H. P. Grice: Conversational Implicata and Conversation As Rational Co-Operation

Utterer's and Addressee's Reasoning in Conversation.

H. P. Grice, St. John's, "Aspects of reason and reasoning," Oxford.

The concept, or as they used to say at Oxford, the 'logical grammar' of reasoning, may need some philosophical elucidation, if a philosopher is going to be 'enough of a rationalist' to defend the view of conversation as a type of rational co-operation aimed at the fulfilment of a shared goal of maximal exchange of information and the institution of a decision.

Why is the elucidation the more abstract 'reason' -- over and above, shall we say, 'conversational reason' -- so centrally important? 

Well, it just, for a philosopher, _is_.

By targeting 'reason' simpliciter, we hope to find a generality that we might otherwise not. 

Plus, some of us are irreverent, conservative, dissenting rationalists!

(And we only wished 'irreverent, conservative, dissenting empiricists would proceed likewise with 'experience'!)

Grice suggests that one good way to start is to provide "a bit of linguistic botany" on the use of the verb, 'to reason.'

It doesn't mean we have to open The Little Oxford Dictionary! For we know that the Romans were pretty confused about this 'ratio,' and transferred his confusions to the Anglo-Normans!

The English still use 'reason,' if guardedly. As George Mikes notes, in "How to become a Brit," 'you won't find a Brit using 'know' idly." 

But 'reason' is different, and the English are keen on pointing to the 'point' of things, that is, the 'ratio essendi,' in scholastic parlance.

Surely, we would then need to put everything in symbols.

"If you cannot put it in symbols, it's not worth saying," Grice told Strawson (Only to get the rebuke, "Oh, no! If you CAN put it in symbols, it's not worth saying!" -- thanks to P. M. S. Hacker for this!)

The canonical SCHEMA would run:

Reasoner R (Utterer U or Addressee A -- U/A for short) reasons 
from 
Premise P 
to 
Conclusion C

For short, "P yields C" -- provided we capture this connection within the scope of a psychological state, attitude, or stance, on the part of utterer and addressee.

More specifically:

U/A holds 
psychological state, attitude, or stance Psi
with content "p."

--- WHICH YIELDS

U/A holds 
psychological state, attitude, or stance, Psi'
with content "c.

Attitudes can be doxastic or boulomaic, since surely you don't need to be Immanuel Kant (but surely you don't want to be David Home) to want to apply 'reason' to practical matters.

The rationale being, as it were, that reason, or 'rationality,' qua, to be Kantians, 'faculty,' is a mere category shift from the verb, 'to reason,' and that it is manifested in behaviour, such as conversational behaviour, which displays in _reasoning_, in for example the production and recognition of both a conversational explicatum and a conversational implicatum, as conversation runs along.

A: Where are you going to, my pretty maid?
B: I'm going a-milking, sir.
A: Then I won't marry you.
B: Nobody asked you, sir. 

The connection between 'reason,' qua verb, and 'reason,' qua noun is via a mere 'swift' category shift, a construction routine which we may also dub 'subjectification.'

Surely, it is U and A who, qua rational personal beings, are, each, a 'primary subject,' with 'reason' as their essential 'attribute.'

There's the country gentleman

By subjectification, 'reason,' or 'rationality,' becomes a faculty or charasteristic of our rational U and A, who reason from p to c.

In the case of the utterer, his reasoning is to the optimal conversational move.

In the case of the addressee, his reasoning is to the optimal recovery of the utterer's meaning-constitutive (or "M-" for short) intention. 

Grice proposes as a 'stalking horse' for reasoning the the occurrence (the entertaining, and often acceptance), as 'manifested' in U's and A's sequence of conversational moves, of a chain of inferences, or more precisely, a sequence of ideas, psychological states, attitudes, or stances (with this or that propositional complex as their content) which consists of an INITIAL set (the initial premises) -- which may be suitably expanded by U/A on request from the premise actually entertained or accepted (an expansion thought or regarded or believed by  both U and A to be formally cogent) -- together with further members each of which is thought or regarded or believed by both U and A to be justfiable derivable by applying some canonical principle of inference P which is entertained by our reasoner (U and A) to be a similarly canonically formally valid one. 

There is an alternative formulation to that bit of verbiage:

Reasoner R reasons 
from premise P  to conclusion C 
if 
Reasoner R thinks, entertains, or accepts that premise P 

and 
Reasoner R intends that, in thinking or entertaining or accepting the conclusion C, 
R should be thinking of something which would be the conclusion C of a formally valid argument the premise of which is a similarly formally valid suplementation of premise P. 

In this occurrence, entertainment, or acceptance, the premise P (or the antecedent sequence, or the protasis), incidentally, may well be dubbed, for short, the 'reason' for the conclusion C.

But then, there is MISreasoning. 

Not all actual reasoning happens to be *good* reasoning. 

"Some is actually downright appalling," -- fallacious, even wicked.

Consider Wittgenstein:

"He said, "That pillar box seems red to me," therefore; the sense of 'seems' includes a reference to doubt and/or denial."

(Discussed at length by Grice in "The Causal Theory of Perception," in connection with his earliest insight on a conversational implicatum as impinging on topics in the philosophy of perception.)

Hence a proviso by Grice.

The conclusion C is _thought_ (regarded, believed) by Reasoner, or Mis-Reasoner R (say, Witters) to be derivable, rather than that it _is_ indeed, as a matter of fact, derivable. 

If Wittgenstein is a polysemy theorist, he may provide his own canon of inference.

Consider Jack to Jill:

(1) 

a. Career women always smoke heavily.

b. You certainly smoke heavily, Jill.

-------------------------------------------------------

Ergo, and therefore:

You must be a career woman, Jill.

Logical form: 

"If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying"

"|- ((Ax)(Ax > Bx) and (Ex.Bx)) > (Ex).Ax

is _not_ a theorem. 

|- ((Ax)(Ax > Bx) and (Ex).Ax)) > (Ex).Bx

is.

While there is, indeed, _bad_ reasoning, as in this bit above by, of all people, Jack, 'reasoning' is still a value-paradigmatic notion -- unlike, say, 'climate,' or 'weather,' especially at Oxford, but LIKE cabbages and kings.

Problem is we may have to know what _good_ reasoning is in order to elucidate 'reasoning' _simpliciter_, including the mis-reasonig of some 'ordinary-language' philosophers, so-called.

Then, there's 'incomplete' (_sic_ with scare quotes), un-exapanded, enthymematic, conversationally implicatural, reasoning. 

A bit of conversational reasoning can be 'incomplete' (albeit expandable). 

As in: 

"He remembered his name; I don't mean to say he once forgot it."

Grice, "Prolegomena to logic and conversation."

Here something like a principle of conversational helpfulness has to be made to work. 

Most actual reasoning, as manifested in your common-or-garden exchange of conversational moves happens to be, thank God, enthymematic.

It involves a conversational implicatum that U's addressee, A, must work out, or 'calculate,' under the assumption that the utterer U is abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.

