Speranza
MALFET is arguing, elsewhere, about this and that for and against a 'materialist' interpretation of stuff.
"Anything else would be an abstraction, an idealized system that can be useful
descriptively but that cannot be said to exist in any material sense (much like, I
would argue, Grice's maxims)."
The point has been discussed elsewhere by yours truly.
A trigger could be B. F. Loar in his "Mind and meaning". He argued that it's best to see those Griceian constraints (never mind 'maxims' -- he was just echoing Kant in a jocular way) as "empirical generalisations over functional STATES".
Of course Grice would disagree. But Loar knew what he was taking about.
If we trace Grice's 'philosophical psychology' back to its Aristotelian roots (rather than "Kantotelian") we do see an endorsement (as in the opening paragraphs of his "Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre") to FUNCTIONALISM (alla, albeit, D. K. Lewis).
In this respect, the literature is enormous. For one, we have Grice's EARLIER (and my favourite) version of the "Logic and Conversation" where he is free from the Kantotelian jargon and speaks of 'desideratum' and 'principle' (rather than 'maxim'). He is having in mind mottoes like, "Clarity is not enough" and speaks of a principle of conversational clarity, one of conversational candour, and a desideratum of conversational benevolence interacting with a desideratum of conversational self-interest. Anything that is said about "Grice's maxims" (so miscalled, :)) should apply to his less technical concoctions (or cfr. his 'principle' or 'feature of discourse' in "Causal theory of perception", -- be as strong as you can -- in what you say).
Another thing is to look for a JUSTIFICATION, which is what Grice is interested in. Not just to posit this or that 'ontological' status to the 'features of conversational discourse'. In this respect, Grice proposes three steps:
an empirical generalisation over functional states (alla Loar) is for Grice an 'empiricist but TOO DULL' an answer to satisfy the Kantotle in him.
Anything more 'rationalist' allows for a 'technical justification' of the "RATIONALity" of the principle and, beyond, a nontechnical, transcendental (which can be either weak -- as mine and Strawson was -- or STRONG as Grice's was) justification of the REASONABLEness" of the principle. The reading of Grice's "Aspects of reason" should at this point be morally mandatory! :).
Monday, September 24, 2012
Saturday, September 22, 2012
Griceian Perissology
Speranza
-- from Quinion's World Wide Words.
Perissology
-- from Quinion's World Wide Words.
Perissology
I
come to this word in the hope that the piece you are about to read won’t be an
example of it. Perissology means using more words than necessary to
explain one’s meaning, a pleonasm. Since perissology is three letters
longer than pleonasm but means the same, you may argue it’s an example of
the related habit of using long words when shorter ones will do.
The
word comes to us from the post-classical Latin of the fourth or fifth century
AD. Romans of classical times knew it as a Greek word, perissologia,
which came from perissos, beyond the usual number or size, redundant,
superfluous. The prefix perisso- is known in two other very uncommon
English words: perissosyllabic, a line of verse that has more syllables
than normal, and perissodactyl, a grazing mammal with hooves made up of
an odd number of toes, which sounds obscure but is a characteristic of horses as
well as tapirs and rhinoceroses. Its opposite is artiodactyl, having an
even number of toes, which refers to mammals such as pigs, deer, goats and
cattle.
Perissology
came into English at the end of the sixteenth century but was never anything
more than an obscure literary word. In recent centuries it has mainly been
exploited for humorous effect.
His
inscience of avitous justicements, and of lexicology, his perissology and
battology, imparted to his tractation of his cause, an imperspicuity which
rendered it immomentous to the jurator audients.
Letters to Squire Pedant, by Samuel Klinefelter Hoshour, 1856. This described a lawyer pleading his case. It says that his knowledge of old judgements and the nature of words, plus his unnecessary repetition, made his case so obscure the jury decided it was unimportant. Battology is another word for perissology; hair-splitting scholars find a distinction between battology, perissology and pleonasm, but we may let that pass us by.
Letters to Squire Pedant, by Samuel Klinefelter Hoshour, 1856. This described a lawyer pleading his case. It says that his knowledge of old judgements and the nature of words, plus his unnecessary repetition, made his case so obscure the jury decided it was unimportant. Battology is another word for perissology; hair-splitting scholars find a distinction between battology, perissology and pleonasm, but we may let that pass us by.
3.
Wordface
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
Other men's flowers
Cicero, the Roman Grice
Speranza
S. Leith, 'Other Men’s Flowers' -- The New York Times, Sept. 8, 2012.
"Rhetoric, simply put, is the study of how language works to persuade."
"So any writer seeking to make a case, or hold a reader’s attention — which is more or less any writer not in the service of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — has something to learn from it."
"If the classical [read: Ancient Greek and Roman -- Speranza] orators have modern counterparts in the realm of the written word, pre-eminent among those counterparts are the authors of
opinion pieces."
"Here is persuasion overt, persuasion front and centre."
"The techniques that served [Cicerone] will just as effectively serve modern writers of opinion."
"Open a book of rhetorical terms, and you will meet a lot of gnarly-looking Greek and Latin words [and a few Italian ones, like "sprezzatura" and "implicatura" -- Speranza].
""Apodioxis" and "epizeuxis" sound like diseases you wouldn’t especially want to catch."
"But, pilgrim, be not afraid."
"The figures — all the different twists of language that rhetoric describes — are sometimes called "the flowers of rhetoric"".
"Think of these words as the botanical names for those flowers, and remember what Shakespeare said about roses and their names." [or Umberto Eco for that matter, and cfr. the ambiguity here -- as per collection of poems, one of my and Grice's favourite, "Other men's flowers" as per title of the essay -- Speranza].
"I have gathered a posie of other men’s flowers, and nothing but the thread that binds them is mine own." Note that Herbert is playing on the two 'meanings' (ring, flowers) as well as on the French loan-word, and on anqos + logia, a collection of flowers.
"Using classical techniques is not, in itself, a different approach to writing."
"I’s simply a way of thinking more consciously about what you’re doing."
"Terms such as "antithesis", which is the technique of setting two terms in opposition, are ways of labeling what any prose stylist does by habit and instinct."
"Like the bourgeois gentleman of the playwright Molière — amazed to discover in middle age that he’d been speaking prose all his life — you’ve been using the figures since long before you could name them."
"If you’re accustomed to thinking of rhetoric as dealing only with fancy language, think again." -- or read Grice, "Logic and Conversation" -- in WoW -- The Way of Words, Harvard University Press.
"Rhetoric is present in the plain style as much as in the high." -- cfr. Grice's caveat: "implicatura" as "something in the nature of a figure of rhetoric".
"One of the best-known figures, "erotema", the “rhetorical question,” is in regular use."
"“What am I, — chopped liver?”"
"Everyday language seethes with metaphor and figuration." Cfr. Grice, "You are the cream in my coffee", and discussion elsewhere! ("FLN").
"The trick, in a formal context, is to use it effectively."
"It does help to keep in mind that, as [ARISTOTELE] wrote, you have three forms of power over the reader: ethos, pathos and logos."
