H. P. Grice and P. S. Kitcher

P. S. Kitcher’s implicature

J. L. Speranza

for The Grice Club

P. S. Kitcher, of England, and Columbia, has made a fabulous contribution to philosophy. Like Grice, Kitcher sees philosophy as a unity (“Philosophy, like virtue, is entire.” – Grice), and he has explored key areas like ‘philosophical’ biology, explanation, and the ‘a priori,’ Browsing through Kitcher’s rich oeuvre, one detects a few Griceian connections which I shall hereby explore. It seems practical to distribute Kitcher’s oeuvre in a few categories: book-length essays (compilations, that is), essays proper, and essays improper! (Just kidding!). I will use ‘essays’ instead of the pedantic ‘book-length essays’, and restrict ‘essays proper’ to, well, ‘essays proper’! I have omitted all references to years, but have kept the volume number. The omission is to make for lighter reading!

A. Kitcher’s essays

“Ab-using science: the case against creationism”

MIT Press. Ch. II repr. in M. Bratman and J. E. Perry, Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford. Ch. II repr. in S. Cahn/P. Kitcher/G. Sher "Reason At Work,” Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; ch. II repr. in N. Bowie, The Philosophical Tradition, chs. II-IV in “The Creation-Evolution Controversy,” in Polish. Parts also appear in R. Solomon et. al., “Twenty Questions” Harcourt Brace, and E. Klemke et.al. “Readings in the Philosophy of Science,” Ch. 1 repr. in H. Lauer History and Philosophy of Science for Science Students Committed in Africa, Unesco, published by EJ Books, Seoul, in Korean.

As it happens, this is a good place to start. An essay gets reprinted. Who reprints it carries an implicature.

Both Bratman and Perry, who reprint Kitcher in their “Introduction to philosophy,” often cite H. P. Grice.

Especially Perry, in his P. G. R. I. C. E., Clarendon Press (that’s the acronym for Grandy’s and Warner’s hidden festschrift, “P[hilosophical] G[rounds of] R[ationality:] I[ntentions,] C[ategories,] E[nds]!

Perry actually reprinted Kitcher – and Grice! Grice’s very early “Personal Identity” (for “Mind,” 1941, can you believe?) is displayed amongst essays by Quinton and Parfit (whom Kitcher has also discussed) in his collection on the subject for the minor (but very Griceian) publishing house, “Berkeley: University of California Press.”

Bratman, on the other hand, has cited Grice in connection with plans, goals, and agency.

Incidentally, “Reason at work,” where Kitcher is also reprinted, happens to be an excellent, Griceian, title for a volume. Grice would delight in the pun: “It’s not reason in the work-place, Strawson!” “Reason out of work?” “Neither!”

Good title, “The philosophical tradition,” too, where Kitcher has also appeared. Cf. “The Griceian Tradition.” I’m never sure what tradition that is, but I know what tradition Grice knew he belonged: the tradition of J. L. Austin’s Play Group, at Oxford!

Re: The ‘evolution controversy,’’ Grice called himself a bit of an ‘evolutionary’ philosopher. But his references to the ‘Genitorial programme’ make you wonder that he may have thought a bit of a creator himself!

                                                   

“The nature of mathematical knowledge”

Oxford, ch. 7 repr. in T. Tymoczko, New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Birkhauser, in Port. in progress, in Fr. (with Payot), and parts in Chin.

This is one of the specialities of Kitcher, but as I say, philosophy, like virtue, seems, as in Grice, entire, with Kitcher.

As it happens, perhaps due to Kitcher’s collaborations with Kantian scholar Patricia Kitcher, I detect a special interest on P. S. Kitcher’s part in the pretty problematic Kantian philosophy of mathematics, which not surprisingly, fascinated Grice! As Ewing (cited by Grice), of Cambridge – Kitcher’s alma mater -- once said, ‘What do I expect to see in heaven, you ask? The synthetic a priori.”

Grice was enamoured with the keyword: “synthetic a priori,” and, at Oxford, he would often test his children’s playmates with questions like, “Can a sweater be red and green all over. No stripes allowed!” Of course, his claim of fame is his answer to Quine’s ‘Two dogmas of empiricism,’ an essay, as Kitcher genially puts it, “almost written by Kant.” Perhaps Kant changed his mind when he found out he was a Griceian at heart!

For Kant, “7 + 5 = 12” is ‘synthetic a priori’ – hence this rambling! Re: the philosophy of mathematics, which is the title of a collection where Kitcher is reprinted, A. J. Ayer would have been fascinated Kitcher’s use of ‘the knowledge’ as applied to the nature of ‘mathematical knowledge.’

In that infamous essay published in 1936, that Grice found too dogmatic, Ayer, then the enfant terrible of Oxford philosophy comes, from Vienna, with the idea that mathematical propositions are ‘analytic a priori.’

As I say, Kitcher will later have occasion to see Kant as palæo-Quineian. “He could have written “Two dogmas,” but he didn’t – I’ll tell you why.” Part of the reason was that, unlike Quine, Kant still had feelings for the synthetic a priori!

“Vaulting ambition: socio-biology and the quest for human nature,” MIT Press

“The advancement of science”

Oxford. Parts of ch. 4 repr. in R. Klee, Scientific inquiry: readings in the philosophy of science, Oxford. Other parts of ch. 4 rep. in J. Arthur/W. Throop, Reason and Culture, Prentice-Hall, Sp. with UNAM Press, Kor., in progress.

A title with Hobbesian overtones! I like overtones, as I detect a Lockeian overtone in Grice’s “Way of Words,” his compilation of essays for Harvard University Press. Here’s to British empiricism!

“The lives to come”

The genetic revolution and human possibilities. Simon and Schuster and Penguin. Ger. with Luchterhand as “Genetik und Ethik.” Greek (University of  Patras Press), Spanish (UNAM press). The U.S. paperback contains a ‘Postscript’ on cloning, almost identical Kitcher’s “Whose Self is it, Anyway?” (in The Sciences).  That postscript repr. in B. MacKinnon. Human cloning: Science, ethics, and public policy, University  of  Illinois Press and in G. McGee, The human cloning debate (Berkeley Hills Books).   Ch. VIII appears in W. Glannon, Bio-ethics, Oxford, Extracts in M. Rothstein, Genetics: ethics, law and policy, West Publishing; and in B. Spatt, Writing from sources (Bedford/St. Martin’s).