Now Jill to a third party, Joe:

(2) 

a. Jack is an Englishman.

------------------------------------------

b. He is, therefore, brave -- broken crown and all.

The 'supressed bit' may be understood as 'an inferential schema': 

"Infer Bx from Ax if whatever satisfies 'A' _also_ satisfies 'B'. 

Whatever satisfies 'Englishman' also satisfies 'brave.'

Alternatively, we may speak of a _suppressed (or implicated) premise: 

"Every Englishman is {always/normally/usually/likely to be}
brave." 

Finicky elaboration of steps is actually, at Oxford, pretty much frowned upon, as it is seen as an offence to the very central principle of conversational helpfulness, "Don't assume your partner is an idiot."

Grice brings back at this point his fellow undergraduate ("Shropshire") at Corpus, Oxford way back in the 1930s, who, in one early tutorial with Hardie, claimed, and with a straight face, too, over a cup of tea and scone:

"The immortality of the human soul happens to be *proved* by the fact that, if you cut off the head of a chicken, the chicken will run round the yard for approximately, shall we say, fifteen minutes, before the chicken's body dropping to the ground."

Grice gave to Hardie, in Shropshire's presence, a rational re-construction for Shropshire's proof of the immortality of the human soul.

It occupied the full essay by Grice at his next tutorial with Hardie and Shropshire: 

(3) 

SHROPSHIRE'S PROOF OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL
by H. P. Grice, on behalf of Shropshire.
Dedicated to Hardie.
Corpus

i. If the soul is *not* dependent on the body (vide Grice, 'Personal identity'), the soul is immortal. 

ii. If the soul is dependent on the body, it is dependent on that part of the body in which it is located. 

iii. If my soul is located in my body, it is located in my head. 

iv. If the soul of a chicken is located in the head of the chicken, the soul of the chicken would be destroyed if the head is rendered inoperative by removal from the rest of the body of the chicken.

v. The chicken runs round the yard for approximately 15 minutes after head-removal. 

vi. The chicken surely can do this only if 'animated,' that is, controlled by a soul. 

----------------------------------------------

vii. Ergo, the soul of the chicken is _not_ located in, and _not_ dependent on, the head of chicken. 

-----------------------------------------------

viii. Ergo, the soul of the chicken is _not_ dependent on the body of the chicken.

ix. Ergo, the soul of the chicken is immortal. 

x. Now, if the chicken's soul is immortal, _a fortiori_ the human soul is immortal. 

x. Final ergo, Q. E. D., the human soul is immortal.

Hardie was not impressed.  Hardie noted what he called a 'minor' problem there.

Hardie said:

"Grice, you have reconstructed, on Shropshire's behalf, Shropshire's reasoning, as displayed in last week's tutorial."

"But, Shropshire, are you yourself willing to exand the reasoning exactly like Grice has done it? 

Shropshire set aside his tea and scone, and said:

"Yes!"

Hardie WAS impressed by Shropshire's tenacity.

For Grice, the lesson was different.

Grice was left wondering that perhaps Shropshire had not been that sincere, and there is an uneliminable 'indeterminacy' here, just as there is in the canonical case of a conversational implicatum.

We don't know!

Maybe yes, maybe no!

And, then, there's stuff which is too _good_ to be reasoning, usually displayed by what Grice called the "pre-Griceian" child and the "Griceian child"

Having allowed for allegedly _bad_ reasoning (as in the case of Witters and other 'ordinary-language' philosophers, even at Oxford, such as Austin, Strawson, and Hart), we also face reasoning which is awfully over-qualified, 'too good' 'too logical' 'to be reasoning' (like a child who is too well behaved for his own good). 

We can give a few conversational examples.

They will all trigger the wrong conversational implicatum, because they all fail to abide with the principle of conversational helpfulness.

(4) 

A: Has Smith arrived?

B: Well, Jones has arrived and Smith has arrived. Ergo: Smith has arrived.

NOT helpful: Addressee A already knew that from U's first conversational move, the second conjunct to his initial conjunction.

(5) 

A: Has Smith arrived?

B: Well, Smith has arrived. Ergo, Smith has arrived.

Hardly conversationally helpful: the addressee A  already knew that from U's first conversational move. No need for further 'inferring.'

(6) 

A: Where is your wife?

B: My wife is at home. Ergo: Someone is at home.

Not always helpful: The addressee A already assumed the conclusion from the premise (Addressees by default know that 'wives' are 'someones.')

Different scenario:

(6')

A: Is there anyone at home?

B: Well, my wife is at home. And she is someone, right?

This is rude. The conversationally helpful way to go is:

(6'')

A: Is there anyone in the house?

B: Well, my wife is at home.

---

Or:

(6")

A: Is there anyone in the house?

B: Yes.

---

Or:

(6''')

A: Is there anyone in the house?

B: My wife.

(meaning, "Someone is at home.")

A related problem: 

We require, in order to ascribe reasoning to some reasoner R, that the reasoner R is trying to solve _some_ problem: the production of the most rational conversational move in the utterer U's case, and the recognition of the most rational conversational move, in the addressee A's case.

We happen to be pretty reluctant to DEEM as 'reasoning' an utterly pointless sequence of formally valid steps as in

Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics:

(7) 

Moore (to Witters): How many hands have you got?

Witters: I don't 'got' any -- I have them. 

See: I have 2 hands. 

If I had 3 more hands, I would have 5 hands. 

Moore: Correct.

Witters:

If I were to have double 5, I'd have 10 hands. 

Moore: Correct.

Witters: Now, if, counter-factually, 4 hands were removed, 6 hands would still remain. 

Moore: Your point?

Witters: Well, Ergo: I would then have 4 more hands than I have now.

Moore: Your reasonings never cease to amaze me. Wait till I report to Bertie. 

The goal of conversational reasoning -- the solution of a conversational co-ordinatio problem -- gives us a criterion for _successful_, or flat apt, conversational reasoning. 

A successful piece of conversational reasoning is a piece of reasoning that achieves its goal.

Sometimes collaboratively.

Conversatioal intentions pervade conversational reasoning: the utterer's intention to make the most rational conversational move; the addresse's intention to recognise it!

Merely _judging_ that there _exists_ a formally valid supplementation does not, or should not,  _count_ as a piece of reasoning. 

It may be that 

|- P YIELDS C

But if that's not the object of the reasoner R's _intention_, there's no need to call it even a _possible_ or potential reasoning. 

We think of the reasoner as *intending* the production of the consequence to _be_ the consequence of P (which clearly is different from R the merely alethic _judging_ (right or wrong) that C is derivable from P.

Then there's what classical logic cannot catch, but maybe an implicatum can.

There are factors in reasoning seldom touched on by Whitehead's and Russell's so-called 'classical,' modernist logical approach to deductive reasoning, even as proved undecidable by Goedel.

Consider the Oxonian philosopher who many months ago undertakes to give a set of ten lectures at Cambridge, the *other* place.

