what sort of information to be conveyed, also the means for locating or identifying that to which information refers).

But Peirce fails to see that icon and sentence may be in just same position in that respect.

Suppose I have on the wall

— a picture of Smith

— a placard with “Smith is there” written on it.

Suppose then we hear a loud noise outside the door.

I could then convey the information by taking up and showing to the addressee either the placard or the picture (with or without pointing).

The point is that icon and context alone and non-linguistic context alone, as also sentence and non-linguistic context alone, may “make assertion”, as it were.

A similar point can be made in connection with the dici-sign.

Peirce rightly in case of a demonstrative, wrongly in case of a natural sign connects indices with “quasi-imperatives”.

But he says a weathercock is a dicisign.

A weathercock is a dicisign not because it “as it were tells us to” but because it “as it were tells us that”; i.e. we learn that from it.

This I think of same value as pointer to why one word ‘mean’ has such variety of different uses in connection with “what we can learn from things.”

But obviously there is a vast difference between why and which a natural and other signs tell us things.

This is marked by Peirce only by whether a dicisign is an index or a symbol.

Peirce is implying the need for a widest case of ‘symbol’, to distinguish communication from non-communication.

A similar point can be made in connection with rheme.

A rheme sometimes “elements in” communication, sometimes any non-informative sign.

A further complication through tying up symbol with ‘descriptive’ sign (or as he much less clearly says, signs with ‘general’ meaning).

This cuts out a demonstrative from a symbols although obviously conventional.

Instead, Peirce makes a highly shaky assimilation between ademonstrative and an indexical sign (which leads him to say very wrong dubious things about a demonstrative, e.g. that there is a ‘real’ connection between a demonstrative and its object.

Pierce fails to realize consistently (though on occasion seems to get across) that although the expression “this” is non-general (if that means non-descriptive), nonetheless ‘this’ has general meaning in the sense that there are general rules (non defining) for use of ‘this.’

Peirce fails to notice that from a natural sign one learns both what to expect and often where to expect it (i.e. indexical sign in a way analogous to combination of demonstrative + descriptive), and has been over imposed by contr very clearly explicit comparison between signs which have function of indicating individual, + signs from which we can learn something about an individual (indexical sign).

The class of the icon is rather a jumble.

It  seems to include

—things that remind one of something (pictures on wall: no genuine use of ‘mean’ applicable here),

— a sketch

— a diagrams to aid construction of something (no ‘meaning’ here either)

— the use of pictures (or imitative gestures?) in communication (but here often we want to rule out what Peirce describes as distinguishing feature of icons, namely that by direct inspection we can learn more about object than is necessary for construction of icons; e.g.

if I draw a bird, I impart information about the presence of some bird or other, I shall make drawing as sketchy as is compatible with recognition as bird, just to prevent the addressee from studying picture further to learn details about bird.

I try to avoid making it like a map.

This cannot distinguish it from a map or a diagram, about which Peirce good (apart from logical diagrams).

Here there is a point that I resort to a drawing + to a diagram if language breaks down; but to drawings, if e.g. no intelligible language to hand, or physical impediment to use of language, to images e.g. if language would be impossibly lengthy or difficult to follow.

It doesn’t seem as if mere likeness is ever per se justification of use of ‘meaning’.

E.g. a photograph (indexical) requires causal link; the use of drawing or map requires additional special coincidences to make us use a communication willing to say that we have here case of communication.

I should not really be in a position to assess Peirce’s theory of a “sign” until I have some fairly good idea of the nature of the distinctions that have been or might be drawn within the body of “sign.”

For until I have a fairly clear notion of the similarities and differences among the entities which Peirce calls a ‘sign’, I cannot really judge down whether a single general theory of a “sign” is a possibility, and Incertainly cannot be in any very good position to decide which question (or questions) should be answered by such a theory.

I shall, therefore, at any rate, say only as much about Peirce’s claims about “sign” in general, as it is necessary as a preliminary tonconsidering his three detailed trichotomies of ‘signs.’

I shall try, at this stage at any rate, to evade the many difficulties raised by what Pierce has to say about a sign, or a sign-situation, to use Ogden’s and Richards’s phrase.

“A sign s, or representamen r, is something which stands to some interpretant i for some object o in some respect or capacity.”

“It addresses an interpretant, i. e., it creates in the mind of the interpretant an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign.”

That sign s2 which the first s1 creates I call the “interpretant” of the first sign.

The sign s1 stands for some object o.

It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which call “the ground of the representamen.”

Peirce goes on to give an extremely unclarifying explanation of ‘idea’ here, which I think we can safely ignore.

Some sense can be made of the notion of the ‘ground of a representamen’ if (I hope the right sense) if ‘feature’ or ‘property’ or ‘characteristic’ be substituted for ‘idea’.

Peirce is, I think, simply saying that if x ‘stands for’ (‘is a sign of’ ‘represent’) y, this is always because of some particular feature which x has —e.g. its likeness to y.

The sign-object-interpretant is, Peircecsays, “a genuine triadic relation, that is its three members, or better, terms, are bounded together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of more primitive *dyadic* relations”.

A sign is a representamen with a mental interpretant.

In the passage from which these quotations are taken, and I think in many other places in Peirce’s work, an interpretant of a sign is regarded as being ‘mental’ in the sense of being a ‘thought.’

This is complicated by Peirce’s occasional distinctions between different kinds of interpretants.

However, this does not affect the fact that the kind of interpretant with which Peirce normally concerns himself is something which he would normally describe as a ‘thought.’

But it is Peirce’s view that thought itself consists of signs!

“The third principle whose consequences we have to deduce is that, whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a “sign.””

The development of this view lands leads him into some of his murkier obscurities.

But, fortunately we need not, for the present purpose, go into them.

Pierce’s view that thought consists of signs clearly lands Peirce with an infinite process.

For if a sign s1 has to have an interpretant s2, and s2 is itself a sign, s2 has itself an interpretant s3, a sign which itself … etc.

This consequence of his theory of signs Peirce himself points out in the passage under consideration, and, in the passage, shows no sign of unwillingness to accept it.

In fact, he regards it as involved in the “familiar idea of a Sign.”

Elsewhere, Peirce finds it necessary to say more — and on somewhat different lines — on this subject.

I may list the salient points so far.

A sign s stands to some interpretant i for some object o in some respect.

This involves a sign s being actually (or possibly) related by a triadic relation to an object onand an interpretant i.

This triadic relation is ‘genuine’.

The interpretant i is itself a sign thought, and so a sign, and therefore an actual or possible sign is a member of a further triad, which generates yet a further triad and so on *ad infinitum*.

Now, the following seem to me to be some of the more pressing questions which arise out of the passages I have just summarized.

What is Peirce’s theory of a “sign” a theory of?

Are we to understand Pierce’s ‘sign’ in its normal every day sense, or is it used in a non-everyday, technical way?

If the latter, to what purpose?

What is the force of Peirce’s contention that the ‘sign-relation’ is genuinely triadic?

Does this claim rule out a further explanation about the nature of the ‘relation’?

If not, what sort of explanation does Peirce favour?

Is the infinite process series of interpretants of a sign tolerable?

Does Peirce tolerate it?

These questions cannot be dealt with without some further discussion of the question of what an interpretant is, and this will, I think, be found to have some bearing on the questions.

What about the ‘object’ of a sign?

Does such a notion involve hypostatization?

About these questions I shall at this stage anyway say as little as possible.

What is a theory of signs a theory of?

We can answer this question, as regards Peirce, straight away by saying that when Peirce says something about a ”sign” in general, what he says can be understood as saying something in general about ‘meaning.’

A weak support for this contention comes from noticing that the words he uses when talking about (and applies to) ‘sign’ in general, e.g. ‘stand for’ ‘represent’ (as in representamen), and elsewhere ‘denote’.

All these expressions (and “sign” itself) are traditional encountered in philosophical discussions of meaning.

Peirce maintains that meaning is not only a genuine triadic relation, but also is involved in any genuine triadic relation.

In support forcthis latter (not very intelligible) contention, Peirce considers some examples of triadic relations and claims that the idea of a ‘sign’ is involved — e.g. in the notion of a, b, c being identical.

It is clear that for Peirce ‘having a meaning’ and ‘being a sign’ are interchangeable expressions.

Let us take, more or less at random, some of the things that Peirce wants to call a ‘signs’:

— the rolling gait (of a sailor)

—a diagram

— a shout of “Hi”

— the word “that”

— any sentence (which is not nonsense)

— a weather-cock.

For most of these items there seem no great difficulty in framing sentences containing the expression  “x mean y” which I am fairly sure would be able to replace sentences containing the word “sign” which Peirce would be ready to employ about the things in question:

A rolling gait means that the its owner is a sailor.”

A rolling gait is a sign of a sailor.

2) a “that one is the ripest” b “which one do you mean by ‘that’ (‘that one’)” [Not very natural, but cumbrous rather than contrary to usage]

The weathercock pointing south means that the wind is in that direction”.

The only one about which there seems some difficulty is the diagram (he doesn’t naturally speak of a diagram as ‘meaning’ this or that).

But I think one could (although alternative locutions would usually perhaps be clearer and come more trippingly to the tongue) talk about what parts or features of a diagram or map mean: e.g. if, considering a Mercator’s projection map, I find that the shape marked ‘Greenland’ is approximately the same size as the shape marked ‘Arabia.”

I’ve no idea whether or not this is in fact the case.

I may ask (or answer) the question:

“Does the approximate equality of size of that and that mean that Greenland and Arabia are (really) about the size same size”; or looking at a diagram of some kind of machine and noticing (say) some curious (nb) parallel sort of parallel lines circles, I might ask “what do these mean?” or “do these mean anything?”

What seems to emerge as a suggestion from the isolated examples in clauses, is that it may be natural to use ‘mean’

— when one knows or thinks or suspects that some ‘distortion’ is involved (as in case of ‘Greenland’ etc.)

— when one knows thinks or suspects that features in question have not a merely representative character, but are in some sense conventional (which is what I had in mind in second case (‘circles’).

It is important to remember that a map and a diagram often or always embody a ‘conventional’ feature or element.

One thing I think is quite certain.

When we should never point to an area on the map and say “That means Arabia”; and I am afraid that Peirce would want to give as answer to question “what is map or diagram sign of”, “that of which it is a map or diagram.”

This, if correct, means of course that to explain a ‘sign’ in terms of “meaning” will not wholly fit Peirce’s use of ‘sign’.

But I think the substitution will work fairly well.

In most cases, the answers to the question “what does x mean” would correspond fairly closely with the sort of answers Peirce would give or might be compelled to give to question “what is x sign of?”

Moreover I feel fairly confident that no other word but “mean” would do anything like as well.

It is here important to note that “sign” in any ordinary, un-technical sense cannot be applied to a considerable number of Peirce’s examples of ‘signs’ [e.g. ‘this’, ‘Hi’, a sentence, if we consider merely above-quoted examples].

The same applies to other words verbs which occur in Peirce’s explanation of sign — ‘stand for’, ‘represent [representamen]’.

I recognize that I have made quite a bit out of the question about the relation between “meaning” and “sign” on the one hand and Peirce’s words (“sign” etc) on the other, but I make no apology for doing so.

For, in general, the unannounced and unheralded use of technical or crypto-technical terms leads to nothing but trouble, obscuring proper questions and raising improper ones.

In this particular instance, there are good reasons for discussing and emphasizing the need to restate Peirce’s remarks in terms of “meaning”.

Peirce’s “sign”, when it occurs in contexts in which there is some reference to an utterer U, does so most naturally most clearly in contexts where something is a sign to someone or ‘for’ so.

That is to say in context, where the utterer U or the addressee A are concerned, is roughly speaking in position of an addressee.

I do not of course say it cannot be used otherwise.

Moreover, If we do think of an utterer U and an addressee A as concerned thus, I may tend to neglect the fact that some at least of entities Peirce calls a “sign’ can be used as well as ‘encountered’, and that this may be very important.

It is clear that Peirce himself usually, though not always, does tend to think of an utterer U and an addressee A, and this no doubt has some connection with philosophers who do this tend to hold a “causal theory of meaning,” or at any rate philosophers who hold a “causal theory of meaning” tend (in the first instance at least) to treat a person as an utterer U or an addressee A.

It is important in view of this question about Peirce’s own position vis-a-vis a “causal theory” of “meaning.”

