The semiotic triangle

By JLS
for the GC

--- J in comment on "Process and Conversation":

"the politics of the science establishment is not strictly a semantic or syntactic affair".

Hear, hear. But one wishes! I have to meditate on this so a hurried reply. In semiotic circles, there are indeed three angles to consider:

syntactics -- the interreation between signs. Consider Hilbert's formalism in mathematics. I think it would not be unfair to consider a formalist as being pretty happy and satisfied with a syntax of mathematics. (He would not use the word 'syntactics'). Since we then have a System, or Language -- call it System H, for Hilbert --, most of the notions should be defined at THIS level. A true formalist is never going to ask you what a sign 'means' or represents. So I would think concatenation of signs is a pretty basic thing and obviously prior to any interpretation.

With intuitionism, logicism, etc., there's the realm of the 'semantics' of a language to be taken into account. This, since the development of 'model' theory SHOULD be understood as making a claim on 'reality'. A predicate-calculus (like Grice's System G) needs to specify the correlations with 1 (truth) and 0 (falsity) -- polyvalent models are even trickier. Now, at THIS level, a theory, a system, or a language MAY be said to be a 'semantic' affair. But people usually underestimate semantics as when they criticise Clinton, "Depends on what you mean by 'is'" as being mere 'semantic'. Etc.

Finally, there is the 'pragmatic' dimension. This has been explored notably by Kuhn, and Lakatos -- even for the 'progress' or revolutions in 'formal' and not so formal sciences. Consider Lakatos on what COUNTS as evidence in a research programme. It would be a good idea to encompass those considerations which EXTEND beyond the 'semantics' of the language of a specific theory as dealing with its pragmatics.

J:

"the politics of the science establishment is not strictly a semantic or syntactic affair".

In the case of the big-bang cosmology, for example, the politics HAS been confirmationist. I.e. alternate-cosmologies have been given little support, the wiki says, because, well, they have been thought to have been 'falsified'. When it comes to more formal disciplines, like mathematics, logic, or some sort of conceptual analysis, the points may be trickier. No wonder Grice LOVED the longitudinal unity of what he called 'philosophy': treat those who were great and are dead as if they are great and living. Why is it? Just for an amor theologicus, or because of some point about the inner architectonics of concepts, or stuff?