"That is, roughly: selling yourself, swaying the emotions and advancing your argument."
"Any sentence you write should be pulling one or more of those levers."
"The best will do all three."
-- Grice was careful here: he would distinguish between 'exhibition' and 'protrepsis' and would recall the way grammarians -- in Greek and Latin, following Aristotle -- would be refining the terminology of what he called the 'modes' -- "indicative" and "subjunctive", say -- and "imperative" and "optative".
"Even apparent decoration works to a purpose — if a phrase is beautiful, funny or memorable, it
is doing work on its audience."
"First, consider the three R’s — repetition, repetition and repetition."
"Richard A. Lanham’s authoritative “A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms” lists no fewer than 36 figures of repetition covering everything from the repetition of sounds to the repetition of larger ideas and
arguments."
"So it’s not a paradox to say that your repetition can be various."
"Repeat, but do not be repetitive."
"An argument can be given gathering force by anaphora, for instance, where a word or phrase is repeated at the beginning of successive sentences."
"“Big Tobacco will want to tell you X… Big Tobacco will want to tell you Y… Big Tobacco will want to tell you Z. But there’s something you can tell Big Tobacco…”"
"Its conclusion can be given a sense of roundness and inevitability with epistrophe — where the
repetition comes at the end rather than the beginning of a sentence."
"But repetition applies at a subtler level, too." -- and they all involve what Grice calls a "flout" to some 'pragmatic' principle, desideratum, maxim, or what you will. In this case something like what he played with when he referred to the 'categories' of "quantitas" versus "qualitas" (versus "relatio" versus "modus") -- Grice, "The causal theory of perception" -- "Do not say MORE than you need to say" and "be brief".
"The memorable or resonant phrase, for instance, is often alliterative or assonant: “I like Ike.”"
"A light touch is best."
"A thunderous 15-sentence run of anaphora might not be appropriate for an article on traffic measures in suburban New Jersey."
"Sprezzatura, or naturalness, is the quality to cultivate."
"If a piece of writing feels like a unit, it lends its argument an impression, however spurious, of coherence."
"The more each clause or sentence relates to those around it, whether in parallel or counterpoint, intellectually or musically, the more it will feel like an organic whole. "
"Syntax can do much of the work of sense."
"The tricolon, putting phrases into groups of three, is perennially effective."
"Once you start to notice these — be they in newspaper articles, politicians’ speeches or TV advertisements (that’s an example right there) — the little monkeys are everywhere."
"Lists, in general, work well."
"Try enumeratio: setting out your points one by one, to give the impression of clarity and command."
Grice was obsessed with this. The motto those days was, "Clarity is not enough" -- (The philosopher, like CICERONE, needs to be more than 'clear') but he would have the desideratum of clarity versus candour and the principles of conversational benevolence versus self-interest in his earlier set of notes on "Logic and Conversation" (Oxford, 1965).
"Music matters, too."
"The effects of the tricolon, as of any number of other figures, are in some ways metrical. Think of how clusters of stressed syllables can sound resolute and determined."
"“Yes we can!” is three strong syllables."
"Persuasion operates as much through the ear as through the faculties of reason."
"Prose does not scan like poetry."
"But it shares its effects. One of the most memorable lines in American history, for instance, is the clause in the Declaration of Independence."
"“We hold these truths to be self-evident.”"
"That, among other things, is an example of iambic pentameter."
"Rhetoric, whether on the page or in the spoken word, is about patterns and echoes and resonances."
"Recently, Mitt Romney declared: “It’s time for a president who cares more about America’s workers than he does about America’s union bosses.”"
"That’s, arguably, a false opposition."
"But my point isn’t about politics so much as about the way a ringing antithesis can sound."
"The template is: “It’s time for a president who cares more about [supposedly good thing] than he does about [supposedly opposite bad thing].”"
"The sentence is an ethos appeal — “I stand for [good thing]” — disguised as a piece of argument."
"Note how it is inflated for musical reasons by the extra syllables “he does about” and the
repetition of “America’s”"
"And how “It’s time” lends a sense at once of urgency and of history’s being on the speaker’s side."
"Whether history is on Mr. Romney’s side has yet to be established."
"But it’s clear that during his perambulations in the garden of rhetoric, he has been picking the flowers."
"So has his opponent."
"And so have the countless pundits whose commentary will swell blogs and op-ed pages
over the coming months."
"Ask not what you can do for chiasmus, then: ask what chiasmus can do for you."
REFERENCES
Cicero, The Loeb Classical Library
Grice, Way of Words -- Harvard University.
Speranza, Join the Grice Club.
Wavell, Other men's flowers.
S. Leith, 'Other Men’s Flowers' -- The New York Times, Sept. 8, 2012.
"Rhetoric, simply put, is the study of how language works to persuade."
"So any writer seeking to make a case, or hold a reader’s attention — which is more or less any writer not in the service of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — has something to learn from it."
"If the classical [read: Ancient Greek and Roman -- Speranza] orators have modern counterparts in the realm of the written word, pre-eminent among those counterparts are the authors of
opinion pieces."
"Here is persuasion overt, persuasion front and centre."
"The techniques that served [Cicerone] will just as effectively serve modern writers of opinion."
"Open a book of rhetorical terms, and you will meet a lot of gnarly-looking Greek and Latin words [and a few Italian ones, like "sprezzatura" and "implicatura" -- Speranza].
""Apodioxis" and "epizeuxis" sound like diseases you wouldn’t especially want to catch."
"But, pilgrim, be not afraid."
"The figures — all the different twists of language that rhetoric describes — are sometimes called "the flowers of rhetoric"".
"Think of these words as the botanical names for those flowers, and remember what Shakespeare said about roses and their names." [or Umberto Eco for that matter, and cfr. the ambiguity here -- as per collection of poems, one of my and Grice's favourite, "Other men's flowers" as per title of the essay -- Speranza].
"I have gathered a posie of other men’s flowers, and nothing but the thread that binds them is mine own." Note that Herbert is playing on the two 'meanings' (ring, flowers) as well as on the French loan-word, and on anqos + logia, a collection of flowers.
"Using classical techniques is not, in itself, a different approach to writing."
"I’s simply a way of thinking more consciously about what you’re doing."
"Terms such as "antithesis", which is the technique of setting two terms in opposition, are ways of labeling what any prose stylist does by habit and instinct."
"Like the bourgeois gentleman of the playwright Molière — amazed to discover in middle age that he’d been speaking prose all his life — you’ve been using the figures since long before you could name them."
"If you’re accustomed to thinking of rhetoric as dealing only with fancy language, think again." -- or read Grice, "Logic and Conversation" -- in WoW -- The Way of Words, Harvard University Press.
"Rhetoric is present in the plain style as much as in the high." -- cfr. Grice's caveat: "implicatura" as "something in the nature of a figure of rhetoric".
"One of the best-known figures, "erotema", the “rhetorical question,” is in regular use."
"“What am I, — chopped liver?”"
"Everyday language seethes with metaphor and figuration." Cfr. Grice, "You are the cream in my coffee", and discussion elsewhere! ("FLN").