Some of the expressions Peirce uses (‘stand for’, ‘represent’) seem to me reflect, orchelp, or give rise to, an inclination to think of the “meaning,”  e.g. of an expression, as always an object (if not a thing, something at least which is a particular, or something at any rate which is, for philosophical purposes, not too unlike a thing).

“This picture represents the death of Napoleon (or Napoleon in his youth)”

“This match represents the bowler Lindwall.”

“The letter “H” stands for ‘Henry’ ”

‘stand for’ ‘represent’ are much less common than ‘mean.’

The philosopher’s use of unfamiliar subjects (grammatical), which “Represent’, and “stand for” also seem to be connected with notion of ‘substitution,

And although this may be helpful, if it is generalized (as the use of verbs in questions perhaps induces us unconsciously to do) it may reflect, help, or give rise to the suggestion that, for every expression, there is something for which it is a substitute.

Cf. Russell’s use of ‘stand for’ in discussion of an universalium (Aristotle's "kath'holou") in his “Problems of Philosophy.”

Having I hope justified my intention of treating Peirce as attempting to give some sort of analysis of “meaning,” I want now to ask what it is.

I should say in advance that I do not think it possible to find any very detailed analysis of meaning in Peirce.

Peirce is too volatile and inconsistent for that.

But we may hope to find a motive for an analysis (or analyses), which could be useful as introduction to working out of at least some of these by others.

First, can we re-state Peirce’s claim that ‘sign-relation’ is triadic in terms of “mean”?

I take it that this would have to claim, roughly, that wherever we get a sentence statement, e.g. beginning

“x means ....”

or

“x meant ....”

this would always be capable of expansion into, or analysis in terms of a statement such as

x means (meant) ..... to ...... (person or persons)”.

Now, as regards these, there are one or two things he clearly does not mean.

Peirce very obviously does not mean that any statement about x “meaning” something entails that

“x has meant or will mean”

something is actually understood (interpreted) by any particular person at any particular time.

E.g.

It might be true that a recherché or difficult sentence might mean something, without in fact ever having been interpreted by anybody or even uttered (here must be some meaning for sentences which have or never will be uttered).

There is the possibility, too, of meaning to, being understood, being interpreted is the essential, not relative interpretation.

Since being interpreted by, or understood by, (actually ‘meaning to’) seems to involve the presence of an interpretant which is itself a ‘sign’, either the interpretant sign needs not itself be understood and has a further possible interpretant, it works as if either there is an endless series of constantly present interpretants, or else I at some stage come to an interpretant ‘sign’ which although perhaps capable of being understood, is not in fact understood (God?).

But I do not think Peirce, if asked, would say that either of these alternatives is the case.

“It is not necessary that an interpretant should actually exist”.

“An interpretant “in futuro” will suffice”.

I think the regress of natural interpretants should be avoided by his saying that e.g. I can understanding it might well be true that I understood a remark made to me, even if no interpretant ‘sign’ came before my mind, provided that I could provide an interpretant, i.e., provided I would have done do so if some further unspecified condition is fulfilled.

I am not sure that Peirce always thinks in this way about the original interpretant in the series.

But this has to do with what I have to say about interpretants.

Which is this “habit” that Peirce talks about, as constituting the ultimate “logical” interpretant for every “sign”?

Peirce can be pretty obscure here.

*Some* things are clear, though.

In some sense or other, Peirce’s reference to the causal effect of a “sign” (or of the “semiosis” of a “sign,” whatever being a causal effect of that is) may be no more than Peirce’s way of emphasising the genuinely triadic relation of the sign-situation, or as I prefer, “meaning.”

Although not identical with them, this “habit” is obviously fairly closely connected with an observation, or an experiment.

Peirce:

“It is not necessary that the sign’s interpretant i should actually *exist*.”

“An interpretant *in futuro* may suffice”.

“It is rather important to emphasise that, by ‘interpretant,’ I mean ‘possible interpretant’.

For Peirce, this is not a mere habit, but a controlled — i. e. deliberatively formed — habit.

This habit may be the conclusion of an ‘ideal experimentation,’ i.e. where one imagines oneself in certain circumstances, and doing certain things.

The habit in question is described as a “habit of action” in a given way.

Whenever we desire a given kind of result, a readiness to act, given certain motives and conditions, is said to be a belief.

This habit may be a conjecture which is an ‘ideal experimentation,’ and the expression of’a ‘belief,’ or equivalent to a habit of the kind in question.

“The most perfect account of a concept that an expression can convey consists in the description of the habit that that concept is calculated to produce.”

“But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with a specification of the motive and the conditions?”

There seem to be various scenarios.

One is the habit of giving or uttering experiment or observable result when stimulated by the occurrence of the sign.

Another scenario is a habit of making a confirmation, i, e., testing or confirming the proposition expressed by the sign.

A habit may involve a *belief* in the proposition expressed by the sign.

The habit seems to tie in best with talk of belief.

This doxastic interpretation of the habit seems however to commit Peirce to holding that a sentence must be believed if fully understood.

But this is perhaps avoidable if the belief need not be an actual one, but only would be brought about by the sign in a certain case.

Descriptive  meaning is roughly a tendency to arouse belief.

This might link with the operation-sensible result rule, since a tendency to perform an operation if one desires the result would be one of the

tendencies of which the habit (now construed as a belief) would consist.

Peirce:

“In every case, after some preliminaries, the activity takes the form of an experimentation in the inner world.”

“The conclusion, if it comes to a definite conclusion, is that, under given conditions, the interpreter will form the habit of acting in a given way, whenever he may desire a given kind of result”.

Peirce:

“Meantime, do not forget that every conjecture is equivalent to, or is expressive of, such a habit that having a certain desire one might accomplish it, if one performs a certain act”.

Peirce:

“Consequently, the most perfect account of a concept that an expression can convey consists in a description of the habit which that concept is calculated to produce.”

“But how otherwise can a habit be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it gives rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the motive?”

Peirce would be holding a “causal theory” of a Stevensonian type, mixed up with a meaning-explainability theory.

There is some confusion as to whether explainability is requisite of meaning, and whether it will do as definition.

It would no longer follow from definition.

So you might skip over to it from another theory.

Then there is the issue of an ambiguity of interpretation.

Peirce’s unexpectedly says, about the definition of a “sign,” that the meaning is not the object o, but the interpretant i.

No doubt Peirce sees reasons for this.

A habit is one of giving operation-result type rule when stimulated by a sign (in one’s own thought or otherwise).

A habit is one of going about confirming sentence — the meaning of sentence is the habit of going about confirming it.

It is important which counts as an “interpretation.”

It would just be an expression of a belief that finally will give meaning of e.g. this island.

This is not a belief that seems very reasonable for one to have.

If it just means that one would if necessary confirm it, this does not seem to tie “sign” with “belief.”

Peirce’s “object” is usually roughly, I think, what Mill would call “denotation,” as opposed to “connotation.”

The interpretant i is connected with the “connotation,” but still here the interpretant is said to be a representation “representamen of same object as sign” (= has same denotation?) if we suppose interpretant not always synonymous/definition with sign (seems undoubtedly an account of anything we can do) then why bring it in at all.

Is Peirce a “metaphysical” object?

The object of a sign has to be there anyway, by definition.

But this might be got over by Peirce’s pretty unintelligible distinction between two kinds of object.

“The ‘meaning’ of a sentence is thus the habit of going about confirming it, and this is described by a conditional formula”.

An interpretant can be what Peirce calls an “emotional” one.

Some examples:

— A feeling, i. e., a sensation.

Music, for example, conveys — and is intended to convey — the composer’s ideas, usually feelings.

Then there’s a feeling of recognition, i. e., a feeling we come to interpret as evidence we comprehend the sign.

The immediate interpretant is the “total unanalysed effect” the sign is calculated to produce.

“I have been accustomed to identify this with effect the sign first produces on a mind without any reflection on it.

An interpretant can also be “energetic,” when it “functions through mediation of an emotional interpretant.”

Such further effect involves an effort” (“ground arms”).

An energetic interpretant may be a muscular effort, but it is more usually a merely “mental” effort.

The emotional and the energetic interpretants are not the meaning of a sign, because they are individual.

An interpretant may be “logical,” the ‘meaning’ of sign, in its primary acceptation of a sign into another system of signs.

“The meaning of a sign is the sign it has to be explained into.”

This is confined to “intellectual concepts.”

“The performance of a piece of concerted music is a sign.”

It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer’s musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings”.

“This emotional interpretant may amount to much more than that a feeling of recognition.”

“In some cases, this is the only proper significate effect that a sign produces”.

“The immediate interpretant is the total unanalysed effect that a sign is calculated to produce”.

— Peirce, Letter to Welby, cited by Ogden’s & Richards’s “MM.”

“If it produces any further proper significate effect, a sign does so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect always involves an effort.”

“I call it the energetic interpretant.”

“The effort may be a muscular one, as it is in the case of the command to ground arms.”

“But it is much more usually an exertion upon the inner world, a ‘mental’ effort”.

“‘meaning,’ which is, in its primary acceptation, the elucidation of a sign into another system of signs.”

“The meaning of a sign is the sign it has to be elucidated into.”

There are various theories to account for this.

One theory focuses on the causal effect — what the sign effects, or tends to effect.

This causal effect may be construed behaviouristic, but not necessarily so.

Then, there is utterer U’s intention, e.g. the intention of the user of a sign — e.g. the explanation provided by Ewing.

There is also the ability to give a rule, e.g., as in Peirce’s account of the ‘logical’ interpretant.

Peirce speaks in a language of time but he really does not have to.

The relation to metaphysics only applies against behaviouristic alternatives.

There seems to be restriction to expressions like “... represents ...,” “... stand for ...”

These obviously require intention (only in theory do, but can’t see any evidence that this obvious to Peirce.

Question is for Buchler that only “... represent ...” as treating something for certain purposes as it may involve an utterer’s intention, but not obviously the user’s intention.

The logical interpretant is what the sign refers to.

This, again, doesn’t help.

Peirce objects to Lady Welby that an “intention” will not do because a natural sign has no utterer.

[maybe means sign special department intentional theory]

The idea of interpretants as significate effect [rep. in Buchler 276 seq. “Pragmatism in Retrospect.”

Why does Peirce get worried about the logical interpretant as the meaning of a sign?

A series of thoughts as interpretants must be ended by some *ultimate* logical interpretant which (sign) is *not* a sign, at any rate in the same way as the non-ultimate interpretants are) but is a habit.

Are we imprisoned in language?

But why bring in habit?

Why not a different kind of rule?

This fact is the rule.

There is the circularity difficulty: no sign that he is [illeg.] symbol [illeg.] it.

But not aware.

Peirce:

“Now, a natural sign or a symptom has no utterer”. (Peirce to Welby, Ogden's and Richards's "The meaning of meaning" 288) “Pragmatism in Retrospect: A Last Formulation”, b 269–289; on p. 275

The interpretant is said to be “the proper significate outcome or effect” of the sign.

Peirce’s notion of an ultimate logical interpretant is highly obscure.

It is not purely habit but controlled (dependent on deliberate formation).

It is of the same nature, although not a thought.

Consider engendered (“the conclusion of”) mental experimentation “imagining yourself acting in certain ways.

Consider trial rules of form (given experiment observation their sensible result).

A rule like this is not enough because it doesn’t tell us of the essential nature of effect of the on the interpretation of semiosis of sign” — semiosis explain as action or influence involving sign/object/interpretant.

Nevertheless, habit is in some way connected with  some type of rule.

Habit is described as “habit of action” given certain conditions and motives; and readiness to act given certain conditions and motives is earlier said to be just belief (same earlier passage conjecture seems to be expressive of or equivalent to a habit of kind in question)

It looks then that it is possible that habit might be a quasi-belief or conjecture in what the sign (not interpretant) asserts (habit of ‘imagining’ oneself acting as if …).

Keyword: meaning.

"Can you think of a title for the talk?"
"'Meaning!'"
"Thank you!"

Armed with a deep exploration of Peirce, Ewing, Lady Welby, Ogden and Richards, Wittgenstein, Strawson, Hare, Duncan-Jones, Stevenson, and others, H. P. Grice feels confident enough to present his "Meaning" to the typically unenthusiastic Oxford Philosophical Society.

Grice had been involved in some research on C. S. Peirce's semiotics, and felt like sharing.

"Consider the following sentences," Grice rather abruptly opens his presentation, which he had then, entitled, simply, 'Meaning':

1.a. Those spots MEAN measles.
cf.
That spot means measles.

