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Jul 30th 2018 GMT

1. Hyperintensional Semantics: A Fregean Approach.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - forthcoming - Synthese.
   In this paper, we present a new semantic framework designed to capture a distinctly cognitive or epistemic notion of meaning akin to Fregean senses. Traditional Carnapian intensions are too coarse-grained for this purpose: they fail to draw semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, differ in meaning. This has led some philosophers to introduce more fine-grained hyperintensions that allow us to draw semantic distinctions among co-intensional sentences. But the hyperintensional strategy has a flip-side: it risks drawing semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, do not differ in meaning. This is what we call the ‘new problem’ of hyperintensionality to distinguish it from the ‘old problem’ that faced the intensional theory. We show that our semantic framework offers a joint solution to both these problems in virtue of satisfying a version of Frege’s so-called ‘equipollence principle’ for sense individuation. Frege’s principle, we argue, not only captures the semantic intuitions that give rise to the old and the new problem of hyperintensionality, but also points the way to an independently motivated solution to both problems.
2. Axiomatization in the Meaning Sciences.Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas Icard - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning: Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 73-97.
   While much of semantic theorizing is based on intuitions about logical phenomena associated with linguistic constructions—phenomena such as consistency and entailment—it is rare to see axiomatic treatments of linguistic fragments. Given a fragment interpreted in some class of formally specified models, it is often possible to ask for a characterization of the reasoning patterns validated by the class of models. Axiomatizations provide such a characterization, often in a perspicuous and efficient manner. In this paper, we highlight some of the benefits of providing axiomatizations for the purpose of semantic theorizing. We illustrate some of these benefits using three examples from the study of modality.
3. Changing Notions of Linguistic Competence in the History of Formal Semantics.Barbara H. Partee - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning: Essays on the metatheory of natural language semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 172-196.
   In the history of formal semantics, the successful joining of linguistic and philosophical work brought with it some difficult foundational questions concerning the nature of meaning and the nature of knowledge of language in the domain of semantics: questions in part about “what’s in the head” of a competent language-user. This paper, part of a project on the history of formal semantics, revisits the central issues of (Partee, 1979) in a historical context, as a clash between two traditions, Fregean and Chomskyan, a clash that accompanied early work combining Montague’s semantics with Chomskyan syntax. Recent advances in philosophy of mind (from, e.g., Stalnaker and Burge) go a long way towards changing the framework of arguments about “psychological reality” and “competence”, challenging the suppositions on which the original dichotomy rested, thus largely defusing the tension.
4. What is — or, for That Matter, Isn’T — ‘Experimental' Semantics?Pauline Jacobson - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of meaning: Essays on the metatheory of natural language semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 46-72.
   This paper examines the currently fashionable notion of 'experimental semantics', and argues that most work in natural language semantics has always been experimental. The oft-cited dichotomy between 'theoretical' (or 'armchair') and 'experimental' is bogus and should be dropped form the discourse. The same holds for dichotomies like 'intuition-based' (or 'thought experiments') vs. 'empirical' work (and 'real experiments'). The so-called new 'empirical' methods are often nothing more than collecting the large-scale 'intuitions' or, doing multiple thought experiments. Of course the use of multiple subjects could well allow for a better experiment than the more traditional single or few subject methodologies. But whether or not this is the case depends entirely on the question at hand. In fact, the paper considers several multiple-subject studies and shows that the particular methodology in those cases does not necessarily provide important insights, and the paper argues that some its claimed benefits are incorrect.

Jul 27th 2018 GMT

1. A Historically-Informed Defense of a Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.Landon D. C. Elkind - 2018 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 38:89-96.
   Book Review: Samuel Lebens (2017) "Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement".

Jul 26th 2018 GMT

1. A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
   I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent.  The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p.  The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p.  The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p.

Jul 24th 2018 GMT

1. Towards a Theory of Singular Thought About Abstract Mathematical Objects.James E. Davies - forthcoming - Synthese.
   This essay uses a mental files theory of singular thought—a theory saying that singular thought about and reference to a particular object requires possession of a mental store of information taken to be about that object—to explain how we could have such thoughts about abstract mathematical objects. After showing why we should want an explanation of this I argue that none of three main contemporary mental files theories of singular thought—acquaintance theory, semantic instrumentalism, and semantic cognitivism—can give it. I argue for two claims intended to advance our understanding of singular thought about mathematical abstracta. First, that the conditions for possession of a file for an abstract mathematical object are the same as the conditions for possessing a file for an object perceived in the past—namely, that the agent retains information about the object. Thus insofar as we are able to have memory-based files for objects perceived in the past, we ought to be able to have files for abstract mathematical objects too. Second, at least one recently articulated condition on a file’s being a device for singular thought—that it be capable of surviving a certain kind of change in the information it contains—can be satisfied by files for abstract mathematical objects.
2. Moral Twin Earth, Reference and Disagreements.Heimir Geirsson - 2018 - In Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 53. pp. 53-57.
   Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the new moral realism. The new moral realism is based on advances made in the philosophy of language that allows us to introduce synthetic definitions of moral terms. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. Specifically, it relies on the intuitions that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. Horgan and Timmons rely on that intuition when they argue that the meaning of the relevant terms on Earth and Twin Earth must be the same. I will argue that we can accept that Earthers and Twin Earthers can have genuine moral disagreement while at the same time claim that the terms they use have different referents and so different semantic meaning. That is, having genuine disagreements does not require that the semantic meaning or the reference of the terms used in the debate being the same.
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