Re: Berkeley Hills Books: well, Grice lived on the Berkeley Hills!

“Science, truth, and democracy,” Oxford, Fr. with Presses Universitaires de France, Chin. with Shanghai Jiaotong University Press.

“In Mendel’s mirror: philosophical reflections on biology” Oxford.

If mathematical knowledge is one of Kitcher’s special philosophical interests, it pairs with ‘philosophical biology,’ as Grice would call it! Kitcher would possibly dislike ‘multiplying biologies beyond necessity.’ But I think Grice is being merely jocular when referring to ‘a philosopher’s reflections on biology’ as ‘philosophical biology.’

Ditto, especially, for ‘philosophical psychology,’ as per the title of his Presidential Address for the A. P. A.: “Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.” Perhaps his implicature is that a philosophical biologist or psychologist can wander in the bizarre as the non-philosophical cannot?

“Finding an ending: reflections on Wagner’s Ring” W/R. Schacht. Oxford University Press.

Grice liked Wagner, too, and disliked bits of Wagner too. Grice’s obituary for the St. John’s Records (written by G. Richardson), Oxford, has it that Grice thought Meistersinger for children…

“Living with Darwin: evolution, design, and the future of faith” Oxford, Ger. Mit Darwin Leben with Suhrkamp 

“Joyce’s kaleidoscope: an invitation to Finnegans Wake” Oxford.

This sounds fascinating. Kitcher also has an essay on ‘the small’ and ‘the large’ where he goes Joyceian himself and uses a Joyceian word in the title! Recently, I was fascinated to read Stephen Joyce’s obituary in the NYT: “I’m not a Joycean, I’m a Joyce!” Ah well! It includes a delightful anecdote, if you are into that type of  humour. A composer wrote to Stephen Joyce, “I would like to set to music 15 lines of your grandfather’s “Finnegan’s Wake””. Stephen Joyce curtly replied, “Its Finnegans Wake. And neither my wife nor I like your music, to put it politely.” The obituarist in the NYT thinks that Stephen Joyce’s spelling ‘its’ is intentional! Of course the whole thing is based on an old Irish folksong, with the possessive, and we know WHAT woke him up!

“The ethical Project” Harvard, Kor. in progress, Ar. in progress, Chin. in progress.

"Science in a democratic society" Prometheus.

As Kitcher explains, part of his interest in ‘keyword: philosophy of science’ grew out of his studies under Hempel. Kitcher was especially impressed by Kuhn’s work, too, as we’ll see. Unlike Grice, Kitcher knows science, both of them, in Snow’s parlance! But both Grice and Kitcher seem to agree on some details of the devil of scientism. Grice’s ‘devil of scientism’ appears in his “Method in philosophical psychology.”

"Preludes to pragmatism”Oxford.

This is fascinating. When Grice was lecturing (as University Lecturer) at Oxford, out of the blue, and in the mid 1940s, too, he comes with this idea of having a seminar on C. S. Peirce’s theory of signs. It helped him to formulate his ideas on meaning. At the seminar he would justify the choice of subject matter by saying, “Peirce is not as well-known on these shores as he should be.” There is a school of English pragmatism (Schiller, etc.), but we usually tend to associate it with the, so-called, “New World.”

“Deaths in Venice” The Schoff Lectures" Columbia. Actually an expanded version of The Schoff Lectures, Sp., Editorial Cátedra, Madrid.

The title is Griceian in nature! Mann did not pluralise, but Kitcher, in Schoff’s honour, does!

“Philosophy of science: a new introduction” W/G. Barker Oxford

“Life after faith: the case for secular humanism” Yale.

“The seasons alter: how to save the human future in six acts” W/E. F. Keller, W.W. Norton, Liveright.

***

B. Kitcher’s ndividual essays -- as opposed to “A”, which are, as I say, book-length compilations of essays.

“Fluxions, limits and infinite littleness’

Isis 64.

“Infinite littleness” would have fascinated Grice. One of his examples in “Ways of Words” is “I know there are infinitely many stars” (unintended ‘implicature’: ‘infinity’ and ‘knowledge’ don’t usually go together).

“Kant and the foundations of mathematics” The Philosophical Review 74, repr. in C. Posy, Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, Dordrecht, Reidel.

Cf. note above on Kant on mathematical propositions (or at least “7 + 5 = 12”) as synthetic a priori.

“Bolzano 's ideal of algebraic analysis” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 6.

I guess Grice would have liked the ‘ideal’ of the ‘ideal’! Cf. Kitcher below on Kantian ‘regulative’ ideal.

“Hilbert’s epistemology,” Philosophy of Science 43.

In the second William James lecture, Grice targets formalists such as Hilbert. But only to contrast them with his pupil at Oxford, P. F. Strawson, who was behaving, with his “Introduction to Logical Theory,” in a pretty anti-Hilbertian way!

“Explanation, conjunction, and unification,” The Journal of Philosophy 73.

The idea of ‘conjunction’ reminds me of Ramsey’s sentence. Grice for some reason loved Ramseyfication (of naming and describing), as he calls it in “Method in philosophical psychology.”

“Fictionalisers,” Philosophical Studies 30.

Grice would hardly read fiction, but this title seems to implicate something like Quine’s involvement with Pegasus. “Pegasus may be fictional, but, qua fiction, it flew!” (Grice, “Vacuous Names” in “Words and objections: essays on the philosophy of W. V. O. Quine).

“Positive under-statement: the logic of attributive adjectives,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 7.

Of course, the understatement is Grice’s implicature, and the attributive is one of Strawson’s fixations (“Subject and predicate in logic and grammar,” Methuen).

“The nativist's dilemma,” Philosophical Quarterly 28.

When I hear ‘nativist’ I cannot but think of Chomsky’s “Cartesian linguistics.”

“The plight of the platonist,” Nous 12.