1.b. Those spots MEANT measles.
cf.
That spot meant measles.

Grice's first illustration is 'mean' in the plural number.

Cfr. Homer's dual: "Those two horses mean-(DUAL) that Achilles and Patroclus have arrived."

2. 

Those spots didn't MEAN anything to me, but to the doctor they MEANT measles.

cf.

That spot does NOT mean anything to _me_; to the doctor, it means measles.


3. The recent budget MEANS that we shall have a hard year.

Note that this is the first where 'means' is followed by a 'that'-clause, as J. L. Austin would call it. Cfr. Staal and Grice on the 'that'-clause. 



Grice goes on to make five observations:




(I) "I cannot say,"

"Those spots meant measles, but he hadn't got measles," 

and I cannot say, 

"The recent budget MEANS that we shall have a hard year, but we shan't have." 

Cannot say and SHOULD NOT say!

"That is to say, in cases like the above, x meant that and x means that p entail [alla G. E. Moore] p."

(2) 
"I cannot argue from"

 "Those spots mean (meant) measles" 

"to any conclusion about "what is (was) meant by those spots"; for example, I am not entitled to say, "What was meant by those spots was that he had measles.""

This is bad language. Cannot argue -- shouldn't argue. Conceptually impossible to argue. 

"Equally I cannot draw from the statement about the recent budget the conclusion "What is meant by the recent budget is that we shall have a hard year."

CANNOT draw, shouldn't draw. CONCEPTUALLY impossible to draw.

(3) "I cannot argue from"

 "Those spots meant measles" 

to any conclusion to the effect that SOMEBODY OR OTHER"

a person that is -- cfr. Grice, "Personal identity,"

"meant by those spots so-and-so."

"Mutatis mutandis, the same is true of the sentence about the recent budget."

(4) 

"For none of the above examples can a restatement be found in which the verb "mean" is followed by a sentence or phrase in inverted commas."

And thus signal something unequivocally linguistic.

"Thus "Those spots meant measles" cannot be re-formulated as "Those spots meant 'measles' " or as "Those spots meant 'he has measles.' "

Unless you are perhaps a greengrocer keen on the greengrocer's use of quotes: "These carrots mean 'success'!"

(5)

"On the other hand, for all these examples an approximate re-statement can be found beginning with the phrase "The fact that . . .";"

"for example, "The FACT that he had those spots meant that he had measles" and "The fact that the recent budget was as it was means that we shall have a hard year."

Perhaps this gave the Kiparskys the idea. Grice will later call these 'factives,' in factual fact!

After making the five observations, Grice asks us to contrast the four sentences above with another group:

"Now contrast the above sentences with the following:

1. 

Those three rings on the bell [of the bus] MEAN that the 'bus is full.'

(Perhaps a typo there; the thing was typed by somebody else. "MEAN 'the bus is full'" seems more Oxonian.). If Grice thought the 'the' otiose: "THREE RINGS mean that 'bus is full'

Cockney rhyming slang:

2. That remark, 'Smith couldn't get on without his trouble and strife,' MEANT that Smith found his wife indispensable."

-- Except that the rephrase stops being 'funny,' as Cleese would say. 

Grice goes on to make five co-relative observations for this second group:

(I) I can use the first of these and go on to say, 

"But it isn't in fact full-the conductor has made a mistake""

"And I can use the second and go on, 

""But in fact Smith deserted her seven years ago.""

Moore's entailment again applies:

"That is to say, here x means that p and x meant that p do not entail p."

Or to use the singular:

Here neither 'x means that p' nor 'x meant that p' entail p.

Second observation about Mnn:

(2) I can argue from the first to some statement about "what is (was) meant" by the rings on the bell and from the second to some statement about "what is (was) meant" by the quoted remark.

Third observation:

(3) 

"I can argue from the first sentence to the conclusion that somebody (viz., the conductor)"

i. e. some person -- vide Grice, "Personal identity"

"meant, or at any rate should have meant, by the rings that the bus is full, and I can argue analogously for the second sentence."

(4) 

"The first sentence can be re-stated in a form in which the verb "mean" is followed by a phrase in inverted commas, that is, "Those three rings on the bell mean 'the bus is full.'"

In this second instance, the quote is correctly placed, and 'that' omitted. 

"So also can the second sentence."

(5) 

"Such a sentence as "The fact that the bell has been rung three times means that the bus is full" is not a re-statement of the meaning of the first sentence."

"Both may be true, but they do not have, even approximately, the same meaning."

FACTIVITY otiose or 'subject-changer,' or 'game-changer,' as it were.

Grice stipulates two 'usages' for "MEAN":

"When the expressions "means," "means something," "means that" are used in the kind of way in which they are used in the first set of sentences, I shall speak of the sense, or senses, in which they are used, as the 'NATURAL' sense, or senses, of the expressions in question."

"When the expressions are used in the kind of way in which they are used in the second set of sentences, I shall speak of the sense, or senses, in which they are used, as the 'NON-NATURAL' sense, or senses, of the expressions in question."

Grice's abbreviation:

"I shall use the abbreviation "meansNN" to distinguish the nonnatural sense or senses."

"MEAN TO" as 'natural'

"I propose, for convenience, also to include under the head of natural senses of "mean" such senses of "mean" as may be exemplified in sentences of the pattern "A means (meant) to do so-and-so (by x)," where A is a human agent."

i.e. when 'mean' is strictly, 'intend.'

"By contrast, as the previous examples show, I include under the head of non- MEANING natural senses of "mean" any senses of "mean" found in sentences of the patterns "A means (meant) something by x" or "A means (meant) by x that. . . .""

Where again A is a human agent, OR PERSON.

Grice on 'human agent,' not person, but on 'person' in "Personal identity," in Mind. 

"This is over-rigid; but it will serve as an indication."

By over-rigid, he means extra-ordinary.

"I do not want to maintain that all our uses of "mean" fall easily, obviously, and tidily into one of the two groups I have distinguished."

There are borderline cases.

"But I think that in most cases we should be at least fairly strongly inclined to assimilate a use of "mean" to one group rather than to the other."

PEIRCE'S QUESTION:

"The question which now arises is this: 'What MORE"

and that it is philosophically interesting, since this is the Oxford Philosophical Society,

"can be said about the distinction between the cases where we should say that the word is applied in a natural sense and the cases where we should say that the word is applied in an non-natural sense?'"

"Asking this question will not of course prohibit us from trying to give an explanation of "meaning,," in terms of one or another natural sense of "mean.""

"will not" and SHOULD not. Vide Bennett on Grice's meaning-nominalism, and meaning-NATURALISM. 

"This question about the distinction between natural and non-natural meaning is, I think, what people are getting at when they display an interest in a distinction between "natural" and "conventional" signs."

People such as Peirce and Lady Welby, that is, as reported by Ogden and Richards, that Grice was reading.

And before them, Occam, that Peirce knew so well.

"But I think my formulation is better."

And more English, less Latinate! Hobbes, too! (He used to write in BOTH English and Latin, and expands on 'signum' in "Computatio sive logica."

Occam, or Ockham, was strictly Latinate!

"For some things which can mean,, something are not signs (e.g., words are not), and some are not conventional in any ordinary sense (e.g., certain gestures) ;while some things which mean naturally are not signs of what they mean (cf. the recent budget example)."

Excellent.

CAUSAL THEORIES

"I want first to consider briefly, and reject, what I might term a causal type of answer to the question, "What is meaning,,?" We might try to say, for instance, more or less with [the American philosopher] C. L. Stevenson that for x to mean,, something, x must have (roughly) a tendency to produce in an audience [or addressee, A] some attitude (cognitive or otherwise) [boulomaic or doxastic] and a tendency, in the case of a speaker [or utterer U], to be [causally] produced by that attitude, these tendencies being dependent on "an elaborate process of conditioning attending the use of the sign in communication." (Ethics and Language (New Haven, rgqq), ch. iii. Ibid., p. 57)."

Grice omits Yale.


Stevenson actually uses 'scare quotes' for Grice's NATURAL 'meaning.'

And his use of 'conditioning' is Pavlovian, Watsonian, rather New-World.

What Chomsky would judge 'behaviourist.'

(Cfr. Suppes defending Grice contra Chomsky).

"This clearly will not do."

Grice's criticism of Stevenson:

"(I) 

"Let us consider a case where an utterance, if it qualifies at all as meaning,, something, will be of a descriptive or informative kind and the relevant attitude, therefore, will be a cognitive one, for example, a belief."

"(I use "utterance" as a neutral word to apply to any candidate for meaning,,; it has a convenient act-object ambiguity.)"

Cfr. his remarks later on conception/concept of value, and 'implicatum' and 'implicature.'

FIRST COUNTER-EXAMPLE to Stevenson:

"It is no doubt the case that many people have a tendency to put on a tail coat when they think they are about to go to a dance, and it is no doubt also the case that many people, on seeing someone put on a tail coat, would conclude that the person in question was about to go to a dance."

"Does this satisfy us that putting on a tail coat means,, that one is about to go to a dance (or indeed means,, anything at all)?"

"Obviously not."

"It is no help to refer to the qualifying phrase "dependent on an elaborate process of conditioning. . . .""

"For if all this means is that the response to the sight of a tail coat being put on is in some way learned or acquired, it will not exclude the present case from being one of meaning,"

CIRCULARITY charge:

"But if we have to take seriously the second part of the qualifying phrase ("attending the use of the sign in communication"), the account of meaning,, is obviously circular."

"We might just as well say, "X has meaning,, if it is used in communication," which, though true, is not helpful."

Helpful to philosophers of the analytic kind who look for reductive analyses in terms of set of sufficient and necessary conditions, surely.

What IS to 'com-municate'?

Second observation:

"(2) 

"If this is not enough, there is a difficulty-really the same difficulty, I think-which Stevenson recognizes: how we are to avoid saying, for example, that "Smith is tall" is PART of what is meant by 'Smith is an athlete," since to tell someone that Smith is an athlete would tend to make him believe that Smith is tall."

"Stevenson here resorts to invoking linguistic rules, namely, a permissive rule of language that "athletes may be non-tall,.""

"This amounts to saying that we are not prohibited by rule from speaking of "non-tall athletes." But why are we not prohibited?"

"Not because it is not bad grammar, or is not impolite, and so on, but presumably because it is not meaningless (or, if this is too strong, does not in any way violate the rules of meaning for the expressions concerned)."

"But this seems to involve us in ANOTHER circle."

Second circle.

"Moreover, one wants to ask why, if it is legitimate to appeal here to rules to distinguish what is meant from what is SUGGESTED" (or implied), 

"this appeal was not made earlier, in the case of groans, for example, to deal with which Stevenson originally introduced the qualifying phrase about dependence on conditioning.""

A groan is a groan is a groan.

In his seminar, Grice discussed the groan example profusely. 

What do you mean by that groan?

What do you SUGGEST by that groan?

What do you IMPLICATE by that groan?

Cfr. Grice later on 'frowning,' and on 'expressing pain,' in "Meaning, revisited."

"A further deficiency in a CAUSAL theory of the *type*"
not any type

"just expounded seems to be that, even if we accept it as it stands, we are furnished with an analysis only of statements about the standard meaning, or the meaning in general, of a "sign.""

If we must go Peirceian.

"No provision is made for dealing with statements about what a particular speaker or writer" 

or human agent or person

"means by a sign on a particular occasion (which may well diverge from the standard meaning of the sign) ;nor is it obvious how the theory could be adapted to make such provision."

I believe Stevensonians might disagree!

"One might even go further in criticism and maintain that the causal theory ignores the fact that the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions; and so the latter notion, which is unexplained by the causal theory, is in fact the fundamental one."
What Bennett calls 'meaning-nominalism,' Griceian key.

"I am sympathetic to this more radical criticism, though I am aware that the point is controversial."

For Bennett!

"I do not propose to consider any further theories of the "causal tendency" type."

Other than  his own. As Dretske pointed out, it IS causal, in a way. Cf. Grice, "The causal theory of perception." And his "cf. causal theory" when discussing 'know' at Harvard.

"I suspect no such theory could avoid difficulties analogous to those I have outlined without utterly losing its claim to rank as a theory of this type."

"I will now try a different and, I hope, more promising line."

"If we can elucidate the meaning of 6 cx meant,, something (on a particular occasion)" and 6 c x meant,, that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)" and of "A meantNNsomething by x (on a particular occasion)" and (6 A meant,, by x that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)," this might reasonably be expected to help us with (6 x means,, (timeless) something (that so-and-so)," c 6 A means,, (timeless) by x something (that so-and-so)," and with the explication of "means the same as," "understands," "entails," and so on."

"Let us for the moment pretend that we have to deal only with utterances which might be informative or descriptive."

i.e. doxastic.

"A first shot would be to suggest that "x meant,, something" would be true if x was intended by its utterer to induce a belief in some "audience" and that to say what the belief was would be to say what x meant,,."

Rephrase in terms of utterer and addressee.

"This will not do."

COUNTER-EXAMPLE directed to the SUFFICIENCY of the prongs.

"I might leave B's handkerchief near the scene of a murder in order to induce the detective to believe that B was the murderer; but we should not want to say that the handkerchief (or my leaving it there) meant,, anything or that I had meant,, by leaving it that B was the murderer."

"Clearly we must AT LEAST add that, for x to have meant,, anything, not merely must it have been "uttered" with the intention of inducing a certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an "audience" to recognize the intention behind the utterance."

"This, though perhaps better, is not good enough."

FURTHER PROBLEMS, further counter-examples directed towards the alleged sufficiency of the previous prongs.

"Consider the following cases."

Three cases:

(I)

Herod presents Salome with the head of St. John the Baptist on a charger.

(2)

Feeling faint, a child lets its mother see how pale it is (hoping that she may draw her own conclusions and help).

(3)

I leave the china my daughter has broken lying around for my wife to see.

"Here we seem to have cases which satisfy the conditions so far given for meaning,,"

"For example, Herod intended to make Salome believe that St. John the Baptist was dead and no doubt also intended Salome to recognize that he intended her to believe that St. John the Baptist was dead."

"Similarly for the other [two] cases."

"Yet I certainly do not think that we should want to say that we have here cases of meaning,,."

"What we want" i. e. need

"to find is the difference between, for example, "deliberately and openly letting someone know" and "telling" and between someone to think" and "telling." 

"The way out is perhaps as follows."

FURTHER PROBLEMS LEAD TO A SOLUTION:

"Compare the following two cases."

(I) 

I show Mr. X a photograph of Mr. Y displaying undue familiarity to Mrs. X.

versus

(2) 

I draw a picture of Mr. Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr. X.

"I find that I want to deny that in (I) the photograph (or my showing it to Mr. X) meant,, anything at all; while I want to assert that in (2) the picture (or my drawing and showing it) MEANING meant,, something (that Mr. Y had been unduly unfamiliar), or at least that I had meant,, by it that Mr. Y had been unduly familiar."

"What is the difference between the two cases?"

"Surely that in case (I) Mr. X's recognition of my intention to make him believe that there is something between Mr. Y and Mrs. X is (more or less) irrelevant to the production of this effect by the photograph."

"Mr. X would be led by the photograph at least to suspect Mrs. X even if instead of showing it to him I had left it in his room by accident; and I (the photograph shower) would not be unaware of this."

Unless it's a very artistic photography?

"But it will make a difference to the effect of my picture on Mr. X whether or not he takes me to be intending to inform him (make him believe something) about Mrs. X, and not to be just doodling or trying to produce a work of art."

"But now we seem to be landed in a further difficulty if we accept this account."

"For consider now, say, frowning."

Or groaning, to stick with Stevenson.

"If I frown spontaneously, in the ordinary course of events, someone looking at me may well treat the frown as a natural sign of displeasure."

"But if I frown deliberately (to convey my displeasure), an onlooker may be expected, provided he recognizes my intention, still to conclude that I am displeased."

"Ought we not then to say, since it could not be expected to make any difference to the onlooker's reaction whether he regards my frown as spontaneous or as intended to be informative, that my frown (deliberate) does not mean,, anything?"

"I think this difficulty can be met; for though in general a deliberate frown may have the same effect (as regards inducing belief in my displeasure) as a spontaneous frown, it can be expected to have the same effect only provided the audience takes it as intended to convey displeasure."

As he naturally should.

"That is, if we take away the recognition of intention, leaving the other circumstances (including the recognition of the frown as deliberate), the belief-producing tendency of the frown must be regarded as being impaired or destroyed."

"Perhaps we may sum up what is NECESSARY for A to mean something by x as follows."

"A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must also intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended."

"But these intentions are not independent; the recognition is intended by A to play its part in inducing the belief, and if it does not do so something will have gone wrong with the fulfillment of A's intentions."

"Moreover, A's intending that the recognition should play this part implies, I think, that he assumes that there is some chance that it will in fact play this part, that he does not regard it as a foregone conclusion that the belief will be induced in the audience whether or not the intention behind the utterance is recognized."

"Shortly, perhaps, we may say that "A meant,, something by x" is roughly equivalent to "A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention." 

"This seems to involve a reflexive paradox, but it does not really do so."

And if it does, what?

cf. Grice on a recursive clause: "there is no inference element," and later meaning as involving a value concept under the guise of optimality (as providing a reason for the ad-hocness of the 'no inference element,' no sneaky intention, allowed).

"Now perhaps it is time to drop the pretense that we have to deal only with "informative" cases."

"Let us start with some examples of imperatives or quasi-imperatives."

"I have a very avaricious man in my room, and I want him to go; so I throw a pound note out of the window."

via conditioning.

"Is there here any utterance with a meaning,,?"

"No, because in behaving as I did, I did not intend his recognition of my purpose to be in any way effective in getting him to go."

The avaricious man just IGNORED the intention. But perhaps he didn't care. And to ignore or dismiss, intentionally, an intention, the addressee has to recognise it.

"This is parallel to the photograph case."

"If on the other hand I had pointed to the door or given him a little push, my behaviour might well be held to constitute a meaningful,, utterance, just because the recognition of my intention would be intended by me to be effective in speeding his departure."

"Another pair of cases would be (I) a policeman who stops a car by standing in its way and (2) a policeman who stops a car by waving."

"Or, to turn briefly to another type of case, if as an examiner I fail a man, I may well cause him distress or indignation or humiliation; and if I am vindictive, I may intend this effect and even intend him to recognize my intention."

Cf. the avaricious man's recognition of the intention.

"But I should NOT be inclined to say that my failing him meant,, anything."

"On the other hand, if I cut someone in the street I do feel inclined to assimilate this to the cases of meaning,;,,, and this inclination seems to me dependent on the fact that I could not reasonably expect him to be distressed (indignant, humiliated) unless he recognized my intention to affect him in this way."

"Cf., if my college stopped my salary altogether I should accuse them of ruining me; if they cut it by 2/6d I might accuse them of insulting me; with some intermediate amounts I might not know quite what to say."

"Perhaps then we may make the following generalizations."

GRICE'S GENERALISATIONS:

(I) "A meantLqNsomething by x" 

is (roughly) equivalent to 

"A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention"; 

And we may add that to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the intended effect (though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a straight answer involving a "that" clause, for example, "a belief that . . ."). 

SECOND GENERALISATION:

(2) 

"x meant something" is (roughly) equivalent to "Somebody meantlGN something by x.""

"Here again there will be cases where this will not quite work. I feel inclined to say that (as regards traffic lights) the change to red meant,, that the traffic was to stop; but it would be very unnatural to say, "Somebody (e.g., the Corporation) meantNN by the red-light change that the traffic was to stop." Nevertheless, there seems to be some sort of reference to somebody's intentions."

THIRD GENERALISATION

(3) "x means,, (timeless) that so-and-so" might as a first shot be equated with some statement or disjunction of statements about what "people" (vague) intend (with qualifications about "recognition") to effect by x. I shall have a word to say about this."

Further elaborations, of a concluding kind:

"Will any kind of intended effect do, or may there be cases where an effect is intended (with the required qualifications) and yet we should not want to talk of meaningNN?"

"Suppose I discovered some person so constituted that, when I told him that whenever I grunted in a special way I wanted him to blush or to incur some physical malady, thereafter whenever he recognized the grunt (and with it my intention), he did blush or incur the malady."

"Should we then want to say that the grunt meantNu something?"

"I do not think so."

"This points to the fact that for x to have meaningNN, the intended effect must be something which in some sense is within the control of the audience, or that in some sense of "reason" the recognition of the intention behind x is for the audience a reason and not merely a cause."

Grice on rationality, rational  control, akrasia, and Kant.

"It might look as if there is a sort of pun here ("reason for believing" and "reason for doing"), but I do not think this is serious."

"For though no doubt from one point of view questions about reasons for believing are questions about evidence and so quite different from questions about reasons for doing, nevertheless to recognize an utterer's intention in uttering x (descriptive utterance), to have a reason for believing that so-and-so, is at least quite like "having a motive for" accepting so-and-so.""

Excellent point. He'll later talk of 'acceptance.'

"Decisions "that" seem to involve decisions "to" (and this is why we can "refuse to believe7' and also be "compelled to believe")"

"The "cutting" case needs slightly different treatment, for one cannot in any straightforward sense "decide" to be offended; but one can refuse to be offended."

Which entails some complicated formalising, as Strawson might disagree. Vide his 'Freedom and resentment."

"It looks then as if the intended effect must be something within the control of the audience, or at least the sort of thing which is within its control."

"One point before passing to an objection or two, I think it follows that from what I have said about the connection between meaningNN and recognition of intention that (insofar as I am right) only what I may call the PRIMARY [not implicatural] intention of an utterer is relevant to the meaningNN of an utterance."

"For if I utter x, intending (with the aid of the recognition of this intention) to induce an effect E, and intend this effect E to lead to a further effect F, then insofar as the occurrence of F is thought to be dependent solely on E, I cannot regard F as in the least dependent on recognition of my intention to induce E."

Except perhaps as an implicatum versus an explicitum. 

"That is, if (say) I intend to get a man to do something by giving him some information, it cannot be regarded as relevant to the meaningNN of my utterance to describe what I intend him to do."

cfr. 

Smith has beautiful handwriting
that is
IMPLICATUM: he is hopeless at philosophy.

"Now some question may be raised about my use, fairly free, of such words as "intention" and "recognition.""

"I must disclaim any intention of peopling all our talking life with armies of complicated psychological occurrences."

Ryle was in the audience!

"I do not hope to solve any philosophical puzzles about intending,"

He will in "Intentions and dispositions," citing Ryle and Hampshire -- but not Anscombe.

"but I do want briefly to argue that no special difficulties are raised by my use of the word "intention" in connection with meaning."

Why should there be?

And he's not using 'intention' alla phenomenology as Ogden and Richards do in citing Husserl.

"First, there will be cases where an utterance is accompanied or preceded by a conscious "plan," or explicit formulation of intention (e.g., I declare how I am going to use x, or ask myself how to "get something across")."

"The presence of such an explicit "plan" obviously counts fairly heavily in favor of the utterer's intention (meaning) being as "planned"; though it is not, I think, conclusive."

"For example, a speaker who has declared an intention to use a familiar expression in an unfamiliar way may slip into the familiar use."

"Similarly in nonlinguistic cases: if we are asking about an agent's intention, a previous expression counts heavily."

"Nevertheless, a man might plan to throw a letter in the dustbin and yet take it to the post."

"When lifting his hand he might "come to" and say either "I didn't intend to do this at all'' or "I suppose I must have been intending to put it in.""

Note the subtlety of "I suppose I must have been intending to..."

"Explicitly formulated linguistic (or quasi-linguistic) intentions are no doubt comparatively rare." Grice continued to analyse this.

U means by uttering x that *psi p iff (E.phi) (Ef) (Ec): I. U utters x intending x to be such that anyone who has phi will think that (i) x has f  (ii) f is correlated in way c with psi-ing that p (iii) (E.phi'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has phi' will think, via thinking (i) and (ii), that U psi-s that p (iv) in view of (3), U psi-s that p; and II. (operative only for certain substituends for "*psi") U utters x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has phi, he will, via thinking (iv), himself psi that p; and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has phi will both (i') rely on E in coming to psi (or think that U psi-s) that p and (ii') think that (E. phi'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has phi' will come to psi (or think that U psi-s) that p without relying on E. 

All very grand!



"In their absence we would seem to rely on very much the same kinds of criteria as we do in the case of nonlinguistic intentions where there is a general usage."

CRITERIA, Witters.

"An utterer is held to intend to convey what is normally conveyed (or normally intended to be conveyed), and we require a good reason for accepting that a particular use diverges from the general usage (e.g., he never knew or had forgotten the general usage)."

"Similarly in nonlinguistic cases."

"We are presumed to intend the normal consequences of our actions."