One month before the starting date, the philosopher -- let's call him "Shropshire," -- is asked for the ten titles of the individual lectures.

That night, the philosopher reasons to himself as follows.

*********THE PHILOSOPHER'S LAMENT*******

(8) 

Oh God. 

It's all rather a mess. 

I do have piles of philosophical material. 

And all in my beautiful handwriting.

None of it seems, however, worth listening to by those pretentious Cantabrigians.

I may grant you that my material is not precisely in what we would call 'shape.'

I am in a terrible muddle, now.

If I give Cambridge the titles I have in mind, surely I'm not sure that the titles that I give will *fit* what finally emerges (if anything does).

And at Cambridge there's nothing more vexing that an improperly untitled free philosophical talk!

Why do I keep doing these things? 

Will I ever I learn? 

Now, if I cancel the whole Cambridge thing, though, my name will be mud, or Mudd.

And it isn't.

So: what I'll do is give them those otiose titles I had planned, while I will make a point about asking for some latitude to depart from them, if need be.

------

The philosopher's lament illustrates what Grice calls the degree-variant notion of 'reasoning,' as opposed to the 'flat' notion.

Reasoning is a gradational notion or concept, and I'm not surprised Austin never tackled it.

Reasoning is also pretty specific, or local, unless you are a philosopher.

One may be good at mathematical reasoning but not good at theological reasoning. 

This does not apply to Philosophy, regina scientiarum.

In fact, the reverse is true

GRICE: Hello.
CHAIRMAN: Hello, Professor Grice. So nice to see you. Allow me to introduce you to our faculty members.
GRICE: Charmed.
CHAIRMAN: This is Mister Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental philosophy.
GRICE: What continent?

Grice's implicature is that Mister Puddle is, if the Chairman is thought of as abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness, pretty hopeless at nineteenth-century continental philosophy.

Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. And chairmen should know it!

There are, however, basic 'excellences,' as it were, which are, alas, also degree-variant.

Grice lists just four.

I. Simplicity.

"Austin's reasoning were hard from simple."

II. Economy:

"D. F. Pears kept bringing idle premises to his account of intending."

III. Accuracy:

"P. F. Strawson talks of 'truth-value gaps,' as if we were supposed to take 'gap' literally."

IV. Inventiveness:

"And then, I thought we might need the concept of an implicatum." -- Grice.

We usually distinguish between 'rational' and 'reasonable'. 

But should we?

Grice formulates the principle of conversational helpfulness as one that would make anyone who cares for the shared goal of conversation think it 'reasonable, indeed rational' to engage in conversations that abide by it.

But that was YEARS ago -- and Grice was playing 'the altogether rationalist.'

Does the distinction still hold conceptual water? 

Grice engages here in a bit of linguistic botany, old Oxonian, full Austinian-Code style: 

Consider, first, and just because, the negation contexts involving 'reasonable' and 'rational.'

"Not reasonable," therefore, "not rational"?

Don't think so!

While it would NOT be 'irrational' (not rational, that is, and therefore, pretty rational?) to expect one's spouse to clean one's football boots, it might be _unreasonable_ (not reasonable). (The spouse has enough things to do, plus the spouse is not a slave, and it was not the spouse who got the boots in the state they are in).

Those football boots, incidentally, were not bought at a very _rational_ price.

For I would  not know what that means (cf. Grice/Strawson, "In defence of a dogma").

The football boots, as I recall, were bought, at High Street, as I remember, only at a pretty _reasonable_ price, actually.

A different scenario: 

To cheat someone in a business deal ("as such," as Kant would not put it) is neither _irrational_ nor  _unreasonable_.

It is just morally repulsive, and Kant knows it.

Further, while it would NOT be 'irrational' to cheat a man when you know you may be found out and as a result lose a valuable client, that would be a rather 'unreasonable' thing for you to do. 

An 'irrational' thing, on the other hand, would be to cheat the man when you know it is quite likely that you WILL be found out, and when, if you are, you lose your job at a time when employment is very difficult to obtain, you know. 

A third scenario: 

Yielding to a tempting invitation to go out drinking at "The Lamb and Flag," when you have already decided to spend the evening at St. John's working on tomorrow's lecture on the clash between the sub-principle of conversational self-interest and the sub-principle of conversational benevolence, would (as such) be, for all I care, neither irrational nor unreasonable.

Some might find it at most 'pretty weak and foolish.'

It's different at the Bird and Baby, since they are smarts up there.

On the other hand, to yield to that temptation to go beer drinking at the Lamb and Flag when you have _not_ yet decided what do do, even if you think you *know* you ought to get on with that work on the clash of the sub-principle of conversational benevolence and the sub-principle of conversational self-interest for tomorrow's seminar would yet not be still 'irrational,' although it _might_ be pretty unreasonable, seeing that you get paid as a 'university lecturer' here, and students can always report to the Sub-Faculty!

A fourth scenario: 

If you have bungingly got your firm into a difficulty, and you go and confess the matter to your boss, your boss may end up being both rational and reasonable about your bung.

"Was it intentional?"

Your boss will be rational if he coolly and in a reasoned way tells you what is the best course to take.

Your boss will be reasonable if he is not too hard on you. 

All this 'linguistic botany' as to how Grice uses 'reasonable' and 'rational' suggests, luckily, some, shall we say, _rationale_: 

"reasonable", but not "rational", is, a _privative_ adjective, what R. Hall calls an excluder, and what Grice calls 'privation,' in "Negation and privation" (Harborne, 1938). 

Further, it is the weaker  _unreasonable_ which happens to be the word that wears the trousers, to use Austin's artless sexist idiom, if we mustn't.

To be 'reasonable' is to be relatively *free from* being 'unreasonable.'

ARISTOTLE AND GRICE ON THE SOUL

The 'rational,' on the other hand, is the realm of what Aristotle in _Nichomachean Ethics_ calls, the ratiocinative soul, "psyche logike," which is _intrinsically_ or essentially (since it's a second substance, or "deutero ousia") rational. 

The 'reasonable' is the realm of the 'desiderative' soul, "boule," the appetites and feelings, the pre- or sub-rational 'soul' ("psyche") -- which can become at most _extrinsically_ (accidentally) rational, as it heeds to the executive dictate of the ratiocinative soul, or "psyche logike."

The _privative_ notion of the 'reasonablene' happens to be beneficial for the characterisation of a rational being such as a person, in his best moments, that is. 

Akrasia, or *incontinentia*, on the other hand, is never to be conceived -- as perhaps D. F. Pears did -- as a stumbling block in the theory, or philosophical conceptual analysis, of rationality.

Quite the contrary, 'incontinentia' should be something the *possibility* of which we must provide from the very start, as Davidson doesn't!

Now, a reason can be either justificatory or explanatory -- "or both," if that's idle.

If a reason is the stuff of which reasoning is made, and I did say that we call the premise the 'reason' for the conclusion, it is proper to proceed to a consideration, or linguistic botany, now, of some of the collocations of the the nominal "reason" which we get from the verb via category shift.

