Jones's gardener, Jones's butler

Speranza

Oddly, Jones was discussing this. Rather, Jones was referring to Neale judging Grice's "Vacuous Names" the gem that it is. Jones is aware of this.

In the Ling. & Phil. piece, Neale provides further evidence for why "Vacuous Names" is a gem. He Neale) is discussing material Neale will elaborate in his classic "Definite descriptions".

I always loved Grice's "Vacuous Names" for the references to the 'definite description' controversy. There's loads written on this, which I have researched motivated by the casual (not causal) reference by Grice to Donnellan, to the effect, "I don't agree with Donnellan".

But this is Neale bringing "Vacuous Names" to the fore, then:

"In fact, Grice disposes very neatly of the view that descriptions are ambiguous
between Russellian and referential readings. In “Vacuous Names” (which is unfortunately not included in Studies) Grice contrasts the following examples."

(1) SCENARIO I

A group of men is discussing the situation arising from the death of a business acquaintance, of whose private life they know nothing, except that (as they think) he lived extravagantly, with a household staff that included a butler. One of them says “Well, Jones’ butler will be seeking a new position.”

(2) SCENARIO II

"Earlier, another group has just attended a party at Jones’ house, at which their hats and coats were looked after by a dignified individual in dark clothes with a wing-collar, a portly man with protruding ears, whom they heard Jones addressing as “Old Boy,” and who at one point was discussing with an old lady the cultivation of vegetable marrows. One of the group says

i. “Jones’ butler got the hats and coats mixed up”

(p. 141).

Neale:

"Grice then highlights two important features of case (2)."

"First, only in case (2) has some particular individual been “‘described as’, ‘referred to as’, or ‘called’, Jones’ butler by the speaker” (ibid.)."

"Second, in case (2), someone who knew that Jones had no butler and who knew that the man with the protruding ears, etc., was actually Jones’ gardener “would also be in a position to claim that the speaker had misdescribed that individual as Jones’ butler” (p. 142)."

Neale:

"Whereas many philosophers used pairs of examples with these general features to motivate the view that descriptions are ambiguous between Russellian and referential readings [e.g. Donnellan 1966) [as cited indeed by Grice, "Vacuous Names" in a footnote, and being the locus classicus which originated much Griceian literature, since Kripke thought he was being Griceian by citing Donnellan!] Grice does not think there is a problem for Russell here."

Neale: "what U says is given by the Russellian expansion even if the description is used referentially (in an “identificatory way” as Grice puts it) as in case (2) above."

Grice provides typographical ways of distinguishing this:

JONES'S BUTLER

vs.

Jones's butler

One is identificatory; the other Grice unimaginatively (rather?) calls it non-identificatory.

Neale:

"In a referential case, U intends to communicate information about some particular individual; but all this means is that what U means diverges from what U says. This very natural move (which has subsequently received strong support from a variety of other sources [...]) provides a perfectly satisfactory account of what is going on when U uses a description that does not fit its target."

"If Jones’s butler did not get the hats and coats mixed up, but Jones’s gardener did, then when U uttered the sentence

“Jones’ butler got the hats and coats mixed up”

what U said was ****false**** [emphasis Speranza's and Grice's for that matter! If not Neale's!], but part of what U meant was true."

The problem is HOW MUCH, what percentage of what U meant (Just teasing!)

"Now it is important to see, as Grice does not, that when a description is used referentially there will always be a mismatch between what U says and what U means (even where the description uniquely fits the individual the speaker intends to communicate information about) because what is said is, on Russell’s account, analysable as a general proposition, whereas what is meant will always include a singular proposition."

And so on!