"The trick, in a formal context, is to use it effectively."
"It does help to keep in mind that, as [ARISTOTELE] wrote, you have three forms of power over the reader: ethos, pathos and logos."
"That is, roughly: selling yourself, swaying the emotions and advancing your argument."
"Any sentence you write should be pulling one or more of those levers."
"The best will do all three."
-- Grice was careful here: he would distinguish between 'exhibition' and 'protrepsis' and would recall the way grammarians -- in Greek and Latin, following Aristotle -- would be refining the terminology of what he called the 'modes' -- "indicative" and "subjunctive", say -- and "imperative" and "optative".
"Even apparent decoration works to a purpose — if a phrase is beautiful, funny or memorable, it
is doing work on its audience."
"First, consider the three R’s — repetition, repetition and repetition."
"Richard A. Lanham’s authoritative “A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms” lists no fewer than 36 figures of repetition covering everything from the repetition of sounds to the repetition of larger ideas and
arguments."
"So it’s not a paradox to say that your repetition can be various."
"Repeat, but do not be repetitive."
"An argument can be given gathering force by anaphora, for instance, where a word or phrase is repeated at the beginning of successive sentences."
"“Big Tobacco will want to tell you X… Big Tobacco will want to tell you Y… Big Tobacco will want to tell you Z. But there’s something you can tell Big Tobacco…”"
"Its conclusion can be given a sense of roundness and inevitability with epistrophe — where the
repetition comes at the end rather than the beginning of a sentence."
"But repetition applies at a subtler level, too." -- and they all involve what Grice calls a "flout" to some 'pragmatic' principle, desideratum, maxim, or what you will. In this case something like what he played with when he referred to the 'categories' of "quantitas" versus "qualitas" (versus "relatio" versus "modus") -- Grice, "The causal theory of perception" -- "Do not say MORE than you need to say" and "be brief".
"The memorable or resonant phrase, for instance, is often alliterative or assonant: “I like Ike.”"
"A light touch is best."
"A thunderous 15-sentence run of anaphora might not be appropriate for an article on traffic measures in suburban New Jersey."
"Sprezzatura, or naturalness, is the quality to cultivate."
"If a piece of writing feels like a unit, it lends its argument an impression, however spurious, of coherence."
"The more each clause or sentence relates to those around it, whether in parallel or counterpoint, intellectually or musically, the more it will feel like an organic whole. "
"Syntax can do much of the work of sense."
"The tricolon, putting phrases into groups of three, is perennially effective."
"Once you start to notice these — be they in newspaper articles, politicians’ speeches or TV advertisements (that’s an example right there) — the little monkeys are everywhere."
"Lists, in general, work well."
"Try enumeratio: setting out your points one by one, to give the impression of clarity and command."
Grice was obsessed with this. The motto those days was, "Clarity is not enough" -- (The philosopher, like CICERONE, needs to be more than 'clear') but he would have the desideratum of clarity versus candour and the principles of conversational benevolence versus self-interest in his earlier set of notes on "Logic and Conversation" (Oxford, 1965).
"Music matters, too."
"The effects of the tricolon, as of any number of other figures, are in some ways metrical. Think of how clusters of stressed syllables can sound resolute and determined."
"“Yes we can!” is three strong syllables."
"Persuasion operates as much through the ear as through the faculties of reason."
"Prose does not scan like poetry."
"But it shares its effects. One of the most memorable lines in American history, for instance, is the clause in the Declaration of Independence."
"“We hold these truths to be self-evident.”"
"That, among other things, is an example of iambic pentameter."
"Rhetoric, whether on the page or in the spoken word, is about patterns and echoes and resonances."
"Recently, Mitt Romney declared: “It’s time for a president who cares more about America’s workers than he does about America’s union bosses.”"
"That’s, arguably, a false opposition."
"But my point isn’t about politics so much as about the way a ringing antithesis can sound."
"The template is: “It’s time for a president who cares more about [supposedly good thing] than he does about [supposedly opposite bad thing].”"
"The sentence is an ethos appeal — “I stand for [good thing]” — disguised as a piece of argument."
"Note how it is inflated for musical reasons by the extra syllables “he does about” and the
repetition of “America’s”"
"And how “It’s time” lends a sense at once of urgency and of history’s being on the speaker’s side."
"Whether history is on Mr. Romney’s side has yet to be established."
"But it’s clear that during his perambulations in the garden of rhetoric, he has been picking the flowers."
"So has his opponent."
"And so have the countless pundits whose commentary will swell blogs and op-ed pages
over the coming months."
"Ask not what you can do for chiasmus, then: ask what chiasmus can do for you."
REFERENCES
Cicero, The Loeb Classical Library
Grice, Way of Words -- Harvard University.
Speranza, Join the Grice Club.
Wavell, Other men's flowers.
Sunday, September 9, 2012
Kripke cites Grice in reply to Linsky
Speranza
di S KRIPKE - Citato da 737 - Articoli correlati
0 1977 by Saul Kripke. .... Previously Linsky had given a similar example. ..... distinguish, following Grice,Is between what the speaker's words meant, on a given ...
SPEAKER'S REFERENCE and SEMANTIC REFERENCE1
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di S KRIPKE - Citato da 737 - Articoli correlati
0 1977 by Saul Kripke. .... Previously Linsky had given a similar example. ..... distinguish, following Grice,Is between what the speaker's words meant, on a given ...
Grice, Kripke, and Linsky
Speranza
LINSKY is concerned, in "Names and descriptions", his second book, with a response to KRIPKE.
Kripke (we love him) had been misquoting Grice for some time now.
This had occasioned a 'tangential' Griceian literature on the topic. "Putting Humpty Dumpty together again", etc.
My favourite Kripkean defense would be in a lecture by Patton on the topic.
While Grice refers to DONNELLAN in "Vacuous Names", his views on 'dossiers' were rather different from anything that Kripke said (or thought?) on the issue.
--- Etc.
LINSKY is concerned, in "Names and descriptions", his second book, with a response to KRIPKE.
Kripke (we love him) had been misquoting Grice for some time now.
This had occasioned a 'tangential' Griceian literature on the topic. "Putting Humpty Dumpty together again", etc.
My favourite Kripkean defense would be in a lecture by Patton on the topic.
While Grice refers to DONNELLAN in "Vacuous Names", his views on 'dossiers' were rather different from anything that Kripke said (or thought?) on the issue.
--- Etc.
Grice, Strawson and Linsky ON REFERRING
Speranza
In the final paragraph to "Presupposition and conversational implicature" (in WoW -- Way of Words), Grice notes that it would perhaps be better to start anew and reconsider the issues at hand. This would mean, notably, a change of approach in dealing with the operator "the" (a structural device that he equates with the 'iota' operator' of the logicians). And right he is, too.
That new approach is only suggested by Grice, but obviously he is linking his thoughts to his "Vacuous Names".
For the alternative approach to "the" would start by taking seriously the idea that "the" is a "referential expression".
