A commentary on Jones's, "Grice and Carnap, doctrines schools and tendencies"

Speranza

Thanks to R. B. Jones for his post.

Jones writes:

"Speranza and I have been exploring, over a very extended timescale, the (counterfactual) possibilities for dialogue between Grice and Carnap (counterfactual at least because they are long gone)."

Indeed.

And for refreshers,

Carnap -- born May 18, 1891 – died September 14, 1970
Grice -- born March 13, 1913 – died August 28, 1988

so they DID have an opportunity to talk, and I wouldn't be surprised if they did not exchange a greeting or two at some A. P. A. meeting (Grice loved them).

---- * American Philosophical Association.

----

Jones goes on:

"Interwoven with this we have the question of whether Oxford ordinary language, or North American nominalists constitute a school."

Indeed, where the very root for it is Greek and meaning 'otium'.

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INTERLUDE ON GREEK "SKHOLE":


σχολή , ἡ,
A.leisure, rest, ease, Pi.N.10.46, Hdt.3.134, etc.; opp. ἀσχολία, Arist.Pol.1334a15, etc.; σχολὴν ἄγειν to be at leisure, enjoy ease, keep quiet, Hdt. l.c., E.Med.1238, Th.5.29; ἐπί τινι for a thing, Pl.Ap.36d; “περί τι” Antip.Stoic.3.256; “πρός τι” Pl.Phdr.229e, Arr.Epict.1.27.15; τινι Luc.Cal.15; ς. ἀγαγεῖν ἐπί τινα to give up one's time to him, Id.DDeor.12.2, etc.; ς. ἔχειν to have leisure, E.Andr. 732, Pl.Lg.813c, etc.; ἀμφὶ ἑαυτόν for one's own business, X.Cyr.7.5.42; ς. ποιεῖσθαι to find leisure, “πρός τι” Id.Mem.2.6.4: c. inf., Pl. Ion530d; μὴ σχολὴν τίθει, i.e. make haste, A.Ag.1059; “ἡνίκ᾽ ἂν σχολὴν λάβω” E.IT1432; σχολή [ἐστί] μοι I have time, “οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ” Pl.Prt.314d; οὐκ οὔσης ς. Ar.Pl.281; also “παρούσης πολλῆς ς. . . πρός τι” Pl.Plt.272b: prov., “οὐ ς. δούλοις” Arist.Pol.1334a21: c. inf., “οὔτοι . . τῇδ᾽ ἐμοὶ ς. πάρα τρίβειν” A.Ag.1055, etc.; εἴ τῳ καὶ λογίζεσθαι ς. S. Aj.816; “εἴ σοι ς. προϊόντι ἀκούειν” Pl.Phdr.227b; καταβαίνειν οὐ ς. Ar. Ach.409,al.; “ς. πλείων ἢ θέλω πάρεστί μοι” A.Pr.818; σχολὴ ἐδόκει γίγνεσθαι he thought he had plenty of time, Th.5.10; ς. διδόναι, παρέχειν τινί, X.Cyr.4.2.22, Hier.10.5; “ς. καταναλίσκειν εἴς τι” Isoc.1.18; τὴν τοῦ πράττοντος ς. περιμένειν to wait his leisure, Pl.R.370b; σχολῆς τόδ᾽ ἔργον a work for leisure, i.e. requiring attention, E. Andr.552: freq. with Preps., ἐπὶ σχολῆς at leisure, Pl.Tht.172d; “κατὰ σχολήν” Ar.Ec.48, Pl.Phdr.228a; “μετὰ σχολῆς” Id.Criti.110a; “ὑπὸ σχολῆς” Plu.2.667d; v.infr. B.
