H. P. GRICE

H. P. Grice was born in Harborne.

Grice was a Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at St. John's, Oxford.

Grice published little, but had a great influence.

Grice's earliest work dealt with negation (1938), personal identity (1941), Peirceian semiotics (1948), and the philosophy of perception, but he subsequently moved to further problems in language, ethics, and metaphysics. 

A concern with reason (and rationality) is a subtle thread which unites Grice's investigations. 

His historical idols was Ariskant -- never Plathegel!

One early topic was his defense of the 'causal' theory of perception. 

This defense required separating the scientific or specialist's part of the task of analyzing perception from that of the philosopher. 

This distinction relies on an underlying notion of analysis closely related to the analytic–synthetic distinction for which Grice and Strawson provide a brief spirited defense ("In defence of a dogma") in an influential essay evoking Quine's criticism in "Two dogmas of empiricism."

Three subsequent essays by Grice represent intricate attempts to define 'meaning' (after having studied C. S. Peirce's semiotics), using only common sense psychological concepts such as intending, believing, and desiring. 

If this programme is successful it would provide a more elaborate defense of the analytic synthetic distinction.

Grice's best known and most influential contribution is the concept of a conversational implicature, or conversational IMPLICATUM.

The conversational IMPLICATUM of an utterance made by some utterer U is something that is conveyed to a thoughtful addressee by the mode of expression rather than by the 'meanings' of the expression itself. 

The conversational IMPLICATUM arises from the fact that conversation is normally governed by principles including cooperation, truthfulness, and informativeness, and that both parties are aware of these. 

The three best known applications of this concept are to perception, 'informal logic,' and presupposition.  

Grice is concerned to provide an account of sense-data ("phenomenalist") discourse in terms of how things seemed to the perceiver. 

A common objection to this is that it is odd (misleading, baffling) to say in a normal case of the perception of a pillar box that it seems red to the subject that a red pillar box is present. 

Grice's concept of conversational implicatum can be invoked to explain the oddity as a result of the fact that a stronger statement can be made, thus leaving room for the seems statement to remain misleading (perhaps even pointless), BUT TRUE. 

The concept of conversational implicatum has been widely deployed in philosophy and is a continuing topic of research and debate. 

One major focus of discussion is the adequacy of the account when applied to quantitative (or numerically quantified, as Quine has it) statements, such as "John has two children." 

It is controversial whether by uttering the utterance, utterer U means that John has exactly two children, or whether U means that John has at least two children. 

In the latter case, interpreting an assertion of the statement as conveying that John has exactly two children brings in the conversational implicatum.

Grice also scouts the possibility of defending the claim that the logician's "⊃" is an adequate representation of "if" by explaining the apparent divergence as a matter of conversational implicata. 

If one knows the truth values of p and q, one can make a more informative statement than p⊃q, so the only conversationally appropriate use of p⊃q is when the utterer U does *not* know the truth of either component, but only that they are so connected that the truth of p guarantees the truth of q. 

The appropriate conversational use of p⊃q requires a connection that is not part of the truth condition of the compound. 

The main objection to Grice's approach of "if" concedes that his account squares fairly well with the assertion of conditionals, but points out that it does nothing to ameliorate the implausible fact that on the material conditional account, to deny "if p, q" implies both p and ∼q.

Part of the definition of a conversational implicatum requires that the addressee A should be able to reason out the intentions of the utterer U and in conjunction with the conversational principles to discern the implicit message. 

This places an important role on reasoning, especially inasmuch as in typical cases the reasoning is not conscious in the addressee.

Grice devotes considerable energy to investigating rationality, reasoning, and reasons. 

Grice emphasises that reasoning is typically directed to the goal of producing reasons relevant to some end in view. 

This intentional activity involves the ability to make reason-preserving transitions. 

Grice defines "reason preserving" analogous to the concept of "truth preserving" in deductive logic. 

A transition is reason-preserving just in case, for if one has reasons for the initial set of thoughts, beliefs, actions or intentions, one does for the subsequent set as well.

Grice uses this GENERAL account of reasoning to investigate moral reasoning and moral reasons. 

Grice emphasizes the connections between reasons, actions, and freedom. 

Strong rational evaluation — which Grice sees as essential to freedom — involves the rational evaluation and selection of ends, including ultimate ends.

How do people choose ultimate ends? 

Grice answers that people should choose ends that have unrelativized value. 

Grice grants that the concept of unrelativized value requires defense. 

Typically, things have value only relative to ends and beneficiaries. 

A concern for the focus of relativization gives the value-concept a bite on a person; it ensures that the value-concept carries weight for that person. 

So how are people to understand unrelativized value?

Grice turns to final causation for a special kind of value. 

A tiger is a good tiger to the degree that it realizes the final end of tigers. 

Grice defines a good person as one who has, as part of their essential nature, an autonomous finality consisting in the exercise of rationality. 

Grice's philosophical psychology supports this conception of a person as end-setter. 

Freedom intimately involves the ability to adopt and eliminate ends. 

One does not (ideally) arbitrarily select and conform to ends; one does so for reasons. 

This makes being an end-setter an instance of unrelativized value; for to take a consideration as an ultimate justification of action is to see it as having value. 

Grice defines unrelativized value "in Aristotelian style [as] whatever would seem to possess such value in the eyes of a duly accredited judge; and a duly accredited judge might be identifiable as a good person operating in conditions of freedom." (Aspects of Reason 2001, p. 119) 

Of course, we are still talking about what is of value for and to persons. 

But the point was not to avoid this relativization ; the point was to avoid relativization to this or that kind of person.

works by grice

The Conception of Value. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

The Paul Carus Lectures, 

Studies in the Way of Words, or WoW, for short. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press

A collection including most of the important works.

Aspects of Reason. Oxford: The Clarendon Press

The John Locke Lectures, Oxford.

Grice, H. P., and P. F. Strawson. "In Defense of a Dogma." Philosophical Review Vol. 65 (1956) 141–58. A defense of the analytic-synthetic distinction, widely reprinted and discussed.

Cf. 

Avramides, Anita. 

Meaning and Mind: 

An Examination of a Gricean Account of Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Cosenza, Giovanna, ed. 

Paul Grice's Heritage. 

Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols.

Davis, Wayne A. 

Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of Gricean Theory. 

Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 

Grandy, R. E., and R. O. Warner. Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. 

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

A festschrift celebrating Grice's work, with a lengthy editorial introduction and a 'Reply to Richards' (i.e. Richard Grandy and Richard Warner) by Grice -- originally entitled, "Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice."

----

R. E. G and R. O. W.