Grice was indebted, in part, to his pupil Strawson.
Strawson considers:
"The king of France is not bald" IMPLIES there is a king of France.
Grice will CORRECT: "IMPLICATES".
Note that while Strawson did use "imply" (naturally enough) in "On referring", he, rather confusingly, to some, preferred the 'term of art', "presupposes" in later writing.
This was one of Linsky's big pre-occupations, if we may call them thus, and occupations, too. Vide his seminal "Referring".
In the final paragraph to "Presupposition and conversational implicature" (in WoW -- Way of Words), Grice notes that it would perhaps be better to start anew and reconsider the issues at hand. This would mean, notably, a change of approach in dealing with the operator "the" (a structural device that he equates with the 'iota' operator' of the logicians). And right he is, too.
That new approach is only suggested by Grice, but obviously he is linking his thoughts to his "Vacuous Names".
For the alternative approach to "the" would start by taking seriously the idea that "the" is a "referential expression".
Grice was indebted, in part, to his pupil Strawson.
Strawson considers:
"The king of France is not bald" IMPLIES there is a king of France.
Grice will CORRECT: "IMPLICATES".
Note that while Strawson did use "imply" (naturally enough) in "On referring", he, rather confusingly, to some, preferred the 'term of art', "presupposes" in later writing.
This was one of Linsky's big pre-occupations, if we may call them thus, and occupations, too. Vide his seminal "Referring".
Leonard Linsky (1922-2012) and Herbert Paul Grice (1913-1988)
Speranza
Linsky -- PhD dissertation, UC/Berkeley. Theory of "Reference" in Frege and Carnap (under Marhenke).
----
Linsky -- PhD dissertation, UC/Berkeley. Theory of "Reference" in Frege and Carnap (under Marhenke).
----
Grice and the Linskys
Speranza
B. Linsky's research has been in areas of Philosophical Logic related to Metaphysics and in the History of Logic, in particular, Bertrand Russell's logic.
B. Linsky's PhD thesis, on
"Natural Kinds and Natural Kind TERMS"
developed into an interest in properties, both as the meaning of predicates and as universals in metaphysics.
This interest in semantics has led to several papers on logical form, definite descriptions, and how to extend the notion of rigid designation to general terms.
Beginning in 1990 B. Linsky wrote a series of papers with Edward Zalta, applying his "Object Theory" to problems about the semantics of necessity and quantified modal logic and the philosophy of mathematics.
B. Linsky also began to study of Bertrand Russell's logic as a theory of properties and propositions, and then, after a first visit to the Bertrand Russell Archives in 2003, various manuscripts by Russell.
A series of papers came out of the notes that Russell made on the works of Gottlob Frege in 1902, and a few sheets from the largely missing manuscript of Principia Mathematica from around 1910.
B. Linsky has most recently published edited notes and manuscripts that Russell made for the second edition of PM , from 1925.
---- Grice would be fascinated, since he would usually refer to "PM" (notably in "Retrospective Epilogue", 1989).
Current research continues to be for B. Linsky the study of Russell's logic and metaphysics and his relation to other logicians including Henry Sheffer, Leon Chwistek and Ernst Mally. (Grice refers to the Sheffer stroke in 1967/1989). These projects include: (1) editing Sheffer's notes on Russell's Lectures on Logic at Cambridge, October-December 1910 (2) editing a translation by Rose Rand of Chwistek's 1922 Zasada sprzecznosci w swietle nowsych Bertranda Russella (The Law of Contradiction in the light of recent investigations of Bertrand Russell) and (3) a paper "Ernst Mally's Anticipation of Encoding", based on Mally's 1912 Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik (Object theoretic foundations of logic and logistic).
---- Grice relied on the first edition. He quotes from it in "Retrospective Epilogue" (1989) to "WoW" (Way of Words)
On Denoting: 1905-2005 Bernard Linsky & Guido Imaguire, eds., Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2005, 451pp.
--- Grice quotes from this in "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature". Of course, Grice was interested in how little his tutee (Strawson) had learned from him! (:)).
Russell’s Metaphysical Logic Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1999, vii+150pp.
---- Grice, once, made fun of Russell's making fun of Strawson ("Mr. Strawson on referring"). Grice corrects Russell's phrase: "stone-age metaphysics" should read, for Grice -- and me for that matter [Speranza] -- "stone-age PHYSICS".
Philosophy and Biology Mohan Matthen & Bernard Linsky, eds., ( Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 14 ), Calgary: Univ. of Calgary Press, 1988, 267pp.
Book Chapters
Quantification and Descriptions, in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, Leon Horsten and Richard Pettigrew, eds., London and New York: Continuum, 2011, 77-104.
From Descriptive Functions to Sets of Ordered Pairs, in Reduction -- Abstraction -- Analysis : Proceedings of the 31th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2008 , Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb, eds., Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009, 259-272.
Russell and Frege on the Logic of Functions, in 200 Years of Analytic Philosophy : The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Vol 4 (2008), 1-17 . www.thebalticyearbook.org The Baltic International Yearbook
Leon Chwistek's Theory of Constructive Types, in The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski’s Philosophical Legacy , S. Lapointe, Jan Wolenski, Mathieu Marion and Wioletta Miskiewicz, eds., Springer, 2009, 203 - 219.
Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky, Russell vs. Frege on Definite Descriptions as Singular Terms, in Russell vs. Meinong: The Legacy of “On Denoting” , Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette, eds., London: Routledge, 2009, 40-64.
----- cfr. Grice, "Definite descriptions in Russell and the vernacular" -- and G. Bealer, "Quality and concept".
Logical Types in Arguments about Knowability and Belief, in New Essays on the Knowability Paradox , J. Salerno, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 163-179.
Logical Analysis and Logical Construction, in The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology , Michael Beaney, ed., London: Routledge, 2007, 107-122.
---- There is an essay in the Grice Papers entitled, "The logical construction of Personal identity", which he had defended back in the day. (Mind, 1941)
Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky What is Frege's Theory of Descriptions?, in B. Linsky and G. Imaguire, eds., On Denoting: 1905-2005 , Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2005, 195-250.
Classes of Classes and Classes of Functions in Principia Mathematica, in Godehard Link, ed. One Hundred Years of Russell's Paradox . Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004, pp. 435-447.
The Metaphysics of Logical Atomism, in The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell , Nicholas Griffin, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 371-391.
---- My favourite source here is by the genial philosopher, J. O. Urmson, "Philosophical analysis: its development between the two worlds." He discusses each connective alla Grice. "He went to bed and took off his trousers".
The Resolution of Russell's Paradox in Principia Mathematica, in Philosophical Perspectives, 16, Language and Mind, 2002 , James E. Tomberlin, ed., Boston and Oxford: Blackwell, 395-417.
Russell's Logical Form, LF, and Truth-Conditions, in Logical Form and Language , Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, 391-408.
---- Of course, Grice was OBSESSED with "Logical Form", and if his audience at Harvard back in 1967 started to "over-circulate" the rectangular pages of his mimeo, it was because THEY were also concerned with it.
