Pre-Griceian

1. introduction 1
noel burton-roberts

2. on a pragmatic explanation of negative polarity licensing 10
jay david atlas

3. regressions in pragmatics (and semantics) 24
kent bach

4. constraints, concepts and procedural encoding 45
diane blakemore

5. optimality theoretic pragmatics and the
explicature/implicature distinction 67
reinhard blutner

6. varieties of semantics and encoding:
negation, narrowing/loosening and numericals 90
noel burton-roberts

7. relevance theory and shared content 115
herman cappelen and ernie lepore

8. concepts and word meaning in relevance theory 136
marjolein groefsema

9. neo-gricean pragmatics: a manichaean manifesto 158
laurence r. horn

10. the why and how of experimental pragmatics:
the case of ‘scalar inferences’ 184
ira noveck and dan sperber

11. indexicality, context and pretence:
a speech-act theoretic account 213
françois recanati

12. a unitary approach to lexical pragmatics:
relevance, inference and ad hoc concepts 230
deirdre wilson and robyn carston


The theoretical field of enquiry now called ‘pragmatics’ was effectively
launched, from within philosophy, by Staffordshire-born author, Herbert Paul Grice.

His work (brought together in Grice 1989) remains an enduring presence in the field even now when pragmatics is seen primarily as an adjunct to linguistics and
psychology, and in the context of reservations as to the viability of
Grice’s precise conception of pragmatics and the semantics/pragmatics
distinction.

The chapters that make up this contribution to Palgrave’s Advances
series address a wide range of issues that have arisen in post-Gricean
pragmatic theory and present a range of theoretical positions and
approaches.

The field is currently characterized by lively debate and
this is fully reflected here.

The volume includes considerations of
relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995 and related work),

neo-Gricean pragmatics,

optimality theoretic pragmatics, experimental
work and philosophical considerations.

The specific topics covered
include scalar implicature, lexical semantics and pragmatics, concepts
and concept-adjustment, indexicality, speech acts, procedural meaning
and the notion of ‘constraint’, the explicature-implicature distinction,
numerical expressions, the semantics and pragmatics of negation and
negative polarity items, and whether successful communication involves
‘shared content’.

Rather than attempt to group these chapters by theme – impractical
given that each chapter connects up with others in so many different
ways – I introduce them in alphabetical order of the first author, the
order in which they appear.

Jay Atlas’ chapter

(‘On a Pragmatic Explanation of Negative Polarity Licensing’)

is a contribution to the discussion of the long-standing and
intriguing problems posed by the expressions only, even, almost and not
quite.

What is communicated by utterances of sentences in which these
occur clearly includes a negative proposition. But it is not clear just what
the status of the negative proposition is in the total signification of the
sentence uttered. Atlas approaches the problems through an exploration
of the licensing of Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) in such sentences and
reconsiders a pragmatic proposal of Horn. Horn (2002) proposed to
treat assertion (and non-assertion, or ‘presupposition’) as speech acts
pragmatically independent of semantic entailment. Although NPIs would
be licensed by the semantics facts, Horn proposed that they are in fact only
licensed by falling within the scope of the (independent) pragmatic act of
assertion. Atlas explores and critiques this pragmatic proposal, advancing
new data and asking why the occurrence of NPIs should depend on the
pragmatics of assertion and how we are to characterize assertion, nonassertion
and entailment in the representation of utterance meanings.

Kent Bach’s chapter, ‘Regressions in Pragmatics (and Semantics)’,
is in part a defence of Griceian principles, but with the refinement of
impliciture (see, for example, Bach 1994).

The paper defends the idea
that semantics and pragmatics are strictly separate though interacting in
communication.

Semantics concerns sentences. It captures what speakers
actually say (in the locutionary sense of ‘say’, rather than the illocutionary
sense of ‘state’ or ‘assert’).

It determines what is fully explicit in utterances.

Pragmatics concerns what is communicated by the utterance of sentences,
the performance of speech acts. Fully implicit communication – what
is not said but conveyed by the saying of what is said (i.e. implicature)
– falls within pragmatics. Bach’s idea of impliciture is offered as a way
of maintaining this picture while qualifying it. Crucially, saying versus
implicating is not exhaustive. Impliciture takes up the slack, accounting
for aspects of what is communicated that are neither said nor implicated
but required by the fact that sentences may need completing (if utterances
of them are to express propositions) and expanding (if utterances of them
are to express the intended proposition). Impliciture is implied by what is
said (i.e. it is implicit in what is said) – in contrast to implicature, which
is implied only by the saying of what is said (and is not implicit in what
is said). Against this background, Bach identifies nine ‘suspect ideas’ in
current pragmatic theory. He calls them ‘regressions’ because, he argues,
they hark back to pre-Gricean ‘ordinary language’ philosophy influenced
by Wittgenstein’s injunction: ‘Don’t look for the meaning, look for the
use’. He argues that this mistakenly imports into semantics what pertains
to pragmatics. The nine suspect ideas that he identifies commit, in
different ways, the error of conflating pragmatics and semantics.
introduction 3