Excellent alliteration. One of philosophy’s best! Kitcher has an excellent ear for philosophical alliterations: cf. ‘monism’s moment,” “pragmatist’s progress,” etc.!

“Theories, theorists, and theoretical change”

The Philosophical Review 87, repr. in The Philosopher's Annual, Sp. in Filosofia de la Ciencia, and in Y. Balashov/A.Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: contemporary readings, Routledge.

Great title. Of course, people say that Grice was a theorist. But in “Studies in the way of words,” he says he ain’t [sic]. He is responding to Mrs. Julie Jack (of Somerville) in her “The rights and wrongs of Grice on meaning” who keeps referring to Grice’s ‘theory’ of meaning. Grice responds: “Meaning, for starters, cannot be a theoretical object,” Grice claims – “only a matter of intuition, and the object of a reductive conceptual analysis, at most!”

“Frege's epistemology” The Philosophical Review, 88, repr. in H. Sluga, The Philosophy of Frege, New York, Garland.

Fascinating. Frege’s “Gedanke” is usually interpreted so objectively that one wonders what Frege would make of ‘epistemology.’ On the other hand, his ‘modes of presentation’ are delightfully Griceian and subjective – if not ‘episteme’! Matter of fact, talking of editors, Grice cites brilliant Sluga in “Presupposition and conversational implicature” in a footnote. Sluga, on his turn, spoke for the H. P. Grice bench-warm ceremony outside Moses in Berkeley, warmly, about his experiences of learning to play cricket from Grice while a student at Balliol.

 “A-priori knowledge” The Philosophical Review 79, repr. in The Philosopher's Annual and in H. Kornblith, Naturalized Epistemology, Bradford Books/MIT Press, repr. in R. Goodman/R. Snyder, Contemporary epistemology, Prentice-Hall, in A. Casullo, A priori knowledge, Dartmouth Press/International Research Library of Philosophy, in J. Crumley, Readings in epistemology, Mayfield, in part, in P. Kitcher, Kant’s critique of pure reason, Rowman and Allanheld, in F. Dretske/S. Bernecker, Knowledge: readings  in contemporary epistemology, Oxford.

Fascinating subject! Quinton, in Oxford, spoke of the a priori and the analytic. But surely the a priori merits an essay on its own! The fact that it’s reprinted in “naturalised” epistemology suggests an innovative approach!

Re: the reprint in P. Kitcher’s compilation on Kant, for Rowman and Allanheld, Grice has, for the record, PILES of papers on Kant at the “H. P. Grice Collection,” The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. As for the reprint in Dretske, a causalist, likes to quote Grice, and Grice attempts in his third William James lecture an account of ‘knowledge’ that may be deemed as ‘causalist.’ At least Grice wrote, in brackets “(cf. causal theory)”!

“Arithmetic for the Millian” Philosophical Studies 37, repr. in M. Resnik, Mathematical objects and mathematical knowledge, Dartmouth  Press/ International Research Library of Philosophy, in A. Casullo, A priori knowledge, Dartmouth Press/International Research Library of Philosophy, and in V. Sanchez-Valencia, Mill: general philosophy, Ashgate/International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy.

When playing with words, Grice would speak, “not to bring more Grice to the Mill.”

So there! But the issue is very serious for, for Mill, arithmetic, contra Kant, is surely synthetic a posteriori!

“Apriority and necessity” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58, repr. in P. Moser, A priori knowledge, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford.

Excellent word, apriority. Cf. aprioriness, ugly, by contrast!

Re: the reprint in Moser, Kitcher has contributed to the Oxford Readings in Philosophy. In my view, the best readings in philosopher EVER! They were originally conceived by G. J. Warnock, sometime of Hertford, later Vice-Chancelor, and collaborator with Grice in the philosophy of perception.

“Mathematical rigour: who needs it?” Nous 15

The implicature seems to be “not me.” Grice would add: “Neither Hardy!” Grice loved to recollect how it would take six or seven hours to Hardy to find if a proposition was rigorously deduced in a proof. Grice also observed that it would be fair to say that every proof that Hardy presented contained at least one mistake! (The anecdote is repeated by Bruce Aune, elsewhere).

“How Kant almost wrote ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ (and why he didn’t)” Philosophical Topics 12 – This issue of Philosophical Topics appears as “Essays on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,” ed. by J. N. Mohanty/R. Shahan, University of Oklahoma Press, also repr., in part, in P. Kitcher, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Rowman and Allanheld.

Cf. Grice and Strawson, "In defence of a dogma," The Philosophical Review, repr. in Grice, "Studies in the Way of Words,” mentioned above. Apparently, Grice and Strawson wrote the piece to honour Quine when Quine was visiting Oxford. He was NOT impressed. He found Grice’s and Strawson’s collaborative seminars, ‘too boring to my taste.’

However, Quine is kind enough to quote Grice/Strawson in “Words and objects,” which motivated Davidson and Hintikka to invite Grice to contribute with this piece on “Vacuous names” to “Words and objections: essays in the work of W. V. O. Quine.” The inclusion of Kitcher’s piece in P. Kitcher’s Kant compilation for Rowman, again, reminds me of Grice in the William James, second lecture:

“I am enough of a rationalist to want to echo Kant. I shall therefore speak of FOUR CONVERSATIONAL categories: of qualitas, quantitas, relatio, and modus, and, to boot, a number of ‘conversational maxims,’ all universalisable under a general principle of conversational co-operation or altruism!” Cf. Kitcher on ‘altruism,’ or “Thou winnest, I win.”

“Explanatory unification” Philosophy of Science, 48, repr. in J. Pitt, Scientific explanation, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford, and, with a postscript, in Ger., in G. Schurz, Erklaren und Verstehen in den Wissenschaften, Oldenburg-Verlag, Vienna-Munich. repr. in R. Boyd/P. Gasper/J. D. Trout, Readings in the philosophy of science, Bradford Books, MIT Press, in D. Rothbart, Science, reason, and reality, Harcourt Brace, in E. Klemke et al, Introductory readings in the philosophy of science, and in T. Schick, Readings in the philosophy of science: from positivism to post-modernism, Mayfield Publishing Co.

