Neo-Russellians claim that propositions can be modelled by tuples. A common view is that propositions cannot be tuples. I argue that the interpretivist account of propositions developed by Jeffrey C. King can be adapted for the tuple view.
Thursday, March 29, 2018
H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza on underdeterminacy and propositional complexes
Speranza
Neo-Russellians claim that propositions can be modelled by tuples. A common view is that propositions cannot be tuples. I argue that the interpretivist account of propositions developed by Jeffrey C. King can be adapted for the tuple view.
Neo-Russellians claim that propositions can be modelled by tuples. A common view is that propositions cannot be tuples. I argue that the interpretivist account of propositions developed by Jeffrey C. King can be adapted for the tuple view.
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