In ‘Constraints, Concepts and Procedural Encoding’, New-Zealand-born author Diane Blakemore
offers an intricate investigation of procedural meaning, its relation to
conceptual meaning and to the notion of ‘constraint on relevance’. She
approaches the issues through a discussion of a range of parentheticals.
The parentheticals that concern her – as- and and- parentheticals
– achieve relevance by providing information about how their hosts are
to be interpreted (and they can do this in a variety of different ways).
In that respect, they might be described as providing constraints on
the relevance/interpretation of another expression, the host. The effect
of using one of these expressions, then, might seem to be the same
as that of using an expression that encodes a procedure. However, she
shows that their encoded meaning is clearly conceptual. She argues
that, unlike purely procedural elements, the (conceptual) content of
the parenthetical does not drop out of the picture once it has served its
purpose of constraining the process of interpreting the host. It contributes
to the overall conceptual representation and (again unlike procedural
elements) is itself subject to all inferential operations – e.g. strengthening
– that conceptual representations are subject to. Thus we need to make
a distinction between constraints on interpretation/relevance and
procedural meaning. In the light of this, she argues that we need to
recognize two notions – and loci – of constraints on interpretation:
(a) constraints that are encoded as such – this constitutes procedural
meaning, arising at the level of linguistically encoded meaning, and (b)
constraints that arise at the level of conceptual representation, through
the interpretation of the relation between the conceptual content of the
parenthetical and that of the host.

German-born author Reinhard Blutner, in ‘Optimality Theoretic Pragmatics and the
Explicature/Implicature Distinction’ offers a wide-ranging discussion
that centres on relevance theory’s explicature/implicature distinction.
It begins by noting problems with how that distinction is defined
within relevance theory. Blutner speculates that the distinction might
be independently derivable within the framework of optimality theoretic
(OT) pragmatics (see Blutner and Zeevat 2004) based on neo-Gricean
principles and ‘global’ considerations governing rational communication.
The OT framework invites the development of a ‘diachronic’ perspective.
Blutner suggests the manipulation of the different rankings of a given
OT system of constraints is a powerful but computationally simple
task. This perspective encourages us to see certain on-line (synchronic)
inferential processes as having become fossilized and thus automatized.
This makes for highly efficient, speedy, on-line processing, consistent
with the experimental results reported in the work of Noveck (see also
the chapter in this volume by Noveck and Sperber). The automatization
and speed of processing of such processes, Blutner suggests, is consistent
with relevance theory’s treatment of them as explicatures, rather than
with regarding them as the processing (the calculation and potential
cancellation) of implicatures.

Newcastle-born Burton-Robert's contribution, ‘Varieties of Semantics and
Encoding: Negation, Narrowing/Loosening and Numericals’,
considers
relevance theory’s distinction between ‘linguistic semantics’ (the encoded
semantics of linguistic expressions) and ‘real semantics’ (the propositional
– truth-theoretic – semantics of thoughts).

Burton-Roberts suggest that, on several
grounds, ‘linguistic semantics’ is problematic and argue for a single (‘real’)
notion of semantics, located in the Language of Thought. This implies
– with Fodor (1998) and the strongest of Recanati’s (2004) contextualist
positions – that particular languages like English have no semantics.
Distinguishing between ‘having meaning’ and ‘having semantics’, Burton-Roberts allows
that – like all signs – utterances in English do ‘have meaning’, but argue
that this is so only in virtue of their being intended and recognized
as standing in a relation of conventional representation to syntacticosemantically
constituted thoughts.

As representational of conceptual
properties, utterable words are not themselves possessed of any conceptual
property (either specific or schematic – Carston 2002).

In this connection,
I compare ‘representation’ with relevance theory’s notion of ‘encoding’.
The implications of these ideas are explored with reference to negation
(where a sharp distinction is drawn between the utterable English word
not and the logical operator), ‘narrowing’ and ‘loosening’ (i.e. ‘concept
adjustment’) and the problems posed by numerical expressions. A representational
perspective, I argue, allows us to acknowledge that the
differing concepts represented by uses of the word three all include the
concept EXACTLY THREE while denying that the word itself has a semantic
definition (including, and especially, ‘exactly three’).

The chapter by Dutch-born author Herman Cappelen and American-born Ernie Lepore (‘Relevance Theory and Shared Content’) is a critique of relevance theorists’ claim that
grasping what the speaker intends to communicate by the utterance of
a sentence does not involve or require duplicating the speaker’s thought.
The relevance-theoretic (RT) claim is that successful communication
involves entertaining a thought sufficiently similar to the speaker’s
thought. Cappelen and Lepore dub this the No Shared Content (NSC)
principle: an audience will never grasp p (the intended proposition) but
only another proposition q. They claim that RT is committed to the NSC
principle because the only ‘similarity’ relation implied by RT is that two
propositions are similar if they are developments of the same logical
form and this is too unconstrained to guarantee anything approaching
shared content: two propositions can be developments of the same logical
form and yet be utterly different. Furthermore, the NSC is implied if the
cognitive effects of a particular utterance on an interpreter depend on
that interpreter’s assumptions, since such assumptions vary from person
to person. In short, there is no ‘fixed standard of similarity that RT can
appeal to’. Cappelen and Lepore argue that, being committed to the
NSC principle, relevance theory fails to account for our general practice
of reporting what others say, and assessing the truth of what they say.
It also fails to account for coordinated planned action. They write: ‘A
central challenge in pragmatics is to develop a theory of communication
that reconciles two fundamental facts: we can share contents across
contexts and communicated content is deeply context sensitive.’ The
authors conclude with a useful summary of their proposed response to
this challenge, ‘Pluralistic Minimalism’ (Cappelen and Lepore 2004).