Metaphysics II (1945 to the present), in Philosophy of Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the 20th Century, Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. X , John Canfield, ed., London: Routledge, 1996, 108-133.
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta, In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, Philosophical Perspectives, 8, Logic and Language , J.E. Tomberlin, ed. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1994, 431-58. Chinese translation by Xing Tao Tao in Zhexue Yicong [Philosophical Translations] (Beijing), 1994, 45-53.
Why Russell Abandoned Russellian Propositions, in Russell and Analytic Philosophy , A. D. Irvine and G. A. Wedeking, eds., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, 193-209.
-- cfr. Why Grice Abandoned Griceian Misconceptions.
Critical Notice: Richard Gaskin, The Unity of the Proposition, in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41, 2011, 469-482.
Russell's Notes on Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, from §53, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 26(2), 2006-7, 127-66. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
--- This book was translated by Grice's favourite 'colleague': J. L. Austin.
Bernard Linsky and Edward N. Zalta, What is Neo-Logicism?, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic,2006, 12:1, 60-99.
Russell's Notes on Frege for Appendix A of The Principles of Mathematics, in Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 24(2), Winter 2004-05, 133-72. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
Russell’s Marginalia in his Copies of Frege’s Works, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 24(1), 2004, 5-36. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
Leon Chwistek on the no-classes theory in Principia Mathematica, History and Philosophy of Logic, 25(1), 2004, 53-71.
The Substitutional Paradox in Russell’s 1907 Letter to Hawtrey, [corrected version] Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 22(2), 2002, 151-160. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta, Naturalized Platonism versus Platonized Naturalism, The Journal of Philosophy XCII, Oct., 1995, 525-55.
----- This sort of thing should interest R. B. Jones who has attempted various formalisations of ARISTOTELIANISM and PLATONISM alla Code and Grice.
Truth Makers for Modal Propositions, The Monist Apr (77:2), 1994, 192-206.
A Note on the ‘Carving up Content’ Principle in Frege's Theory of Sense, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33, 1992, 126-35. Chinese translation by Wang Xuegang in Zhexue Yicong [Philosophical Translations](Beijing) 1993, 60-65.
--- Grice ONCE refers to "something like a Fregean sense".
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta, Is Lewis a Meinongian?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69, 1991, 438-53.
--- Grice refers to MEINONGIAN ontological jungles in "Vacuous Names" ("Pegasus is my favourite flying horse.")
Truth at a World is a Modality, Philosophia 20, 1991, 387-94.
Was the Axiom of Reducibility a Principle of Logic?, Russell: The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives 10, Winter 1990-91, 125-40. reprinted in: Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, W.W.Tait, ed., Chicago: Open Court, 1997, 107-121 and in Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments Vol. 2, A.D. Irvine, ed., London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 250-264. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
Propositional Functions and Universals in Principia Mathematica in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66, 1988, 447-60.
Factives, Blindspots and Some Paradoxes, Analysis 64, 1986, 10-15.
--- If we have the Linskys, Grice had the KIPARSKYS, who "Invented" "Factives". Oddly, Grice took up the neologism!
General Terms as Designators, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65, 1984, 259-76.
Phenomenal Qualities and the Identity of Indistinguishables, Synthese 59, 1984, 363-80.
Is Transmutation Possible?, Philosophical Studies 41, 1982, 367-81.
Putnam on the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977, 819-28.
Bernard Linsky and Kenneth Blackwell, New manuscript leaves and the printing of the first edition of Principia Mathematica, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies , n.s. 25(2), Winter 2005-06, 141-54.
General Terms as Rigid Designators, Philosophical Studies (2006) 128: 655-667.
Remarks on Platonized Naturalism, Croatian Journal of Philosophy ,V(13),2005,3-15.
Hugues Leblanc (pp. 1434-5) and Dana Scott (pp. 2169-2170) in Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers , J.R. Shook, ed. London: Thoemmes, 2005.
The Notation in Principia Mathematica, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) http://plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
--- taken up by Grice 1967.
Placing Abstract Objects in Naturalism, Philosophical Inquiry , XXIII (1-2), 2001, 73-85.
Logical Constructions, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , E. Zalta, ed., 1996, http://plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
--- Grice 1941 ("Personal Identity") as an application or instance.
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta, In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete, Philosophical Studies 84, 1996, 283-294
Philosophy After Quine, Eidos 13(2), 1996, 55-65.
The Vienna Circle and German Speaking Culture Before and After World War II, Acta Analytica (Slovenia) 14, 1995, 189-94.
Russell's Logical Constructions, Studies in Dialectics of Nature (Beijing), Vol. 11 Supplementary Issue, 1995, 129-48. in Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments Vol. 3, A.D.Irvine, ed., London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 128-50.
G.W. Fitch's Paleontology, Philosophical Studies 73, 1994, 189-93.
The Logical Form of Descriptions, (Critical Notice of Stephen Neale's Descriptions ), Dialogue XXXI, 1992, 677-83. --- a reanalysis of Grice.
Critical Notice of: Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence, Canadian Journal of Philosophy ,14, 1984, 499-515.
Bernard Linsky & John King-Farlow, John Heintz's Subjects and Predicates , Philosophical Inquiry 6, 1984, 47-56.
-- cfr. Strawson (Grice's pupil), "Subject and predicate in logic and grammar" (Methuen).
Critical Notice: Baruch Brody, Identity and Essence, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12, 1982, 391- 407.
Critical Notice: Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10, 1980, 513-23.
--- one chapter on "Implicature".
-- Platts will go on to review Grice's festschrift for "Mind": "a philosopher's philosopher, if ever there was one."
B. Linsky is the son of L. Linsky (U.C./Berkeley).
B. Linsky's research has been in areas of Philosophical Logic related to Metaphysics and in the History of Logic, in particular, Bertrand Russell's logic.
B. Linsky's PhD thesis, on
"Natural Kinds and Natural Kind TERMS"
developed into an interest in properties, both as the meaning of predicates and as universals in metaphysics.
This interest in semantics has led to several papers on logical form, definite descriptions, and how to extend the notion of rigid designation to general terms.
Beginning in 1990 B. Linsky wrote a series of papers with Edward Zalta, applying his "Object Theory" to problems about the semantics of necessity and quantified modal logic and the philosophy of mathematics.
B. Linsky also began to study of Bertrand Russell's logic as a theory of properties and propositions, and then, after a first visit to the Bertrand Russell Archives in 2003, various manuscripts by Russell.
A series of papers came out of the notes that Russell made on the works of Gottlob Frege in 1902, and a few sheets from the largely missing manuscript of Principia Mathematica from around 1910.
B. Linsky has most recently published edited notes and manuscripts that Russell made for the second edition of PM , from 1925.
---- Grice would be fascinated, since he would usually refer to "PM" (notably in "Retrospective Epilogue", 1989).
