skip to main | skip to sidebar

The Grice Club

where scruples of Gricean lizards can lounge at ease.

jls.rbjones.com

  • jls.rbjones.com

The Grice Club

Welcome

The Grice Club

The club for all those whose members have no (other) club.

Is Grice the greatest philosopher that ever lived?

Search This Blog

Friday, August 31, 2018

A checklist of Griceianisms

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:12 AM No comments:

Herbert Paul Grice

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:12 AM No comments:

Grice at Harborne

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:11 AM No comments:

Grice and Banbury Road

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:11 AM No comments:

Grice and the Berkeley Hills

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:11 AM No comments:

Grice's Peak in Darien

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:11 AM No comments:

Grice's Sense of Humour

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:11 AM No comments:

Grice's Tuttees at Oxford -- Alphabetical List

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:10 AM No comments:

Grice's Years as University Lecturer, Oxford

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:10 AM No comments:

Grice's Years as Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, St. John's

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:10 AM No comments:

Grice at Merton

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:09 AM No comments:

Grice at Corpus Christi

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:09 AM No comments:

Grice at The House

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:09 AM No comments:

Grice's and the Oxonian Philosophical Tradition

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:09 AM No comments:

Grice's Pirotology

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:08 AM No comments:

Grice's "Excursus" to "The Causal Theory of Perception"

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:08 AM No comments:

Grice's "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being"

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:08 AM No comments:

Grice's "Vacuous Names"

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:08 AM No comments:

Grice's "Actions and Events"

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:07 AM No comments:

Grice's Philosophical Papers -- Beyond "Studies in the Way of Words," "The Conception of Value," and "Aspects of Reason"

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:07 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice: The British Academy Lecture on "Intention and Uncertainty"

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:06 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:06 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with A. Woozley

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:06 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with D. E. Cooper

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:05 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with T. Potts

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:05 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with P. Facione

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:05 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with A. Martinich

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:04 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with D. W. Stampe

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:04 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with A. Kenny

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:04 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with R. M. Sainsbury

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:03 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with J. D. Atlas

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:03 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with S. N. Hampshire

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:02 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with O. P. Wood

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:02 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with S. Haslanger

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:02 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with J. Baker

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:02 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with A. Kasher

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:01 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with J. Biro

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:01 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with J. R. Searle

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:01 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with S. R. Schiffer

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:00 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with G. P. Baker

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:00 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence with J. O. Urmson

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 4:00 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza -- Correspondence with P. H. Nowell-Smith

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:59 AM No comments:

Grice and the Play Group: G. J. Warnock

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:59 AM No comments:

Grice's Philosophical Collaborations: G. J. Warnock

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:59 AM No comments:

Grice and the Play Group: J. O. Urmson

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:58 AM No comments:

Grice and the Play Group: R. M. Hare

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:58 AM No comments:

Grice and the Play Group: J. L. Austin

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:58 AM No comments:

Grice's Philosophical Collaborations: D. F. Pears

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:58 AM No comments:

Grice's Philosophical Collaborations: J. F. Thomson

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:57 AM No comments:

Grice's Philosophical Collaborations: P. F. Strawson

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:57 AM No comments:

Usages of "implicature" by Grice pre-dating the William James Lectures -- The Bancroft

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:57 AM No comments:

Why Grice Felt The Need To "Coin" "Implicature"

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:56 AM No comments:

What Grice Implicates

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:56 AM No comments:

Grice's Favourite Philosopher: Grice

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:56 AM No comments:

Alphabetical list of all philosophers cited by H. P. Grice -- including his self!

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:55 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice's Catalogue Raisonné

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:55 AM No comments:

A catalogue raisonné of Grice's unpublications at Bancroft

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:55 AM No comments:

Grice and His Friends

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:54 AM No comments:

Grice's Unpublications at Bancroft

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:54 AM No comments:

Grice's Contributions to Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Language

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:53 AM No comments:

Grice and the Play Group

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:53 AM No comments:

The Grice Generation

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:53 AM No comments:

Grice Without Oxford -- and Within

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:53 AM No comments:

Grice Outside Oxford

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:52 AM No comments:

Grice's Concept of "Disimplicature" -- and Its Discontents

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:52 AM No comments:

H. P. Grice and Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy

Speranza
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 3:52 AM No comments:

Thursday, August 30, 2018

Grice’s biosemantics

Speranza

A central idea in Ruth Millikan’s biosemantics is that a representation’s content is restricted to conditions required for the normal success of actions that it has as its function to guide. This paper raises and responds to a problem for this idea. The problem is that the success requirement seems to block us from saying that epistemic modal judgments represent our epistemic circumstances. For the normal success of actions guided by these judgments seems to depend on what is actually the case, not on whether or to what extent various possibilities were supported by our evidence. In response, I argue, first, that actions guided by epistemic modal judgments have as their function to implement strategies for handling epistemic circumstances, second, that the successful performance of this function requires that aspects of these circumstances obtain, and, third, that biosemantics can thus understand epistemic modal judgments as representing these aspects. The recognition of such strategic contents introduces complications; I further argue that these are benign.

Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:45 AM No comments:

Experiments with Grice

Speranza

Psycholinguistic methods hold great promise for experimental philosophy. Many philosophical thought experiments and arguments proceed from verbal descriptions of possible cases. Many relevant intuitions and conclusions are driven by spontaneous inferences about what else must also be true in the cases described. Such inferences are continually made in language comprehension and production. This chapter explains how methods from psycholinguistics can be employed to study such routine automatic inferences, with a view to assessing intuitions and reconstructing arguments. We demonstrate how plausibility ratings, pupillometry, and reading time measurements can be used to examine hypotheses about automatic inferences in speech and text comprehension. Two experiments on inferences from polysemous (perception-)verbs provide evidence of a potentially consequential ‘salience bias’. Findings help assess intuitions about unusual cases and analyse a philosophical paradox (‘argument from hallucination’). The paper thus illustrates how we can adapt psycholinguistic methods for philosophical purposes and demonstrates the methods’ philosophical usefulness.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:44 AM No comments:

Griceian assertion

Speranza

Many contemporary philosophers argue that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm. In particular, many defend the knowledge account of assertion, which says that one should assert only what one knows. Here, I defend a non‐normative alternative to the knowledge account that I call the repK account of assertion. According to the repK account, assertion represents knowledge, but it is not governed by a constitutive epistemic rule. I show that the repK account offers a more straightforward interpretation of the conversational patterns and intuitions that motivate the knowledge account. It does so in terms of ordinary normative principles that philosophers already accept, none of which are constitutive to assertion. I then contend that the repK account is preferable to the knowledge account because it is simpler, its implications are less contentious, and it avoids a problem for normative accounts of assertion recently raised by Peter Pagin. I also argue that the repK account offers a satisfying explanation of selfless assertion, a counterexample to the knowledge account posed by Jennifer Lackey.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:43 AM No comments:

Grice on the alethic

Speranza

Alfred Tarski’s work on truth has played such a central role in the discourse on truth that most coming to it for the first time have probably already heard a great deal about what is said there. Unfortunately, since the work is largely technical and Tarski was only tan- gentially philosophical, a certain incautious assimilation dominates many philosophical discussions of Tarski’s ideas, and so, examining Tarski on the concept of truth is in many ways an act of unlearning.
In this paper I focus on those key ideas in Tarski’s work that have made a lasting impact on the philosophical discourse. These are the notions of T-sentence, Convention T, Tarskian truth definition, and Tarski’s general limiting theses on the expressibility and definability of truth. Though these ideas are in name familiar, we will seek in this essay to uncover and remove certain widespread misunderstandings of each. Tarski’s name also features prominently in discussions of the liar paradox, so we will take time out to explain Tarski’s connection to this ancient puzzle.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:42 AM No comments:

Griceian Colour

Speranza

So far, color-naming studies have relied on a rather limited set of color stimuli. Most importantly, stimuli have been largely limited to highly saturated colors. Because of this, little is known about how people categorize less saturated colors and, more generally, about the structure of color categories as they extend across all dimensions of color space. This article presents the results from a large Internet-based color-naming study that involved color stimuli ranging across all available chroma levels in Munsell space. These results help answer such questions as how English speakers name a more complex color set, whether English speakers use so-called basic color terms (BCTs) more frequently for more saturated colors, how they use non-BCTs in comparison with BCTs, whether non-BCTs are highly consensual in less saturated parts of the solid, how deep inside color space basic color categories extend, or how they behave on the chroma dimension.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:40 AM No comments:

Grice’s Circle

Speranza

The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendum P occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they develop in this book one general theory of definitions based on revision sequences, namely, ordinal-length iterations of the operator which is induced by the definition of the predicate. Gupta-Belnap’s approach to circular definitions has been criticised, among others, by D. Martin and V. McGee. Their criticisms point to the logical complexity of revision sequences, to their relations with ordinary mathematical practice, and to their merits relative to alternative approaches. I will present an alternative general theory of definitions, based on a combination of supervaluation and ω-length revision, which aims to address some criticisms raised against revision sequences, while preserving the philosophical and mathematical core of revision.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:39 AM No comments:

Grice on the alethic

Speranza

We show that any coherent complete partial order (ccpo) is obtainable as the fixed-point poset of the strong Kleene jump of a suitably chosen first-order ground model. This is a strengthening of Visser’s result that any finite ccpo is obtainable in this way. The same is true for the van Fraassen supervaluation jump, but not for the weak Kleene jump.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:38 AM No comments:

Disimplicature and self-knowledge

Speranza

We argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one is asserting is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm “Assert that p only if you believe that p”. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own doxastic states. It is, as we put it, transparent rather than empirical self-knowledge.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:37 AM 1 comment:

Tuesday, August 28, 2018

Implicatures in "The Sunshine Boys"

Speranza

 
 - Trustworthy Site
This site is safe with a low security risk.
(PDF) Stand-up as interaction : performance and... - ResearchGate

https://www.researchgate.net/.../33774855_Stand-up_as_interaction_performance_an...
The Sunshine Boys, Neil Simon. i. TABLE OF ...... of audience laughter which links it not with jokepunchlines but rather with a set of. rhetorical devices which ...... Or it might be more routinised or cryptic as in the implicature in Error! Reference.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:47 AM No comments:

Paul Grice and Neil Simon: Punchline and Implicature

Speranza

About 20,800 results (0.31 seconds) 

Search Results

Web results

 
Neil Simon (1927-2018): The King of Stage Comedy - WSJ

https://www.wsj.com/.../neil-simon-1927-2018-the-king-of-stage-comedy-1535315129
2 days ago - Playwright Neil Simon in 1994 Photo: Gary Stuart/ASSOCIATED PRESS ... His one-two-here-comes-the-punchline style of comedy, which took ...

 
Broadway Remembers Neil Simon | Playbill

www.playbill.com/article/broadway-remembers-neil-simon
2 days ago - Award-winning playwright Neil Simon died August 26 at age 91. He was .... His one two combo of setup, punchline was unparalleled. As a kid, I ...

 
Mel Brooks on Twitter: "Neil Simon was a clutch hitter. When we ...

https://twitter.com/MelBrooks/status/1034198993553641473
18 hours ago - Neil Simon was a clutch hitter. When we needed the punchline on Your Show of Shows he delivered. He also delivered 32 plays and over 20 ...

 
Neil Simon: How the playwright wrote his own second act and finally ...

www.latimes.com/.../arts/la-et-cm-neil-simon-appreciation-20180826-story.html
2 days ago - Neil Simon, shone in 1994, wrote "The Odd Couple," "Brighton Beach ... way characters were easily sacrificed for the sake of a good punchline.

 
Neil Simon and the fault line in US culture that pulled him down

https://www.irishtimes.com/.../neil-simon-and-the-fault-line-in-us-culture-that-pulled-...
1 day ago - King of comedy: the playwright Neil Simon in 2009. ... self-recognition, reflecting life but with palpable structure and better punchlines. In the ...

 
Gentle humor was the lifeblood of playwright Neil Simon | The Times ...

https://www.timesofisrael.com/gentle-humor-was-the-lifeblood-of-playwright-neil-sim...
2 days ago - In this file photo taken on July 27, 2006 playwright Neil Simon speaks onstage ... NEW YORK (AP) — When master playwright Neil Simon accepted the Mark ..... Comedy legend Carl Reiner turns Emmy shot into punchline.

 
For Neil Simon, the Prescription Was Farce - The New York Times

https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/13/.../for-neil-simon-the-prescription-was-farce.html
Nov 13, 1988 - ''I was going through some difficult times,'' Neil Simon says. ... Bound'' - certainly showed that there is a lot more to him than punchlines.

 
Neil Simon, Pulitzer Prize winning playwright, has died — Quartz

https://qz.com/1370235/neil-simon-pulitzer-prize-winning-playwright-has-died/
2 days ago - Known for his hilarious punchlines, Neil Simon did not think of his plays as comedies or his work as writing jokes.

 
Neil Simon, Broadway's long-reigning king of comedy, dies at 91 - The ...

https://www.sltrib.com/artsliving/2018/08/26/neil-simon-broadways-long/
2 days ago - Neil Simon, the Pulitzer- and Tony-winning author of plays such as .... with setting up apunchline than presenting fully rounded characters.

 
Why Neil Simon's plays, for all their success on Broadway, didn't make ...

https://www.haaretz.com › U.S. News
18 hours ago - Almost all of Neil Simon's plays and stage hits became films, but none of ... although not in depth; every punchline they uttered came at the right ...
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:46 AM No comments:

Grice: Implicatures of Credence

Speranza

Grice presents a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent.  The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p.  The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p.  The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:44 AM No comments:

Grice As An Experimental Pragmaticist

Speranza

Grice examines the currently fashionable notion of 'experimental semantics', and argues that most work in natural language semantics has always been experimental. The oft-cited dichotomy between 'theoretical' (or 'armchair') and 'experimental' is bogus and should be dropped form the discourse. The same holds for dichotomies like 'intuition-based' (or 'thought experiments') vs. 'empirical' work (and 'real experiments'). The so-called new 'empirical' methods are often nothing more than collecting the large-scale 'intuitions' or, doing multiple thought experiments. Of course the use of multiple subjects could well allow for a better experiment than the more traditional single or few subject methodologies. But whether or not this is the case depends entirely on the question at hand. In fact, the paper considers several multiple-subject studies and shows that the particular methodology in those cases does not necessarily provide important insights, and the paper argues that some its claimed benefits are incorrect.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:44 AM No comments:

Grice's Aunt Matilda

Speranza

In the history of formal semantics, the successful joining of linguistic and philosophical work brought with it some difficult foundational questions concerning the nature of meaning and the nature of knowledge of language in the domain of semantics: questions in part about “what’s in the head” of a competent language-user. This paper, part of a project on the history of formal semantics, revisits the central issues of (Partee, 1979) in a historical context, as a clash between two traditions, Fregean and Chomskyan, a clash that accompanied early work combining Montague’s semantics with Chomskyan syntax. Recent advances in philosophy of mind (from, e.g., Stalnaker and Burge) go a long way towards changing the framework of arguments about “psychological reality” and “competence”, challenging the suppositions on which the original dichotomy rested, thus largely defusing the tension.

Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:43 AM No comments:

Grice's Meaning Axiomatics

Speranza

While much of semantic theorizing is based on intuitions about logical phenomena associated with linguistic constructions—phenomena such as consistency and entailment—it is rare to see axiomatic treatments of linguistic fragments. Given a fragment interpreted in some class of formally specified models, it is often possible to ask for a characterization of the reasoning patterns validated by the class of models. Axiomatizations provide such a characterization, often in a perspicuous and efficient manner. In this paper, we highlight some of the benefits of providing axiomatizations for the purpose of semantic theorizing. We illustrate some of these benefits using three examples from the study of modality.

Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:42 AM No comments:

Grice's Hyperintensionalism

Speranza

Grice presents a new semantic framework designed to capture a distinctly cognitive or epistemic notion of meaning akin to Fregean senses. Traditional Carnapian intensions are too coarse-grained for this purpose: they fail to draw semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, differ in meaning. This has led some philosophers to introduce more fine-grained hyperintensions that allow us to draw semantic distinctions among co-intensional sentences. But the hyperintensional strategy has a flip-side: it risks drawing semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, do not differ in meaning. This is what we call the ‘new problem’ of hyperintensionality to distinguish it from the ‘old problem’ that faced the intensional theory. We show that our semantic framework offers a joint solution to both these problems in virtue of satisfying a version of Frege’s so-called ‘equipollence principle’ for sense individuation. Frege’s principle, we argue, not only captures the semantic intuitions that give rise to the old and the new problem of hyperintensionality, but also points the way to an independently motivated solution to both problems.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:42 AM No comments:

Grice's Disimplicature

Speranza

New items in your areas of interest
Click here to unsubscribe or view or modify your alerts