TOWARDS A CONCLUSION:

"Again, in cases where there is doubt, say, about which of two or more things an utterer intends to convey, we tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternatives would be relevant to other things he is saying or doing, or which intention in a particular situation would fit in with some purpose he obviously has (e.g., a man who calls for a "pump" at a fire would not want a bicycle pump)."

"Nonlinguistic parallels are obvious."

"Context is a criterion in settling the question of why a man who has just put a cigarette in his mouth has put his hand in his pocket; relevance to an obvious end is a criterion in settling why a man is running away from a bull."

"In certain linguistic cases we ask the utterer afterward about his intention, and in a few of these cases (the very difficult ones, like a philosopher asked to explain the meaning of an unclear passage in one of his works), the answer is not based on what he remembers but is more like a decision, a decision about how what he said is to be taken."

Cf. relative identity. Temporal indexes t1 and t2. 

"I cannot find a nonlinguistic parallel here; but the case is so special as not to seem to contribute a vital difference."

"All this is very obvious."

"But surely to show that the criteria for judging linguistic intentions are very like the criteria for judging nonlinguistic intentions is to show that linguistic intentions are very like nonlinguistic intentions."

Indeed. But where is Urmson? Where is Strawson? Surely we need them!

TERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS' I. INTRODUCTION W ITHIN THE range of uses of the word "mean" which are specially connected with communication (uses, that is, of the word "mean" in one or another of what I have called "nonnatural" senses), there are distinctions to be made. Consider the following sentence (S): "If I shall then be helping the grass to grow, I shall have no time for reading." (la) It would be approximately true to say that S means (has as one of its meanings) "If I shall then be assisting the kind of thing of which lawns are composed to mature, I shall have no time for reading." It would also perhaps be approximately true to say that S means (has as another of its meanings, in at least one version of English) "If I shall then be assisting the marijuana to mature, I shall have no time for reading." Such meaning-specification I shall call the specifications of the timeless meaning(s) of a "complete" utterance-type (which may be a sentence or may be a "sentencelike" nonlinguistic utterance-type, such as a hand-signal). (I b) It would be true to say that the word "grass" means (loosely speaking) "lawn-material," and also true to say that the word "grass" means "marijuana." Such meaning-specifications I shall call the specifications of the timeless meaning(s) of an "incomplete" utterance-type (which may be a nonsentential word or phrase, or may be a nonlinguistic utterance-type which is analogous to a word or phrase). 1 I am even more indebted to the comments, criticisms, and suggestions which I have been receiving over a considerable period from my colleague Stephen Schiffer than is indicated in the text of this paper. This paper was delivered at the Philosophy Colloquium at Oberlin College in April i968. A revised version of material contained in it will, I hope, be part of a book soon to be published by the Harvard University Press. 147 H. P. GRICE (2a) Since a complete utterance-type x may have more than one timeless meaning, we need to be able to connect with a particular utterance of xjust one of the timeless meanings of x to the exclusion of the others. We need to be able to say, with regard to a particular utterance of S, that S meant here (on this occasion) "If I shall be assisting the kind of thing of which lawns are composed to mature, I shall have no time for reading," and that "I shall then be assisting the grass to grow" meant here "I shall be assisting the kind of thing of which lawns are composed to mature." Such meaning-specifications I shall call specifications of the applied timeless meaning of a complete utterance-type (on a particular occasion of utterance). Such specifications aim to give one the correct reading of a complete utterance-type on a particular occasion of utterance. (2b) Similarly, we need to be able to specify what I shall call the applied timeless meaning of an incomplete utterance-type; we need to be able to say, with respect to the occurrence of the word "grass" in a particular utterance of S, that here, on this occasion, the word "grass" meant (roughly) "lawn-material" and not "marijuana." (3) It might be true to say of a particular utterer (U) of S that when U uttered S, he meant by S (by the words of S): (i) "If I am then dead, I shall not know what is going on in the world," and possibly, in addition, (ii) "One advantage of being dead will be that I shall be protected from the horrors of the world." If it were true to say of U that, when uttering S, he meant by S (i), it would also be true to say of U that he meant by the words, "I shall be helping the grass to- grow" (which occur within S), "I shall then be dead." On the assumption (which I make) that the phrase "helping the grass to grow," unlike the phrase "pushing up the daisies" is not a recognized idiom, none of the specifications just given of what U meant by S (or by the words "I shall be helping the grass to grow") would be admissible as specifications of a timeless meaning or of the applied timeless meaning of S (or of the words 148 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS constituting the antecedent in S). The words "I shall be helping the grass to grow" neither mean nor mean here "I shall be dead." The kind of meaning-specification just cited I shall call the specification of the occasion-meaning of an utterance-type. (4) The varieties of meaning-specification so far considered all make use of quotation marks (or, perhaps better, italics) for the specification of what is meant. The fourth and last type to be considered involves, instead, the use of indirect speech. If it were true to say of U that he meant by S (i) (and[ii]), it would also be true to say of him that when he uttered S (by uttering S) he meant that if he would then be dead he would not know what was going on in the world, and that when he uttered S he meanthat (or part of what he meant was that) one advantage of being dead would be that he would be protected from the horrors of the world. Even if however, when he uttered S he meant by the words "I shall then be helping the grass to grow" "I shall then be dead," it would not be true to say that he meant by these words that he would then be dead. To have meant that he would then be dead, U would have to have committed himself to its being the case that he would then be dead; and this, when uttering S, he has not done. Type (4) meaning-specifications I shall call specifications of an utterer's occasion-meaning. We can, then, distinguish four main forms of meaning-specification: (i) "x (utterance-type) means '. . .' " [Specification of timeless meaning for an utterance-type which is either (i a) complete or (i b) incomplete] (2) "x (utterance-type) meant here '...'" [Specification of applied timeless meaning for an utterance-type which is either (2a) complete or (2b) incomplete] (3) " U meant by x (utterance-type) '...'" [Specification of utterance-type occasion-meaning] (4) "U meant by uttering x that .. ." [Specification of utterer's occasion-meaning] There is, of course, an element of legislation in the distinction between the four cited linguistic forms; these are not quite so regimented as I am, for convenience, pretending. I49 H. P. GRICE In a paper shortly to be published in Foundations of Language, entitled "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and WordMeaning," I consider in some detail the relations between timeless meaning, applied timeless meaning, and what I am now calling utterer's occasion-meaning. Starting with the assumption that the notion of an utterer's occasion-meaning can be explicated, in a certain way, in terms of an utterer's intentions, I argue in support of the thesis that timeless meaning and applied timeless meaning can be explicated in terms of the notion of utterer's occasionmeaning (together with other notions), and so ultimately in terms of the notion of intention. In that paper I do not distinguish utterance-type occasion-meaning from utterer's occasion-meaning; but once the distinction is made, it should not prove too difficult to explicate utterance-type occasion-meaning in terms of utterer's occasion-meaning. The following provisional definition, though inadequate, seems to provide a promising start in this direction. Let "a (x)" denote a complete utterance-type (a) which contains an utterance-type x. x may be complete or incomplete, and may indeed be identical with a. Let "O" denote an utterance-type. Let "ua(b/x)" denote the result of substituing 0 for x in a. Then I propose for consideration the following loosely framed definition. "By x, U meant c iff ( 3a) {U uttered a (x), and by uttering a (x) U meant that ... [the lacuna to be completed by writing a(ck/x)]}." My task is, however, to consider further the assumption made in the paper to which I have been referring, that the notion of utterer's occasion-meaning is explicable, in a certain way, in terms of the notion of utterer's intention, and the remainder of this paper will concern that topic. II. INITIAL DEFINITION OF UTTERER'S OCCASION-MEANING I shall take as a starting-point the account of "nonnatural" meaning which I offered in my article "Meaning" (Philosophical Review, 1957), treating this as an attempt to define the notion of utterer's occasion-meaning. To begin with, I shall take as my 150 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS definiendum not the form of expression which is of primary interest, namely (A) "By uttering x U meant that p," but rather the form of expression most prominently discussed in my I957 article, namely (B) "By uttering x U meant something." My I957 account, of course, embodied the idea that an adequate definiens for (B) would involve a reference to an intended effect of, or response to, the utterance of x, and that a specification of this intended effect or response would provide the material for answering the question what U meant by uttering x. At a later stage in this paper I shall revert to definiendum (A), and shall attempt to clarify the supposed link between the nature of the intended response and the specification of what U meant by uttering x. I start, then, by considering the following proposed definition: "U meant something by uttering x" is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending (i) A to produce a particular response r (2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (i) (3) A to fulfill (i) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2). Two explanatory remarks may be useful. (i) I use the terms "uttering" and "utterance" in an artificially extended way, to apply to any act or performance which is or might be a candidate for nonnatural meaning. (ii) To suppose A to produce r "on the basis of" his thinking that U intends him to produce r is to suppose that his thinking that U intends him to produce r is at least part of his reason for producing r, and not merely the cause of his producing r. The third subclause of the definiens is formulated in this way in order to eliminate what would otherwise be a counterexample. If, for subclause (3), we were to substitute (3a) A to fulfill (i) as a result of his fulfillment of (2) we should have counter-intuitively to allow that U meant something by doing x if (as might be the case) U did x intending (i) A to be amused (2) A to think that U intended him to be amused (3a) A to be amused (at least partly) as a result of his thinking that U intended him to be amused. I5' H. P. GRICE But though A's thought that U intended him to be amused might be a part-cause of his being amused, it could not be a part of his reason for being amused (one does not, indeed, have reasons for being amused). So the adoption of (3) rather than of (3a) excludes this case. I shall consider objections to this account of utterer's occasionmeaning under two main heads: first, those which purport to show that the definiens is too weak, that it lets in too much; and second, those which purport to show that the definiens is too strong, that it excludes clear cases of utterer's occasion-meaning. To meet some of these objections I shall at various stages offer redefinitions of the notion of utterer's occasion-meaning; each such redefinition is to be regarded as being superseded by its successor. III. ALLEGED COUNTEREXAMPLEs DIRECTED AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE SUGGESTED ANALYSANS (i) (Urmson)2 There is a range of examples connected with the provision by U (the utterer) of an inducement, or supposed inducement, so that A (the recipient, or audience) shall perform some action. Suppose a prisoner of war to be thought by his captors to possess some information which they want him to reveal; he knows that they want him to give this information. They subject him to torture by applying thumbscrews. The appropriate analysans for "They meant something by applying the thumbscrews (that he should tell them what they wanted to know)" are fulfilled: (I) They applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing a certain response on the part of the victim; (2) They intended that he should recognize (know, think) that they applied the thumbscrews with the intention of producing this response; (3) They intended that the prisoner's recognition (thought) that they had the intention mentioned in (2) should be at least part of his reason for producing the response mentioned. 2J. 0. Urmson, in conversation. 152 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS If in general to specify in (i) the nature of an intended response is to specify what was meant, it should be correct not only to say that the torturers meant something by applying the thumbscrews, but also to say that they meant that he should (was to) tell them what they wished to know. But in fact one would not wish to say either of these things; only that they meant him to tell. A similar apparent counterexample can be constructed out of a case of bribery (Urmson's original example). A restriction seems to be required, and one which might serve to eliminate this range of counterexamples can be identified from a comparison of the two following examples: (a) I go into a tobacconist's shop, ask for a packet of my favorite cigarettes, and when the unusually suspicious tobacconist shows that he wants to see the color of my money before he hands over the goods, I put down the price of the cigarettes on the counter. Here nothing has been meant. (b) I go to my regular tobacconist (from whom I also purchase other goods) for a packet of my regular brand X, the price of which is distinctive (say 43 cents). I say nothing, but put down 43 cents. The tobacconist recognizes my need, and hands over the packet. Here, I think, by putting down 43 cents I meant something-namely, that I wanted a packet of brand X. I have at the same time provided an inducement. The distinguishing feature of the second example seems to be that here the tobacconist recognized, and was intended to recognize, what he was intended to do from my "utterance" (my putting down the money), whereas in the first example this was not the case. Nor is it the case with respect to the torture example. So one might propose that the analysis of meaning be amended accordingly (Redefinition I): "U meant something by uttering x" is true if: (i) U intended, by uttering x, to induce a certain response inA (2) U intended A to recognize, at least in partfrom the utterance of x, that U intended to produce that response (3) U intended the fulfillment of the intention mentioned in (2) to be at least in part A's reason for fulfilling the intention mentioned in (i). x53 H. P. GRICE While this might cope with this range of counterexamples, there are others for which it is insufficient. (ii) (Stampc, Strawson, Schiffcr)3 (a) (Stampc) A man is playing bridge against his boss. He wants to earn his boss's favor, and for this reason he wants his boss to win, and furthermore he wants his boss to know that he wants him to win (his boss likes that kind of self-cffacemcnt). He does not want to do anything too blatant, however, like telling his boss by word of mouth, or in cffcct telling him by some action amounting to a signal, for fear the boss might be offended by his crudity. So he puts into operation the following plan: when he gets a good hand, he smiles in a certain way; the smile is very like, but not quite like, a spontaneous smile of plcasurc. He intends his boss to detect the diffcrcncc and to argue as follows: "That was not a genuine give-away smile, but the simulation of such a smile. That sort of simulation might be a bluff (on a weak hand), but this is bridge, not poker, and he would not want to get the better of me, his boss, by such an impropriety. So probably he has a good hand, and, wanting me to win, he hoped I would learn that he has a good hand by taking his smile as a spontaneous give-away. That being so, I shall not raise my partner's bid." In such a case, I do not think one would want to say that the cmployec had meant, by his smile (or by smiling), that he had a good hand, nor indeed that he had meant anything at all. Yet the conditions so far listed arc fulfilled. When producing the smile, (i) The cmployec intended that the boss should think that the employee had a good hand (2) The cmployec intended that the boss should think, at least in part because of the smile, that the employee intended the boss to think that the hand was a good one (3) The employee intended that at least part of the boss's reason for thinking that the hand was a good one should be that the employee wanted him to think just that. 3 Dennis W. Stamped, in conversation; P. F. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review, LXXIII (1964), 439-460; Stephen Schiffer, in conversation. '54 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS (b) To deal with an example similar to that just cited, Strawson proposed that the analysans might be restricted by the addition of a further condition, namely that the utterer U should utter x not only, as already provided, with the intention that A should think that the utterer intends to obtain a certain response from A, but also with the intention that A should think (recognize) that U has the intention just mentioned. In the current example, the boss is intended to think that the employee wants him to think that the hand is a good one, but he is not intended to think that he is intended to think that the employee wants him to think that the hand is a good one; he is intended to think that it is only as a result of being too clever for the employee that he has learned that the employee wants him to think that the hand is a good one; he is to think that he was supposed to take the smile as a spontaneous give-away. (c) (Schiffer) A more or less parallel example, where the intended response is a practical one, can be constructed, which seems to show the need for the addition of a fifth condition. The utterer U is in a room with a man A who is notoriously avaricious, but who also has a certain pride. U wants to get rid of A. So U, in full view of A, tosses a five-pound note out of the window. He intends that A should think as follows: " U wants to get me to leave the room, thinking that I shall run after the ?5 note. He also wants me to know that he wants me to go (so contemptuous was his performance). But I am not going to demean myself by going after the banknote; I shall go, but I shall go because he wants me to go. I do not care to be where I am not wanted." In this example, counterparts of all four of the conditions so far suggested for the analysans are fulfilled; yet, here again, I do not think that one would want to say that U had meant something by throwing the banknote out of the window; that he had meant, for example, that A was to (should) go away. The four conditions which are fulfilled are statable as follows: U uttered x (threw the banknote) with the intention (i) that A should leave the room (2) that A should think (at least partly on the basis of x) that U had intention (i) '55 H. P. GRICE (3) that A should think that U had intention (2) (4) that in the fulfillment of intention (i), at least part of A's reason for acting should be that he thought that U had intention (i) (that is, that intention [2] is fulfilled). So unless this utterance is to qualify as having meant something, yet a further restriction is required. A feature of this example seems to be that though A's leaving the room was intended by U to be based on A's thought that U wanted him to leave the room, U did not intend A to recognize that U intended A's departure to be so based. A was intended to think that U's purpose was to get him to leave in pursuit of the /5 note. So the needed restriction is suggested as being that U should intend: (5) that A should think (recognize) that U intended that (4). We can now formulate the general form of these suggested conditions (Redefinition II, Version A): "U meant something by x" is true iff U uttered x intending thereby: (i) that A should produce response r (2) that A should, at least partly on the basis of x, think that U intended (i) (3) that A should think that U intended (2) (4) that A's production of r should be based (at least in part) on A's thought that U intended that (i) (that is, on A's fulfillment of [2]) (5) that A should think that U intended (4). A notable fact about this analysans is that at several points it exhibits the following feature: U's nth "sub-intention" is specified as an intention that A should think that U has his n-i th "sub-intention." The presence of this feature has led to the suggestion that the analysis of meaning (on these lines) is infinitely or indefinitely regressive, that further counterexamples could always be found, however complex the suggested analysans, to force the incorporation of further clauses which exhibit this feature; but that such a regress might/will be virtuous, not vicious; it might/will be as harmless as a regress proceeding from "Z knows that p" to "Z knows that Z knows that p" to .... 156 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS I am not sure just how innocent such a regress in the analysans would be. It certainly would not exhibit the kind of circularity, at least prima facie strongly objectionable, which would be involved in giving, for example, a definiens for " U meant that p" which at some point reintroduced the expression "U meant that p," or introduced the expression " U meant that q." On the other hand, it would not be so obviously harmless as it would be to suppose that whenever it is correct to say "it is true thatp," it is also correct to say "it is true that it is true that p," and so on; or as harmless as it would be to suppose that ifZ satisfies the conditions for knowing that p, he also satisfies the condition for knowing that he knows that p. In such cases, no extra conditions would be required for the truth of an iteration of, for example, "he knows that" over and above those required for the truth of the sentence with respect to which the iteration is made. But the regressive character of the analysans for "U meant something by x" is designed to meet possible counterexamples at each stage, so each additional clause imposes a restriction, requires that a further condition be fulfilled. One might ask whether, for example, on the assumption that it is always possible to know that p without knowing that one knows thatp, it would be legitimate to define "Z super-knows that p" by the open set of conditions: (I) Z knows that p (2) Z knows that (i) (3) Z knows that (2) and so forth. There is, however, the possibility that no decision is required on this question, since it might be that the threatened regress cannot arise. It does not seem easy to construct examples which will force the addition of clauses involving further iterations of " U intended A to think that .... " The following is an attempt by Schiffer. U sings "Tipperary" in a raucous voice with the intention of getting A to leave the room; A is supposed to recognize (and to know that he is intended to recognize) that U wants to get rid of A. U, moreover, intends that A shall, in the event, leave because he recognizes U's intention that he shall go. U's scheme is that A should (wrongly) think that U intends A to think that U intends to '57 H. P. GRICE get rid of A by means of the recognition of U's intention that A should go. In other words A is supposed to argue: " U intends me to think that he intends to get rid of me by the raucous singing, but he really wants to get rid of me by means of the recognition of his intention to get rid of me. I am really intended to go because he wants me to go, not because I cannot stand the singing." The fact that A, while thinking he is seeing through U's plans, is really conforming to them, is suggested as precluding one from saying, here, that U meant by the singing that A should go. But once one tries to fill in the detail of this description, the example becomes baffling. How is A supposed to reach the idea that U wants him to think that U intends to get rid of him by the singing? One might suppose that U sings in a particular nasal tone which he knows not to be displeasing to A, though it is to most people. A knows that U knows this tone not to be displeasing to A, but thinks (wrongly) that U does not know that A knows this. A might then be supposed to argue: "He cannot want to drive me out by his singing, since he knows that this nasal tone is not displeasing to me. He does not know, however, that I know he knows this, so maybe he wants me to think that he intends to drive me out by his singing." At this point one would expect A to be completely at a loss to explain U's performance; I see no reason at all why A should then suppose that U really wants to get rid of him in some other way. Whether or not this example could be made to work, its complexity is enormous, and any attempt to introduce yet further restrictions would involve greater complexities still. It is in general true that one cannot have intentions to achieve results which one sees no chance of achieving; and the success of intentions of the kind involved in communication requires those to whom communications or near-communications are addressed to be capable in the circumstances of having certain thoughts and drawing certain conclusions. At some early stage in the attempted regression the calculations required of A by U will be impracticably difficult; and I suspect the limit was reached (if not exceeded) in the examples which prompted the addition of a fourth and fifth condition. So U could not have the intentions required of him in order to force the addition of further restrictions. Not only are 158 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS the calculations he would be requiring of A too difficult, but it would be impossible for U to find cues to indicate to A that the calculations should be made, even if they were within A's compass. So one is tempted to conclude that no regress is involved. But even should this conclusion be correct, we seem to be left with an uncomfortable situation. For though we may know that we do not need an infinite series of "backward-looking" subclauses, we cannot say just how many such subclauses are required. Indeed, it looks as if the definitional expansion of "By uttering x U meant something" might have to vary from case to case, depending on such things as the nature of the intended response, the circumstances in which the attempt to elicit the response is made, and the intelligence of the utterer and of the audience. It is dubious whether such variation can be acceptable. This difficulty would be avoided if we could eliminate potential counterexamples not by requiring U to have certain additional ("backward-looking") intentions, but rather by requiring U not to have a certain sort of intention or complex of intentions. Potential counterexamples of the kind with which we are at present concerned all involve the construction of a situation in which U intends A, in the reflection process by which A is supposed to reach his response, both to rely on some "inference-element" (some premise or some inferential step) E and also to think that U intends A not to rely on E. Why not, then, eliminate such potential counterexamples by a single clause which prohibits U from having this kind of complex intention? So we reach Redefinition II, Version B: "U meant something by uttering x" is true iff (for some A and for some r): (a) U uttered x intending (i) A to produce r (2) A to think U to intend (i) (3) A's fulfillment of (i) to be based on A's fulfillment of (2) (b) there is no inference-element E such that U uttered x intending both (i') that A's determination of r should rely on E and (2') that A should think U to intend that (I') be false. 159 H. P. GRICE (iii) (Searle)4 An American soldier in the Second World War is captured by Italian troops. He wishes to get the troops to believe that he is a German officer, in order to get them to release him. What he would like to do is to tell them in German or Italian that he is a German officer, but he does not know enough German or Italian to do that. So he "as it were, attempts to put on a show of telling them that he is a German officer" by reciting the only line of German that he knows, a line he learned at school: "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blahen." He intends to produce a certain response in his captors, namely that they should believe him to be a German officer, and he intends to produce this response by means of their recognition of his intention to produce it. Nevertheless, Searle maintains, it is false that when he says "Kennst du das Land" what he means is "I am a German officer" (or even the German version of "I am a German officer") because what the words mean is "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom." He uses this example to support a claim that something is missing from my account of meaning; this would (I think he thinks) be improved if it were supplemented as follows (my conjecture): " U meant something by x" means " U intended to produce in A a certain effect by means of the recognition of U's intention to produce that effect, and (if the utterance of x is the utterance of a sentence) U intends A's recognition of U's intention (to produce the effect) to be achieved by means of the recognition that the sentence uttered is conventionally used to produce such an effect." Now even if I should be here faced with a genuine counterexample, I should be very reluctant to take the way out which I suspect was being offered me. (It is difficult to tell whether this is what was being offered, since Searle is primarily concerned with the characterization of a particular speech-act (promising), not with a general discussion of the nature of meaning; and he was mainly concerned to adapt my account of meaning to his current purpose, not to amend it so as to be better suited to its avowed end.) Of course I would not want to deny that when the vehicle of meaning is a sentence (or the utterance of a sentence) the speaker's 4John R. Searle, "What is a Speech Act?" in Philosophy in America, ed. by Max Black (Ithaca, N. Y., I965), pp. 221-239. i6o UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS intentions are to be recognized, in the normal case, by virtue of a knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence (indeed my account of "non-conventional implicature" depends on this idea). But as I indicated earlier, I would like, if I can, to treat meaning something by the utterance of a sentence as being only a special case of meaning something by an utterance (in my extended sense of utterance), and to treat a conventional correlation between a sentence and a specific response as providing only one of the ways in which an utterance may be correlated with a response. Is the present example, however, a genuine counterexample? It seems to me that the imaginary situation is underdescribed, and that there are perhaps three different cases to be considered. (i) The situation might be such that the only real chance that the Italian soldiers would, on hearing the American soldier speak his German line, suppose him to be a German officer, would be if they were to argue as follows: "He has just spoken in German (perhaps in an authoritative tone); we don't know any German, and we have no idea what he has been trying to tell us, but if he speaks German, then the most likely possibility is that he is a German officer-what other Germans would be