Frisian author Marjolein Groefsema’s contribution (‘Concepts and Word Meaning
in Relevance Theory’) is a detailed consideration of relevance theory’s
treatment of word meaning, concepts and their content. She focuses
particularly on the proposal that concepts are triples, having three
kinds of ‘entry’: logical, lexical and encyclopaedic. She argues that this
treatment is open to several interpretations. She rejects the idea that
the content of concepts might include lexical information, since this
would make phonological and syntactic information about words part
of the content of the concepts that are supposed to be the meaning of
those words. She then considers three further accounts: (1) that the
content of concepts is constituted by their logical and encyclopaedic
entries, (2) that concepts are unanalyzable atomic entities whose entries
do not constitute their content, and (3) that their logical entries, but not
their encyclopaedic entries, constitutes their content. Finally, Groefsema
considers Carston’s (2002) recent proposal to distinguish between
encoded concepts and ‘ad hoc’ concepts derived from encoded concepts
by ‘concept adjustment’. She investigates each of these accounts in turn
and argues that they make different predictions about what proposition
is expressed by an utterance (the explicature) and what is implicitly
communicated (implicature). Ultimately, as with several other chapters
in this volume, it is the explicature-implicature distinction that is at issue
in this chapter. Groefsema argues that, since relevance is defined in terms
of the cognitive effects derived from the interaction of the proposition
expressed/explicature with assumptions in the context, it is crucial that
we know how to make the explicature-implicature distinction in principle
and in practice.

As American linguist Laurence Horn’s subtitle indicates, his chapter,

‘Neo-Gricean Pragmatics: A Manichaean Manifesto’,

is indeed a wide-ranging manifesto
for his neo-Gricean pragmatic stance (for example, Horn 1984, 1989),
setting it in its historical context and within a range of philosophical,
rhetorical, and cultural contexts.

It is ‘Manichaean’ in the sense of being grounded in the idea of two opposing but co-dependent, interacting principles (Good-Evil for Manichaeans, Yin-Yang for Confucians).

In the
pragmatic context, the co-dependent oppositions include speaker-hearer,
economy-sufficiency, brevity-clarity, minimizing-maximizing, effort-effect
(the last also found in relevance theory).

Horn’s neo-Gricean enterprise
‘folds’ the several maxims proposed by Grice into exactly two such
principles, the R Principle (‘Don’t say too much’) and the Q Principle (‘Say
enough’).

The R Principle is speaker-orientated (minimizing effort) and is
‘upper-bounding’ in its effect, giving rise to strengthening implicatures.

The Q Principle is hearer-orientated (guaranteeing sufficiency) and is
‘lower bounding’, giving rise to typically scalar implicatures (which, Horn
argues, are distinct from strengthening implicatures).

Horn illustrates the
pervasive influence of the principles – and their explanatory character in
offering a ‘division of pragmatic labour’ – across a wide range of linguistic
phenomena: lexical, semantic and logical, not only synchronically but
also diachronically, in semantic and lexical change.

Horn defends this
‘dualist’ (‘Manichaean’) picture against the three principles of Levinson
(2000) – Q, I (equivalent to Horn’s R) and M (for Manner) – and against
the ‘monist’ position of relevance theory, which is grounded in a single
Principle of Relevance.

He questions whether relevance theory is in fact
‘monist’ since, as noted, it too stresses the effort-effect opposition.

In ‘The Why and How of Experimental Pragmatics: The Case of
“Scalar Inferences”’, French authors Ira Noveck and Dan Sperber present the case for
an experimental methodology (see Noveck and Sperber 2004). This,
they argue, is especially necessary in pragmatics, where the exclusive
reliance on intuition is particularly problematic. They point up some
interesting contrasts between semantic and pragmatic intuitions in this
connection. In particular they advocate an experimental approach in
choosing between alternative theories that may agree on the content of
the interpretations of utterances, but have different implications for the
cognitive mechanisms that derive these interpretations. A case in point is
what is generally referred to as ‘scalar inference’ (e.g. the inference from
some to not all and from possible to not necessary/certain) – and it is this
that provides the focus of their chapter. While the treatment of scalar
inference in terms of Grice’s Generalized Conversational Implicature
(GCI) is intuitive enough, they suggest the implications of that treatment
for processing are not attractive. Here they focus on Levinson’s (2000)
approach, in which the rationale for GCIs lies in the optimization of
processing – the relevant inferences are automatic, speedy, one-step,
default inferences. Noveck and Sperber doubt this claim about processing,
doubt that the relevant inference is scalar and doubt that it results in an
implicature. As regards processing, the speed of the inference has to be set
against the potential processing cost of cancelling the implicature. They
argue for an alternative account in terms of relevance theory. Ultimately,
they suggest, the choice between these competing approaches needs
to be – and can be – tested experimentally, by timing actual on-line
comprehension processing (as Levinson himself has suggested). Noveck
and Sperber present the results of their experiments, and compare them
with results from similar experiments. They argue that these results
strongly favour their own RT account over Levinson’s GCI account. They
suggest that, while this does not exactly falsify Levinson’s account, it
does present that account with a serious challenge.

