Grice on Grice on Grice on Grice

Speranza

Actually, that should read:

Grice₄ on Grice₃ on Grice₂ on Grice₁.

It's a reference to Jones's idea of commenting on Neale, Ling. and Phil, who writes about WoW:i:

"Grice provides further examples in Essays 1 and 15."

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I.e. A-philosophical theses. In his website, R. B. Jones has provided extensive commentary on the A-philosopher. My point here is that, "Grice provides further examples" is a charming thing to say.

I am particularly fascinated by the fact that the most important, I hope, example, that Grice provides, is his OWN.

Grice 1967:i, i.e. "Prolegomena" to "Logic and conversation" cites from Grice, 1961, A causal theory of perception.

I.e. Grice is going on record as criticising his own former self.

In 1965, he had delivered a full set of "Logic and Conversation" lectures at Oxford, where he used 'implicature' extensively.

But he is now in the USA, and he draws back to an earlier self, "Causal theory". He is distinguishing between:

D-or-D implication,

"That pillar box seems red to me" (his example).

"In fact it IS".

---- Grice is suggesting that he is now in possession of a fuller theory to explain why that seems like an odd thing to say:

"Hey, that pillar box seems red to me, and is red." (Or: even odder: "That pillar box is red and seems red to me"?)

Cheers.