H. P. Grice: Conversational Implicata and Conversation As Rational Co-Operation

H. P. Grice: Conversation

Why does conversation matter to philosophy?

Conversational implicata: conversation as rational co-operation

“There are all sorts of imperatives, or axioms, or principles, or desiderata, or maxims -- aesthetic, social, or moral in character -- such as ‘be polite,’ that are normally observed by participants in conversations.”

"The principle of conversational helpfulness, however, and the conversational implicata connected with this principle, are specially connected (some of which of much philosophical interest), it is hoped, with the particular purpose that conversation is adapted to serve, and is primarily, or centrally, in fact thus employed to serve."

This particular collaborative or concerted purpose may be identified as comprising, in the 'alethic' realm, the maximally effective collaborative exchange of information; in the 'practical' sphere, the collaborative influencing, or directing, of the attitudes or actions of your conversational partner.”

“Conversational implicata are, by definition, and as their name suggests, essentially connected with some such general (if not vague) feature that all conversation displays.”

“But what is, essentially, this general (if not vague) feature?”

“The following description, no doubt familiar to you, may provide a first shot, or approximation, to what we may label, if that's not too pretentious, a general "principle of conversational helpfulness."”

"Honour your conversationalist's goal, as he'll honour yours, as both proceed along the lines of the shared purpose of the conversation in which you two are engaged."

"A conversation, you see, will not normally consist of a succession of totally disconnected conversational 'moves'." 

"It's more like chess."

“A conversation would be, perhaps, be still considered a purposive activity, but indeed not be a rational concerted activity if it did consist of a sequence of totally unrelated 'moves.'” 

"Conversation would rather be pretty irrational, and it ceteris paribus ain't!"

“A conversation, such as we know it, on the other hand is, rather, and characteristically, to some degree at least, what we may regard as a pretty tidy, rational, and, as we say, co-operative, concerted, effort.”

"Each participant recognises in the conversation in which he is engaged, to some extent at least, a shared, common purpose, or set of shared, common purposes, or at least a mutually accepted 'direction' or flow to it."

“This conversational common purpose, purposes, or direction, or flow, may be pretty much fixed from the start, *ab initio*, by, e.g., an opening proposal of some philosophical question for discussion."

"Or again, the shared, common purpose, purposes, or direction, may very much evolve during the conversation itself: the initial proposal of a question turns into a request for clarification, say."

"The conversational shared common purpose may, too, be fairly definite, as a conversations between a philosophy don and his tutee about the basis Descartes gives for innate ideas."

"But then again, the conversational shared common purpose may be so indefinite as to leave quite some *considerable* latitude to the conversationalists to make pretty much any conversational move as he pleases, as in a casual, naturally-occurring conversation between two dons, or between two tutees, as the case might be, in the pub outside college."

“But, in any case, at each stage, some possible conversational moves will be deemed as being excluded as being conversationally rather unsuitable, or un-co-operative."

"A rough version, then, of this general principle, the principle of conversational helpfulness, for lack of a better name, which rational conversationalists are expected, ceteris paribus, to observe, may run more or less as follows: ‘do your best to make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it happens to occur, by what you perceive to be the accepted shared, common purpose or mutual direction of the conversation in which you are engaged, thus honouring your co-conversationalist's goal, into the bargain, and expecting he'll honour yours."

“The avowed aim of this philosophical enterprise we are engaged in, which involves the identification of conversational implicata usually ignored by this or that Oxonian philosopher, is, simply put, then, to regard conversation as a special case, indeed, or a variety, of not just purposive, but strictly rational, concerted, co-operative behaviour.”

“It is rewarding, therefore, to find that the specific concerted expectations or presumptions connected with this principle of conversational helpfulness have perfect analogues in the sphere of transactions that are still concerted, coooperative, and rational, but not conversations as such: the 'moves' can still be identified with, to contrast with the 'implicata,' what we may call the 'explicata.”

“The analogies from the realm of non-conversational co-operative transactions are highly relevant to one pretty fundamental question about the principle of conversational helpfulness, viz., what the very basis is for the assumption which conversationalists seem to make, and on which it appears that a great range of conversational implicata depend, that each conversationalist will, in general, ceteris paribus, and in the absence of indications to the contrary, proceed in the manner that this principle of conversational helpfulness prescribes.”

