H. P. Grice: Conversation
“There are all sorts of imperatives, axioms,
principles, desiderata, or maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character),
such as ‘be polite,’ that are normally observed by participants in
conversations.”
“The principle of conversational helpfulness, however,
and the conversational implicata connected with it, are specially connected, I
hope, with the particular purpose that
conversation is adapted to serve and is primarily or centrally employed to
serve: a maximally effective exchange of information, and influencing, or
directing, the action of your co-conversationalist.”
“Conversational
implicata are, by definition, and as their name suggests, essentially connected
with certain general features of conversation.”
“What features are these?”
“The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle of conversational helpfulness.”
“The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle of conversational helpfulness.”
“A conversation does not normally consists of a
succession of disconnected remarks.”
“A conversation would not be a rational activity if it
did.”
“A conversation is characteristically, to some degree
at least, a rational co-operative effort.”
“Each participant recognizes in the conversation in which he is engaged, to some extent, a common purpose or set of commonpurposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.”
“Each participant recognizes in the conversation in which he is engaged, to some extent, a common purpose or set of commonpurposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction.”
“This conversational common purpose, or direction may
be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for
discussion).
“Or the common purpose may evolve during the
conversation itself.”
“The conversational common purpose may be fairly
definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to
the participants, as in a casual
conversation.”
“But at each
stage, some possible conversational moves
will be excluded as conversationally unsuitable.”
“A rough version of a general principle, the principle
of conversational helpfulness, which conversationalists are be expected, ceteris paribus, to observe, may run: ‘make
your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the conversation in which you
are engaged.”
“The avowed aim
is to regard conversation as a special case, or variety, of purposive, indeed rational, behaviour.”
“Therefore, it may be worth noting that the specific
expectations or presumptions connected with a principle of conversational
helpfulness have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are not conversations.”
“These analogies are relevant to one fundamental
question about the principle of conversational helpfulness, viz., what the
basis is for the assumption which we
seem to make, and on which it appears that a great range of conversational
implicata depend, that conversationalists will,
in general, ceteris paribus, and in
the absence of indications to the contrary, proceed in the manner that the
principle of conversational helpfulness prescribes.”
“A dull but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate
answer to that fundamental question is that it is just a well-recognised empirical fact that conversationalists do behave in helpful ways.”
“Conversationalists have learned to subscribe to a principle
of conversational helpfulness in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so.”
“Indeed, it would involve a good deal of effort to
make a radical departure from the habit.”
“One may want to be, however, enough of a rationalist
to wish to find a basis that
underlies these empirical facts, undeniable though these empirical facts may
be.”
“One would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice
not merely as something that all, or most, do in fact follow, but as something that it is reasonable for conversationalists to follow, that
conversationalists should not abandon.”
“One may feel attracted by the idea that observance of
a principle of conversational helpfulness, in a conversation, may be thought of
as a tacit quasi-contractual matter,
with parallels outside the realm of conversation.”
“If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded
car, I, no doubt, have some degree of expectation that you will offer help.”
“Once you join me
in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more
specific forms (in the absence of indications that you are merely an
incompetent meddler).”
“Conversation does seem to exhibit,
characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish co-operative
transactions in general.”
“First, participants in a co-operative transaction have
some shared or common immediate aim, like getting a car mended.”
“Their ultimate aims
may, of course, be independent and not shared, even in conflict.”
“Each may want to get the car mended in order to drive
off, leaving the other stranded.”
“In characteristic conversations, however, we may
assume a shared, common aim, even if, as in an over-the-garden-wall chat, it is
a second-order aim, viz., that each
party to the conversation should, at least for the time being, identify himself
with, or honour, the albeit transitory conversational interests of the other.”
“Also, the contributions of the participants in a
co-operative transaction should be dove-tailed, mutually dependent.”
“Finally, there is, in a co-operative transaction, some
sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit) that, other things being equal, the
transaction should continue in appropriate co-operative style, unless both
parties to the transaction are agreeable that it should terminate.”
“You do not just shove off, or start doing something
else.”
“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases of conversation, there are too many other types where
such a basis fails to fit comfortably.”
“One would like to be able to show, rather, that the observance
of the principle of conversational helpfulness is reasonable/rational along stronger line than a mere
quasi-contractual basis.
“Anyone who does care about the goals that are central
to conversation (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being
influenced by others) should be
expected to have an interest, given
suitable circumstances, in participation in conversations that will be
profitable only on the assumption
that these conversations are conducted in general accordance with a principle
of conversational helpfulness.”
“Whether any such conclusion can be reached, I am
uncertain.”
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