In Truth and Truthfulness, the Oxonian philosopher B. A. O. Williams sought to defend the value of truth by giving a vindicatory genealogy revealing its instrumental value.
But what separates Williams’s instrumental vindication from the indirect utilitarianism of which he was a critic?
And how can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which, as Williams says of the concept of truth, does not have a history?
By reading Williams’s genealogy as a pragmatic genealogy and clarifying the relation between truth and truthfulness, a Griceian should resolve these puzzles and offers a novel reading of Williams’s project.
It shows how Williams’s genealogy forms a direct answer to the question of why we should cultivate our sense of the value of truth.
Using various criticisms of this genealogical method as a foil, a Griceian should develop an understanding of pragmatic genealogy which shows it to be uniquely suited to dealing with practices exhibiting self-effacing functionality—practices that are functional only insofar as and because we do not engage in them for their functionality.
A Griceian should concludes with an assessment of the wider significance of Williams’s genealogy for his own oeuvre and for further genealogical inquiry.
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