in this part of the world?" If the situation was such that the Italians were likely to argue like that, and the American knew that to be so, then it would be difficult to avoid attributing to him the intention, when he spoke, that they should argue like that. As I recently remarked, one cannot in general intend that some result should be achieved, if one knows that there is no likelihood that it will be achieved. But if the American's intention was as just described, then he certainly would not, by my account, be meaning that he is a German officer; for though he would intend the Italians to believe him to be a German officer, he would not be intending them to believe this on the basis of their recognition of his intention. And it seems to me that though this is not how Searle wished the example to be taken, it would be much the most likely situation to have obtained. (2) I think Searle wanted us to suppose that the American hoped that the Italians would reach a belief that he was a German officer via a belief that the words which he uttered were the Geri6i 2 H. P. GRICE man for "I am a German officer" (though it is not easy to see how to build up the context of utterance so as to give him any basis for this hope). Now it becomes doubtful whether, after all, it is right to say that the American did not mean "I am a German officer." Consider the following example. The proprietor of a shop full of knickknacks for tourists is standing in his doorway in Port Said, sees a British visitor, and in dulcet tones and with an alluring smile says to him the Arabic for "You pig of an Englishman." I should be quite inclined to say that he had meant that the visitor was to come in, or something of the sort. I would not of course be in the least inclined to say that he had meant by the words which he uttered that the visitor was to come in; and to point out that the German line means not "I am a German officer" but "Knowest thou the land" is not relevant. If the American could be said to have meant that he was a German officer, he would have meant that by saying the line, or by saying the line in a particular way; just as the Port Said shop-merchant would mean that the visitor was to come in by saying what he said, or by speaking to the visitor in the way he did. (3) It has been suggested, however, that it makes a difference whether U merely intends A to think that a particular sentence has a certain meaning which it does not in fact have, or whether he also intends him to think of himself as supposed to make use of his (mistaken) thought that it has this meaning in reaching a belief about U's intentions. The Port Said merchant is perhaps thought of as not intending the visitor to think of himself in this way; the visitor is not to suppose that the merchant thinks he can speak Arabic. But if A is intended to think that U expects A to understand the sentence spoken and is intended to attribute to it a meaning which U knows it does not have, then the utterer should not be described as meaning something by his utterance. I do not see the force of this contention, nor indeed do I find it easy to apply the distinction which it makes. Consider just one example. I have been listening to a French lesson being given to the small daughter of a friend. I noticed that she thinks that a certain sentence in French means "Help yourself to a piece of cake," though in fact it means something quite different. When there is some cake in the vicinity, I address to her this French sentence, and as I intended, i62 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS she helps herself. I intended her to think (and to think that I intended her to think) that the sentence uttered by me meant "Help yourself to some cake"; and I would say that the fact that the sentence meant, and was known by me to mean something quite different is no obstacle to my having meant something by my utterance (namely, that she was to have some cake). Put in a more general form the point seems to be as follows. Characteristically, an utterer intends an audience to recognize (and to think himself intended to recognize) some "crucial" feature F, and to think of F (and to think himself intended to think of F) as correlated in a certain way with some response which the utterer intends the audience to produce. It does not matter so far as the attribution of the speaker's meaning is concerned, whether F is thought by U to be really correlated in that way with the response or not; though of course in the normal case U will think F to be so correlated. Suppose, however, we fill in the detail of the "American soldier" case, so as to suppose he accompanies "Kennst du das Land" with gesticulations, chest-thumping, and so forth; he might then hope to succeed in conveying to his listeners that he intends them to understand the German sentence, to learn from the particular German sentence that the American intends them to think that he is a German officer (whereas really of course the American does not expect them to learn that way, but only by assuming, on the basis of the situation and the character of the American's performance, that he must be trying to tell them that he is a German officer). Perhaps in that case, we should be disinclined to say that the American meant that he was a German officer, and ready to say only that he meant them to think that he was a German officer. How can this example be differentiated from the "little girl" example? I would like to suggest a revised set of conditions for " U meant something by x" (Redefinition III, Version A): Ranges of variables: A: audiences f: features of utterance r: responses c: modes of correlation (for example, iconic, associative, conventional) I63 H. P. GRICE (HA) (if) (3r) (ic): U uttered x intending (i) A to think x possessesf (2) A to think U intends (i) (3) A to think off as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (4) A to think U intends (3) (5) A to think on the basis of the fulfillment of (i) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (6) A, on the basis of fulfillment of (5), to produce r (7) A to think U intends (6). In the case of the "little girl" there is a single feature f (that of being an utterance of a particular French sentence) with respect to which A has all the first four intentions. (The only thing wrong is that this feature is not in fact correlated conventionally with the intended responses, and this does not disqualify the utterance from being one by which U means something.) In the "American soldier" case there is no such single feature. The captors are intended (i) to recognize, and go by, feature f1 (x's being a bit of German and being uttered with certain gesticulations, and so. forth) but (2) to think that they are intended to recognize x as havingf2 (as being a particular German sentence). The revised set of conditions also takes care of the earlier bridge example. The boss is intended to recognize x as havingf (being a fake smile) but not to think that he is so intended. So intention (2) on our revised list is absent. And so we do not need the condition previously added to eliminate this example. I think, however, that condition (7) (the old condition [i]) is still needed to eliminate the "?5 note" example, unless it can be replaced by a general "anti-deception" clause. It may be that such replacement is possible; it may be that the "backward-looking" subclauses (2), (4), and (7) can be omitted, and replaced by the prohibitive clause which figures in Redefinition II, Version B. We have then to consider the merits of Redefinition III, Version B, the definiens of which will run as follows: i64 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS (3A) (if) (3r) (ic): (a) U uttered x intending (I) A to think x possessesf (2) A to thinkf correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (3) A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (I) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (4) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r, and (b) there is no inference-element E such that U intends both (I') A in his determination of r to rely on E (2') A to think Uto intend (I') to be false. IV. EXAMPLES DIRECTED TOWARD SIIOWING THE THREE-PRONG ANALYSANS Too STRONG Let us (for simplicity) revert to the original analysans of "U means something by uttering x," and abbreviate "U utters x intending A: (I) to produce r (2) to think U intends A to produce r (3) to think U intends the fulfillment of (I) to be based on the fulfillment of (2)" to "U utters x M-intending that A produce r." In my original article, I supposed that the identification of what U meant by x would turn on the identification of the M-intended response or effect. In particular I supposed that generic differences in type of response would be connected with generic differences within what is meant. To take two central examples, I supposed (a) "U meant by x that so-and-so is the case" would (roughly speaking) be explicated by " U uttered x M-intending to produce in A the belief that so-and-so"; (b) " U meant by x that A should do such-and-such" would be explicated by "U uttered x Mintending to produce in A the doing of such-and-such." Indicative i65 H. P. GRICE or quasi-indicative utterances are connected with the generation of beliefs, imperative or quasi-imperative utterances are connected with the generation of actions. I wish to direct our consideration to the emendation of this idea: to substitute in the account of imperative or quasi-imperative utterances, as the direct, M-intended response, "intention on the part of A to do such-and-such" (vice "A's doing such-and-such"). This has the advantages (i) that symmetry is achieved, in that the M-intended response will be a propositional attitude in both cases (indicative and imperative); (2) that it accommodates the fact that agreement ("yes," "all right") in the case of "The engine has stopped" signifies belief, and in the case of "Stop the engine" signifies intention. Of course action is the ultimate objective of the speaker. Cases of immediate response by acting are treatable, however, as special cases of forming an intention-namely, the intention with which the agent acts. Imperatives always call for intentional action. Alleged counterexamples are best seen as attempts to raise trouble, not for the suggested analysis for "U means something by uttering x," but for this analysis when supplemented by the kind of detail just mentioned, so as to offer an outline of an account of "By uttering x, U means (meant) that . . .." In particular, it is suggested that to explicate "By uttering x, U meant that so-and-so is the case" by "U uttered x M-intending to produce in A the belief that so-and-so" is to select as explicans a condition that is too strong. We need to be able to say on occasion that U meant that so-and-so, without committing ourselves to the proposition that U M-intended to produce a belief that so-and-so. The following examples seem to present difficulties: Examinee: Q: "When was the Battle of Waterloo"? A: "I8 5" ("18I6") Here the examinee meant that the Battle of Waterloo was fought in i8I5 (i8i6) but hardly M-intended to induce a belief to that effect in his examiner. The examiner's beliefs (whatever they may be) are naturally tobe thought of by the examinee as independent of candidates' answers. The M-intended effect is (perhaps) that the examiner knows or thinks that the examinee thinks the Battle i66 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS of Waterloo was fought in I815 (i8I6); or (perhaps) that the examiner knows whether the examinee knows the correct answer to the question. (Perhaps the former is the direct, and the latter the indirect, intended effect). Confession (some cases): Mother: "It's no good denying it: you broke the window, didn't you ?" Child: "Yes, I did." Here the child knows his mother already thinks he broke the window; what she wants is that he should say that he did. Perhaps the M-intended effect, then, is that the mother should think the child willing to say that he did (what does "say" mean here-how should it be explicated?); or that the mother should think the child willing not to pretend that he did not break the window (not to say things or perform acts intended to induce the belief that the child did not break the window). (Confession is perhaps a sophisticated and ritual case.) Reminding: Q: "Let me see, what was that girl's name?" A: "Rose" (or produces a rose). The questioner is here to be presumed already to believe that the girl's name is Rose (at least in a dispositional sense); it has just slipped his mind. The intended effect seems to be that A should have it in mind that her name is Rose. Review offacts: Both speaker and hearer are to be supposed already to believe that p (q, and so forth). The intended effect again seems to be that A (and perhaps U also) should have "the facts" in mind (altogether). Conclusion of argument: p, q, therefore r (from already stated premises). While U intends that A should think that r, he does not expect (and so intend) A to reach a belief that r on the basis of U's intention that he should reach it. The premises, not trust in U, are supposed to do the work. The countersuggestible man: A regards U as being, in certain areas, almost invariably mistaken, or as being someone with whom he i67 H. P. GRICE cannot bear to be in agreement. U knows this. U says "My mother thinks very highly of you" with the intention that A should (on the strength of what U says) think that U's mother has a low opinion of him. Here there is some inclination to say that, despite U's intention that A should think U's mother thinks ill of him, what U meant was that U's mother thinks well of A. These examples raise two related difficulties. (i) There is some difficulty in supposing that the indicative form is conventionally tied to indicating that the speaker is Mintending to induce a certain belief in his audience, if there are quite normal occurrences of the indicative mood for which the speaker's intentions are different, in which he is not M-intending (nor would be taken to be M-intending) to induce a belief (for example, in reminding). Yet, on the other side, it seems difficult to suppose that the function of the indicative mood has nothing to do with the inducement of belief. The indication of the speaker's intention that his audience should act (or form an intention to act) is plausibly, if not unavoidably, to be regarded as by convention the function of the imperative mood; surely the function of the indicative ought to be analogous. What is the alternative to the suggested connection with an intention to induce a belief? The difficulty here might be met by distinguishing questions about what an indicative sentence means and questions about what a speaker means. One might suggest that a full specification of sentence meaning (for indicative sentences) involves reference to the fact that the indicative form conventionally signifies an intention on the part of the utterer to induce a belief; but that it may well be the case that the speaker's meaning does not coincide with the meaning of the sentence he utters. It may be clear that, though he uses a device which conventionally indicates an intention on his part to induce a belief, in this case he has not this but some other intention. This is perhaps reinforceable by pointing out that any device the primary (standard) function of which is to indicate the speaker's intention to induce a belief that p could in appropriate circumstances be easily and intelligibly employed for related purposes, for example (as in the "examinee" example), to indicate that the speaker believes that p. The problem then would be to exhibit the alleged counterexamples as natural adaptations of a i68 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS device or form primarily connected with the indication of an intention to induce a belief. I think we would want if possible to avoid treating the counterexamples as extended uses of the indicative form, and to find a more generally applicable function for that form. In any case, the second difficulty is more serious. (2) Even if we can preserve the idea that the indicative form is tied by convention to the indication of a speaker's intention to induce a belief, we should have to allow that the speaker's meaning will be different for different occurrences of the same indicative sentence. (Indeed, this is required by the suggested solution for difficulty [i]). We shall