French author François Recanati, in ‘Indexicality, Context and Pretence: A Speech Act
Theoretic Account’, is concerned with context and context shift. He argues
that, in the normal way of things, ‘context’ refers the objective context
of utterance, and context shift is impossible. The reference of genuine
indexicals – expressions whose dependence on context is determined by
semantic rule, e.g. I, here, now – cannot be shifted by speakers’ intentions.
In this they contrast with context-dependent expressions such as you,
we, John’s car, and demonstratives, whose reference can be shifted at will.
However, this difference between genuine indexicals and other contextand
intention-dependent expressions has to be qualified in the light of
pretence. This is the focus of his chapter. Pretence allows for context shift
even with indexicals. Here Recanati distinguishes two types of contextshifting
pretence. The first occurs in direct speech reports, delayed
communication, the historical present, and, in parallel, ‘presentifying’
uses of here. The second type of context-shifting pretence occurs in
various sorts of displayed assertion: non-quotational echoes, irony and
free indirect speech. Recanati suggests that the distinction between
these two types correlates with the distinction between locutionary and
illocutionary acts. In the light of this, he suggests speech act theory
must allow for a correlative distinction between locutionary contexts and
illocutionary contexts, a distinction between the context of utterance and
the context of assertion. As a consequence, context cannot be regarded
as an objective given, but as constructed intentionally as an aspect of
utterance meaning.

Finally, Deirdre Susan Moir Wilson and New-Zealand-born author Robyn Carston’s chapter (‘A Unitary Approach to Lexical Pragmatics: Relevance, Inference and Ad Hoc
Concepts’) reports on their recent work in the domain of lexical semantics
and pragmatics.

They explore how the concepts encoded as wordmeanings
are adjusted in the context of utterance. The disparity between
lexically encoded meaning and what is generally communicated by the
use of words, they argue, is generally accounted for by positing a range
of different mechanisms. They accept that concept adjustment appears
to take different forms, including narrowing (strengthening), loosening
(broadening) and metaphorical extension. However, with extensive
illustration, Wilson and Carston argue, against a variety of previous
accounts which treat these three phenomena as distinct, that there are
no well-defined distinctions among these intuitive types of adjustment.
Accordingly, their concern is to develop a more constrained, unified
account in which a single inferential process, guided by the expectation of
(optimal) relevance, is involved in all three – a single process that derives
an ad hoc concept. Narrowing, loosening (including approximation,
hyperbole, and category extension) and metaphor are simply different
outcomes of this single process. They compare their unified inferential
account with that of Recanati, which they argue is only partly inferential,
and with what they see as the non-inferential account of Lakoff (e.g 1987,
1994). They conclude by asking whether their account can be extended to
cover a range of further figurative phenomena: metonymy, synecdoche,
blends, puns and meaning transfers.

references

Bach, K.
Conversational impliciture’. Mind and Language 9: 124–62.

Blutner, R. and H. Zeevat (eds).
Optimality Theory and Pragmatics. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.

Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore
Insensitive Semantics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Carston, R. Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication.
Oxford: Blackwell. -- a rewrite of her PhD dissertation, UCL.

Fodor, J. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. New York: Oxford
University Press.

Grice, H.P. (1938). Negation and privation. The Grice Papers.
--- (1941). Personal identity.
--- (1964). Logic and conversation. Oxford -- for the first use of 'implicature'.
--- (1967). Logic and conversation, Harvard.
--- (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
--- (1991). The conception of value
--- (2001). Aspects of reason
--- (in press). The Grice Papers. Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Horn, L.R. (1984). ‘Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and
R-based implicature’. In D. Schiffrin (ed.). Meaning, Form, and Use in Context
(GURT 1984). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 11–42.

— (1989). A Natural History of Negation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
(Reissued: Stanford, CA: CSLI, 2001).

— (2002). ‘Assertoric Inertia and NPI Licensing’. CLS 38 Part 2. Chicago, IL:
Chicago Linguistics Society. 55–82.

----. 'A brief history of negation.'

Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.

— (1994). Conceptual metaphor home page. Available at edu/lakoff/MetaphorHome.html>

Levinson, S. (2000). Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational
Implicature. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Noveck, I. and D. Sperber (eds). (2004). Experimental Pragmatics. Basingstoke:
Palgrave.

Recanati, F. (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (1986). (2nd edition 1995). Relevance: Communication
and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.