Current research continues to be for B. Linsky the study of Russell's logic and metaphysics and his relation to other logicians including Henry Sheffer, Leon Chwistek and Ernst Mally. (Grice refers to the Sheffer stroke in 1967/1989). These projects include: (1) editing Sheffer's notes on Russell's Lectures on Logic at Cambridge, October-December 1910 (2) editing a translation by Rose Rand of Chwistek's 1922 Zasada sprzecznosci w swietle nowsych Bertranda Russella (The Law of Contradiction in the light of recent investigations of Bertrand Russell) and (3) a paper "Ernst Mally's Anticipation of Encoding", based on Mally's 1912 Gegenstandstheoretische Grundlagen der Logik und Logistik (Object theoretic foundations of logic and logistic).
Recent and Upcoming Talks by B. Linsky's include
-
2010
May 24, 2010, Conference: PM@100: Logic from 1910-1927, McMaster University
October 20: Logos Colloquium, Facultat de Filosofia, University of Barcelona
October 27: X Coloquio Compestelano de Logica y Filosofia Analytica,
University of Santiago de Compostela
October 29: 1st joint LanCog-Logos Workshop, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa,
University of Lisbon
2011
May 18: Institut fuer Christliche Philosophie, University of Innsbruck
May 26: Philosophiekolloquium, FB Philosophy KGW, University of Salzburg
October 7-9: Conference on The Foundational Crisis, University of Montreal
2012
May 24-26: Society for the Study of the History of Analytic Philosophy,
McMaster University
Education
-
AB, (General Honors, Philosophy) University of Chicago 1971
PhD, (Philosophy) Stanford University 1975
Academic Appointments
-
2009-10 Associate Chair (Graduate Studies), Department of Philosophy,
University of Alberta
2005-08 Associate Dean (Research), Faculty of Arts, University of Alberta
1999-03 Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta
2002 (July-August) Visiting Professor, University of Auckland, New Zealand
1997-99 Acting Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta
1997- Professor
1982-97 Associate Professor with tenure
1976-82 Assistant Professor
1975-76 Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Alberta
Publications
Books
LINSKY, B.
---- Grice relied on the first edition. He quotes from it in "Retrospective Epilogue" (1989) to "WoW" (Way of Words)
On Denoting: 1905-2005 Bernard Linsky & Guido Imaguire, eds., Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2005, 451pp.
--- Grice quotes from this in "Presupposition and Conversational Implicature". Of course, Grice was interested in how little his tutee (Strawson) had learned from him! (:)).
Russell’s Metaphysical Logic Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1999, vii+150pp.
---- Grice, once, made fun of Russell's making fun of Strawson ("Mr. Strawson on referring"). Grice corrects Russell's phrase: "stone-age metaphysics" should read, for Grice -- and me for that matter [Speranza] -- "stone-age PHYSICS".
Philosophy and Biology Mohan Matthen & Bernard Linsky, eds., ( Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 14 ), Calgary: Univ. of Calgary Press, 1988, 267pp.
Book Chapters
Quantification and Descriptions, in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, Leon Horsten and Richard Pettigrew, eds., London and New York: Continuum, 2011, 77-104.
From Descriptive Functions to Sets of Ordered Pairs, in Reduction -- Abstraction -- Analysis : Proceedings of the 31th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2008 , Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb, eds., Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2009, 259-272.
Russell and Frege on the Logic of Functions, in 200 Years of Analytic Philosophy : The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Vol 4 (2008), 1-17 . www.thebalticyearbook.org The Baltic International Yearbook
Leon Chwistek's Theory of Constructive Types, in The Golden Age of Polish Philosophy: Kazimierz Twardowski’s Philosophical Legacy , S. Lapointe, Jan Wolenski, Mathieu Marion and Wioletta Miskiewicz, eds., Springer, 2009, 203 - 219.
Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky, Russell vs. Frege on Definite Descriptions as Singular Terms, in Russell vs. Meinong: The Legacy of “On Denoting” , Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette, eds., London: Routledge, 2009, 40-64.
----- cfr. Grice, "Definite descriptions in Russell and the vernacular" -- and G. Bealer, "Quality and concept".
Logical Types in Arguments about Knowability and Belief, in New Essays on the Knowability Paradox , J. Salerno, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 163-179.
Logical Analysis and Logical Construction, in The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology , Michael Beaney, ed., London: Routledge, 2007, 107-122.
---- There is an essay in the Grice Papers entitled, "The logical construction of Personal identity", which he had defended back in the day. (Mind, 1941)
Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky What is Frege's Theory of Descriptions?, in B. Linsky and G. Imaguire, eds., On Denoting: 1905-2005 , Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2005, 195-250.
Classes of Classes and Classes of Functions in Principia Mathematica, in Godehard Link, ed. One Hundred Years of Russell's Paradox . Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004, pp. 435-447.
The Metaphysics of Logical Atomism, in The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell , Nicholas Griffin, ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 371-391.
---- My favourite source here is by the genial philosopher, J. O. Urmson, "Philosophical analysis: its development between the two worlds." He discusses each connective alla Grice. "He went to bed and took off his trousers".
The Resolution of Russell's Paradox in Principia Mathematica, in Philosophical Perspectives, 16, Language and Mind, 2002 , James E. Tomberlin, ed., Boston and Oxford: Blackwell, 395-417.
Russell's Logical Form, LF, and Truth-Conditions, in Logical Form and Language , Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, 391-408.
---- Of course, Grice was OBSESSED with "Logical Form", and if his audience at Harvard back in 1967 started to "over-circulate" the rectangular pages of his mimeo, it was because THEY were also concerned with it.
Metaphysics II (1945 to the present), in Philosophy of Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the 20th Century, Routledge History of Philosophy, Vol. X , John Canfield, ed., London: Routledge, 1996, 108-133.
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta, In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic, Philosophical Perspectives, 8, Logic and Language , J.E. Tomberlin, ed. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1994, 431-58. Chinese translation by Xing Tao Tao in Zhexue Yicong [Philosophical Translations] (Beijing), 1994, 45-53.
Why Russell Abandoned Russellian Propositions, in Russell and Analytic Philosophy , A. D. Irvine and G. A. Wedeking, eds., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, 193-209.
-- cfr. Why Grice Abandoned Griceian Misconceptions.
Critical Notice: Richard Gaskin, The Unity of the Proposition, in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41, 2011, 469-482.
Russell's Notes on Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, from §53, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 26(2), 2006-7, 127-66. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
--- This book was translated by Grice's favourite 'colleague': J. L. Austin.
Bernard Linsky and Edward N. Zalta, What is Neo-Logicism?, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic,2006, 12:1, 60-99.
Russell's Notes on Frege for Appendix A of The Principles of Mathematics, in Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 24(2), Winter 2004-05, 133-72. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
Russell’s Marginalia in his Copies of Frege’s Works, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 24(1), 2004, 5-36. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
Leon Chwistek on the no-classes theory in Principia Mathematica, History and Philosophy of Logic, 25(1), 2004, 53-71.
The Substitutional Paradox in Russell’s 1907 Letter to Hawtrey, [corrected version] Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 22(2), 2002, 151-160. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta, Naturalized Platonism versus Platonized Naturalism, The Journal of Philosophy XCII, Oct., 1995, 525-55.