Grice features five features of _flat_ 'reason.'

Flat reason is:

1) not variable.

2) basic.

3) non-valuational.

4) essential to Kantotle's idea of a rational being.

5) the source for degree-variant reason. 

Grice goes on to list thirteen manifestations, or "excellences," of degree-variant, rather than 'flat', reason:

Clear headedness

Critical acumen

Thoroughness

Tenacity in argument

Flexibility

Orderliness

Breadth

A sense of relevance

Intellectual Caution

Intuitiveness, "Nose."

Inventiveness

Subtlety

Memory

Some of these features are truly specificatory, e. g. orderliness, critical acumen.

Some are just ancillary (e. g. memory) -- just as in tennis a good eyesight is while indispensable not itself a part of excellence as having a powerful service is.

Grice proposes to focus on what he calls the 'justicatory' use of  the categorially-shifted nominal 'reason'. 

Grice distinguishes 'justificatory' reason from a purely 'explanatory' use by a number of criteria for Reason.

justificatory

and explanatory:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

| | Distinctive Features |

| |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|

| Canonical Form |factive|explanatory |causal|mass/count|relative |

|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_P _C_ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _|

|i. Justificatory:|No Yes |P justifies C|P yields X | mass | Yes |

|P is a reason for| | | | | |

|x to C. | | | | | |

|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ _ |

|i. Explanatory: |Yes Yes|P explains C | P yields C | count | No |

|P is a reason | | | | | |

|why C | | | | | |

|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ | _ _ _| _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ _ |

A justificatory 'reason' always allow the qualification "good" or "bad" (or "little" or even "no" reason).

Not so with explanatory 'reason.'

It does sound terrible to say:

"There was a bad reason why the bridge collapsed."

A justificatory reason may become explanatory. 

This happens when the reasoner R _thinks_ that the premise P is a _justificatory_ reason for the consequence C, *and goes on and acts accordingly*.

A justificatory reason can be, to borrow from von Wright, if not to return it, "alethic" (doxastic, or judicative) versus "deontic" (boulemaic, or volitive).

With this, Grice introduces what is Grice's main thesis about reasoning, viz. the so-called Aequi-vocality Thesis: 

'Reason' is, as every item in the philosopher's lexicon, aequi-vocal (univocal) in the collocations "alethic" and "deontic."

("We don't need ichthyological necessity."

"Necessities are not be be multiplied beyond necessity."

Grice's neutral (in regard to mode) approach to a conversational implicatum suggests so ("Arrest the intruder!").

Grice discusses Davidson's arguments in 'How is weakness of the will possible,' which he elsewhere confronted with J. Baker, in Hintikka/Vermazen,
viz:

(9) 

If the barometer falls, it will probably rain.

The barometer falls.
_______________________________

Ergo:

Ceteris paribus it will probably rain.

The nderlying logical form ("If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying.") being:

Prob (h, p) = Good (h; a, b). 

More prob (h; p, q) =

Better (h; a, b).

(10) 

If, prima facie, 
Act I would be a lie and Act II would not,

P is better than Q.

Act I, but not Act II, would be a lie.

Ergo:
Ceteris paribus, P is better than Q.

Grice notes one problem with _deontic_ or non-alethic modality.

For anyone else, though, a non-alethic conclusion is _nothing_ that one can draw, either logically or decently or sensibly. 

What is a reason for a reasoner R1 to do something may _not_ be a reason to so something for R2. 

Grice's example:

(11) 

If Tommy has been tormenting my cat, 
it's best that I ambush him on his way home from school.

Tommy _has_ been tormenting my cat.

Principle of Total Evidence
___________________________

Ergo, I shall ambush Tommy.

Grice now introduces the key operator for rational acceptance, "Acc.," to be read as:

"it is reasonable/rational that...". 

The operator "acc." is immediately followed by a neustic (or mood operator: "." or "!") and a phrastic or radix. 

The scheme for Procedure Specifiers for Mode Operators is:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

| mood | sub- | | |

| operator | mood | differential | complement |

|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|

| |exhibitive| | |

| | !1 | none | |

|imperative|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| wills that p |

| ! |protreptic| | |

| | !2 | wills addreseee A | |

|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|

| |exhibitive| | |

| | .1 | none | |

|indicative|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| judges that p |

| . |protreptic| | |

| | .2 | wills addressee A | |

|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|

"Willing that p" and "judging that" are treated as primitive concepts in a functionalist theory of psychology ('Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre').

Actually, 'willing-that' is MORE primitive ("We soon believe what we desire.")

For the neustic, Grice draws from the idea of "direction of fit", as distinguishing alethic or doxastic and deontic or boulomaic. 

A perceptual belief is _caused_ by the world (the world affects the doxastic system), but in the case of the boulomaic subsystem it is the system (the will) which _affects_ the world.  Cf. Schopenhauer, the world as will or representation.

Grice remarks that he does not limit the scope of the phrastic for an !-mode utterance: 

"_They_ shall not pass" is a legitimate intentional (indicative exhibitive)

"The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn" -- uttered by a captain to a lieutenant -- is a legitimate imperative. 

There is no need to restrict the realm of the intentional to the first person, or imperatives to the second.

There's Conditional and Unconditional Rationality: relative vs. absolute. 

Further to his Aequi-vocality thesis, Grice considers:

"S must get the Oxford Chair of Pastoral Theology."

i.e. 

"There is (some) reason for S to get the Chair"). 

Unlike 'alethic' modality, there seems to be an agency-relative necessity. 

It is either S or _us_ who must do something about that. 

How are we to deal with this apparent asymmetry?

Grice examines general introduction and elimination rules, alla a natural deduction system:

"Derive 
Nec.P from P" 

and 

"Derive 
P from Nec.P". 

These two rules may be interpreted endowing us with the concept of a syntactic (= 'provabilitiy') or a semantic (= validity or demonstrability) kind. 

In the alethic realm, for example, Fermat's conjecture is not provable yet valid. 

The apparent asymmetry ("[]p -> p" vs. "ObligatoryP~-> P") Grice judges a matter of interpretation only, "a way of speaking," as Austin would put it.

If Reasoner R says that Reasoner must eat his hat (with his head in it), Reasoer is committed to his saying that he shall eat it (with his head in it).

The agency-relativity of "must" is just _system_-relativity. 

Consider: 

"It is necessary for Reasoner R1 that Reasoner R2 becomes his ambassador". 

We mean: 

R2's becoming an ambassador will be advantageous to R1, and that it's R1 who shall bring about that R1 becomes so. 

It is as if the introduction rule is as follows.

If it is established in R's system that P, 

"Nec (relative-to-R) P" 

is also establishable (i.e. satisfactory-for-R). 

The elimination rule would read quite the opposite:

If it is necessary (relative-to-R) that R shall eat his hat (with his hat in it) 

'R shall eat his hat' 

will be establishable. 

A further problem concerns utterances which containa _double_ agency-relative modality. 

E.g. 

"It is necessary for Joe Gumb that the American public retains an interest in baseball". 

