H. P. Grice: Conversational implicata and conversation as rational co-operation

H. P. Grice: Conversation

Why does conversation matter to philosophy?

Conversational implicata: conversation as rational co-operation

“Conversational implicata are, by definition, and as their very name suggests, essentially connected with some such general, if not vague, feature that all conversation seems to display.”

“But can we engage in a bit of philosophical exploration as to what, essentially, this general, if not vague, feature is?”

“The following description, or characterisation, no doubt familiar to you, may provide a first shot, or approximation, to what we may label, if that's not too pretentious, a general "principle of conversational helpfulness."”

"Honour your conversationalist's goal, as he'll honour yours, as both proceed along the lines of the shared purpose of the conversation in which you two are engaged."

"A conversation, you see, will not normally consist, or *should* not normally consist -- if have to allow for Samuel Beckett -- of a succession of totally disconnected conversational 'moves'." 

"It's more like chess."

“A conversation would be, perhaps, be still considered a purposive, even concerted purposive, activity, but indeed not, surely, a a rational concerted activity -- as we philosophers use the word 'rational' -- if your common-or-garden conversation did consist of a haphazard sequence of totally unrelated conversational 'moves.'” 

"Conversation would rather be pretty irrational, and it ceteris paribus ain't!"

"A conversation, such as we know it, on the other hand is, rather, and characteristically, to some degree at least, we hope, what we may regard as a pretty tidy, reasonable, indeed rational, and, as we say, co-operative, concerted, effort, to boot."

"But what brings this sort of rational order to conversation?"

"Well, for starters, each participant should recognise in the conversation in which he is engaged, to some extent at least, a shared, common purpose, or set of shared, common purposes (if we add the institution of 'boulemaic' decisions to the maximally effective exchange of 'alethic' or 'doxastic' information), or least a mutually accepted 'direction' or flow to it."

"This conversational common purpose, or purposes, (if we allow for a distinction between the 'doxastic' realm involved in the maximally effective exchange of information, and the 'boulemaic' realm involved in the institution of decisions), or r direction, or flow, may be pretty much fixed from the start, *ab initio*, by, e.g., an opening proposal of some philosophical question by a philosophy don to his tutee for discussion."

"Or again, the shared, common purpose, or purposes, or direction, may very much evolve during the conversation itself."

"As every philosophy don is well aware, an initial proposal of a question by himself turns into a request for clarification for what his tuttee has contributed to the conversation, say."

"Hardly vice versa, since it would be perceived as rude."

"The conversational shared common purpose may, too, be fairly definite, as a conversation between this philosophy don and his tutee about the basis Descartes gives for innate ideas, and why his tutee should find that repugnant."

"But then again, the conversational shared common purpose may be so indefinite as to leave quite some *considerable* latitude to the conversationalists, if perhaps, they are not philosophical ones, to make pretty much any conversational move as he pleases, as in a casual, naturally-occurring conversation between two philosophy dons, or between two tutees, as the case might be, in the pub, outside college."

“But, in any case, at each stage, some possible conversational moves will be deemed as being excluded as being conversationally rather unsuitable, or un-co-operative."

"And this is where we get closer to the conversational implicatum of things like "That pillar-box seems red to me, you know," retrieving my conversational partner's surprise: "But it *is* red. It's an *English* pillar box."

"A rough version, then, of this general principle, the principle of conversational helpfulness, for lack of a better name, or 'co-operation,' if you must, which reasonable, or even rational, conversationalists are expected, ceteris paribus, to observe, may run more or less as follows -- I'll formulate it in ways that manifest its potential universability: ‘try to do your best to try to make your conversational contribution such as that conversational contribution is required, at the stage at which it happens to occur, by what you perceive, to the best of your knowledge, to be the accepted shared, common purpose (or purposes), or mutual direction, of the conversation in which you are engaged, thus honouring your co-conversationalist's goal, into the bargain, and expecting he'll honour yours in return."

"I hope that's not too much of a mouth-full."