----- This sort of thing should interest R. B. Jones who has attempted various formalisations of ARISTOTELIANISM and PLATONISM alla Code and Grice.
Truth Makers for Modal Propositions, The Monist Apr (77:2), 1994, 192-206.
A Note on the ‘Carving up Content’ Principle in Frege's Theory of Sense, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 33, 1992, 126-35. Chinese translation by Wang Xuegang in Zhexue Yicong [Philosophical Translations](Beijing) 1993, 60-65.
--- Grice ONCE refers to "something like a Fregean sense".
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta, Is Lewis a Meinongian?, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69, 1991, 438-53.
--- Grice refers to MEINONGIAN ontological jungles in "Vacuous Names" ("Pegasus is my favourite flying horse.")
Truth at a World is a Modality, Philosophia 20, 1991, 387-94.
Was the Axiom of Reducibility a Principle of Logic?, Russell: The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives 10, Winter 1990-91, 125-40. reprinted in: Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, W.W.Tait, ed., Chicago: Open Court, 1997, 107-121 and in Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments Vol. 2, A.D. Irvine, ed., London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 250-264. Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies
Propositional Functions and Universals in Principia Mathematica in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66, 1988, 447-60.
Factives, Blindspots and Some Paradoxes, Analysis 64, 1986, 10-15.
--- If we have the Linskys, Grice had the KIPARSKYS, who "Invented" "Factives". Oddly, Grice took up the neologism!
General Terms as Designators, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65, 1984, 259-76.
Phenomenal Qualities and the Identity of Indistinguishables, Synthese 59, 1984, 363-80.
Is Transmutation Possible?, Philosophical Studies 41, 1982, 367-81.
Putnam on the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977, 819-28.
Bernard Linsky and Kenneth Blackwell, New manuscript leaves and the printing of the first edition of Principia Mathematica, Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies , n.s. 25(2), Winter 2005-06, 141-54.
General Terms as Rigid Designators, Philosophical Studies (2006) 128: 655-667.
Remarks on Platonized Naturalism, Croatian Journal of Philosophy ,V(13),2005,3-15.
Hugues Leblanc (pp. 1434-5) and Dana Scott (pp. 2169-2170) in Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers , J.R. Shook, ed. London: Thoemmes, 2005.
The Notation in Principia Mathematica, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) http://plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
--- taken up by Grice 1967.
Placing Abstract Objects in Naturalism, Philosophical Inquiry , XXIII (1-2), 2001, 73-85.
Logical Constructions, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , E. Zalta, ed., 1996, http://plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
--- Grice 1941 ("Personal Identity") as an application or instance.
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta, In Defense of the Contingently Nonconcrete, Philosophical Studies 84, 1996, 283-294
Philosophy After Quine, Eidos 13(2), 1996, 55-65.
The Vienna Circle and German Speaking Culture Before and After World War II, Acta Analytica (Slovenia) 14, 1995, 189-94.
Russell's Logical Constructions, Studies in Dialectics of Nature (Beijing), Vol. 11 Supplementary Issue, 1995, 129-48. in Bertrand Russell: Critical Assessments Vol. 3, A.D.Irvine, ed., London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 128-50.
G.W. Fitch's Paleontology, Philosophical Studies 73, 1994, 189-93.
The Logical Form of Descriptions, (Critical Notice of Stephen Neale's Descriptions ), Dialogue XXXI, 1992, 677-83. --- a reanalysis of Grice.
Critical Notice of: Nathan Salmon, Reference and Essence, Canadian Journal of Philosophy ,14, 1984, 499-515.
Bernard Linsky & John King-Farlow, John Heintz's Subjects and Predicates , Philosophical Inquiry 6, 1984, 47-56.
-- cfr. Strawson (Grice's pupil), "Subject and predicate in logic and grammar" (Methuen).
Critical Notice: Baruch Brody, Identity and Essence, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12, 1982, 391- 407.
Critical Notice: Mark Platts, Ways of Meaning, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10, 1980, 513-23.
--- one chapter on "Implicature".
-- Platts will go on to review Grice's festschrift for "Mind": "a philosopher's philosopher, if ever there was one."
L. Linsky (U. C./Berkeley) and H. P. Grice
Speranza
L. Linsky received a B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degree from the University of California at Berkeley.
He held teaching positions at the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Illinois at Urbana.
He was a Visiting Professor at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor), Tel Aviv University (Tel Aviv) and the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands).
He is a past president of the American Philosophical Association, and a recipient of the medal of the Université de Liège (Belgium).
He served as chair of the Department at the University of Chicago.
Linsky's teaching and research fell into two areas:
-- the philosophy of language
-- and the history of early Analytic Philosophy.
He published several dozen articles and five books:
Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (edited with an Introduction, this book has been translated into Italian and has been in print continuously for fifty years since its publication),
Reference and Modality (edited with an Introduction, this book has been translated into Italian),
Referring (translated into French),
Oblique Contexts, Names and Descriptions (translated into Spanish).
His most recent publications are on the early philosophy of Bertrand Russell
("The Unity of the Proposition", and "Russell's 'no-classes' Theory of Classes".)
While in retirement he continued to teach classes and direct workshops on Wittgenstein.
Leonard Linsky passed away on August 26, 2012.
L. Linsky received a B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degree from the University of California at Berkeley.
He held teaching positions at the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Illinois at Urbana.
He was a Visiting Professor at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor), Tel Aviv University (Tel Aviv) and the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands).
He is a past president of the American Philosophical Association, and a recipient of the medal of the Université de Liège (Belgium).
He served as chair of the Department at the University of Chicago.
Linsky's teaching and research fell into two areas:
-- the philosophy of language
-- and the history of early Analytic Philosophy.
He published several dozen articles and five books:
Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (edited with an Introduction, this book has been translated into Italian and has been in print continuously for fifty years since its publication),
Reference and Modality (edited with an Introduction, this book has been translated into Italian),
Referring (translated into French),
Oblique Contexts, Names and Descriptions (translated into Spanish).
His most recent publications are on the early philosophy of Bertrand Russell
("The Unity of the Proposition", and "Russell's 'no-classes' Theory of Classes".)
While in retirement he continued to teach classes and direct workshops on Wittgenstein.
Leonard Linsky passed away on August 26, 2012.
Friday, September 7, 2012
Grice, the 'analytic' philosopher
Speranza
We are discussing some claims by L. P. Halpin in his "Analyticity and substantive inquiry". Re:
"if S is analytic in L, the L-speaker is forced to endorse it. If she rejects it, she is reinterpreting the language"
R. B. Jones notes:
"[This seems to overlook] various other possibilities, e.g. that the L-speaker intends to deceive, or that he is simply mistaken (as Fermat might have been but, we now have grounds to believe, was not)."
Perhaps we can play with variants like:
"If Utterer U thinks that an utterance U is analytically true (as he utters it), then U is forced to endorse it."
Etc.