2. c. gen., leisure, rest from a thing, “ἔν τινι σχολῇ κακοῦ” S.OT1286; “ὡς ἂν σχολὴν λύσωμεν . . πόνων” E.HF 725; “ς. ἐστί τινι τῶν πράξεων” Pl.Lg.961b, cf. R.370c; also “ς. γίγνεταί τινι ἀπό τινος” Id.Phd.66d; ς. ἄγειν ἀπό τινος to keep clear of . . , X.Cyr.8.3.47; ἡ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ς. Arist.Pol.1269a35.
3. idleness, τίκτει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐσθλὸν εἰκαία ς. S.Fr.308; “ς. τερπνὸν κακόν” E.Hipp. 384.
II. that in which leisure is employed, οὐ κάμνω σχολῇ I am not weary of talk, Id.Ion 276; esp. learned discussion, disputation, lecture, Pl.Lg.820c (pl.), Arist.Pol.1323b39; “παρεκαθίζανον . . σχολαῖς φιλομαθεῖν προαιρούμενοι” IG22.1011.22; ταῦτ᾽ οὐ σχολὴ Πλάτωνος; Alex.158; “σχολὰς ἀναγράψαι” Phld.Acad.Ind.p.74 M., cf. Plu.2.37c, etc.; ς. περὶ πολιτείας γράψασθαι ib.790e; ς. ἀναγνῶναι, λέγειν, Phld. Acad.Ind.p.82 M., Arr.Epict.4.11.35; ἠθικαὶ ς., title of work by Persaeus, Stoic.1.102, cf.Cic.Tusc.1.4.7,8.
2. a group to whom lectures were given, school, Arist.Pol.1313b3, Phld.Ind.Sto.10, D.H.Isoc.1, Dem.44, Plu.Per.35, Alex.7, etc.; ς. ἔχειν to keep a school, Arr.Epict. 3.21.11; σχολῆς ἡγεῖσθαι to be master of it, Phld.Acad.Ind.p.92 M., D.H.Amm.1.7.
3. Lat. schola, = σχολαστήριον, Vitr.5.10.4, CIL 10.831, etc.
III. σχολαί, αἱ, regiments of the Imperial guard, Procop.Goth.4.27, Suid. s.v. διέδριον; Lat.scholae, Cod.Theod.14.17.9 (iv A.D.), etc.
b. section of an office, PMasp.57 ii 18 (vi A.D.); of the 15 'schools' of shorthand writers, Lyd.Mag.3.6.
B. σχολῇ as Adv., in a leisurely way, tardily, “ἤνυτον ς. βραδύς” S. Ant.231, cf. Th.1.142, 3.46, And.2.19, etc.; ἄτρεμά τε καὶ ς. Alex. 135.4; “ς. καὶ βάδην” Plb.8.28.11.
2. at one's leisure, i.e. scarcely, hardly, not at all, S.OT434. Ant.390, Pl.Sph.233b, etc.; “παραινῶ πᾶσι . . ς. τεκνοῦσθαι παῖδας” E.Fr.317; “ς. γε” And.1.102, X.Mem.3.14.3; “ς. που” Pl.Sph.261 b: freq. in apodosi, to introduce an a fortioriargument, εἰ δὲ μὴ . . , ἦ που σχολῇ . . γε if not so . . , hardly or much less so . . , And.1.90; “εἰ αὗται . . μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσι, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι” Pl.Phd.65b; “εἰ μὴ τούτων . . , ς. τῶν γε ἄλλων” Arist.Metaph.999a10; ὁπότε γὰρ . . , answered by ς. γε, Pl.R.610e; “μὴ γιγνώσκων τὴν οὐσίαν ς. τήν γε ὀρθότητα διαγνώσεται” Id.Lg.668c.

---- end of interlude on etymology of 'school', from Greek 'skhole'.

Jones goes on:

"This does actually connect with the question of what the most significant impediments might be to a fruitful conversation between Grice and Carnap, so I shall try here one way to make that connection."

Good.

"Our starting point in examining the Grice/Carnap question has been Grice's Betes Noires, which turn out to be aspects of "minimalism"."

Indeed.

Grice characterised a number of this. I wonder if he felt THE NEED for this retrospective flashback -- internal need, I mean -- or was just motivated by the fact that the festschrift-editors wanting a cover or big introduction to their thing that would motivate readers. There are various versions of this autobiography by Grice. My favourite runs along the lines:

"Prejudices and predilections; which become the life and opinions of Paul Grice", by Paul Grice.

-- Grice plays with Bunyan's "Pilgrim's progress" and it is with Bunyan that we must look for the ultimate source of Grice's monsters -- or black beasts -- he prefers the French: bête noire.

---

Jones notes:

"At first blush Carnap, as a Positivist (Viennese red neck) is in many ways a minimalist, but on closer inspection he seems (for a positivist, though he was not so sure of that label later on) insufficiently dogmatic on these.  Particularly, just like Grice, he is an ontological pragmatist."

Good.

--- And Jones's reference to Vienna is very apt, because there is possibly progress (as in the pilgrim). Ditto for Grice: from Clifton (where he just read Greek) to Oxford where at first he just did classics (at Corpus Christi) to become a 'logician' at St. John's College (again Oxford) and the centre of a bit of a 'school' when he emigrated to Berkeley.

I'm sure a similar geographical and philosophical development applies to Carnap from his original Vienna corner to elsewhere.

Jones goes on:

"When I look closer to the details  of these points of possible conflict I find myself unconvinced that Grice and Carnap might not reach a mutual and constructive understanding.  But when I step back to survey the scene some of the more pungent critiques on both sides (Carnap's rhetoric on metaphysics, especially but not exclusively his youthful rhetoric, and Grice's throwaway line about Viennese rednecks) seem symptomatic of a cultural rift which reasoned debate might be powerless to bridge."

--- Interesting. But this seems a bit anti-synchronic, because we are trying to compare, as Jones notes, a 'youthful' Carnap with a 'latter-day' (if that's the expression) Grice.

Perhaps they came closest when Grice was writing his "Metaphysics" section to Pears, "The nature of metaphysics" (Macmillan, 1957) -- There, Grice, in a historicist vein, recounts the history of metaphysics and indeed is very objective as to the important role Positivism played there. But I should double-check with the sources! (It's a slim volume by Pears that is seldom quoted! I came across a reference to it in Edwards's Encyclopedia entry for 'metaphysics', as I recall -- and the piece by Grice is co-authored Grice/Strawson/Pears -- it originated in the famous Third Programme lectures of the BBC.

---

Jones goes on:

"Our discussion of minimalism, including extensionalism, lead naturally into consideration of metaphysics (for minimalism is often ontological) and also into the issue whether philosophy should be primarily (or exclusively) concerned with artificial or natural languages"

such as English or German. For we should note that 'natural language', often as used by linguists, tends towards a Platonist abstraction. What we have is Grice's English (or variety thereof, idiolect, basic for Grice) and Carnap's Viennese version of German -- * This Viennese thing reminds me of Popper who would often complain that his German sounded too Viennese even to his self [sic]!

Jones goes on:

"These are both issues on which, though we can see signs in both Grice and Carnap of moderation and tolerance, substantial cultural divergence is evident, of a kind which might be inimical to constructive dialogue."

Grice would, I think, NOT dialogue in German. Andreas Kemmerling did his best to bring Grice to Germany and he succeeded. Grice lectured at Bielefeld. Kemmerling became for me my favourite "German Grice", but there's always the motto:

I said it in Hebrew, I said it in Dutch
I said in German, and Greek,
but I wholly forgot
and it vexes me much
that ENGLISH is what you speak!

---

(Carroll, "Hunting of the Snark"). Kemmerling went on to write his PhD thesis on Grice on German, expanding on the 'meaning' of "Meinen" -- G. Meggle and others followed suit).

---

Jones goes on:

"Carnap's tolerance gives him an ontological flexibility which still sits alongside an intolerance of what he considers "metaphysics" (and does not include these pragmatic choices of ontology, which are not for Carnap metaphysical but conventional).  Grice, though seemingly sharing a pragmatic attitude toward ontology (which perhaps feeds his antipathy toware minimalism) has nevertheles a genuine interest in metaphysics, and a difficulty in reconciling Carnap's anti-metaphysical rhetoric with that interest."

Indeed. It should be recalled that there is a 'professional association' or duty involved. Grice was meant to 'teach' Metaphysics (the "Metaphysics" graduate course) at Berkeley.

Interestingly, in 1968, when Grice emigrated to Berkeley (via Harvard), Strawson -- Grice's former tutee -- had been appointed Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford -- where 'metaphysical philosophy', in Oxford, is only meant to mean the opposition to 'natural' or 'physical' philosophy that was also taught -- at some time!