“Now, you'll surely are ready to jump on me about the fact that, as you feel, there are all sorts of *alternative* imperatives, or axioms, or principles, or desiderata, or maxims -- aesthetic, social, or moral in character, you name them -- such as ‘be polite,’ that are normally observed by participants in a conversation.”

"In French, it's even worse: you have to keep an eye on the pronouns!"

"Our principle of conversational helpfulness, as we've just formulated it, though, however, and, more importantly, the conversational implicata connected with this principle -- recall we are philosophers here -- are specially connected (some of which of much philosophical interest), it is hoped, with a particular, again reasonable, or rational, purpose that conversation is, shall we say, evolutionarily, adapted to serve -- in the development of social altruism and benevolence versus mere self-interest, and is primarily, or centrally, in fact thus employed to serve, as conducted by actual, reasonable, indeed rational, we hope, conversationalists."

"This particular collaborative, co-operative, mutual, or concerted conversational purpose may be identified as comprising, in the 'alethic' realm, as I say, the maximally effective collaborative exchange of 'doxastic' information; in the 'practical' or 'boulemaic' sphere, on the other hand, the collaborative influencing, or directing, of the attitudes or actions of your conversational partner -- the institution of decisions, for short.”

“The avowed aim of the philosophical enterprise we are engaged in, which involves the identification of conversational implicata usually ignored by this or that Oxonian philosopher -- I'll mention J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, H. L. A. Hart, and perhaps even myself! -- is, simply put, then, to regard conversation as a species, or specimen, or special case, indeed, or variety, of not just purposive or merely goal-oriented, or teleological, but strictly rational, concerted, co-operative behaviour.”

“It is rewarding, therefore, to find that specific concerted expectations or presumptions connected with our principle of conversational helpfulness have perfect analogues in the sphere of transactions that are still concerted, co-operative, and rational, but not conversations as such: the 'moves,' what we may now call the explicata, can still be identified, to contrast with the 'implicata,' that philosophers usually ignore, or misidentify."

“Analogues from the realm of non-conversational co-operative transactions are especially highly relevant to one pretty fundamental question, no less, about the principle of conversational helpfulness, viz., what the very basis is for the assumption which conversationalists seem to make, and on which it appears that a great range of conversational implicata -- e.g. "It seems to me that that pillar-box is red" -- depend, that each conversationalist will, in general, ceteris paribus, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary, proceed in the manner that some principle of conversational helpfulness prescribes.”

"One first, rather dull but, no doubt at a certain level, boringly adequate answer, at least at Oxford, to that fundamental question is that it is just *happens* to be a well-recognised and over-proven empirical fact that conversationalists do pretend to think that they behave in charming helpful, and co-operative, altruistic, and benevolent ways, as they exchange pleasantries, philosophical or other."

“Well-bred, benevolent, altruistic -- indeed, helpful or co-operative conversationalists are supposed to have learned to subscribe to this principle of conversational helpfulness in very early childhood from their equally co-operative parents, and have fortuately not lost the habit of doing so, even when down at Oxford!"

"Indeed, it would, if you think of it, involve a good deal of effort (and who wants effort?) to make a radical departure from the habit of conversational helpfulness that we all pretend we are operating with -- and some of us not even pretend!"

"How far can conversational UN-helpfulness will lead you, at Oxford or elsewhere?"

“One may want to be, however, as a philosopher, enough of a rationalist, even at Oxford -- where 'empiricism' is the rule -- to wish to find some non-empirical basis that underlies these over-proven, empirical facts about conversation, undeniable though these over-proven empirical facts may be.”

"One would like, if you are a philosopher, as I say, to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all, or most, reasonable, or indeed rational, conversationalists do in fact follow, but as a practice that it is itself reasonable, for each conversationalist, to follow, that a conversationalist should rather not abandon, provided your co-conversationalist happens to abide by it, too, of course!"