Here, we must distinguish between the agent R1 for whom something is a reason and the agent R2 the utterance is _about_ when it is said what there is a reason for. 

Grice proposes a general universalisability thesis to deal with these complex cases: 

It is necessary that, 
if it is necessary for R1 that p should be the case, 
let there be some condition C such that 
R1 satisfies >; and necessarily for any R2 who satisfies it is also necessary for R2 that p should be the case.

Justificatory reason: alethic and practical. 

Justificatory reason can become explanatory: 

If R judges that 
P is a justificatory reason for accepting that Q, 
and if R does accept Q on account of P, 
P _explains_ his accepting Q. 

One must distinguish three different reading (one explicatum and two implicata) of "Acc", though:

 i. The Kantian "must" (full, indefeasible, acceptability). E.g. 

"A bishop must get fed up with politicians". 

Associated conditional: 

"If x is a bishop, (unreservedly), 
x will get fed up with policians". 

ii. The weaker "ought" (ceteris paribus acceptability). 

E.g.

"To keep his job, 
a bishop ought not to show his irritation with politicians". 

Associated conditional: 

"If one is to keep one's job and if one is a bishop, ceteris paribus, 
one is not to show one's irritation with politicians". 

iii. Degree-Variant acceptability: 

it is to such-and-such a degree acceptable that..." 

There is _another_ distinction to be made, a progress as it were, from 'technical' (Kant's "rules of

skill"), via (ii) 'prudential', to (iii) 'categorical' modality.

Given the existence of the phenomenon of akrasia, we cannot accept that if R concludes, via practical resoning, that it is acceptable that R shall go home', he would _ipso facto_ _will_ to go home.

Similarly, if R concludes, via alethic reasoning, that it is acceptable that it snows, would, _ipso facto_ _judge_ that it snows. 

We should allow for the conditionality involved here formally. 

Grice proposes:

(12) 

Acc

Given that S has a red face, 
S has high blood pressure)

and this from 
"Acc 
Given that x has a red face, 
x has high blood pressure.

S has a red face.
------------------------------------------------

Ergo:
Acc
S has high blood pressure.

While for indicative-mode, doxastic reasoning we qualify the conclusion with the phrase "with some degree of probability", for imperative-boulomaic

reasoning we use "with some degree of _desirability_: 

Let it be that A. 
It is the case that B. 
Ergo, with some degree of desirabiity, let it be that C.

Consider (13) and its more formal counterpart (14):

(13) 

It is acceptable that, 
given that R is to keep dry and that it the the case that R is such that it rains, 
that R is to take an umbrella.

R is to keep dry.

It rains.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

Ergo:

Ceteris paribus, 
it is desirable that R takes an umbrella.

(14) 

Acc

Given !A and .B, !C)

(via Acc (Given !Fx & .Gx, !Hx)

!A

.B

(Principle of Total Evidence)

-------------------------------------

Ergo:

It is desirable that !C.

Consider:

(15)

Acc

Given that x is to survive, x is to eat.

By Universal Instantiation,

Acc

Given that R is to survive that R is to eat.

R is to survive.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Ergo:

By detachment, or cut:

 Acc

R is to eat.

_Ceteris paribus_ generalisations permeate boulomaic (volitive, practical) reasoning. 

Consider:

(16)

Ceteris Paribus

Acc

Given that R1 likes R2, R1 wants R2's company.

R1 likes R2.

No DEFEATER (e.g. R is ill).

--------------------------------------------

Ergo:

R1 wants R2's company.

(17)

Ceteris Paribus

Acc

Given that R is to leave USA, 
and R is an alien, 
that R is to obtain a sailing permit from the Internal Revenue

R is to leave USA and is an alien.

No Defeater (e.g. R is a close friend of the President and R arranges a travel in Air Force I)

------------------------------------------------------

Ergo: R is to obtain a sailing permit.

Can the principle of total evidence be made explicit?

Consider R, the owner a firm which makes and sells ornaments from sea-shells.

Concerned if business will improve during the coming year, R reasons:

(18)

These days, every beach-comber is collecting sea-shells like mad (so as to sell them to firms such as mine).

So I can get sea-shells more cheaply.

It is thus likely that, given that I will get sea-shells more cheaply, the business will improve.

Yet, my not easily replaceable craftsmen are getting restive for higher pay.

I accept that, given that the craftsmen are restive, the business will _not_ improve.

Ornaments from seashells are all the rage at the moment.

So, I may be able to put my prices up, though, and make more money.

--------------------------------------------------------

Ergo:

It is pretty likely, given that I will get sea-shells more cheaply, that my employees are restive, and that everyone is eager to buy shea-shell ornaments, my business will improve.

Grice provides a correlative boulomaic version:

Now R is head accountant of a firm in London (it's accounting time) and he gets an invitation from his mother to visit her in Reading. 

Further, his wife has had a bad riding accident and is lying in a hospital at Reading.

We can represent R's reasoning as:

(19)

1.

Acc

Given that R is to give his mother pleasure and that R is her

favourite son, R is to visit her in Harborne next week.

2.

Acc

Given that R is to get ready his firm's accounts -- he's head accountant and it's accounting time, R is to spend next week in his office.

3.

Acc

Given that R is to give his mother pleasure and he's to get ready the firm's accounts, and

that he's the favourite son and head accountant and it's accounting time, that R visit his mother at Harborne for a long weekend and return to the office on Tuesday.

4.

Acc

Given that R is to sustain his wife and she is lying, with two broken legs, internal injuries, and much pain, that R is to spend next week at Reading.

5.

Acc,

Given that R is

i. to give his mother pleasure and
ii. get ready the firm's accounts and
iii. sustain his wife, and that
iv. R is the favourite son and
v. he's head accountant at accounting time, and
vi. R is a husband with a wife lying at Reading,

that R is to spend next week at Reading, and telephone the mother at Harborne and the office daily.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Ergo:

Acc

R is to spend next week at Reading, telephoning his mother at Harborne and the London office daily.

A slightly different case concerns a doctor examining a patient.

Should a doctor give his patient electro-mixosis?

(20)

1. 

Given that:
the patient is to be relieved of cephalalgia (symptom: headache) 
and 
the patient is of blood group G, 
the patient ought to take an aspirin.

2. 

Given that the patient is to be relieved of cepahlalgia _and gasteroplexis_

(symptom: stomach cramp) 
and 
the patient is of blood group G, 
the patient ought to be treated by electromixosis.

3. 

Given that:
the patient is to be relieved of cephalalgia and gasteroplexis and that he is of blood group

G and; 
his blood has an abnormally high alcohol content, the patient ought merely to be given gentle message until his condition changes.

4. 

Now, the reasoner R does NOT find an abnormally high alcohol content in the patient's blood.

-------------------------------------------------------------

5. 

Ergo, and via the Kantian switch on the face of unqualified in-defeasibility:

The patient not just ought, but _must_ be given electro-mixosis.

The principle of total evidence here seems to be best made explicit as follows.

