Griceian Jurisprudence

Speranza

REFERENCES

Austin, J.L., 1962, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Austin, John, 1832, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, H.L.A.Hart
ed. London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954.

Bentham, Jeremy, 1776, A Fragment on Government, J.H.Burns and H.L.A.Hart
ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
–––, 1782, Of Laws in General, H.L.A.Hart ed., London: Athlone Press,
1970.
–––, 1843, Anarchical Fallacies.
Coleman, Jules (ed.), 2001, Hart's Postscript, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

Coleman, Jules and Simchen, Ori, 2003, “Law,”Legal Theory, 9: 1–41.

Dascal, Marcelo and Wroblewski, Jerzy, 1988, “Transparency and Doubt:
Understanding and Interpretation in Pragmatics and in Law,” Law and Philosophy,
7: 203–224.

De Paramo, 1988, “Entrevista a HLA Hart”, Doxa, 5: 340.

Dworkin, Ronald, 1986a, “Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?”
in A Matter of Principle, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986.
–––, 1986b, Law's Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press)
–––, 1991, “On Gaps in the Law,” in Neil MacCormick and Paul Amselek
(eds.), Controversies about Law's Ontology, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.

Endicott, Timothy, 2001, “Law is Necessarily Vague,”Legal Theory, 7: 377–
383.

Finnis, John, 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.

Grice, H. P. Personal identity, Mind, 1941

Grice, H. P. Intention, 1944.

Grice, H. P. Meaning, 1948

Grice, H. P. The causal theory of perception, 1961

Grice, H. P. Logic and conversation -- quoting Hart -- Harvard, 1967.

Grice, H. P. Intention and uncertainty (cfr. Hart/Hampshire, Intention and certainty). British Academy.

Grice, H. P. Aspects of reasoning -- vide legal reasoning. John Locke Lectures, 1979

Grice, H. P. Conception of Value, Carus Lectures, 1983.

Grice, H. P. The Grice Papers. Bancroft Library, UC/Berkeley.

Greenawalt, Kent, 2001, “Vagueness and Judicial Responses to Legal
Indeterminacy,” Legal Theory, 7: 433–445.


H.L.A.Hart, 1994, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 1982, Essays on Bentham, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Marmor, Andrei, 2008, “The Pragmatics of Legal Language,”Ratio Juris, 21:
423–452.
Posner, Richard, 1996, Law and Legal Theory in England and America,
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Raz, Joseph, 1990, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Schiffer, Stephen, 2001, “A Little Help from your Friends?” Legal Theory,
7: 421–431.
Speranza, Join the Grice Club.
Stavropoulos, Nicos, 1996, Objectivity in Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.


Further reading
Alchourrón, Carlos, and Bulygin, Eugenio, 1971,Normative Systems, Vienna:
Springer.
Bix, Brian, 1996, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Blackburn, Simon, 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University
Press; especially pages 205–209.
Brink, David O., 1988, “Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial
Review,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17: 105–48.
Bulygin, Eugenio, 1982, “Norms, normative propositions and legal statements
”, in G. Floistad (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy A New Survey, The Hague:
M. Nijhoff, 157–163.
Greenawalt, Kent, 1992, Law and Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Greenberg, Mark and Harry Litman, 1998, “The Meaning of Original Meaning,”
Georgetown Law Journal, 86: 569.
Grice, Studies in the Way of Words.
Endicott, Timothy, 2000 Vagueness in Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2002, “How to Speak the Truth,” American Journal of Jurisprudence,
46: 229–248.
–––, 2005, “The Value of Vagueness,”in Vijay K. Bhatia, Jan Engberg,
Maurizio Gotti and Dorothee Heller (eds), Vagueness in Normative Texts, Bern:
Peter Lang, Chapter 1, 27–48.
Fish, Stanley, 1989, Doing What Comes Naturally, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Green, Michael, 2003, “Dworkin's Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of
Language Can't Teach Us about the Law”, Virginia Law Review, 89: 1897–1952.
Moore, Michael, 1985, “A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,” Southern
California Law Review, 58: 277
Patterson, Dennis, 1996, Law and Truth, New York: Oxford University Press.
Perelman, Chaim, 1963, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument,
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Speranza, Join the Grice Club
Williams, Glanville, 1945–1946, “Language and the Law”, Law Quarterly

Review, 61: 71, 179, 293, 384; 62: 387.

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