This sounds Griceian and Occamist. Grice invented the “modified Occam’s razor,” senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.” Ditto for explanation? Re: the reprint in “Erklanen,” Grice, who hardly read any German, would still have loved the ‘erklaren’ and ‘verstehen.’ The ‘erklaren’ would have reminded Grice of British philosopher D. Lewis, with his “Clarity ain’t enough: essays against linguistic philosophy”!

“Genes” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 33, repr. in J. Worrall, Philosophy of the natural sciences, Dartmouth Press.

Grice would write philosophy on anything. There is a little note in “The Grice Papers,” that reads: “Read Dawkins, Selfish Gene.” But we don’t know if he did!

“Kant's philosophy of science” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 8, repr. in A. Wood, Kant on self and nature, Cornell.

I’m not sure about Kant, but Grice loved the phrase, ‘psychologia rationalis,’ which he borrowed, but never returned, from Wolff!

“Implications of incommensurability” in P. Asquith/T. Nickles, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association.

Grice would have that as “implicatURES of incommensurability,” just to tease Kuhn! Implicatures, unlike implications, are cancellable, and almost incommensurable themselves!

“Species” Philosophy of Science, 51, repr. in M. Ereshefsky, The units of evolution, Bradford Books, MIT Press.

Grice, not content with “Homo sapiens sapiens,” turns a Carnapian catchphrase into a new species: the ‘pirot’ (that ‘karulise elatically.) Grice is also playing with Locke’s reference to Prince Maurice’s parrot (“very intelligent, rational?”) in “Essay concerning humane [sic] understanding.”

“1953 and all that: a tale of two sciences” The Philosophical Review 93, repr. in The Philosopher's Annual, in R. Boyd/P. Gasper/J. D. Trout, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Bradford Books, MIT Press, in Elliott Sober, Conceptual issues of evolutionary biology, Bradford Books, MIT Press, in M. Curd/J. Cover, Philosophy of science: the central issues, Norton.

One of the double-pun best philosophically titled essays ever! The references to Sellars and Yeatman and Dickens in the same line, glorious!

“Against the monism of the moment” Philosophy of Science 51.

Another good alliteration, alla the platonist’s plight.

“Darwin’s achievement” in N. Rescher, Reason and rationality in science, University Press of America.

The editor, Rescher, certainly knows a lot about rationality! Indeed, Darwin’s scheme is VERY rational, and clear to understand. Part of his achievement, too, was to be able to re-read Spencer, refine him, and make him understandable to the general reader!

“Two approaches to explanation” Journal of Philosophy, 82.

I detect a Hempelian impicature here. Actually, Grice cites Hempel in a little known essay published in 1986 for the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, “Actions and events,” but his main polemic is against Donald Davidson.

“Frege, Dedekind, and the philosophy of mathematics” in L. Haaparanta and J. Hintikka, Frege synthesized, D. Reidel, Synthese Library, repr. in H. Sluga, The Philosophy of Frege, New York: Garland.

The type of Frege books, where Kitcher’s piece is reprinted, that Grice would read. One of his students at Berkeley once came with the idea of writing on Dummett’s Frege, “Published by Duckworth, if you’ve read that book, professor Grice.” “No, I haven’t read it, and I hope I won’t!” As noted above, Grice cites Sluga in “Presupposition and conversational implicature,” footnote, in P. Cole, “Radical Pragmatics.” For some reason Grice omitted the footnote in the reprint for Harvard University Press, but Sluga forgave him!

“Projecting the order of nature” in R. Butts, Kant's Philosophy of Physical Science, D. Reidel, University  of  Western Ontario Series  in Philosophy of Science, and in P. Kitcher, Kant’s critique of pure reason, Rowman and Allanheld.

As mentioned above, H. P. Grice has, really, PILES of papers on Kant, and Kantotle. The H. P. Grice Papers, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (And Grice famously once lectured at Wellesley! “Post-war Oxford philosophy," in 1958). Possibly, Grice thought that the Oxonian contribution to Kantian ‘alethic’ reason was compleated with Strawson’s “Bounds of sense.” At Berkeley, therefore, Grice focused, mainly in collaborations with Judith Baker, on Kantian ‘practical’ reason. But trust Grice to come up, in the Immanuel Kant lectures at Stanford, with an ‘aequi-vocality thesis’: reasons are not be multiplied beyond necessity!

“Why not the best?” in J. Dupre, The latest on the best: essays on optimality and evolution. Bradford Books/MIT Press.

For some reason, Grice loved ‘optimality.’ He thought that ‘meaning’ was an ideal concept, but captured in the guise of ‘optimal value.’ And he does propose an evolutionary story for language (vide Timothy Wharton, “Pragmatics.”)

“Mathematical naturalism” in W. Aspray and P. S. Kitcher, Essays on the history and philosophy of modern mathematics, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, in Russ. Proceedings of the Soviet Seminar, ed. A. Barabashev.

Naturalism sounds a bit like Millianism.

“Imitating selection”in S. Fox and M.-W. Ho, Metaphors in the new evolutionary paradigm, Wiley.

Grice thought that the study of metaphor, seriously, belonged in a discipline he invented that he called, pretentiously, ‘philosophical eschatology’! (In Studies in the Way of Words).

“Confessions of a curmudgeon” after Precis of “Vaulting Ambition” a reply to 22 commentators, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10.

Lovely confessions. Remind me of Paul Grice, “Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice”!

“Ghostly whispers: Mayr, Ghiselin and the ‘philosophers’ on the ontology of species” Biology and Philosophy 2.

Lovely title. Who do Mayr and Ghiselin think they are?

“On the crest of ‘La nouvelle vague’”International Studies Quarterly 31.

Another genial title.

“Van Fraassen on explanation” W/W. Salmon, The Journal of Philosophy, 84, repr. in The Philosopher's Annual, in D.-H. Rubin, Explanation, Oxford Readings in Philosophy.

This excellent series, “Oxford readings in philosophy,” was founded, for the record, and as mentioned above, by Grice's colleague, G. J. Warnock. And Salmon is a genial Fregeian!

“The transformation of human socio-biology” in A. Fine/P. Machamer, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2.

Interesting.

“Mathematical progress” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 42.

Lakatosian implicature?