IF: 

The reasoner R accepts-at-t an acceptability conditional or hypothetical C1, the antecedent (or protasis) of which _favours_, to degree d, the consequent (or apodosis) of the afore-mentioned conditional or hypothetical C1, 

AND, further, 

the reasoner accepts-at-t the antecedent (or protasis) of the conditional (or hypothetical) C1, 

AND FURTHER, 

the conditional (or hypothetical) C1 is optimal-at-t for the reasoner (i.e., after _due_ (or proper -- sic valuational) search by the reasoner for such a further conditional, there seems to be _no_ conditional (or hypothetical) C2 such that the reasoner accepts-at-t the conditional (or hypothetical) C2 and its antecedent (or protasis), where the antencent of C2 is an *extension* of the antecedent of first conditional C1, yet the consequent of C2 is a _rival_ (or opposite, or negation) of the consequent of C1, and the antecedent or protasis of C2 favours the consequence or apodosis of the conditional or hypothetical C2 MORE than it favours the consequent of C1, 

-----

the reasoner MAY accept-at-t, to degree d, the consequent or apodosis of the conditional or hypothetical C1.

"Satisfactory" is the term chosen by Grice to do general duty for both "truth" or 'true' ('alethic satisfactoriness') -- the radical of an indicative-mode utterance  -- and "goodness" or 'good'  -- the radical of utterance in the imperative-mode utterance ('boulomaic satisfactoriness').

It may be possible to define 'goodness,' or 'the good', in terms of truth (or 'the true') as follows -- the taming of the true.

It is rationally acceptable that !p 
if 
'It is GOOD that !p' is true.

-- where the attribute 'good' occurs within the scope of a doxastically satisfactory utterance.

The reverse seems the pragmatist's, utilitarian's credo:

"It is rationally acceptable that .p
if
'It is TRUE that .p' is good.

The notion of satisfactoriness provides generalised, common, versions for the truth-conditions of usual operators, undestood either syntactically (via rules of inference of introduction and elimination, alla Gentzen, or via truth-tables or semantic assignment)

SATISFACTORINESS-CONDITION 

ASSIGNMENT

UNARY FUNCTOR:

"OR"

"~p" is satisfactory

iff

it is not the case that p is satisfactory.

BINARY FUNCTORS:

***
1


"AND"

"p AND q" is satisfactory

iff
p is satisfactory
AND
q is satisfactory. 

***

2

"OR"

"p OR q"
is satisfactory
iff
p is satisfactory
OR
q is satisfactory. 

*****

3

"IF"

"IF p, q" is satisfactory
iff
it is not the case that p is satisfactory
OR
q is satisfactory.

This account still presents some minor complications with, shall we call it, a "mixed-modal" utterance -- alethic and practical.

The beast is filthy, and do not touch it.

seems to be alright as a warning conversational move at the Zoo.

But the rational acceptability of the reverse of that conversational move, in the same circumstances, seems more dubious:

Do not touch the beast, and it is filthy.

Or again:


Touch the beast AND the beast bites you, I tell you.

This utterance does not, at the conversational implicatum level, contain the _conjunction_ that "and" suggests it is at the conversational EXPLICATUM level. 

L. J. Cohen first pointed this to me New College.

And, while it seems alright to utter something like:

Smith is taking a bath, or leave the bathroom door open.

the reverse utterance seems less so:

Leave the bathroom door open, or Smith is talking a bath.

(A matter of order in the giving of information and topic vs. focus?)

Grice proposes that in case of utterances like these, we take the boulomaic (volitive, practical) mode operator as having broader scope.

 There is also problem with the operation of a functor like negation.

With the doxastic (judicative, or alethic) mode of acceptability there really is no big problem.

".~p"

and

"~.p"

should be deemed truth-conditionally equivalent, even if their implicata differ (vide Grice, "Negation and privation" (1938) and "Lectures on negation" (1961).

With "!"-mode utterances, the issue is far more complex. 

It looks as if an utterance of the form:

"~!~A"

should read as 

"You may (permissive) do A."

One signifies one's refusal to prohibit the

addressee's doing A.

Another complication is brought by an utterance like a philosophy don telling his tutee before a tutorial:

"Your bicycle is to face North."

"Why?"

"Just because."

which Grice regards as 'value-indifferent,' in the practical equivalent of something like a Strawsonian truth-value gap.

None of this two complications is insoluble, though.

*****

CROSSING THE DIVIDE:

THE UNITY OF CONVERSATIONAL REASON

*****

Grice shows us the way to cross the alleged divide between the two modes.

While Kant wrote both an essay on practical reason and an essay on theoretical reason, there are two volumes to the same philosophy.

Grice next considers the inferential relations and analogies between the alethic (or better, 'doxastic,' or judicative) mode and the boulomaic or judicative or practical mode.

Is the boulomaic (volitive, practical) mode reducible to the doxastic (judicative, alethic) mode?

Or is it the other way round, as he suggests in "Method in philosophical psychology."

We soon believe what we desire.

Cf. Grandy on 'modulo' in The Journal of Philosophy. 

Consider some basic alethic means-end reasoning.

"To display a nice complexion, if one has a relatively insensitive skin, one should smear one's face with peanut butter before retiring at night".

More formally:

It should be, given that the reasoner R is to display a nice complexion and that the reasoner R has a relatively insensitive skin, that the reasoner R is to smear his face with peanut butter before retiring."

In symbols:

SHOULD (!p, .q; !r).

Now, the boulomaic (volitive, practical) mode of rational acceptability here seems to be based on, or be derived from, the flat doxastic (judicative, alethic) mode of acceptability.

Grice considers this when he calls a first answer to the fundamental question about the principle of conversational helpfulness merely 'dull' and empiricist. In other words: it is an empirical fact that, given the goal of a maximally effective exchange of information and the institution of a decision, the conversationalists abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness.

In symbols:

SHOULD (.q, .r; .p)

Both the pair of premises q and r, and the conclusion, p, are in the indicative mode.

"It should be that, given that the reasoner smears the face with peanut butter skin before retiring, and that the reasoner R has a relatively insensitive skin, that the reasoner displays a nice complexion".

There is one problem with the 'reducibility' thesis, though, in that the alethic/practical divide displays some grammatical asymmetry, which may reflect an asymmetric underlying logical form.

In the boulomaic (or practical) version, the phrastic "p" features in the antecedent (or "protasis") of the hypothetical utterance.

On the other hand, in the doxastic (judicative or alethic) version, the phrastic "p" features in the consequent (or apodosis) of the hypothetical utterance.

As a consequence, one defeater may be so for the former but not but not for latter.

This, as Grice notes, is what concerns Kant in the "Grundlegung."

Kant's first example is 'doxastic' in character, and drawn from geometry.

"It is fully ACCEPTABLE, given that the reasoner is to bisect a line on an unerring principle, that the reasoner is to draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs."

Such a conditional or 'hypo-thetical,' is vouched for by an analytic , tautological, claim of geometry (cf. Kant's abtuse philosophy of mathematics and the 'synthetic a priori'). 

