R. B. Jones, elsewhere (specifically, his "Grice and Carnap on the value of formalism," Carnap Corner) quotes direct from Carnap:
"When I considered a concept or proposition occurring in a philosophical or scientific discussion, I thought that I understood it clearly only if I felt that I could express it, if I wanted to, in symbolic language."
The context for Grice's utterance is perhaps more complex?
As it happens, it's a Strawson fact.
Ryle, the editor of "Mind", was apparently so mpressed with reports about Strawson's lectures on logic (some of them given jointly with Grice) that he (Ryle) asked him (Strawson) to publish a logical essay.
"On Referring," as Strawson called it, attacked Russell on 'the'.
Russell claimed that any sentence referring to non-existent or contradictory entities (such as unicorns, round squares, or the king of France) can be logically analysed into an assertion that a particular thing exists and has certain properties - the sentence turns out to be simply false.
But Strawson argued that sentences are not in themselves true or false, simply meaningful; it is the statements that they are used to make that are true or false.
"The King of France is wise" could have been used to make a true or a false statement during the years of the French monarchy, but after France became a republic, the sentence "The King of France is wise" used in a fairy story, historical legend, or joke, did not give rise to a question of truth or falsity.
Strawson said Russell had failed to distinguish between a sentence and a statement, and had confused referring or mentioning with meaning.
Merely by implying that someone existed, Russell had presupposed his existence.
He had distorted the nature of how "we actually use and understand" language in an attempt to squash its complexity into uniform usage.
Strawson had struck a blow for ordinary language logic.
Formal logic he considered "an indispensable tool indeed for clarifying much of our thought, but not, as some are tempted to suppose, the unique and sufficient key to the functioning of language and thought in general".
Indeed, when his erstwhile tutor Paul Grice declared, "If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying," Strawson retorted:
"If you can put it in symbols, it's not worth saying."
Not even with flowers!?
Interestingly, Carnap's, Grice's, and Strawson's, adages, are all conditional in form
C. p --> q
G. ~p --> ~q
S. p --> ~q
Let (G) be "If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying". Strawson's (S) comes out as a negation of the antecedent, and the retention of the same consequent. Clever. Carnap is more 'implicatural' (or nuanced, if you must):
"When I considered a concept or proposition occurring in a philosophical or scientific discussion, I thought that I understood it clearly only if I felt that I could express it, if I wanted to, in symbolic language."
As R. B. Jones, Carnap is recollecting, so let's rephrase the utterance in the present, since it's more verbose than the Griceian adage:
i. When I consider a concept or a proposition, occurring in a philosohpical or scientific discussion (or merely English conversation), I think that I can understand it clearly ONLY IF _I_ somehow feel like I can express it, provided I want to, in symbols.
It's like Carnap is also thinking:
ii. "Most likely, Grice, Strawson's future erstwhile tutor, will say something to that effect in due time."
And he did!
It is good to consider IMPLICATURE in this respect, since Grice is talking about "not worth saying" (but perhaps worth 'implicating'). Consider:
iii. Some of the students failed.
In fact, all of them did. The implicature can be put in symbols, and it is yet not worth saying! It is actually worth cancelling:
iv. Some of the students failed; indeed, all.
Other examples may be:
v. Horses run swiftly; therefore, horses run.
This is such an otiose thing to say that I would think Grice would concede that it's NOT worth saying.
What about
vi. Every boy nice some girl.
In "Reply To Richards", Grice speaks of the altogether-boy, and the one-at-a-time-girl, which surely connect.
Carnap and Grice (that is the order in terms of seniority) is that FIRST-ORDER PREDICATE LOGICAL provides "a pretty good guide" to grammar. They were reversing Russell's idea that 'grammar' is a pretty good guide to logical form. Or not!
Ryle, the editor of "Mind", was apparently so mpressed with reports about Strawson's lectures on logic (some of them given jointly with Grice) that he (Ryle) asked him (Strawson) to publish a logical essay.
"On Referring," as Strawson called it, attacked Russell on 'the'.
Russell claimed that any sentence referring to non-existent or contradictory entities (such as unicorns, round squares, or the king of France) can be logically analysed into an assertion that a particular thing exists and has certain properties - the sentence turns out to be simply false.
But Strawson argued that sentences are not in themselves true or false, simply meaningful; it is the statements that they are used to make that are true or false.
"The King of France is wise" could have been used to make a true or a false statement during the years of the French monarchy, but after France became a republic, the sentence "The King of France is wise" used in a fairy story, historical legend, or joke, did not give rise to a question of truth or falsity.
Strawson said Russell had failed to distinguish between a sentence and a statement, and had confused referring or mentioning with meaning.
Merely by implying that someone existed, Russell had presupposed his existence.
He had distorted the nature of how "we actually use and understand" language in an attempt to squash its complexity into uniform usage.
Strawson had struck a blow for ordinary language logic.
Formal logic he considered "an indispensable tool indeed for clarifying much of our thought, but not, as some are tempted to suppose, the unique and sufficient key to the functioning of language and thought in general".
Indeed, when his erstwhile tutor Paul Grice declared, "If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying," Strawson retorted:
"If you can put it in symbols, it's not worth saying."
Not even with flowers!?
Interestingly, Carnap's, Grice's, and Strawson's, adages, are all conditional in form
C. p --> q
G. ~p --> ~q
S. p --> ~q
Let (G) be "If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying". Strawson's (S) comes out as a negation of the antecedent, and the retention of the same consequent. Clever. Carnap is more 'implicatural' (or nuanced, if you must):
"When I considered a concept or proposition occurring in a philosophical or scientific discussion, I thought that I understood it clearly only if I felt that I could express it, if I wanted to, in symbolic language."
As R. B. Jones, Carnap is recollecting, so let's rephrase the utterance in the present, since it's more verbose than the Griceian adage:
i. When I consider a concept or a proposition, occurring in a philosohpical or scientific discussion (or merely English conversation), I think that I can understand it clearly ONLY IF _I_ somehow feel like I can express it, provided I want to, in symbols.
It's like Carnap is also thinking:
ii. "Most likely, Grice, Strawson's future erstwhile tutor, will say something to that effect in due time."
And he did!
It is good to consider IMPLICATURE in this respect, since Grice is talking about "not worth saying" (but perhaps worth 'implicating'). Consider:
iii. Some of the students failed.
In fact, all of them did. The implicature can be put in symbols, and it is yet not worth saying! It is actually worth cancelling:
iv. Some of the students failed; indeed, all.
Other examples may be:
v. Horses run swiftly; therefore, horses run.
This is such an otiose thing to say that I would think Grice would concede that it's NOT worth saying.
What about
vi. Every boy nice some girl.
In "Reply To Richards", Grice speaks of the altogether-boy, and the one-at-a-time-girl, which surely connect.
Carnap and Grice (that is the order in terms of seniority) is that FIRST-ORDER PREDICATE LOGICAL provides "a pretty good guide" to grammar. They were reversing Russell's idea that 'grammar' is a pretty good guide to logical form. Or not!
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