“Mis-representation and responsibility in medical research” W/R. Engler/J. Covell/P. Friedman/R. Peters, New England Journal of Medicine, 317.

Very serious. Very New England.

“The return of the gene” W/ K. Sterelny, The Journal of Philosophy, 85, repr. in R. Boyd/P. Gasper/J. D. Trout, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Bradford Books, MIT Press, and in D. Hull/M. Ruse, Readings in the philosophy of biology, Oxford.

Sterelny can be anti-Griceian, but perhaps Griceian at heart! Re: the reprint in Hull and Ruse, “philosophy of biology,” Cf., again, Grice as a philosophical biologist!

“The animal within: biology and the social sciences” LSE Quarterly, 2.

The beast, almost!

“The child as parent of the scientist” Mind and Language, 3.

Great pun on Wordsworth!

“The foundations of mathematics” in G. Cantor/M. Hodge/R. Olby, Companion to the History of Science, Routledge.

Good!

“Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world” in P. S. Kitcher/W. Salmon, Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13, repr. in part in R. Klee, Scientific inquiry: readings in the philosophy of science, Oxford, and in part in Y. Balashov and A. Rosenberg, Philosophy of science: contemporary readings, Routledge.

Cf. the very pragmatist idea of a ‘unified science,’ mentioned in passing by Grice in the second William James lecture.

“Some puzzles about species” in M. Ruse, What the philosophy of biology is: essays for D. Hull, Reidel.

“Theory structure and theory change in contemporary molecular biology” with S. Culp, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40

“Developmental decomposition and the future of human behavioral ecology” Philosophy of Science, 57

“The division of cognitive labour” The Journal of Philosophy, 87

“The illusory riches of Sober's monism” The Journal of Philosophy, 87, W/K. Sterelny/C. Waters.

“Persuasion” in M. Pera/W. Shea, Persuading science, the art of scientific rhetoric, Science History Publications, in It. in Pera e Shea, L'arte della persuasione scientifica, Milano: Guerini.

Related, perhaps, to J. L. Austin’s explorations on ‘performative effects.’ Grice was once faced with a criticism, “You confuse Austin’s perlocutionary effects, as persuasion, with the illocutionary force proper.” Grice replied: “I may be mistaken, not confused”!

The Naturalists Return” Philosophical Review 101, repr. in J. Losee, New Conceptions of Philosophy of Science: Descriptivism, Normative Naturalism, Methodological Foundationalism, Dordrecht : Kluwer, in Por. in Cad. Hist. Filosof. Cie. 8.

            

“Authority, deference, and the role of individual reasoning” in E. McMullin, The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge, University of Notre Dame Press.

Cf. The title of Grice’s Kant lectures, “Aspects of reason and reasoning.”

“Vier Arten die Moral zu biologisieren” in  K. Bayertz, Evolution und Ethik: Biologische Grundlagen der Moral? Stuttgart, Reclam, in English, “Four ways  of biologicising ethics,” in E. Sober, Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Bradford Books, MIT Press, in M. Ruse, Philosophy After Darwin.

I guess Grice would have liked the 'biologicising'! He did think that questions of philosophical psychology emerge from questions of philosophical biology (After all, he was a classicist, and he treasured the Greek lexeme for 'life'!)

“Gene” in E. F. Keller and E. Lloyd, Keywords in Evolution, Harvard University Press

“Knowledge, society, and history” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23

“Function and design” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18, repr. in C. Allen, Nature’s Purposes, in D. Buller, Function, selection, and design, SUNY Press, in D.Hull/M. Ruse, Readings in the Philosophy of Biology, Oxford.

Cf. H. P. Grice's extensive readings on 'teleology' and 'ends.'

“The evolution of human ALTRUISM” The Journal of Philosophy, 90, repr. in The Philosopher’s Annual.

Evolution from self-interest? That would be Grice’s way. He has benevolence and self-interest as contrasting principles, as he should.

“Contrasting conceptions of social epistemology” In F. Schmitt, Social epistemology, Rowman and Allanheld

“The unity of science and the unity of nature”In  P. Parrini, Kant's Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht, Kluwer.

Pragma-Kantianism!

The Advancement of Science with responses to critics, I. Levi/P. Machamer/R. Miller/D. Shapere, a symposium, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

“Evolution of ALTRUISM in optional and compulsory games” W/J. Batali, Journal of Theoretical Biology.

While Grice speaks of the game of conversation, making conversational moves, and the rules of the conversational game, I wonder if he’d see it as ‘compulsory’!

“Who’s afraid of the human genome project?” in PSA, ed. by M. Forbes/R. Burian, East Lansing : Philosophy of Science Association, repr. in D. Hull/M. Ruse, Readings in the Philosophy of Biology, Oxford.

“The cognitive functions of scientific rhetoric” in H. Krips/J. McGuire/T. Melia, Science and Rhetoric, University of Pittsburgh Press.

“Mill, Mathematics, and the naturalist tradition” in J. Skorupski The  Cambridge  Companion to Mill

“Aprioristic yearnings” A critical study of M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, Erkenntnis.

For the record, Michael Friedman collaborated with H. P. Grice, rather engagingly, on universals. Vide: The H. P. Grice Papers, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. 

“Introduction” to issue on science and ethics" Perspectives on Science, W/N. Cartwright.  

Cartwright attended Grice's seminars at Berkeley. Vide Cartwright, "How the laws of science lie," in P. G. R. I. C. E., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Cartwright recalls with particular affection a seminar by Grice on “as if.”

 “An argument about free inquiry” Noûs, 31

“A plea for science studies” In N. Koertge A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science Oxford. In Sp. in Talon de Aquiles, Chile.

“Psychological ALTRUISM, evolutionary origins, and moral rules” Philosophical Studies, 89.

Griceian. In his Oxford seminars, he would rather jocularly speak of a principle of conversational self-interest in balance with a principle of conversational benevolence. To explain ‘implicature’!

“Truth or consequences?” Proceedings/Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 

Good pun.

“Games social animals play” Commentary on B. Skyrms’s Evolution of the social contract, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59.