Grice would give graduate courses in Metaphysics (usually with G. Myro) and Ethics (usually with J. Baker) -- whereas Carnap's 'academic' connections with these alleged disciplines -- within a philosophy curriculum -- seem divergent.

The Grice Collection (now deposited at Berkeley's Bancroft Library) contains LOADS of stuff by Grice -- as "lecturer" in metaphysics and ethics: educational talks on the masters of these disciplines, with Kantotle on top. And he would often quote from the Oxford Clarendon Greek edition of Aristotle's Metaphysics -- Ackrill, his tutee at Oxford, having translated bits of it, too --.
Jones goes on:

Jones notes:

"I imagine that I can see how Carnap might be persuaded to take less dismissively many of the questions which Grice might consider as worthwhile and metaphysical."

But I wonder if he had enrolled to one of Grice's courses!

They tended to be fun, though. With Myro, who was more into logic, Grice's metaphysics seminars dealt with things like Geach's point about 'relative identity', and they would spend whole semesters discussing Wiggins's idea of substance and continuity...

Jones:

"This is because in general "metaphysical" and "meaningless" are so strongly coupled for Carnap that if one can show that a question has some meaning, even if only in a pragmatic way, then one has shown the question not to be mere metaphysics."

Grice would empathise with this as an Oxonian, seeing that Ryle had reviewed Heidegger's "Time and Being" (not yet translated to German) for "Mind" and was the cause of Ayer going to Vienna. Grice admired Ayer in views (enfant terrible of Oxford philosophy, he called him). Therefore, Grice was well aware that this was an important stage in the development of 'contemporary' "metaphysics" -- the challenge, as per Carnap and others, that metaphysical statements are cross-categorial if not plain nonsensical. Only at a MUCH later stage would Grice divide metaphysics into two branches: ontology proper and 'eschatology', to meet the challenge that metaphor and analogy may be proper methods for metaphysical discourse.

Jones:

"At the same time, Grice's ontological pragmatism suggests that he may be less absolute in his metaphysics than is typical. But despite these reconciling considerations, or perhaps making Carnap and Grice blind to such possibilities, there may be something like a cultural block, which might be seen in a reluctance of either to contemplate the possibility that the other's rhetoric is, under the cloak of differences in usage, not so severely incompatible as it might seem."

Indeed. Grice had a high respect for what he called the 'longitudinal unity' of philosophy, and since metaphysics has featured so large in the history of philosophy as a discipline, he would be more reluctanct to deny its priority. On top of that, Grice addd a 'latitudinal unity': philosophy, like virtue, is one. And he found that "metaphysics", in the words of Aristotle, was 'first philosophy' -- i.e. the source for a systematics of philosophy as a discipline.

Jones:

"Cultural divergence may be even more significant when we come to the ordinary language versus "constructed" languages issue. Until Oxford comes under attack Grice appears as a moderating force, moderating some of the excesses of "ordinary language philosophy". But under attack Grice closes ranks with the culture to which be belongs."

Indeed. This _can_ be irritating, but I guess you have to be 'under attack' to suffer as he did!

--

Jones:

"My suggestion is here, that what is under attack, and is being defended, is not a doctrine or a school, but a culture or a tendency."

Good point.

---- Perhaps alla Snow, "Two cultures" -- a favourite with Oxonians at some point!

Jones:

"Though denying that there is any school or any collection of doctrines or methods shared by the group under attack, Grice is also capable of describing to us the essential features of ordinary language philosophy."

Indeed: the gist of, say, his very first 'Prolegomena' lecture in Harvard "Logic and Conversation": all his examples drawn from ordinary-language philosophers who cannot distinguish a conversational implicature from their elbow, if that's the expression.

Jones:

"For Grice the essential feature is something like a belief that all philosophical problems should be approached via a careful study of the relevant features of our language"

---- In the case of what in that lecture he calls the "A-philosophers", the point being systematic: to be clear as to what pertains to mere 'implicature' (never 'use', which Grice found 'vague') and what to 'sense' (or truth-conditional feature in the logical form as it were -- since 'sense' he ALSO found 'vague').

Jones:

"In contrasting Oxford philosophy as a non-school with the supposed "school" of nominalists, Grice is putting up a paper tiger. If a school is identified using a particular doctrine (in this case nominalism) as a defining characteristic of its members, then that does make possible a criticism of all via a critique of that particular doctrine. However, most philosophical doctrines come in infinite variety."

Indeed.

Jones goes on:

"At one point, when Carnap was for a year or so at Harvard, Quine, Goodman and Carnap collaborated on a nominalistic project, but there may still have been no single notion of nominalism to which they all subscribed."

Interesting. Indeed, Quine was present when Grice delivered his William James lectures at Harvard. My favourite reference here is Lewis, whose PhD dissertation for Harvard is on "Convention", merging Quine with Grice nicely!

----

Jones goes on:

"Carnap for example, would have been interested at best in exploring what could been done with minimal ontologies without endorsing any nominalistic dogmas, but Goodman may well have been motivated by more definite doubts about more generous ontologies (we can see from his contribution to the Carnap Schilpp volume that he was unhappy about the criticisms which Carnap levelled at his own Aufbau as he moved on from that project, as discussed in the recent workshop at UEA in Norwich)."

Excellent references -- and indeed Goodman was a genius. I think M. A. E. Dummett worshipped him too, and I should double check my Goodmanian references.

The reference to the recent UEA workshop is also very apt, thanks.

Jones:

"I have failed to maintain focus here as much as I would have liked. Let me summarise where I now feel that I am in relation to the Carnap/Grice conversation. I feel that the problem of reconciliation, of discovering whether that might be possible or at what points there might be irresolvable conflicts, falls into two quite different parts."

Good.

"Firstly, there are a number of particular problems which one can approach, attempting to analyse apparant differences and establish whether they are substantive or could possibly be resolved.
There would be much detail here, and many uncertainties about what either philosopher would do in the face of attempts at reconciliation."

Here Jones makes interesting sub-divisions within this first part:

Jones's first query:

"Would Carnap, for example, countenance a change of language to admit the use of the word "Metaphysics" for certain meaningful investigations which would not otherwise fall under his concept of metaphysics and would not fall foul of his critique"

Jones's second query:

"Would either philosopher be willing to extend their conception of philosophy to encompass those kinds of useful work done by the other which do not fall within their present conception,  e.g. Carnap to admit some empirical studies of natural languages as belonging to philosophy, or Grice to admit that there are genuinely philosophical problems which can be exposed and progressed in formal languages without any significant prior analysis of natural language?"

I hope to go back to these two queries at a later stage.

Jones notes:

"Those kinds of stumbling blocks might possibly originate in the other (second) part, which is concerned with the broader cultural or perhaps "political" issues.  Often these manifest themselves in differences of language, especially if we admit that different view about the nature and scope of philosophy are at bottom different positions about language, about the use of that word "philosophy"".

T. P. Uschanov is an author that comes to mind to me as being good in this. His essay was published by Croom Helm, and available at this link below. It deals with this 'political' side to the polemic.

http://www.helsinki.fi/~tuschano/writings/strange/

Jones:

"Sometimes such issues are associated with major and irreconcilable rifts, sometimes they seem insignificant. For example, Carnap took the view that philosophy produces only analytic truths, and regarded all synthetic claims as belonging to empirical science. But he came from a positivist tradition, of which David Hume is often consider the first, even though Hume himself modelled philosophy on empirical science, and thought it the business of philosophy to achieve an understanding of human nature based on careful observation. In many other ways Carnap's views break with the positivist tradition of which he was a part, another conspicuous place is in his conception of metaphysics."

Good. Grice's attitude towards Hume was more ambivalent, but we should recall that Grice's book, "The conception of value" starts with a Hume quote: the distinction, indeed, between an objective concept (alleged) and our mere 'conception' of what the 'concept' seems to be about -- in this case, 'value'. Grice would often refer to Hume in his metaphysical routines, as he called them. (And we know that Jones has expanded elsewhere on what Jones calls Hume's Fork).

Jones concludes his post:

"We might progress the first kind, what one might call the technical issues, without ever impacting upon the second, the cultural issues, for in these people are often blind to detail and sensitive only, perhaps, to their sense of belonging, their desire to defend home territory against an alien culture."

Indeed. Excellent reminders, Jones. Thank you.

Cheers.