I note that the Grice Collection, at Berkeley, contains notes on "Truth". This was later incorporated in "Logic and Conversation" (Further notes, special subsection on "Truth"). Note that Grice is careful that it's something like 'factually satisfactory' he wants to speak about, not 'true'.
Jones's points about mistake (and attempt to equivocate) are interesting.
I recently came across a nice study: On lying, or the art of equivocation -- the title went.
Surely, for Grice, aequivocatio is a good thing. And I agree: it just means 'same voice' (aequi- voc-). Grice discusses this in his 'third' book: Aspects of Reason, where he claims that "must" bears ony ONE sense (it's the 'same' or equal voice) in both alethic and practical syllogisms:
.p
.p --> q
-----
Therefore it must be the case that q.
!p
!p --> q!
----
Therefore, it must the case that q!
-- with the typical qualifications alla Grice that make that a sensible thing to hold!
We are discussing some claims by L. P. Halpin in his "Analyticity and substantive inquiry". Re:
"if S is analytic in L, the L-speaker is forced to endorse it. If she rejects it, she is reinterpreting the language"
R. B. Jones notes:
"[This seems to overlook] various other possibilities, e.g. that the L-speaker intends to deceive, or that he is simply mistaken (as Fermat might have been but, we now have grounds to believe, was not)."
Perhaps we can play with variants like:
"If Utterer U thinks that an utterance U is analytically true (as he utters it), then U is forced to endorse it."
Etc.
I note that the Grice Collection, at Berkeley, contains notes on "Truth". This was later incorporated in "Logic and Conversation" (Further notes, special subsection on "Truth"). Note that Grice is careful that it's something like 'factually satisfactory' he wants to speak about, not 'true'.
Jones's points about mistake (and attempt to equivocate) are interesting.
I recently came across a nice study: On lying, or the art of equivocation -- the title went.
Surely, for Grice, aequivocatio is a good thing. And I agree: it just means 'same voice' (aequi- voc-). Grice discusses this in his 'third' book: Aspects of Reason, where he claims that "must" bears ony ONE sense (it's the 'same' or equal voice) in both alethic and practical syllogisms:
.p
.p --> q
-----
Therefore it must be the case that q.
!p
!p --> q!
----
Therefore, it must the case that q!
-- with the typical qualifications alla Grice that make that a sensible thing to hold!
Thursday, September 6, 2012
Griceian and Roman: M. T. CICERO
Speranza
An illustration of the Egyptian, Grecian, and Roman
- digitalgallery.nypl.org/.../dgkeysear...Copia cache - Traduci questa paginaCondividiCondiviso su Google+. Visualizza il post.
- 1-20 of 42 Items 1 2 3. An illustration of the Egyptian, Grecian, and Roman costume : in forty outlines with descriptions . Search in these images: Next ...
Grecian and Roman stucco, mortar, and glass
pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.../ed011p22... - Traduci questa paginaCondivididi W Foster - 1934 - Citato da 4 - Articoli correlatiCondiviso su Google+. Visualizza il post.
GRECIAN and ROMAN STUCCO,. MORTAR, and GLASS*. WILLIAM FOSTER. Princeton University, Princeton. New rersey. T HE SPECIMENS mentioned in this ...Grecian and Roman mythology - Mary Ann Dwight - Google Books
books.google.com/.../Grecian_and_... - Traduci questa paginaCondividiGrecian and Roman mythology. (Google eBook) .... which was the primary cause of the Trojan war, the reader is referred to "Grecian and Roman Mythology." .Condiviso su Google+. Visualizza il post.Immagini relative a "Grecian and Roman"
- Segnala immagini non appropriateAmazon.com: Grecian and Roman Mythology: M.a. Dwight. With an ...
www.amazon.com › ... › TheologyCopia cache - Traduci questa paginaCondividiGrecian and Roman Mythology: M.a. Dwight. With an Introductory Notice by Taylor Lewis... [1849 ] [M. A. (Mary Ann) Dwight] on Amazon.com. *FREE* super ...Condiviso su Google+. Visualizza il post.Grecian and Roman mythology : Dwight, M. A. ... - Internet Archive
archive.org/.../grecianromanmytha0...Copia cache - Traduci questa paginaCondividiEbook and Texts Archive > New York Public Library > Grecian and Roman mythology ... Grecian and Roman mythology (1860). Author: Dwight, M. A. (Mary Ann) ...Condiviso su Google+. Visualizza il post.Grecian and Roman mythology : Dwight, MA (Mary ... - Internet Archive
archive.org/.../grecianromanmythg0...Copia cache - Traduci questa paginaCondividiGrecian and Roman mythology (1849). Author: Dwight, M. A. (Mary Ann), 1806-Condiviso su Google+. Visualizza il post.1858; Lewis, Tayler, 1802-1877. Subject: Mythology, Classical Publisher: New ... Grecian and Roman mythology : Dwight, MA (Mary ... - Internet Archive
archive.org/.../grecianromanmyth00...Copia cache - Traduci questa paginaCondividiEbook and Texts Archive > New York Public Library > Grecian and Roman mythology ... Grecian and Roman mythology (1855). Author: Dwight, M. A. (Mary Ann) ...Condiviso su Google+. Visualizza il post.Grecian and Roman Mythology : Mary Ann Dwight : Free Download ...
archive.org/.../grecianandroman01d...Copia cache - Traduci questa paginaCondividiBook digitized by Google from the library of the New York Public Library and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.Condiviso su Google+. Visualizza il post.An illustration of the Egyptian, Grecian, and Roman costume: in forty ...
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A manual of Grecian and Roman antiquities - HathiTrust
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M. T. CICERO; or, the Roman Grice
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Metaphor (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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Aug 19, 2011 – By the time Quintilian and Cicero come along, metaphor is one of many ..... For fuller discussions of Grice's work as a whole see the entries ...
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M. T. CICERO, or the Roman Grice
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Friends.” In Cicero ... “From Aristotle to Atticus: Cicero and Matius on Friendship.
Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters - Pagina 252 - Risultati da Google Libri
books.google.com/books?isbn=0195329066
Jon Hall - 2009 - Foreign Language Study
Grice, Herbert Paul. 1975. ... “Philosophical Badinage in Cicero's Letters to His Friends.” In Cicero ... “From Aristotle to Atticus: Cicero and Matius on Friendship.
M. T. CICERO: the Roman Grice
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Persuasive Paradoxes in Cicero's Speeches - Springer
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Persuasive Paradoxes in Cicero's Speeches ... of the Enthymeme 2006; Grice's Analysis of Utterance-Meaning and Cicero's Catilinarian Apostrophe April 2009 ...
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M. T. CICERO and H. P. GRICE: rhetoricians
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di AP Salomone - Citato da 1 - Articoli correlati
comparison to Grice and Searle, these two authors have given much importance ..... Two generations later another orator uses the term just as Cicero did: he is ...
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The Concept of Irony in Dialogical Interaction
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di AP Salomone - Citato da 1 - Articoli correlati
comparison to Grice and Searle, these two authors have given much importance ..... Two generations later another orator uses the term just as Cicero did: he is ...
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