Grice the mathematician

Speranza

-- and the work of A. PASEAU

Paseau, A.
Mathematical Knowledge, co-edited with M. Leng & M. Potter (Oxford University Press, 2007).


20. “Proving Induction”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 2011.
19. “Mathematical Instrumentalism, Gödel’s Theorem and Inductive Evidence”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science (forthcoming).
18. “The Consistency of Naturalism”, Metaphilosophy (forthcoming).
17. “Pure Second-Order Logic with Identity”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (forthcoming).
16. “Proofs of the Compactness Theorem”, History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (2010), pp. 73-98.
15. “The Definitions of Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundamental Layer ”, Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010), pp. 169-175.
14. “How to type: reply to Halbach”, Analysis 69 (2009), pp. 280-286.
13. “Reducing Arithmetic to Set Theory”, in Ø. Linnebo & O. Bueno (eds), New Waves in the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 35-55.
12. “Justifying induction mathematically: strategies and functions”, Logique et Analyse 203 (2008), pp. 263-9.
11. “Motivating Reductionism about Sets”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), pp. 295-307.
10. “Fitch’s Argument and Typing Knowledge”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (2008), pp. 153-176.
9. “Scientific Platonism”, in M. Leng, A. Paseau & M. Potter (eds), Mathematical Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 123-149.
8. “Boolos on the Justification of Set Theory”, Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2007), pp. 30-53.
7. “Genuine Modal Realism and Completeness”, Mind 115 (2006), pp. 721-9.
6. “The Subtraction Argument(s)”, Dialectica 60 (2006), pp. 145-156.
5. “Naturalism in Mathematics and the Authority of Philosophy”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2005), pp. 399-418.
4. “On an Application of Categoricity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2005), pp. 411-415.
3. “The Open-Endedness of the Set Concept and the Semantics of Set Theory”, Synthese 135 (2003), pp. 379-399.
2. “Why the Subtraction Argument Does Not Add Up”, Analysis 62(2002), pp. 74-76.
1. “Should the Logic of Set Theory Be Intuitionistic?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (2001), pp. 369-378.
BOOK REVIEWS
Review of Logical Pluralism by JC Beall and Greg Restall, Mind 116 (2007), pp. 391-6.
“What the Foundationalist Filter Kept Out”, Essay Review of Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics by David Corfield, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 36 (2005), pp. 191-201.
Review of The Search for Certainty byMarcus Giaquinto, Philosophical Books 46 (2005), pp. 382- 384.
Review of Resemblance Nominalism by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2005), pp. 146-150.
ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES
“Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
“Naturalised Philosophy of Mathematics”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy