Disimplicature

Speranza

We should clarifies the distinction made by Merleau-Ponty (a philosopher Grice adored -- "I adore his hyphenated surname!") between speaking and spoken speech, and the relation between the two, in his Phenomenology of Perception. 

Against a common interpretation, one might argue on exegetical and philosophical grounds that the distinction should not be understood as one between two kinds of speech, but rather between two internally related dimensions present in all speech. 

"Or implicature," Grice adds.

Ducrot was in the room, and copied him!

This suggests an interdependence between speaking and spoken aspects of speech, and some commentators have critiqued Merleau-Ponty for claiming a priority of speaking over spoken speech. 

"Absurd!" Grice said in French.

However, there is a sense in which Merleau-Ponty is right to emphasize the priority, namely, in terms of the ontological priority of the speaking subject with respect to language understood as a constituted cultural ideality. 

In this respect, "Merleau-Ponty is like Gardiner, only French," Grice implicates.

The latter only maintains its ontological status insofar as it is taken up by a language community. 

We may favorably contrast Merleau-Ponty’s views on this question to those of the late Heidegger and de Saussure, and suggest potential applications of this clarified position for contemporary discussions in philosophy of language.

Grice only read Heidegger via Ryle's reviews, but he would assert that he (Heidegger) "is the greatest living philosopher."

De Saussure Grice loved for his aristocratic French surname!