have to allow this if differences in intended response involve differences in speaker's meaning. But it is not very plausible to say that if U says, "The Battle of Waterloo was fought in I8I 5": (i) as a schoolmaster (intending to induce a belief) (2) as an examinee (3) as a schoolmaster in revision class, U would mean something different by uttering this sentence on the three occasions. Even if the examinee M-intends to induce a belief that he (the examinee) thinks the Battle of Waterloo was fought in i8I5, it does not seem attractive to say that when he said "Waterloo was fought in I8I5" he meant that he thought that Waterloo was fought in i8I5 (unlike the schoolmaster teaching the period for the first time). We might attempt to deal with some of the examples (for example, reminding, fact-reviewing) by supposing the standard M-intended effect to be not just a belief but an "activated belief" (that A should be in a state of believing that p and having it in mind that p). One may fall short of this in three ways: one may (i) neither believe that p nor have it in mind that p (2) believe that p but not have it in mind that p (3) not believe that p, but have it in mind that p. So one who reminds intends the same final response as one who informs, but is intending to remedy a different deficiency. This (even for the examples for which it seems promising) runs I69 H. P. GRICE into a new difficulty. If U says (remindingly) "Waterloo was fought in i8I5," two of my conditions are fulfilled: (i) U intends to induce in A the activated belief that Waterloo was fought in I 8 I 5 (2) U intends A to recognize that (i). But if the date of Waterloo was "on the tip of A's tongue" (as it might be), U cannot expect (and so cannot intend) that A's activated belief will be produced via A's recognition that U intends to produce it. If A already believes (though has momentarily forgotten) that Waterloo was fought in i8I5, then the mention of this date will induce the activated belief, regardless of U's intention to produce it. This suggests dropping the requirement (for speaker's meaning) that U should intend A's production of response to be based on A's recognition of U's intention that A should produce the response; it suggests the retention merely of conditions (i) and (2) above. But this will not do: there are examples which require this condition. (a) Herod, showing Salome the head of St. John the Baptist, cannot, I think, be said to have meant that St. John the Baptist was dead. (b) Displaying a bandaged leg (in response to a squash invitation). In (b) the displayer could mean (i) that he cannot play squash or (dubiously) (2) that he has a bad leg (the bandages might be fake) but not (3) that his leg is bandaged. The third condition seems to be required in order to protect us from counter-intuitive results in these cases. Possible remedies (i) We might retain the idea that the intended effect or response (for cases of meaning that it is the case that p-indicative type) is activated belief, retaining in view the distinction between reaching 170 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS this state (i) from assurance-deficiency (2) from attentiondeficiency; and stipulate that the third condition (that U intends the response to be elicited on the basis of a recognition of his intention to elicit that response) is operative only when U intends to elicit activated belief by eliminating assurance-deficiency, not when he intends to do so by eliminating attention-deficiency. This idea might perhaps be extended to apply to imperative types of cases, too, provided that we can find cases of reminding someone to do something (restoring him to activated intention) in which U's intention that A should reach the state is similarly otiose, in which it is not to be expected that A's reaching the activated intention will be dependent on his recognition that U intends him to reach it. So the definition might read roughly as follows: (*b is a mood marker, an auxiliary correlated with the propositional attitude b from a given range of propositional attitudes) "U means by uttering x that *ap" = "U utters x intending (i) that A should actively b that p (2) that A should recognize that U intends (i) and (unless U intends the utterance of x merely to remedy attention-deficiency) (3) that the fulfillment of (i) should be based on the fulfillment of (2)." This remedy does not, however, cope with (i) the "examinee" example, (2) the "confession" cases, or (3) the countersuggestible man. (ii) Since, when U does intend, by uttering x, to promote in A the belief that p, it is standardly requisite that A should (and should be intended to) think that U thinks that p (otherwise A will not think that p), why not make the direct intended effect not that A should think that p, but that A should think that U thinks that p? In many but not all cases, U will intend A to pass, from thinking that U thinks that p, to thinking that p himself ("informing" cases). But such an effect is to be thought of as indirect (even though often of prime interest). '7' H. P. GRICE We can now retain the third condition, since even in reminding cases A may be expected to think U's intention that A should think that U thinks that p to be relevant to the question whether A is to think that U thinks that p. We have coped, not only with the reminding example, but also with the examinee example and with the countersuggestible man (who is intended to think that U thinks that p, though not to think that p himself). And though the fact-review example is not yet provided for (since A may be thought of as already knowing that U thinks that p), if we are understanding " U believes that p" as " U has the activated belief thatp," this example can be accommodated, too.A, though he is to be supposed to know that U believes that p, does not until U speaks know that U has it in mind that p. But while a solution along these lines may be acceptable for indicative-type cases, it cannot be generalized to all non-indicative cases. Contrast: (a) "You shall not cross the barrier." (b) "Do not cross the barrier." When uttering (a), U would characteristically intend A to think that U intends that A shall not cross the barrier; but it seems that a specification of U's meaning, for a normal utterance of (b), would be incompletely explicated unless it is stated that U intends A not merely to think that U intends that A shall not cross the barrier, but also himself to form the intention not to cross. Let us then draw a distinction between what I might call "purely exhibitive" utterances (utterances by which the utterer U intends to impart a belief that he [ U] has a certain propositional attitude), and utterances which are not only exhibitive but also what I might call "protreptic" (that is, utterances by which U intends, via imparting the belief that he [U] has a certain propositional attitude, to induce a corresponding attitude in the hearer). We reach, then, Redefinition IV, Version A: "By uttering x U meant that */ip" is true iff (3A) (3f) (3c): 172 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS U uttered x intending (i) (2) (3) (4) [as for III(A), with "4-ing that p" (5) substituted for "r"] (6) (7) and (for some cases) (8) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), himself to /b that p. Whether a substitution-instancc of subclause (8) is to appear in the expansion of a statement of the form represented in the dcfinicndum will depend on the nature of the substitution for "*s" which that statement incorporates. We can also reach Rcdcfinition IV, Vcrsion B, by adding what appears above as subclause (8) to the dcfinicns of III(B) as subclausc (a) (5), together with a modification of clause (b) of III(B) to take into account that the intended response r is now specified in terms of the idea of b-ing that p. Whether either version of Rcdcfinition IV is correct as it stands depends crucially on the view to be taken of an imperatival version of the "countcrsuggestiblc man" cxamplc. Mr. A, wishing to be relieved of the immediate presence of Mrs. A, but regarding her as being, so far as he is concerned, countcrsuggestiblc, says to her, "Now, dear, keep me company for a little." Would it be correct to say that Mr. A, who clearly did not mean Mrs. A to keep him company, meant by his remark that she was to (should) keep him company? If the answer is "yes," the Rcdcfinition IV is inadequate, since according to it to have meant that Mrs. A was to keep him company, Mr. A would have had to intend that she form the intention to keep him company, an intention which he certainly did not have. Emcndation, however, would not be difficult; we alter the new subclause from "A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), himself to p to that p" to "A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (6), to think Uto intend A top/ thatp." If, however, the answer is "no," then Rcdcfinition IV is left intact. '73 H. P. GRICE V. UTTERER'S OCCASION-MEANING IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AUDIENCE There are various examples of utterances by which the utterer could correctly be said to have meant something (to have meant that so-and-so), such that there is no actual person or set of persons whom the utterer is addressing and in whom he intends to induce a response. The range of these examples includes, or might be thought to include, such items as the posting of notices, like "Keep out" or "This bridge is dangerous," entries in diaries, the writing of notes to clarify one's thoughts when working on some problem, soliloquizing, rehearsing a part in a projected conversation, and silent thinking. At least some of these examples are unprovided for in the definitions so far proposed. The examples which my account should cover fall into three groups: (a) Utterances for which the utterer thinks there may (now or later) be an audience. U may think that some particular person, for example, himself at a future date in the case of a diary entry, may (but also may not) encounter U's utterance; or U may think that there may or may not be some person or other who is or will be an auditor of his utterance. (b) Utterances which the utterer knows not to be addressed to any actual audience, but which the utterer pretends to address to some particular person or type of person, or which he thinks of as being addressed to some imagined audience or type of audience (as in the rehearsal of a speech or of his part in a projected conversation). (c) Utterances (including "internal" utterances) with respect to which the utterer neither thinks it possible that there may be an actual audience nor imagines himself as addressing an audience, but nevertheless intends his utterance to be such that it would induce a certain sort of response in a certain perhaps fairly indefinite kind of audience were it the case that such an audience was present. In the case of silent thinking the idea of the presence of an audience will have to be interpreted liberally, as being the idea of there being an audience for a public counterpart of the '74 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS utterer's internal speech. In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that some cases of verbal thinking fall outside the scope of my account. When verbal thoughts merely pass through my head as distinct from being "framed" by me, it is inappropriate to talk of me as having meant something by them; I am, perhaps, in such cases more like a listener than a speaker. I shall propose a final redefinition which I hope will account for the examples which need to be accounted for, and which will allow as special cases the range of examples in which there is, and it is known by the utterer that there is, an actual audience. This redefinition will be relatively informal; I could present a more formal version which would gain in precision at the cost of ease of comprehension. Let "p" (and k') range over properties of persons (possible audiences); appropriate substituends for "O" (and i') will include such diverse expressions as "is a passer-by," "is a passer-by who sees this notice," "is a native English speaker," "is identical with Jones." As will be seen, for U to mean something it will have to be possible to identify the value of "/" (which may be fairly indeterminate) which U has in mind; but we do not have to determine the range from which U makes a selection. Redefinition V "U meant by uttering x that *iP" is true iff (30) (3f (3c): I. U uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who has q would think that (i) x hasf (2) f is correlated in way c with M-ing that p (3) (3 0'): U intends x to be such that anyone who has b' would think, via thinking (i) and (2), that U4's that p (4) in view of (3), U O's that p; and II. (operative only for certain substituends for "*4") U uttered x intending that, should there actually be anyone who has 0, he would via thinking (4), himself a that p; '75 H. P. GRICE and III. It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, U intends x to be such that anyone who has 0 will both (i') rely on E in coming to O+ that p and (2') think that (3k'): Uintends x to be such that anyone who has O' will come to /+ that p without relying on E. Notes: (X) "i+" is to be read as "p" if Clause II is operative, and as "think that UO's" if Clause II is non-operative. (2) We need to use both "i" and "i'," since we do not wish to require that U should intend his possible audience to think of U's possible audience under the same description as U does himself. Explanatory comments: (i) It is essential that the intention which is specified in Clause II should be specified as U's intention "that should there be anyone who has 0, he would (will) . . ." rather than, analogously with Clauses I and II, as U's intention "that x should be such that, should anyone be 0, he would ... ." If we adopt the latter specification, we shall be open to an objection raised by Schiffer, as can be shown with the aid of an example of the same kind as his. Suppose that, infuriated by an afternoon with my mother-inlaw, when I am alone after her departure I relieve my feelings by saying, aloud and passionately, "Don't you ever come near me again." It will no doubt be essential to my momentary well-being that I should speak with the intention that my remark be such that were my mother-in-law present, she would form the intention not to come near me again. It would, however, be unacceptable if it were represented as following from my having this intention that I meant that she was never to come near me again; for it is false that, in the circumstances, I meant this by my remark. The redefinition as formulated avoids this difficulty. (2) Suppose that in accordance with the definiens of the latest redefinition, (30): U intends x to be such that anyone who is f will think ... , and suppose that the value of "O" which U has in mind is the property of being identical with a particular person A. Then it will follow that U intends A to think . . . ; and given the further 176 UTTERER'S MEANING AND INTENTIONS condition, fulfilled in any normal case, that U intends A to think that he (A) is the intended audience, we are assured of the truth of a statement from which the definiens of IV(B) is inferrible by the rule of existential generalization (assuming the legitimacy of this application of E. G. to a statement the expression of which contains such "intensional" verbs as "intend" and "think"). I think it can also be shown that, for any case in which there is an actual audience who knows that he is the intended audience, if the definiens IV(B) is true then the definiens of V will be true. If that is so, given that redefinition V is correct, for any normal case in which there is an actual audience the fulfillment of the definiens of IV(B) will constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for U's having meant that *1p. VI. CONCLUSION I see some grounds for hoping that, by paying serious attention to the relation between nonnatural and natural meaning, one might be able not only to reach a simplified account of utterer's occasion-meaning, but also to show that any human institution, the function of which is to provide artificial substitutes for natural signs, must embody, as its key-concept, a concept possessing approximately the features which I ascribe to the concept of utterer's occasion-meaning. But such an endeavor lies beyond the scope of this paper. H. P. GRICE University of California, Berkel