"If the reasoner R bisects a line on an unerring principle, the reasoner does so as a result of having drawn from its extremities two intersecting acts".

In its more general terms, we need to explore the basis for that adage at which Kant trembles:

"He who wills the end wills the indispensable means."

This is relevant to Grice's account of Conversation as Rational Co-Operation, now interpreted in terms of means-end (if not 'strategical') rationality. 

Grice's principle of conversational helpfulness is an indispensable means towards the realisation of the conversationalist's shared, common will or end of a maximal exchange of information and the institution of a decision.

Grice proposes seven steps or stages in this derivation.

***

GRICE'S 

SEVEN-STAGE 

KANTOTELIAN DERIVATION 

OF 

FULLY-FLEDGED RATIONALITY

***

Step or Stage I:

It is a fundamental law of psychology that, ceteris paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R wills and judges if P, P as a result of Q, R wills that q. 

Step or Stage II:

At this step, R places this law within the scope of a "willing" operator:

R wills that, for any P and Q, if R wills that P and  judges that if P, P as a result of Q, R wills that q.

Step of Stage III: "wills" turns to "should":

If rational, R will have to block unsatisfactory (literally) attitudes.

R should (qua rational) judge that for any P and Q, if it is satisfactory to will that P, and that it is satisfactory to judge that if P, P as a result of Q, it is sastisfactory to WILL that Q.

Step or Stage IV:

Expliciting mode specifications:

R should (qua rational) judge that, for any P and Q, if it is satisfactory that !P and that if it .P, .P only as a result of Q, it is satisfactory that !Q.

Step or Stage V:

Via (p & q -> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)):

R should (qua rational) judge that, for any P and Q, if it is satisfactory that if .P, .P only because Q, it is satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let it be that Q.

Step or Stage VI:

R should (qua rational) judge that, for any P and Q, if P, P only because p _yields_ if let it be that P, let it be that Q.

Step or Stage VII.

For any P and Q, if P, P only because Q _yields_ if let it be that P, let it be that Q.

***

What about a 'counsel of prudence,' a desideratum, and such a reasonable' or 'rational 'maxim of conduct'?

They are 'hypotheticals' which are not universalisable, in that the end is specified as involving the agent's empirical desire (to be happy). 

'Prudential' acceptability can be dealt with in a similar fashion.

Prudential acceptability involves the analytical (conceptual, tautological) consequence (or apodosis) of an antecedent (protasis) indicative-mode statement to the effect that so-and-so is the means to such-and-such, with the proviso that there is a specific given end:

"Let the reasoner R be happy." "Let the reasoner lead a life with 'eudaimonia.'"

Grice regards such an end as what Hume would call a "natural disposition," a propension, or propensity, i.e. a matter of _natural_ or physical necessity, and involving the PRE-rational conditions the reasoner finds himself in. 

One complication is drawn from J. L. Austin.

One thing is to know or grasp or decide what is to be done.

This is the realm of "wisdom"  -- sapientia -- qua _administrative_ rationality.

Another thing is how to do what is to be done: the realm of "_phronesis_," -- or 'prudentia' -- as the *executive* rationality (Aristotle's 'psyche logike') above a mere subservient 'administrative' "means-end" rationality. 

A further complication is brought by some end which is not only _finitely_ non specific. With such an end, the situation seems manageable.

The reasoner R may want a large fierce dog to guard my house, and does not care which breed.

But we have to give room to the end also being non-specific, but in an antecedently _indeterminate way -- i.e. just not yet deliberated on.

A reasoner R may want a large fierce dog to guard his house, but he may not have yet decided (or deliberated on) which breed would be optimum.

Is the boundary or divide between "phronesis" (prudentia) and "sophia" (sapientia, or wisdom), as Aristotle thought was not, yet clear-cut to Oxonians?

Consider the case of an ever-dilligent secretary.

If a boss empowers his secretary to make determinate the boss's indeterminately non-specific desires, but not on behalf of the boss himself, but as _the secretary_ thinks best, the secretary just ceases to be the boss's secretary! 

The secretary is  best described as merely an administrative assistant. The executive dictates come from the boss, only. 

A further problem is that an end E1 relating to 'prudence' (phronesis, prudentia) may be allegedly non-propositional -- just as an amimal may desire food, and not _to eat an apple_.

 Grice explores at this stage an extreme scheme of "Crazy-Bayesy" deliberation which rests on a mechanical (or mechanist) model of the vectoring of forces (with a desire -- or an animal spirit -- as such a drive).

In the scenario, the reasoner R has two ends: E1 and E2.

THE DESIRABILITY OF THE END

Each end, E1 and E2, has a different degree of desirability: DESIRABILITY1 and DESIRABILITY2

Now, for any action A1 which will realise E1 or E2 -- to this or that degreee of DESIRABILITY -- there is a (doxastic) PROBABILITY p1 that action A1 will realise end E1 and a different (doxastic) PROBABILITY p2 that action A1 will realise a different E2.

THE DESIRABILITY OF THE ACTION

The desirability of the ACTION A1, relative to E1 and E2, is a function (in Frege's sense) of the desirabiity of the ends E1 and E2 *and* the PROBABILITY that Action A1 will realise E1 and E2.

Only if  Action A1 scores higher (in action-desirability relative to E1) than any alternative action A', should the reasoner actually choose to do Action A1.

Provisions should be made for, e.g. long-term, or standing (cf. the principle of conversational helpfulness) vs. merely situational ends (the conversationalist finds a reason NOT to abide by the principle of conversational helpfulness ("My lips are sealed.").

The reasoner R may will that he priorises family over business, and his children over Aunt Jemima (who's been living with Reasoer R all these years).

On a particular occasion, though, the reasoner R may will that he priorises Aunt Jemima (to get her out of one of her tantrums, say) over taking the reasoner R's son to see the hippopotami at the Zoo in The Regent's Park.

While higher-order, or second-order, prudential rationality is perhaps _not_ just means-end rationality, the determination over the reasoner R's desire certainly does involve the first-order means-end rationality.

Finally, how do we deal with ends, systems of ends, and the end of a counsel of prudence, i.e. 'happiness'?

Grice proposes to explore the_inclusive_ end of any "counsel of prudence", viz.:

Let the reasoner R be happy, let him lead a life with 'eudaimonia.'

Grice tries a proposal.

To be happy (to lead a life with 'eudaimonia') is to be well-off, and this is meant as analytic.

Qua inclusive end, this not only connects with the phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility, but of _vanishing_ marginal utility, altogether, as we should!

KICKING THE BUCKET

"Don't call a man happy until he is dead -- and even then." Aristotle, "Nichomachean Ethics."

It may be, as Grice puts it, that that, on occasion, the bucket of happiness is filled.

No further inpouring of a desirable has any effect on the contents of the bucket of happiness.

One feature to be preserved in the analysis is that what gives rise to the end of happiness (or eudaimonia) is not, strictly, a _means_ to happiness (or eudaimonia). 