Cf. H. P. Grice against quasi-contractualism, and cfr. the oeuvre of G. R. Grice, a philosopher from the University of East Anglia at Norwich, who has covered a lot of the same ground that the other Grice did!

“Race, ethnicity, biology, culture” in L. Harris, Concepts of racism, New York, Prometheus.

“Patients in the twenty-first century: the Impact of preventive medicine” in D. Grossman/H. Valtin, Great Issues for Medicine in the Twenty-First Century: Ethical and Social Issues Arising out of Advances in the Biomedical Sciences, New York, Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 882.

“The hegemony of molecular biology” Biology and Philosophy,14, in Gr. ed. J. Lennox.

“Essence and perfection” Ethics, 110

“Unification as a (Kantian) regulative ideal” Philosophical Perspectives, 7

“Refining the causal theory of reference for natural-kind terms” W/P. K. Stanford, Philosophical Studies 97.

Cf. Grice on Putnam. Grice used to be too formal “until, of all people, Hilary Putnam, told me I was too formal.”

“A priori knowledge, revisited” in P. Boghossian/C. A. B. Peacocke, New Essays on the a priori, Oxford.

C. A. B. Peacocke is a Griceian. Peacocke, Waynflete's professor of metaphysical philosophy, Oxford. He attended Grice’s seminars at Berkeley, too.

“Reasonable people” in J. Fetzer, Science, Explanation, and Rationality: The Philosophy of C. G. Hempel, Oxford.

Cf. Grice on Hempel in Grice’s “Actions and events.”

“Patterns of scientific controversy” in A. Baltas/P.Machamer/M. Pera, Scientific Controversies, Oxford.

A good pun on Hanson.

“Some pictures are worth 2^À₀ sentences” W/A. Varzi, Philosophy, 75

“Reviving the sociology of science” PSA, Philosophy of Science, 67

“Parfit’s puzzle” Noûs, 34, Repr. in The Philosopher’s Annual.

Parfit cites Grice’s “Personal identity.”

“Utopian eugenics and social inequality” in P. Sloan, Implications of the Human Genome Project, University of Notre Dame Press 

“Battling the undead: how and how not to resist genetic determinism” in R. Singh/C. Krimbas/D. Paul/J. Beatty, Thinking About Evolution: Historical, Philosophical and Political Perspectives, Cambridge, Repr. in S.Downes and E. Machery, Arguing about Human Nature, Routledge.

“Infectious ideas” The Monist, 84 

 “Knowledge and tradition” Philosophical Topics, 29

“Real realism: the Galilean strategy” Philosophical Review, 110.

Grice would have enjoyed ‘real realism’! One occasion where ‘real’ is not one of those “trouser-words” on which J. L. Austin poured scorn! Actually, Grice discusses Davidson’s “scientific realism” (alla Smart) in “Actions and events,” but then he had to, because they shared a philosophy department for years!

“Carl G. Hempel” in A. P. Martinich/D. Sosa,  A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell.

Excellent entry. The one for Grice is good, too! Grice, if I may repeat, discusses Hempel in “Actions and events.”

“Creating perfect people” in J. Burley/J. Harris, Blackwell Companion to Genethics.

Grice would just LOVE ‘genethics,’ the kind of wordplay he engaged in!

“On the explanatory role of correspondence truth” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64, 2002, 346-364. Reprinted in Fred Schmitt, Theories of Truth, Blackwell.

Grice holds a variant of the correspondence theory of truth in the third William James lecture (just to oppose Strawson’s ‘performative’ theory of truth, then fashionable). Note that for Kitcher is not the correspondence theory of truth!

“The role of social psychology in a theory of science” in P. Carruthers/S. Stich/M. Siegel, The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge.

“Veritistic value and the project of social epistemology” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64.

Grice would have liked ‘veritistic,’ even if he used von Wright's 'alethic' profusely. Grice loved a truth-value and somewhat opposed to Strawson’s attempt to introduce truth-value GAPS!

“Pop socio-biology re-born: the evolutionary psychology of sex and violence” W/A. L.Vickers in C. Travis, Evolution, Gender, and Rape, Cambridge MA.: MIT Press

“Born again creationism” in R. Pennock, Intelligent design Creationism, MIT Press.

“Scientific knowledge” in P. Moser, The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology

“The third way” and “Reply to Helen Longino” Philosophy of Science, 69

“Giving Darwin his due” in J. Hodge/G. Radick, The  Cambridge Companion to  Darwin

“The scientist’s role” The Annual John Wesley Powell Lecture to the South-Western and Rocky Mountain Division of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, published as an individual pamphlet in the Division’s Series

“What kinds of science should be done?” in A. Lightman/D. Sarewitz/C.. Dresser, Living With the Genie,  Washington, D.C.: Island Press

“The many-sided conflict between science and religion” in William Mann, The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford.

“Global health and the scientific research agenda” W/J. Flory, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32

“Responsible biology” Bioscience, 54 

“Biology and ethics” in D. Copp, The Oxford Handbook of Ethics. Cfr. bio-ethics.

“The ends of the sciences” in B. Leiter, The Future of Philosophy, Oxford

“Philosophy of biology” in F. Jackson/M. Smith The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy

“Philosophy of science” Encyclopedia Britannica.

“A pragmatist’s progress: the varieties of William James’s strategies for defending religion” in W. Proudfoot, William James and a Science of Religions, Columbia. 

An excellent alliteration alla “platonist’s plight,” and “monism’s moment”!

“On the autonomy of the sciences” Philosophy Today 48

“History and the sciences” W/D. Immerwahr, in D. Herwitz/M. Kelly, Action, Art, History: Engagements with A. C. Danto, Columbia.

Indeed, it’s difficult to see how narrativism can be scientific, unless we approach it in a continental way in terms of the sciences of intentional understanding, alla Grice.

“Authority and judgment in Wagner’s Ring” W/Richard Schacht, In L. Goehr/D. Herwitz, The Don Giovanni Moment,  Columbia.

Cf. remarks above on Grice on Wagner’s Meistersinger!

“A priori” in P. Guyer, The Cambridge  Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy.

“Evolutionary theory and the social uses of biology” Biology and Philosophy, 19, repr. in a volume of essays in memory of S. J. Gould.