Jul 30th 2018 GMT
  1. Hyperintensional Semantics: A Fregean Approach.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper, we present a new semantic framework designed to capture a distinctly cognitive or epistemic notion of meaning akin to Fregean senses. Traditional Carnapian intensions are too coarse-grained for this purpose: they fail to draw semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, differ in meaning. This has led some philosophers to introduce more fine-grained hyperintensions that allow us to draw semantic distinctions among co-intensional sentences. But the hyperintensional strategy has a flip-side: it risks drawing semantic distinctions between sentences that, from a Fregean perspective, do not differ in meaning. This is what we call the ‘new problem’ of hyperintensionality to distinguish it from the ‘old problem’ that faced the intensional theory. We show that our semantic framework offers a joint solution to both these problems in virtue of satisfying a version of Frege’s so-called ‘equipollence principle’ for sense individuation. Frege’s principle, we argue, not only captures the semantic intuitions that give rise to the old and the new problem of hyperintensionality, but also points the way to an independently motivated solution to both problems.
  2. Axiomatization in the Meaning Sciences.Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas Icard - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning: Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 73-97.
    While much of semantic theorizing is based on intuitions about logical phenomena associated with linguistic constructions—phenomena such as consistency and entailment—it is rare to see axiomatic treatments of linguistic fragments. Given a fragment interpreted in some class of formally specified models, it is often possible to ask for a characterization of the reasoning patterns validated by the class of models. Axiomatizations provide such a characterization, often in a perspicuous and efficient manner. In this paper, we highlight some of the benefits of providing axiomatizations for the purpose of semantic theorizing. We illustrate some of these benefits using three examples from the study of modality.
  3. Changing Notions of Linguistic Competence in the History of Formal Semantics.Barbara H. Partee - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning: Essays on the metatheory of natural language semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 172-196.
    In the history of formal semantics, the successful joining of linguistic and philosophical work brought with it some difficult foundational questions concerning the nature of meaning and the nature of knowledge of language in the domain of semantics: questions in part about “what’s in the head” of a competent language-user. This paper, part of a project on the history of formal semantics, revisits the central issues of (Partee, 1979) in a historical context, as a clash between two traditions, Fregean and Chomskyan, a clash that accompanied early work combining Montague’s semantics with Chomskyan syntax. Recent advances in philosophy of mind (from, e.g., Stalnaker and Burge) go a long way towards changing the framework of arguments about “psychological reality” and “competence”, challenging the suppositions on which the original dichotomy rested, thus largely defusing the tension.
  4. What is — or, for That Matter, Isn’T — ‘Experimental' Semantics?Pauline Jacobson - 2018 - In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of meaning: Essays on the metatheory of natural language semantics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 46-72.
    This paper examines the currently fashionable notion of 'experimental semantics', and argues that most work in natural language semantics has always been experimental. The oft-cited dichotomy between 'theoretical' (or 'armchair') and 'experimental' is bogus and should be dropped form the discourse. The same holds for dichotomies like 'intuition-based' (or 'thought experiments') vs. 'empirical' work (and 'real experiments'). The so-called new 'empirical' methods are often nothing more than collecting the large-scale 'intuitions' or, doing multiple thought experiments. Of course the use of multiple subjects could well allow for a better experiment than the more traditional single or few subject methodologies. But whether or not this is the case depends entirely on the question at hand. In fact, the paper considers several multiple-subject studies and shows that the particular methodology in those cases does not necessarily provide important insights, and the paper argues that some its claimed benefits are incorrect.
Jul 27th 2018 GMT
  1. A Historically-Informed Defense of a Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment.Landon D. C. Elkind - 2018 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 38:89-96.
    Book Review: Samuel Lebens (2017) "Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement".
Jul 26th 2018 GMT
  1. A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent.  The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p.  The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p.  The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p.
Jul 24th 2018 GMT
  1. Towards a Theory of Singular Thought About Abstract Mathematical Objects.James E. Davies - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This essay uses a mental files theory of singular thought—a theory saying that singular thought about and reference to a particular object requires possession of a mental store of information taken to be about that object—to explain how we could have such thoughts about abstract mathematical objects. After showing why we should want an explanation of this I argue that none of three main contemporary mental files theories of singular thought—acquaintance theory, semantic instrumentalism, and semantic cognitivism—can give it. I argue for two claims intended to advance our understanding of singular thought about mathematical abstracta. First, that the conditions for possession of a file for an abstract mathematical object are the same as the conditions for possessing a file for an object perceived in the past—namely, that the agent retains information about the object. Thus insofar as we are able to have memory-based files for objects perceived in the past, we ought to be able to have files for abstract mathematical objects too. Second, at least one recently articulated condition on a file’s being a device for singular thought—that it be capable of surviving a certain kind of change in the information it contains—can be satisfied by files for abstract mathematical objects.
  2. Moral Twin Earth, Reference and Disagreements.Heimir Geirsson - 2018 - In Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 53. pp. 53-57.
    Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the new moral realism. The new moral realism is based on advances made in the philosophy of language that allows us to introduce synthetic definitions of moral terms. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. Specifically, it relies on the intuitions that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. Horgan and Timmons rely on that intuition when they argue that the meaning of the relevant terms on Earth and Twin Earth must be the same. I will argue that we can accept that Earthers and Twin Earthers can have genuine moral disagreement while at the same time claim that the terms they use have different referents and so different semantic meaning. That is, having genuine disagreements does not require that the semantic meaning or the reference of the terms used in the debate being the same.

Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:41 AM No comments:

Grice's Implicature

Speranza

New items in your areas of interest
Click here to unsubscribe or view or modify your alerts