Were things that easy!

Being an inclusive end -- and a _rationally_ inclusive end at that -- it means it is rather, a a set, or better, harmonic system, of ends, an end for the sake of which some OTHER, more substantial, desirables are desirable.

We need to analyse the 'contributiveness' or conduciveness, relation, i.e. the predicate:

"... is contributive or conducive, in way w, to ...".

Grice proposes:

The reasoner R wills to do P for the sake of Q just in case.

The reasoner R wills to do P because the reasoner R judges that his doing P is something which is contributive, in way w, to the realisation of

Q, and the reasoner R does  _will_ Q.

This involves all sorts of sub-modalities.

Take a 'causal' element.

The causal element may be a merely an initiating factor.

"I stop Smith talking by knocking him cold."

Or again the causal element may be a sustaining or standing one one:

"I stop Smith's talking by keeping my hand over his mouth."

Cf. "His lips were sealed."

Take 'specificatory' in a rule of etiquette.

A host's seating someone at his right hand side at dinner may be a specification of treating him with respect.

(Versus seating him at his left hand side, which is considered rude).

Take 'inclusive proper.'

A reasoner R may wish to take a certainly advertised cruise because it includes a visit to Portofino.

The reasoner R may be hospitable to someone today because the reasoner R desires to be hospitable to that someone throughout this someone's visit (which includes today) o the reasoner R's town.

Perhaps Aristotle's considerations on the practical syllogism may help us here.

Grice notes two versions of Aristotle's practical syllogism.

In the first version, the reasoner R wills to realise Q, he enquires what would lead to Q and decides that doing P would.

So, the reasoner R comes to will, and do, P.

In the second version, the reasoner R conceives that his doing P, enquires what doing P would lead to, sees that it would lead to Q (eudaimonia), which he finds himself willing.

So the reasoner R comes to will, and do, P. 

There are complications, with regard to an inclusive end as it attaches to this or that  _special circumstance_.

For one, a man wrecked on a desert island where he has thus to spend some time (fixed scenario, not chosen) decides to study the local flora and fauna. 

A second complication is with 'reason' (qua bleief/desire actually entertained) versus a mere post-facto 'rationalisation.'

A sailor wants to move from Oxford to sea-side Bournemouth.

He decides it is because of the salubrious climate one finds at Bournemouth.

Here the reason (though not, consciously, _his_, i.e. the reasoner's reason) why he desires to move to a salubrious climate is that such a desire will justify the desire to move to Bournemouth.

A third type of case is illustrated by the tyrant who punishes one of his cabinet ministers by conferring to him the the duty to organise the disposal of the palace's garbage. 

Now, just to frustrate the tyrant's plan or desire to humiliate the minister, the minister decides to take pride in the discharge of his new duty of disposing the garbage of the palace.

Here a "higher-order" volitive or boulomaic state (a desire or want) is involved.

The minister wants to discharge his office efficiently, "for its own sake" as it were.

The minister wants to want to do this because he wants, by so wanting, to frustrate the tyrant.

Grice notes that the expression "wanting that p for the sake of q" may cover indeed two quite different scenarios.

The reasoner R wants that P because the reasoner R judges that p is to be a means for Q.

In the minister case, the situation is other.

The reasoner R wants that P because the reasoner R judges that _wanting_ that P will help to realise Q.

This is conceptually important.

With the inclusive end of 'eudaimonia,' "that the reasoner R be happy", its components are not, strictly, the realisation of a specific end but, rather, the realisation of a desire for that realisation. 

Wanting that p for the sake of q, where q is now the specific 'eudaimonia' condition -- "Reasoner R is happy" -- does not strictly require that the reasoner R should judge P as a means for Q.

In only requires, given akrasia, that the reasoner R  judges that _wanting_ that p will help realise q.

In other words, judging (or judicating) that p is one of a set of items which collectively exhibit the open feature associated with happiness.

"The reasoner R is to be happy" being a rationally inclusive end, it follows that happiness is a "higher-order," or "second-order" desire, i.e. a desire to have, and satisfy, a set of desires which exemplifies some open feature.

Grice had dealt with 'second-order' goals in his explorations on the conversational implicatum. A conversationalist A may further goal G1 and his co-conversationalist B may further goal G2. Still, they may co-operate in abiding with the principle of conversational helpfulness. This would involve a 'second-order' aim, underlying the  most meager types of rational 'conversational co-operation.'

The neo-Prichardian concept of 'willing that...' is crucial here.

The reasoner _decides_ that certain items are constitutive of his happiness, as Jane Austen puts it in "Emma."

One may still wish to list some further features which are conducive to stability and flexibility, which will characterise happiness (or a 'happy life,' a life with 'eudaimonia') as a realisation of a system of ends. 

Such features of a 'happy life' (a life with 'eudaimonia') are listed by Grice.

Feasibility:

Feasibility just means that the adopted system of ends should be *workable*.

Autonomy:

Autonomy is self-sufficiency.

It is better, e.g., not to have to rely on government grants (p.132).

Compatibility or harmony of components ends E1 and E2:

The compatibility or 'harmony' of component ends E1 and E2 is merely the practical (volitive, boulomaic) analogue of alethic consistency or coherence. 

Comprehensiveness:

Comprehensiveness is merely the practical (volitive, boulomaic) analogue of alethic completeness. 

The supportiveness of components ends E1 and E2:

By supportiveness of component ends, one means, say, that one's devotion to one's wife, e.g., may inspire one to heightened endeavour in one's business of selling encyclopaedias. 

Simplicity:

Simplicity related to feasibility.

Agreebleness:

Agreebleness should be understood not as the mere satisfaction of a desire, but as the idea of an activity being a source of delight, or an attraction supporting an otherwise not very desirable principle. 

Grice is aware of limitations in the Kantotelian re-constructed concept of 'eudaimonia.'

One may wish to add ideals such as the maximal development of one's natural talents, or the provision of scope for outstanding or distinctive achievement. 

Perhaps a more serious problem to this account of 'eudaimonia' is the closed systematicity of the listed consitutive features. 

Except for the condition of "agreebleness," they seem all *internal*, and thus prone to objections such as those directed to Bradley's 'idealist' coherence theory of truth.

It will thus be difficult, in this initial scheme, to decide between a really, substantially, happy life, a life with 'eudaimonia,' and, say, the life of a hermit, the life of a mono-maniacal stamp collector, the life of an unwavering egoist, and the life of a well-balanced, kindly country gentleman.

A way out of this 'Aristotelian' objection concerns the importation of the notion of value.

It's a reasonable and rational personal being who is most happy.

The faculty that we (or a few pompous philosophers) name by 'rationality,' or even 'Rationality,' with a capital R, is, after all, man's (or pirot)'s metier of man, the capacity with which the Genitor has endowed a human (as he re-constitutes into a person) in order to make the human maximally viable in his living condition, i.e., in the widest manageable range of different environments in which he is expected to find himself. 

REFERENCES

Join the Grice Club!