“The knowledge business” in E. Olsson, Knowledge and inquiry: essays on the pragmatism of I. Levi, Cambridge.

“The hall of mirrors” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79

“Between fragile altruism and morality: evolution and the emergence of normative guidance” in G. Boniolo/G. De Anna, Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology, Cambridge.

Cf. Grice on the principle of conversational self-interest and the principle of conversational benevolence (a.k.a. conversational altruism, or conversational co-operation).

“Les vies potentielles” in J. Gayon/D. Jacobi, L’Eternel Retour de l’Eugénisme, Presses Universitaires de France

“Ethics and evolution: how to get here from there” in F. de Waal et. al. Primates and philosophers: how morality evolved, The Tanner Lectures, Princeton.

“Public knowledge and the difficulties of democracy” Social Research, 73

“Darwin and democracy” Crosscurrents, 56

“Evolution and religion” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 

“Does ‘race’ have a future?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 35

“Reply to Talisse and Aikin” Journal of Social Philosophy 38

“Der Ring des Nibelungen” in S. Sorgner, Handbuch Nietzsche Wagner, Roholt

“Darwins Herausforderer” in D. Rupnow/C. Wessely, Pseudo-wissenschaft, Suhrkamp

“Carnap and the caterpillar” Philosophical Topics

Cf. R. B. Jones on Carnap. 

“Mill’s consequentialism”in D. Moyar, The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth-Century Thought.

“Mill, Education, and the Good Life” in B. Eggleston, J. S. Mill on the Good Life, Oxford

“Education, Capitalism, and Democracy” in H. Siegel, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education.

“Science, Religion, and Democracy” Episteme, 5

“Scientific research: who should govern?” Nanoethics, 1

“Prospects for a naturalistic ethics” Proceedings of GAP 6

“Beyond disbelief” in R. Blackford, Voices of Disbelief, Blackwell.

An excellent re-figuring of a rather otiose cliché!

“Two forms of blindness: on the need for both cultures” Technology in Society.

Very Snowian.

“One question” in G. Oftedal et. al. Evolutionary Theory: Five Questions, Automatic Press

“Challenges for secularism” in G. Levine, The Joy of Secularism, Princeton

“Scientific realism: the truth in pragmatism” in W. Gonzalez, Scientific Realism and Democratic Society: The Philosophy of P. S. Kitcher, Rodopi, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Science.

“Science in a democratic society,” and “Replies” in Gonzalez (ed) 

“Der andere Weg”in Die Gegenwart des Pragmatismus, ed. by M. Hartmann, J. Liptow, and M. Willaschek, Suhrkamp

“The importance of Dewey for philosophy” in Dewey’s Enduring Impact, J. Shook/P. Kurtz , Prometheus.

“Philosophy inside out”Meta-philosophy 42

“Collideorscape: Finnegans Wake in the large and in the small” Joyce Studies.

“Militant modern atheism” Journal of Applied Philosophy 28

“Bio-medical research, neglected diseases, and well-ordered science” W/Reiss, Theoria, 24

“Varieties of altruism”  Economics and Philosophy, 26

Cf. Again, Grice on the principle of conversational benevolence, and the principle of conversational co-operation. 

“Varieties of freedom and their distribution” Social Research 77.

“Public knowledge and its discontents” Theory and Research in Education, 9

“Drei Herausforderungen für eine naturalistische Ethik” in T. Schmidt and T. Tarkian, Naturalismus in der Ethik, Paderborn: Mentis.

Hardly what G. E. Moore called the ‘naturalistic fallacy’!

“Epistemology without history is blind” Erkenntnis, 75

“On the very idea of a theory of evidence” in G. Morgan, Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of P. Achinstein, Oxford.

“Platons Rache: Undemokratische Nachrichten von einem überhitzten Planeten” in M. Hagner, Wissenschaft und Demokratie, Suhrkamp

“Can we sustain democracy and the planet, too?” Agnotology, ed. by M. Carrier and J. Kourany.

I guess Grice would have loved ‘agnotology.’ I can imagine him formalizing Socrates’s agnotological paradox!

“Pragmatism and realism: a modest proposal” in Preludes to Pragmatism.

Good reference to British literature! Grice has a paper on ‘modest mentalism,’ which may relate!

“Mathematical truth?” in Preludes to Pragmatism

 “The Ethical Project”afterthoughts, and reply to comments, Analyse und Kritik, 34

“The many lessons of Kuhn’s Structure” Historical studies in the natural sciences, special issue on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Grice often wondered if ‘philosophical revoutions’ work alla Kuhn, as Grice would often refer to Ryle’s and Austin’s ‘ordinary-language’ philosophy revolution in Oxford! Cf. Warnock, “Revolution in philosophy.”

“Toward a pragmatist philosophy of science: The Lullius lectures” Theoria 28

“Religion, truth and progress” Religione, verità, e progresso,” in Fenomenologia e Società, on R. Bellah’s Religion in Human Evolution, in P. Thompson and D.Walsh, Essays in Honour of M. Ruse, Cambridge.

“The youth without qualities” Monist, on R. Musil and philosophy.

“Is a naturalised ethics possible?” Behaviour 151, Brill.

Grice would rightly distinguish between ‘naturalistic ethics’ and ‘naturalised ethics’!

“Pragmatism’s constructive project” in J. Green, R.. J. Bernstein and the Pragmatist Turn in Contemporary Philosophy, Palgrave/Macmillan 

Grice saw himself as a constructivist. I think he first learned the word from Broad, who has one approach to personal identity as being that of a ‘logical construction,’ and Grice kept using the expression!

“Deweyan naturalism” in M. Bagger, Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Religion, Columbia.

Grice was sometime Dewey lecture, but I doubt he lectured on Dewey!

“Governing Darwin’s world” in P. Adamson/G. F. Edwards, Animals: Historical Perspectives, Oxford.

“Evolution and ethical life” in D. Livingstone Smith, Bio-philosophy, Cambridge.

“Deweyan pragmatism and the philosophy of science” Journal of Dialectics of Nature 37

“Secularism as a positive position” in M. Rechtenwald/R. Almeida/G. Levine, Global Secularisms in a Post-Secular Age, Boston: De Gruyter.