Jul 24th 2018 GMT
  1. Towards a Theory of Singular Thought About Abstract Mathematical Objects.James E. Davies - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This essay uses a mental files theory of singular thought—a theory saying that singular thought about and reference to a particular object requires possession of a mental store of information taken to be about that object—to explain how we could have such thoughts about abstract mathematical objects. After showing why we should want an explanation of this I argue that none of three main contemporary mental files theories of singular thought—acquaintance theory, semantic instrumentalism, and semantic cognitivism—can give it. I argue for two claims intended to advance our understanding of singular thought about mathematical abstracta. First, that the conditions for possession of a file for an abstract mathematical object are the same as the conditions for possessing a file for an object perceived in the past—namely, that the agent retains information about the object. Thus insofar as we are able to have memory-based files for objects perceived in the past, we ought to be able to have files for abstract mathematical objects too. Second, at least one recently articulated condition on a file’s being a device for singular thought—that it be capable of surviving a certain kind of change in the information it contains—can be satisfied by files for abstract mathematical objects.
  2. Moral Twin Earth, Reference and Disagreements.Heimir Geirsson - 2018 - In Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 53. pp. 53-57.
    Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have written a number of articles where they use their Moral Twin Earth thought experiment to attack the new moral realism. The new moral realism is based on advances made in the philosophy of language that allows us to introduce synthetic definitions of moral terms. The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment relies in crucial ways on the use of intuitions. Specifically, it relies on the intuitions that were Earthers and Twin Earthers to meet, they would be able to have genuine moral disagreements. Horgan and Timmons rely on that intuition when they argue that the meaning of the relevant terms on Earth and Twin Earth must be the same. I will argue that we can accept that Earthers and Twin Earthers can have genuine moral disagreement while at the same time claim that the terms they use have different referents and so different semantic meaning. That is, having genuine disagreements does not require that the semantic meaning or the reference of the terms used in the debate being the same.
  3. Logics for Modelling Collective Attitudes.Daniele Porello - 2018 - Fundamenta Infromaticae 158 (1-3):239-27.
    We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes. Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are then modelled by means of minimal modalities to ensure a number of basic principles. In this way, a viable consistent modelling of collective attitudes is obtained.
  4. Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property.Pietro Salis - 2018 - Acta Analytica:1-18.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a prosententialist account of the use of “true.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of “true” (especially in Brandom’s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that “true” is not understood as a predicate and that truth is not a property. Primitivism, defended by Frege, Moore, and Davidson, is associated with two ideas: (1) that truth is a primitive and central trait of our conceptual system and (2) that truth, as such, cannot be defined. This second claim can be called “negative primitivism,” and it especially points out the facts about the “indefinability” of truth generally advocated by primitivists. In what follows, a connection is established between the deflationist’s rejection of the predicate and of the property and facts (and primitivist ideas) about the indefinability of truth. This connection establishes a common framework to lend further explanatory power to both options. According to the resulting view, this indefinability can explain the appeal and soundness of a deflationist dismissal of predicates and properties dealing with truth.
Jul 23rd 2018 GMT
  1. Semantics, Two-Dimensional.Jens Kipper - 2018 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Two-dimensional semantic theories distinguish between two different aspects, or ‘dimensions’, of the meaning of linguistic expressions. Many other theories identify the meaning of an expression with a dependency of its extension on the state of the world. (The extension of a sentence is its truth-value, and the extension of a sub-sentential expression … Continue reading Semantics, Two-Dimensional →.
  2. Independence Day?Matthew Mandelkern & Daniel Rothschild - forthcoming - Journal of Semantics.
    Two recent and influential papers, van Rooij 2007 and Lassiter 2012, propose solutions to the proviso problem that make central use of related notions of independence—qualitative in the first case, probabilistic in the second. We argue here that, if these solutions are to work, they must incorporate an implicit assumption about presupposition accommodation, namely that accommodation does not interfere with existing qualitative or probabilistic independencies. We show, however, that this assumption is implausible, as updating beliefs with conditional information does not in general preserve independencies. We conclude that the approach taken by van Rooij and Lassiter does not succeed in resolving the proviso problem.
Jul 22nd 2018 GMT
  1. A Solution to Karttunen's Problem.Matthew Mandelkern - 2017 - In Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21.
    There is a difference between the conditions in which one can felicitously assert a ‘must’-claim versus those in which one can use the corresponding non-modal claim. But it is difficult to pin down just what this difference amounts to. And it is even harder to account for this difference, since assertions of 'Must ϕ' and assertions of ϕ alone seem to have the same basic goal: namely, coming to agreement that [[ϕ]] is true. In this paper I take on this puzzle, known as Karttunen’s Problem. I begin by arguing that a ‘must’-claim is felicitous only if there is a shared argument for its prejacent. I then argue that this generalization, which I call Support, can explain the more familiar generalization that ‘must’-claims are felicitous only if the speaker’s evidence for them is in some sense indirect. Finally, I sketch a pragmatic derivation of Support.
  2. Against Preservation.Matthew Mandelkern & Justin Khoo - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Richard Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between cre- dences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.
Jul 20th 2018 GMT
  1. A Defence of Intentionalism About Demonstratives.Alex Radulescu - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Intentionalism about demonstratives is the view that the referent of a demonstrative is determined solely by the speaker's intentions. Intentionalists can disagree about the nature of these intentions, but are united in rejecting the relevance of other factors, such as the speaker's gestures, her gaze, and any facts about the addressee or the audience. In this paper, I formulate a particular version of this view, and I defend it against six objections, old and new.
Jul 19th 2018 GMT
  1. Uniformity Motivated.Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-20.
    Can rational communication proceed when interlocutors are uncertain which contents utterances contribute to discourse? An influential negative answer to this question is embodied in the Stalnakerian principle of uniformity, which requires speakers to produce only utterances that express the same content in every possibility treated as live for the purposes of the conversation. The principle of uniformity enjoys considerable intuitive plausibility and, moreover, seems to follow from platitudes about assertion; nevertheless, it has recently proven controversial. In what follows, I defend the principle by developing two arguments for it based on premises reflecting the central aims and assumptions of possibility-carving frameworks for modeling inquiry—that is, frameworks which describe the evolution of individuals’ attitudinal states in terms of set-theoretic operations defined over a domain of objects representing possibilities.
  2. Quantification and Paradox.Edward Ferrier - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    I argue that absolutism, the view that absolutely unrestricted quantification is possible, is to blame for both the paradoxes that arise in naive set theory and variants of these paradoxes that arise in plural logic and in semantics. The solution is restrictivism, the view that absolutely unrestricted quantification is not possible.
    It is generally thought that absolutism is true and that restrictivism is not only false, but inexpressible. As a result, the paradoxes are blamed, not on illicit quantification, but on the logical conception of set which motivates naive set theory. The accepted solution is to replace this with the iterative conception of set.
    I show that this picture is doubly mistaken. After a close examination of the paradoxes in chapters 2--3, I argue in chapters 4 and 5 that it is possible to rescue naive set theory by restricting quantification over sets and that the resulting restrictivist set theory is expressible. In chapters 6 and 7, I argue that it is the iterative conception of set and the thesis of absolutism that should be rejected.
Jul 18th 2018 GMT
  1. Gary Ostertag (Ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer.Indrek Reiland - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.