INDEX

abbreviation, 160, 165, 174
abduction, 84
acquisition, 105, 110
address, 136, 137, 138
ad hoc concept, see concept
adjustment, see concept
adverbials, 46, 47, 53, 214
almost, 10, 11, 87
ambiguity, 25, 40, 41, 59, 99, 100, 111
Amis, K., 168
analytical/synthetic distinction, 106,
142–3, 155
Anderson, S., 175
Anscombre, J.-C. and O. Ducrot, 169
antonyms, 233
apparently, 47, 51, 59
approximately, 103, 112
approximation, 8, 231, 234, 239, 256
arbitrariness, 93
Argument from Design, 102
Aronoff, M., 170, 175
Asch, S. 255
asides, 47
asserted content, 120
assertion, 2, 38
displayed, 224, 226, 227
downward, 11, 13, 18
assertoric inertia, 11–22
association, 244, 252
Atlas, J.D., 1, 2, 10–22, 99–100, 103,
and S. Levinson, 17, 178
Austin, J.L., 24, 25, 38, 213, 216, 226,
227
Availability Principle, 152–3, 155
Bach, K. 2, 26, 29, 42, 43, 63
and R.M. Harnish, 28
bald, 101
Barsalou, L.W., 143, 230, 233, 254,
255–6
Barwise, J. and J. Perry, 219
Beaver, D. and H. Lee, 78
belief attributions, 120
Benz, A., 78
Bezuidenhout, A., 116, 117, 131
and J.C. Cutting, 208
Bickerton, D., 111
Blakemore, D., 3, 50, 56, 58, 63–5
Blass, R., 45, 50, 61–3, 65
blends, 164, 253, 255
blocking, 75–8, 81, 169, 175
Bloom, P., 177
Bloomfi eld, L., 176
Blutner, R. 3, 4, 69, 74, 77, 78, 80, 87,
254, 255
and R. Sommer, 87
and H. Zeevat, 3, 69, 73, 78
Bolinger, D., 176
Bontly, T., 177
Borges, J. L. , 174
Bosanquet, B., 166
Bott, L. and I.A. Noveck, 204–5, 207,
210
Bower, B., 177
Bowerman, M. and S. Choi, 102
bounding (upper, lower), 103, 162–4,
169, 208–9
Braine, M. and B. Rumain, 201
Bréal, M., 175
Breheny, R., 208–9
brevity, 162
broadening, 8, 230, 246
see also loosening; narrowing vs.
broadening;
Brown, P. and S. Levinson, 166
index
index 261
Burton-Roberts, N., 4, 70–2, 91, 100,
106, 108, 111, 149, 155, 156
and G. Poole, 93, 97
Bybee, J. and P. Hopper, 161
calculation, 39, 151, 154
Camp, E., 255
cancellation, 7, 72–3, 87, 149, 154, 188
Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore, 4, 5, 41,
42, 43, 91, 118, 133–5
Carroll, J. and M. Tanenhaus, 160
Carston, R., 4, 5, 41, 43, 47, 54, 56,
58, 64, 67, 70–2, 81, 91, 97–100,
101–5, 106, 109, 110, 112, 115,
117, 128–32, 142, 144–8, 149,
151, 153, 155, 168–9, 173, 177,
179, 239, 241–3, 251, 254, 255,
256
category extension, 8, 236–7
Casenhiser, D., 177
causative, 76
character, 42
Chierchia, G. 69, 79, 82, 169, 201
children, 176–7, 202–3, 210
vs. adults, 85–6, 197, 198–9, 203
Chng, S., 111
Chomsky, N., 92, 94–6, 98, 111, 185
clarifi cation, 72
Clark, B., 65
Clark, E., 177
and H. Clark, 175, 237
Clark, H., 228, 238
and R. Gerrig, 222, 224, 228, 237
clipping, 164
coding, 67
cognitive effects, 138
cognitive linguistics, 243, 253–4
Cole, P., 70
communicative intention, 26–8
competence vs. performance, 39, 40
completion, 30, 38
concepts, 3, 5, 47, 91, 136–57
absolute vs. gradient, 101
ad hoc, 5, 8, 56, 145, 146–8, 155,
230–57
adjustment, 4, 5, 8, 108–9, 145,
238, 239–52
atomic, 139, 141,146, 147, 148, 255
encoded, 5, 8, 231, 239, 246, 252
lexical, 101, 104, 109, 145,155
see also pro-concept
concept schema, 104–5, 112, 148
conceptual addresses, 143
conceptual-intentional structure, 90,
95, 110
conceptual-procedural distinction, 63,
110
conditional perfection, 173
conditionals, 173, 240
constraint
conceptual, 46
procedural, 46
on implicit content, 45
violable, 74
content
assessment of, 120–1
of a concept, 139, 144, 148
truth-conditional, 35, 231, 239,
241–2, 254
‘context’, 213–28
locutionary vs. illocutionary, 226–7
context-sensitive expression vs.
indexical, 214
context shift, 7, 213–28
contextual effects, 128–30, 142, 147
Contextualism, 25, 35, 42, 92, 254
radical, 118
convention, 98, 111
Cooperative Principle, 177–8, 179
Cormack, A and N. Smith, 93
creolization, 174
cross-linguistic variation, 97
default, 18, 97, 187–8, 208, 209, 239
Dawkins, R., 85
decoding, 91
delayed communication, 222, 227
demonstratives, 42, 215, 218, 225
denotation, 106
Derbyshire, D., 65
development, 5, 67, 70, 72–3, 84, 108,
109, 117, 128–9, 130–1, 146–7,
149, 151
diachronic/synchronic distinction,
68, 78, 85
Diesendruck, G. and L. Markson, 177
direct speech report, 221–2, 227
disimplicature
disambiguation, 100, 241
262 pragmatics
displacement, 93
Division of Pragmatic Labour, 6, 76,
77, 79, 170–4, 178–9
Doherty, M., 177
domain mapping, 243
domain restrictions, 83
double interface, 93, 96, 98
Ducrot, O., 73, 172–3, 220–2, 226,
227
Dutch, 87
Dynamic Syntax, 111
echo, 7, 223–4, 227
economy, 160, 173–4, 175–6
effort, 129, 172–3, 179
elimination rules, 137, 142
Elsewhere Condition, 175
Embedded Implicature Hypothesis,
71–2, 81, 83–4
embedding test, 241
emergent property, 251–2
encoding, 4, 63, 98, 100
C- vs M-, 97–110
vs. what is encoded, 98
encyclopaedic information, 67, 70,
106, 147, 152, 235, 247, 249,
251, 255, 247, 256
enrichment, 151, 197
entailment, 2, 162
downward, 11, 15, 18, 80, 82, 169
upward, 82
entry (encyclopaedic, lexical, logical)
5, 106, 136–57, 142, 145–7, 148,
239
even, 14
expansion, 30
explicature, 47, 52, 58, 59, 61, 63,
68, 82, 84, 131, 132, 141, 146–8,
188, 190, 193, 241
higher level, 45, 48, 50–3, 58, 61,
62, 64
explicature/implicature distinction, 3,
5, 67–70, 72–3, 84, 108–10, 138,
139–40, 141, 147, 149, 239, 242
Fanselow, G., 78
Fauconnier, G. and M. Turner, 243
Feeney, A., 201
Fidelholtz, J., 161
fi gurative meaning, 231
fi gurative vs. literal, 230–54
fi ne-tuning, 231
Flemming, E., 161
Fodor, J., 4, 91–2, 95, 97, 111, 254
and Lepore, E., 106
fossilization, 68, 73, 79, 85, 87
frankly, 46, 47
Fraser, B., 65
free enrichment, 71, 83
free indirect speech, 7, 225, 227
free variables, 214
Frege, G., 118, 122
frequency, 160, 164, 173
Functional Independence Principle,
71, 108, 153–4
Gazdar, G., 69, 80, 81
genitive, 214
German, 76
Gibbs, R.W., 43
and M. Tendahl, 253
Giegerich, H., 175
Gilliéron, J., 176
global vs. local, 79–80, 82, 85, 86
Glucksberg, S., 230, 236, 255–6
and D. Manfredi and M. McGlone,
254
Goffman, E., 166
Greek, 59–60
Green, M., 71–72
Grice, Herbert Paul, 1, 17, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
41, 64, 67, 68, 70, 73, 82, 87,
111, 149, 151, 154, 159, 162,
177–8, 179, 185, 186–8, 215, 219,
221, 224, 230–1, 239, 254, 255
Griceian -- vide palaeo-Griceian, pre-Griceian, neo-Griceian.
Groefsema, M., 5, 106, 155
Gross, S., 255
Guasti, M.T., 184, 201–2, 207
Haiman, J., 174
Hall, A., 63
Hand, M., 64
Hawthorn, J., 128
Hayes, B., 161
hearsay, 45
Hendricks, P.
and H. de Hoop, 69, 74
and J. Spenader, 87
index 263
Hintzman, D., 105–6, 111
historical present, 223, 227
homonymy, 174–9
homophony, 176
Hoop, H. de and H. de Swart, 74
Horn, L., 2, 6, 10–22, 76–9, 81, 103,
162–4, 166, 167–8, 169–70,
171–3, 176–7, 187, 209, 255
Horn-scales, 80
Horsey, R., 255
hyperbole, 8, 231, 235
and approximation, 235–6
hyponymy, 165–6
illocutionary acts, 7, 38
illocutionary adverbials, 52
implicature, 2, 25, 30, 37, 38, 39, 47,
58, 68, 81, 141–2, 146, 151, 163,
168, 179, 190, 193, 231, 239–40
conventional, 14, 48, 64
conversational, 17, 26, 28, 29,
254
generalized, 6–7, 27, 42–3, 87,
186–211
particularized, 43, 73, 187, 189
embedded, 71–2, 79, 81, 83–4
scalar, 7, 71–3, 80–2,162, 169,
186–211
impliciture, 2, 29, 31, 38, 43
indexicals, 7, 25, 30, 33, 35, 41, 42,
213–28
hidden, 36, 41
Infantidou, E., 46, 48–53, 58–60, 62,
64, 65
informativeness, 187
intention, 35, 38, 41
referential, 42
intentionalism, 33–4, 42
interpretability at PF/LF, 93
intuition, 6, 35, 184–6
intuitionism, 38–9
I-principle, 74–5, 78
irony, 7, 29, 227
Isomorphism Principle, 43
Israel, M., 169
Itani, R., 65
Iten, C., 59
Jackendoff, R., 111, 140–1, 143
Jäger, G., 77–8
Japanese, 61, 76
Kaplan, D., 42, 216, 228
Karttunen, L. and S. Peters, 13–15,
18–22, 87
Kasher, A., 177
Kavalova, Y., 64
Kempson, R., 111
King, J. and J. Stanley, 29
Kintsch, W., 243, 254
Kiparsky, P., 170, 175
Kirby, S., 85
Kirschner, R., 161
Kuppevelt, J. van, 72–3
Ladusaw, W., 13