                                                                              

“On progress” in S. Rangan, Performance and Progress, Oxford, in Ger., “Über den Fortschritt”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 64

Cf. Grice, “In progress.” :)

 “After Kuhn” in P. Humphreys, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science, Oxford.

Cf. those philosophers who called themselves “post-Griceian.”

“Experimental animals” Philosophy and Public Affairs 43

“Rationality for dummies” in W. Doniger/P. Galison/S. Neiman, What Reason Promises , Berlin: De Gruyter.

“What reason promises,” the title of the compilation. Implicature: But does not deliver?

“Social progress” Social Philosophy and Policy.

“Masking the meaningful” Global Policy, 7

Sounds Griceian!

“Deaths in Venice” response to commentaries, Teorema, 35 

“Synthetic wisdom” The Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences

GROUP C: Other.

“Teaching philosophy of science” Teaching Philosophy 2

“Darwin, the bogeyman” The National Forum 63

“Good science, bad science, dreadful science, and pseudo-science” The Journal of College Science Teaching 14.

Grice would love the bad/dreadful distinction! And of course pseudo-science is not science, odd as that linguistic construction might be!

“The trouble with human socio-biology is …,” On D. Vinning. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences

“The devil, the details, and Dr. Dennett” W/P. Kitcher, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Review of Daniel Dennett The Intentional Stance.

Dennett, who studied at All Souls, Oxford, calls himself a Griceian. 

“The compleat falsifier” Psychological Inquiry.

Great spelling of ‘complete.’

“Junior comes out perfect” The New York Times Magazine, It. Liberal.

“Explanation” The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

On Simon LeVay. Queer Science, in The Sciences,

“L’origine de la morale” La Recherche, Tr. Sp. Mundo cientifico

“Why there’ll never be another you” Los Angeles Times

“Clones, sheep, gnats, and camels” New Scientist

“Whose self is it, anyway?” The Sciences, repr. in G. Pence, Flesh of my flesh: the ethics of cloning humans, Rowman and Littlefield.

“Reconstituted chicken” London Review of Books

“Jeden gibt’s nur einmal” Interview, Die Zeit.

“Tall, Slender, Straight, and Intelligent” London Review of Books, Tr. German in Die Zeit

“You win, I win” London Review of Books.

Cf. Grice on conversation as a non-zero-sum game!

“Das göttliche Kind: selbst-gebastelt” Der Tagesspiegel

“What, if anything, is it all about?” Multiple review of recent books in the philosophy of mathematics, Times Literary Supplement

“Sea-shells and tigers” London Review of Books

“Not in my body, thank you” London Review of Books

“Ethik ohne Gott” Die Zeit

“Charles Darwin – besonders gründlich, besonders überzeugend” Neue Züricher Zeitung

“Was heisst denn hier Freiheit?” Schweizer Monatshefte 969 

“John Dewey, Philosophical Radical” Free Inquiry.

“Mis-understanding Darwin” W/N. Block, Boston Review.

Block quotes Grice's Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.” He rightly has him as a functionalist.

“The climate-change debates” Science 328.

“The lure of the peak” The New Republic.

“Seeing is unbelieving” New York Times Book Review.

Another good refiguring of a cliché, as ‘beyond disbelief!’

“The taint of ‘social darwinism,” The New York Times, Opinionator, at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/the-taint-of-social-darwinism/)  repr. in P. Catapano/S. Critchley, The Stone Reader: Modern Philosophy in 133 Arguments, New York, Norton.

“The trouble with scientism” The New Republic.

Cf. Grice on 'the devil of scientism.'

“Die gesellschaftliche Verantwortung der Philosophie” interview, Information Philosophie

“Experiments of living” The Humanist, 73.

Sounds like the title of a play by Noel Coward, :) (“Design for a living.”)

“Things fall apart,” The New York Times, Opinionator, at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/things-fall-apart/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0, Repr. in The Stone Reader.

“A deeper freedom: Democracy and Education Revisited” Berlin Journal.

“Soft atheism” in G. Gutting, Talking God, New York, Norton.

D.  P. S. Kitcher as editor.

Philosophy of Science Association, co-ed. with P. Asquith.

“An opinionated introduction,” W/W. Aspray) in Essays on the History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, co-ed. with W. Aspray, University of Minnesota, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Includes P. S. Kitcher's "Mathematical Naturalism"

“Philosophy of mathematics,” The Revue Internationale de Philosophie, ed. by P. S. Kitcher.

Scientific Explanation, co-ed. W. Salmon, University of Minnesota, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science.

            

E. Reviews by Kitcher.

Some fifty reviews in: Science, Historia Mathematica, Annals of Science, Isi, The Philosophical Review, History and Philosophy of Logic, Evolution , The Journal of Higher Education, Philosophical Books, The New York Times, Nature, The Times Higher Education Supplement, The Times Literary Supplement , The Journal of Philosophy, The Wall Street Journal, and Mind.

F. Secondary bibliography.

Conceptus 9.

Naturalismus in der Ethik, from a workshop on Kitcher’s “The Ethical Project”. T. Schmidt/T. Tarkian, eds. Paderborn, Mentis.

Scientific realism and democratic society: the philosophy of P. S. Kitcher, ed. W. Gonzalez, Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Analyse und Kritik 34, on Kitcher’s ‘The Ethical Project.’

“Preludes to pragmatism” a symposium, Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society, 50.

Cf. H. P. Grice, "Lectures on C. S. Peirce's theory of signs," Oxford, mentioned above. "A rather cryptic author not well known on these shores!"

“P. S. Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism,” ed. M. Kaiser/A. Seide, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, Münstersche Vorlesungen Series, Essays on Kitcher’s philosophy (ed. by M. Couch/J. Pfeifer, Oxford) by N. Cartwright, L. Daston, D. C. Dennett, J. Dupre, P. Griffiths, M. Massimi, K. Neander, G. Rosen, M. Smith, M. Strevens, J.Woodward, with Kitcher’s individual replies.

Good Cartwright and Dennett contributed! Both good Griceians!

“Deaths in Venice,” Teorema, 35