"One rather dull but, no doubt at a certain level, boringly adequate answer, at least at Oxford, to that fundamental question is that it is just happens to be a well-recognised and proven empirical fact that conversationalists do pretend to think that they behave in charming helpful ways, as they exchange pleasantries, philosophical or other."

“Well-bred conversationalists are supposed to have learned to subscribe to this principle of conversational helpfulness in very early childhood and have fortuately not lost the habit of doing so, even when down at Oxford!"

"Indeed, it would, if you think of it, involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit of conversational helpfulness."

"How far can conversational UN-helpfulness would lead you?"

“One may want to be, however, enough of a rationalist, even at Oxford, to wish to find a non-empirical basis that underlies these empirical facts about conversation, undeniable though these empirical facts may be.”

"One would like, if you are a philosopher, to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all, or most, conversationalists do in fact follow, but as a practice that it is reasonable, for each conversationalist, to follow, that a conversationalist should not abandon, provided your co-conversationalist abides by it, too, of course!"

"One may feel attracted by the idea that observance of our principle of conversational helpfulness, in this or that conversation, may be thought of as a tacit, quasi-contractual matter between conversational partner."

 "Again, it is rewarding to find quasi-contractual parallels, too, outside the realm of conversation proper.”

"Let's talk cars."

“If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded car, I, no doubt, have some degree of expectation that you will try to offer some help with it."

"Once you do join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms, in the absence of indications, of course, that you are merely an incompetent meddler, of the type that abound at Oxford."

“Conversation does seem to exhibit, characteristically, certain a few features that jointly distinguish any co-operative, concerted transaction.”

"Let us explore these features."

“First, participants in a co-operative transaction, conversational or other, have some shared or common immediate aim, such as, in the realm beyond conversation, getting a car mended -- which may involve a 'conversational' move or two."

"A harmless caveat, though: each agent's ultimate aim may, of course, be independent from the other; not only a not shared one, but one that is even in conflict with the co-agent's aim."

“In the worst-case scenario, each agent may want to (collaboratively, if you excuse me the split infinitive) get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other one stranded.”

“In characteristic conversations, however, conversationalists should assume a shared, common aim, even if, as in an 'over-the-garden-wall' chat, as we may call it, it is strictly a second-order aim, viz., that each party to the conversation should, at least for the time being, identify himself with, or honour, the superfluous and transitory conversational interests of the other, and join him in rather idle talk about the weather.”

"Another feature: each contribution by the participants in any co-operative transaction, conversational or other, should be in principally dove-tailed, mutually dependent. If an answer follows a question, your getting in the building offers my opening the door."

“Finally, there is, in a any co-operative rational transaction, conversational or other, some sort of understanding (which may be at best, some think, explicitly formulated, but which is often, thanks God, tacit) that, other things being equal, the co-operative concerted transaction should continue in appropriate smooth, co-operative style, unless one party to the transaction, or both of them, are agreeable that the transaction should terminate.”

“You are not supposed or expected to just shove off, without a warning, stop collaborating, and start doing something else.”

“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this one we have just described may apply to some specimens of conversation, even at Oxford, there are too very many other types, perhaps of a more argumentative character, between Oxford professors, say, where such a quasi-contracctual basis just fails to fit comfortably.”

“One would rather like to be able to show, or prove, or deduce, rather, that the default observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness is both reasonable and indeed, rational along somewhat stronger line than those a mere quasi-contractual basis provides.

“Almost in transcendental terms, we should be able to prove, deduce, or show, that any conversationalist who does care about the goals that are central or constitutive to conversation -- giving and receiving information, in the alethic realm; influencing and being influenced by others, in the practical realm) should be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in conversations that will be profitable only on the assumption that these conversations are conducted in general accordance with our principle of conversational helpfulness.”

"Whether any such conclusion or transcendental proof can be reached, I am far from certain."

"But then, if philosophy generated no problems, it would be dead, wouldn't it?"