Lakoff, G., 8, 243, 253, 255, 257
Language of Thought, 4, 90–2, 97,
104, 106, 110, 111
vs. language faculty, 96
Lascarides, A. and A. Copestake, 254
Lasersohn, P., 234, 255
least effort, 115–16, 129, 131, 159–60,
174, 177
see also Zipf
Lehrer, A., 255
Levinson, S., 6, 7, 42–43, 76, 79, 80,
87, 169, 171, 178–9, 187–8, 194,
209, 241, 255
Levorato, M.C., 256
Lewis, D., 16, 98, 100, 215–18, 255
lexical change, 179
lexical gap, 175
lexicalization, 163
lexical item, 92–4
lexical pragmatics, 8, 85–6, 101, 170,
179, 230–57
Lindblom, B., 161
literal, 249
litotes, 167
Locke, J., 174
locutionary acts, 7, 38
Logan, G.D., 85
logical form, 63, 70, 91, 93, 117,
128–9, 130–1, 136, 146–8, 151
loosening, 4, 8, 100–2, 145
loose use, 145
Lyons, J., 228
264 pragmatics
McCawley, J., 13, 76, 80, 170–1, 173
Magritte, R., 94, 104
making as if to say, 224
Manichaeanism, 158–79
Manner (M), 6, 178
markedness, 75, 77–9, 87, 173, 178
Markman, E. and G.F. Wachtel, 175
Martinet, A., 160, 173–4
Matsumoto, Y., 173
Mattausch, J., 69, 76, 79
maxims, 67, 162, 177–8, 186–7, 239
Mazzocco, M., 177
meaning, 4, 95
conceptual vs. procedural, 58, 110
word, 136–57
vs. semantics, 4, 95, 110–12
see also use and meaning
Meaning Eliminativism, 92, 111
meaning transfer, 253
Menner, R., 176
Merin, A., 83–4
meronomic restrictions, 83,
metaphor, 8, 29, 145, 195, 231,
235–6, 238, 239, 246–8, 251–4,
256
and approximation, 248, 252–3
and hyperbole, 248, 252–3, 254
metaphorical extension, 239
metonymy, 29, 252–4, 257
mind-reading, 110
Minimalist Program, 92, 93, 97
Minimalism (Pluralistic), 132–5
Minimalist Principle, 155
minimal proposition, 29, 30, 33,
38–41
Minimax Principle, 160, 161, 179
Modifi ed Occam’s Razor, 177
moods, 240
Moore, G.E., 24
Moore’s paradox, 26
morphology, 176
Morse Code, 98
multiple trace memory model, 105
Murphy, G., 233
names, 236
narrowing, 4, 8, 100–2, 145, 193, 230
vs. loosening, 108, 230–57
see also strengthening
negation, 4, 15, 21, 96, 99–100, 166,
167, 240
metalinguistic, 31, 87
not vs. logical operator, 96, 99
not quite, 10, 11
scope-of-, 99, 241
negative polarity items, 2, 10–22,
169
neg-raising, 167
neologism, 237, 240, 253
neo-Wittgensteinian, 188
non-demonstrative inference, 116
No-Shared Content Principle, 4,
117–18
Noveck, I.A., 4, 85–7, 199–202
and A. Posada, 207
and D. Sperber, 4, 6, 7, 184
numerical expressions, 4, 39–40, 73,
102–4, 107–8
Nunberg, G., 214, 228, 252, 254, 257
only, 11, 13, 16, 18, 22
open, 101–2, 105
optimality theory, 3, 67–87
evolutionary, 85
optimization, 74, 77, 78
ordinary language philosophy, 24–6,
32, 185
ostensive stimulus, 109
Panther, K.U. and G. Radden, 257
Papafragou, A., 257
and Musolino, J., 184, 201–2
and Tantalou, N., 201, 210–1
parentheticals, 3, 46–65
and, 53–7
as, 54–7
Paris, S.G., 201
parsing, 97
Partee, B., 43
particular languages, 96, 97
Passy, P., 174
Paul, H., 159–60, 174–5
Peirce, C.S., 94, 96, 104
Pelczar, M., 111
Perry, J., 43
phonetic effort, 109
phonetic form, 93
phonetics, 106, 161
index 265
phonology, 74, 92, 95–7, 138, 161,
174, 175
Pilkington, A., 236
Pinker, S., 111
Pluralistic Minimalism, 5, 132–5
Pointer (to a concept), 104–5, 110, 148
polysemy, 103, 238, 241, 256
Popper, K., 17–18
Potts, C., 48–9, 63, 64
Pragmatic Intrusionism, 39–40
pragmatics
developmental, 198
experimental, 6, 69, 184–6,
196–211
neo-Gricean, 6, 69, 73–4, 80, 81,
84, 85, 103, 158–79, 186–7, 190,
194, 209–10
optimality theoretical, 3, 67–87
radical, 70, 111
rationality based, 177
relevance theoretical, 4–7, 67–69,
80, 90–2, 94, 97, 109, 115–32,
136–57, 178–9, 190–6, 205, 207,
209–10, 230–57
truth-conditional, 25, 34, 67, 231,
254
see also division of labour
precision (standards of), 215–19, 239
Predelli, S., 223
presumptive meaning, 43
presupposition 2, 13–16, 19, 22
pretence, 7, 220–8
principle of effective means, 178
procedural meaning, 3, 45–63, 110
processing, 7
pro-concept, 104, 110
pro-form, 110
pronouns, 227, 110
proposition, 34–7, 40
expressed, 35, 37