  2. Colivan Committment Vis-a-Vis Moore's Paradox.T. Parent - forthcoming - Philosophia.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Annalisa Coliva's book _The Varieties of Self-Knowledge_. I present her notion of a "commitment" and how it is used in her treatment of Moore paradoxical assertions and thoughts (e.g., "I believe that it is raining, but it is not;" "It is raining but I do not believe that it is"). The final section notes the points of convergence between her constitutivism about self-knowledge of commitments, and the constitutivism from my book _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_.
Posted by Luigi Speranza at 9:41 AM No comments:
Newer Posts Older Posts Home
Subscribe to: Posts (Atom)

Subscribe To The Grice Club

Posts
Atom
Posts
All Comments
Atom
All Comments

Followers

Blog Archive

  • ►  2023 (42)
    • ►  October (25)
    • ►  September (17)
  • ►  2022 (684)
    • ►  September (32)
    • ►  June (31)
    • ►  May (124)
    • ►  April (161)
    • ►  March (229)
    • ►  February (69)
    • ►  January (38)
  • ►  2021 (755)
    • ►  December (4)
    • ►  November (69)
    • ►  October (75)
    • ►  September (126)
    • ►  August (87)
    • ►  July (118)
    • ►  June (151)
    • ►  May (68)
    • ►  April (32)
    • ►  March (14)
    • ►  February (9)
    • ►  January (2)
  • ►  2020 (5712)
    • ►  December (40)
    • ►  November (3)
    • ►  October (7)
    • ►  September (311)
    • ►  August (614)
    • ►  July (255)
    • ►  June (251)
    • ►  May (726)
    • ►  April (1606)
    • ►  March (1100)
    • ►  February (615)
    • ►  January (184)
  • ►  2019 (60)
    • ►  September (1)
    • ►  August (1)
    • ►  June (15)
    • ►  April (43)
  • ▼  2018 (1528)
    • ►  November (42)
    • ►  October (71)
    • ►  September (170)
    • ▼  August (87)
      • A checklist of Griceianisms
      • Herbert Paul Grice
      • Grice at Harborne
      • Grice and Banbury Road
      • Grice and the Berkeley Hills
      • Grice's Peak in Darien
      • Grice's Sense of Humour
      • Grice's Tuttees at Oxford -- Alphabetical List
      • Grice's Years as University Lecturer, Oxford
      • Grice's Years as Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, St...
      • Grice at Merton
      • Grice at Corpus Christi
      • Grice at The House
      • Grice's and the Oxonian Philosophical Tradition
      • Grice's Pirotology
      • Grice's "Excursus" to "The Causal Theory of Percep...
      • Grice's "Aristotle on the multiplicity of being"
      • Grice's "Vacuous Names"
      • Grice's "Actions and Events"
      • Grice's Philosophical Papers -- Beyond "Studies in...
      • H. P. Grice: The British Academy Lecture on "Inten...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza, Correspondence wit...
      • H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza -- Correspondence w...
      • Grice and the Play Group: G. J. Warnock
      • Grice's Philosophical Collaborations: G. J. Warnock
      • Grice and the Play Group: J. O. Urmson
      • Grice and the Play Group: R. M. Hare
      • Grice and the Play Group: J. L. Austin
      • Grice's Philosophical Collaborations: D. F. Pears
      • Grice's Philosophical Collaborations: J. F. Thomson
      • Grice's Philosophical Collaborations: P. F. Strawson
      • Usages of "implicature" by Grice pre-dating the Wi...
      • Why Grice Felt The Need To "Coin" "Implicature"
      • What Grice Implicates
      • Grice's Favourite Philosopher: Grice
      • Alphabetical list of all philosophers cited by H. ...
      • H. P. Grice's Catalogue Raisonné