"One may feel attracted by the idea that observance of our principle of conversational helpfulness, in this or that conversation, may be thought of as a tacit, quasi-contractual matter between the two conversational partners."

 "Again, it is rewarding to find 'quasi-contractual,' as I may call them -- I love "quasi-" -- parallels, too, outside the realm of conversation proper.”

"Let's talk cars."

“If you pass by, as I am obviously struggling with my stranded car, I, no doubt, have some degree of expectation (unless I perceive that you are obviously in a hurry -- High Way can be busy! -- that you will try (if not do your best) to offer some help with it."

"Once you do join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms, in the absence of indications, of course, that you are, as it may sometimes happen, merely an incompetent meddler, of the type that actually abound at Oxford, during the summer!"

“And conversation does seem to exhibit, or display, or manifest, characteristically, certain few features that jointly distinguish or characterise any form of co-operative, concerted transaction.”

"Let us explore some of these features."

“First, both participants in any co-operative transaction, conversational or other, have some shared or common immediate aim or goal, such as, in the realm beyond conversation, and in the scenario I have just presented, getting a car mended -- which may involve a 'conversational' move or two, into the bargain."

"A harmless caveat, though: each agent's ultimate aim or goal may, of course, be independent from the other."

"Each agent's ultimate goal may not only not be a shared one, but one that is even in conflict with his co-agent's aim."

“In the worst-case scenario of the car situation, each agent may want to (collaboratively, if you excuse me the split infinitive) get the afore-mentioned car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other one stranded.”

"One would be a thief, though!"

“In characteristic conversations, however, conversationalists should assume a shared, common aim, even if, as in an 'over-the-garden-wall' chat, or chit-chat, or small talk, as we may call it, it is strictly a second-order aim, viz., that each party to the conversation should, at least for the time being, identify himself with, or honour, the superfluous, frivolous, transitory conversational interests of the other, and join him in some rather idle talk about, say, the weather, or how nicely the flowers have bloomed."

"There is another feature to a rational co-operative transaction, regardless of its conversational status."

"Each contribution, or move, by the participants in any co-operative transaction, conversational or other, should be in principally dove-tailed, mutually dependent."

"If an answer follows a question in conversation, your getting in the building follows my help in opening the door."

“There is yet another feature I can think of."

"There is, in a any co-operative rational transaction, conversational or other, some sort of understanding (which may be at best, some think, explicitly formulated, but which is often, thanks God, tacit) that, other things being equal, the co-operative concerted transaction should continue in appropriate smooth, co-operative, collaborative, helpful style, unless one of the two parties to the transaction, or actually both of them, are agreeable that the transaction should terminate.”

“One is not supposed, let alone expected, to just shove off, without a warning, stop collaborating, and start doing something else.”

“But, while some such quasi-contractual basis as this one we have just sketched may apply to some specimens of conversation, even at Oxford, there are too very many other types, perhaps of a more argumentative character, between Oxford philosophy professors, at a meeting at Merton's sub-faculty -- there are three of them -- , say, and not just philosophy dons, where such a 'quasi-contractual' basis just fails to fit comfortably.”

“One would rather like to be able to show, or prove, or deduce, or make it evident, rather, that the default observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness is both reasonable and indeed, rational along somewhat stronger line than those that a merely 'quasi-contractual' basis provides.

“Almost in transcendental, or metaphysical, terms, we, as philosophers, should be able to prove, deduce, or show, or make it evident, that any conversationalist who does care, or show some concern, about the goals that are central or constitutive to conversation -- giving and receiving information, in the alethic or doxastic realm; influencing and being influenced by others, in the practical or boulemaic realm) should be a fortiori, as a matter of conceptual consequence, expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, if you wish, in the very participation in conversations that will be profitable or useful or worth your time only on the assumption that these conversations are conducted, or proceed, in general accordance with our principle of conversational helpfulness.”

"Whether any such conclusion or transcendental, metaphysical, proof can be reached, I am far from certain."

"But then, if philosophy generated no problems, it would be dead, wouldn't it?"