incomplete, 33, 34, 39
Propositionalism, 34, 35
psycholinguistics, 184
psychology, 254
puns, 253
Putnam, H., 17–18
Q-principle, 6, 74–5, 78, 162, 165, 175
Q vs. R, 170–4, 176, 178
Q-scales, 162
qualifi cation
implicit, 30
quantifi er restriction, 30
Quintilian, 161
Recanati, F., 4, 7, 8, 34, 38, 41, 43,
71, 87, 92, 106, 111, 112, 118,
152–5, 222, 226, 228, 231, 241,
243, 250, 252, 254, 256, 257
raw, 101
reciprocals, 83
reference, 41, 42
relevance, 45–65, 85, 115, 147, 191,
210
communicative principle of, 129
expectation of, 129
optimal, 8, 128–32
principle of, 117
cognitive principle of, 245
communitive principle of, 245
constraints on, 45–65
relevance theoretic comprehension
strategy, 47
representation, 4, 94
M-, 94–7
Representational Hypothesis, 92–111
Richards, I.A., 112
Rips, L.J., 204
Rooy, R. van, 72–3
R-principle, 6, 74–5, 78, 162, 164,
165, 168–9, 175
Rubio Fernandez, P., 256
Russell, B., 80–2
Sadock, J., 10, 87, 103, 107
Sauerland, U., 80–2
Saul, J., 179
Saussure, F. de, 92, 94, 96, 98
Sayce, A.H., 174
Schlenker, P., 223, 225, 227
scope, 167
scope embedding test, 71
scope neutrality, 99, 100
scope principle, 154
Searle, J. 24–5, 42, 106, 109, 118, 233,
255
seemingly, 50
semantic change, 239, 255
266 pragmatics
semantic content, 27, 30, 133
semantic defi nition, 107
semantic incompleteness, 29, 31, 32,
36, 40–2
semantic minimalism, 133–4
semantic underdetermination, 42
semantics, 90–112
lexical, 106
linguistic, 4, 91, 98, 106, 108
linguistic vs. real, 4, 90–2
speech act conception of, 134
truth-conditional
for sentences, 34
semantics/pragmatics distinction, 1,
24–43, 111
semantics vs. meaning, 95, 98,
110–12
sentence-utterance distinction,
24–43
shared content, 4, 115–32
signs, 4, 94
Saussurian, 93–4
similarity, 4, 116–17, 124–6, 131, 145,
252
Sissala, 45, 47, 61
Smith, C.L., 200–1
Soames, S., 42, 80, 81, 85
sortal incorrectness, 97
sound change, 174
sound-meaning correspondence, 93,
95
speaker’s intention, 33, 214–15, 219,
221
speaker vs. hearer, 162
speech acts, 2, 7, 35, 45, 64, 213–28
indirect, 38
reported, 225
see also locutionary, illocutionary
speech act fallacy, 24
speech act monism, 133
speech report, 117, 119
Speranza, J. L.
Sperber, D., 255
Sperber, D. and D. Wilson, 1, 51,
58–61, 64, 65, 67, 70, 72–3,
91, 104, 106, 116, 130, 136–7,
138–9, 141–2, 144, 147, 149,
151–2, 155, 179, 190, 224, 231,
236, 239, 241–3, 250, 253, 254,
255, 256, 257
spreading activation model, 243
square of opposition, 163
Stalnaker, R., 27
Stanley, J., 43
Steels, L., 85
stereotypes, 171–2
Stern, G., 165
Sternberg, R.J., 201
Storto, G. and M. Tanenhaus, 39
Strawson, P.F., 24
strengthening, 3, 8, 50, 85, 155, 162,
167–9
see also narrowing
stress, 161
strictly speaking, 218–19
supposedly 59
Sweet, H., 174
synecdoche, 253
synonymy, 174–8
syntactic correlation constraint, 43
syntactic structure, 35
syntax, 36–7, 43, 74, 97, 138, 174
T’ai Chi, 159
tenses, 224–5, 227
Theory of Mind, 177
Thomason, R., 93
thoughts, 91, 97, 105, 111, 115–32
duplication of, 116–17
timing, 203–9
tired, 101, 132, 190
Tobler, A., 164
token-refl exive rule, 214
trade names, 165, 236
training, 202
Traugott, E.C., 179
and R. Dasher, 179, 239
Travis, C., 42, 118
type/token, 93, 94
unarticulated constituents, 36–7, 40,
43
undertermination, 25, 31, 34, 70
Urmson, J.O., 64
use and meaning, 24, 39, 41, 106,
107–8, 110, 111
utterance, 34, 35, 39
utterance semantics, 34
utterance-type meaning, 42
index 267
vagueness, 25
Van de Henst, J.B. and D. Sperber,
211
variables, 40
Vega Moreno, R., 251, 256, 257
Vincente, B., 106, 146, 150–1
what is said, 2, 14, 28, 31, 38, 43, 119,
124–6, 134, 149, 188
vs. what is implicated, 37–8
Williams, E.R., 176
Wilson, D., 144, 150, 239
see also Sperber, D.
and R. Carston, 8, 108, 231, 242–3,
255, 257
Wittgenstein, L., 2, 24, 111
word-formation, 170–1
word play, 238
Yang/Yin, 158
Young, D.G., 102
Zeevat, H., 78
Zipf, G.K., 68, 73, 78, 159, 161–2, 164,
173–4, 175
Zwarts, J., 85, 87