      • A catalogue raisonné of Grice's unpublications at ...
      • Grice and His Friends
      • Grice's Unpublications at Bancroft
      • Grice's Contributions to Twentieth-Century Philoso...
      • Grice and the Play Group
      • The Grice Generation
      • Grice Without Oxford -- and Within
      • Grice Outside Oxford
      • Grice's Concept of "Disimplicature" -- and Its Dis...
      • H. P. Grice and Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy
      • Grice’s biosemantics
      • Experiments with Grice
      • Griceian assertion
      • Grice on the alethic
      • Griceian Colour
      • Grice’s Circle
      • Grice on the alethic
      • Disimplicature and self-knowledge
      • Implicatures in "The Sunshine Boys"
      • Paul Grice and Neil Simon: Punchline and Implicature
      • Grice: Implicatures of Credence
      • Grice As An Experimental Pragmaticist
      • Grice's Aunt Matilda
      • Grice's Meaning Axiomatics
      • Grice's Hyperintensionalism
      • Grice's Disimplicature
      • Grice's Implicature
      • Neil Simon's Compleat Conversational Implicatures ...
      • What Is Your Favourite Neil Simon Implicature?
      • Neil Simon’s Implicature
      • Herbert Paul Grice and Marvin Neil Simon
    • ►  July (158)
    • ►  June (201)
    • ►  May (29)
    • ►  April (57)
    • ►  March (257)
    • ►  February (456)
  • ►  2017 (1500)
    • ►  December (20)
    • ►  November (9)
    • ►  October (39)
    • ►  September (845)
    • ►  August (472)
    • ►  May (9)
    • ►  April (4)
    • ►  March (11)
    • ►  February (57)
    • ►  January (34)
  • ►  2016 (135)
    • ►  October (3)
    • ►  July (19)
    • ►  June (8)
    • ►  May (8)
    • ►  April (8)
    • ►  March (32)
    • ►  February (55)
    • ►  January (2)
  • ►  2015 (419)
    • ►  December (39)
    • ►  November (59)
    • ►  October (53)
    • ►  September (2)
    • ►  August (41)
    • ►  July (6)
    • ►  June (1)
    • ►  May (10)
    • ►  April (1)
    • ►  March (29)
    • ►  February (117)
    • ►  January (61)
  • ►  2014 (189)
    • ►  December (7)
    • ►  November (21)
    • ►  October (132)
    • ►  September (3)
    • ►  July (2)
    • ►  June (3)
    • ►  May (2)
    • ►  April (2)
    • ►  March (5)
    • ►  February (4)
    • ►  January (8)
  • ►  2013 (317)
    • ►  December (93)
    • ►  November (2)
    • ►  October (6)
    • ►  September (42)
    • ►  August (10)
    • ►  July (16)
    • ►  June (48)
    • ►  May (4)
    • ►  April (9)
    • ►  March (24)
    • ►  February (17)
    • ►  January (46)
  • ►  2012 (392)
    • ►  December (5)
    • ►  November (1)
    • ►  October (9)
    • ►  September (103)
    • ►  August (98)
    • ►  July (9)
    • ►  June (11)
    • ►  May (4)
    • ►  March (14)
    • ►  February (19)
    • ►  January (119)
  • ►  2011 (1463)
    • ►  December (16)
    • ►  November (24)
    • ►  October (3)
    • ►  August (1)
    • ►  July (37)
    • ►  June (41)
    • ►  May (182)
    • ►  April (375)
    • ►  March (435)
    • ►  February (346)
    • ►  January (3)
  • ►  2010 (3170)
    • ►  November (4)
    • ►  October (7)
    • ►  September (50)
    • ►  August (227)
    • ►  July (411)
    • ►  June (310)
    • ►  May (402)
    • ►  April (495)
    • ►  March (162)
    • ►  February (641)
    • ►  January (461)

Contributors

  • Andrea Rocci
  • Bayne
  • Bob Doyle
  • Bruce Aune
  • Henry C. Alphin Jr.
  • Jason
  • Larry Tapper
  • Lawrence Solum
  • Luigi Speranza
  • Mike Geary
  • Roger Bishop Jones
  • Russell Dale
  • Seth Sharpless
  • cargan
  • nick