H. P. Grice: Conversational Implicata and Conversation As Rational Co-Operation

H. P. Grice: Conversation

“There are all sorts of imperatives, axioms, principles, desiderata, or maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as ‘be polite,’ that are normally observed by participants in conversations.”

“The principle of conversational helpfulness, however, and the conversational implicata -- some of which of highly philosophical interest -- connected with this principle, are specially connected, it is hoped, with a particular purpose that conversation is adapted to serve, and is primarily, or centrally, in fact thus employed to serve.

This particular collaborative or concerted purpose may be identified as comprising, in the 'alethic' sphere, the maximally effective exchange of information, and, in the 'practical' sphere, the influencing, or directing, of the attitudes or action of your co-conversationalist.”

“Conversational implicata are, by definition, and as their name suggests, essentially connected with some such general feature of conversation.”

“But what is, essentially, this general feature?”

“The following description, no doubt familiar, may provide a first shot or approximation to what we may label, if that's not too pretentious, a general principle of conversational helpfulness.”

"Honour your conversationalist's goal!"

"A conversation, you see, will not normally consist of a succession of totally disconnected conversational 'moves'." "It's more like chess."

“A conversation would indeed not be a rational concerted activity if it did consist of a sequence of totally unrelated 'moves.'” "It would rather be pretty irrational!"

“A conversation, such as we know it, on the other hand is, rather, and characteristically, to some degree at least, what we may regard as a pretty rational, as we say, co-operative, concerted, effort.”

"Each participant recognise in the conversation in which he is engaged, to some extent at least, a shared, common purpose, or set of shared, common purposes, or at least a mutually accepted 'direction.' or flow to it."

“This conversational common purpose, purposes, or direction, or flow, may be fixed from the start, *ab initio*, by, e.g., an initial proposal of a question for discussion.

"Or then the shared, common purpose, purposes, or direction, may very evolve during the conversation itself: the initial proposal of a question turns into a request, say."

“The conversational shared common purpose may, too, be fairly definite, as a conversations between a philosophy don and his tutee."

"But then again the conversational shared common purpose may be so indefinite as to leave quite some *considerable* latitude to the conversationalists to make any conversational move as he pleases, as in a casual, naturally-occurring conversation between two dons, or between two tutees, as the case might be."

“But, in any case, at each stage, some possible conversational moves will be deemed as being excluded, deemed excluded, that is, as being conversationally rather unsuitable.”

"A rough version, then, of this general principle, the principle of conversational helpfulness, which conversationalists are expected, ceteris paribus, to observe, could run more or less as follows: ‘try to make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by what you perceive to be the accepted shared common purpose or direction of the conversation in which you are engaged, thus honouring your co-conversationalist's goal, into the bargain."

“The avowed aim of this philosophical enterprise we are engaged in of identifying conversational implicata as ignored by this or that philosopher, is, simply put, to regard conversation as a special case, indeed, or a variety, of not just purposive, but strictly rational, concerted co-operative behaviour.”

“It may be worth noting, therefore, that the specific concerted expectations or presumptions connected with this principle of conversational helpfulness will obviously have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are still concerted, coooperative, and rational, but not conversations: the 'moves' can still be identified with, to contrast with the 'implicata,' what we may call the 'explicata.”

“These analogies in the realm of non-conversational transactions are highly relevant to one fundamental question about the principle of conversational helpfulness, viz., what the very basis is for the assumption which we seem to make, and on which it appears that a great range of conversational implicata depend, that conversationalists will, in general, ceteris paribus, and in the absence of indications to the contrary, proceed in the manner that this principle of conversational helpfulness prescribes.”

“One dull but, no doubt at a certain level, pretty adequate answer, if you are from Oxford, to that fundamental question is that it is just a well-recognised empirical fact that conversationalists do pretend to think that they behave in charming helpful ways.”

“Well-bred conversationalists have learned to subscribe to this principle of conversational helpfulness in childhood and have fortuately not lost the habit of doing so, even at Oxford!"

"Indeed, it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit of conversational helpfulness."

“One may want to be, however, enough of a rationalist, even at Oxford, to wish to find a non-empirical basis that underlies these empirical facts, undeniable though these empirical facts may be.”

“One would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all, or most, conversationalists do in fact follow, but as a practice that is reasonable, for each conversationalist, to follow, that a conversationalist should not abandon.”

“One may feel attracted by the idea that observance of our principle of conversational helpfulness, in a conversation, may be thought of as a tacit, quasi-contractual matter, with quasi-contractual parallels, too, outside the realm of conversation proper.”

“If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded car, I, no doubt, have some degree of expectation that you will offer some help.”

"Once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms, in the absence of indications, of course, that you are merely an incompetent meddler."

“Conversation does seem to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish any co-operative, concerted transaction.”

“First, participants in a co-operative transaction, conversational or not, have some shared or common immediate aim, like in the realm beyond conversation, getting a car mended.”

“Each agent's ultimate aim may, of course, be independent from the other; not only not shared, but even in conflict.”

“Each agent may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded.”

“In characteristic conversations, however, we may assume a shared, common aim, even if, as in an 'over-the-garden-wall' chat, as we may call it, it is a second-order aim, viz., that each party to the conversation should, at least for the time being, identify himself with, or honour, the albeit transitory conversational interests of the other, say, talk about the weather.”

“Also, each contribution of the participants in a co-operative transaction, not just conversational, should be dove-tailed, mutually dependent.”

“Finally, there is, in a any co-operative transaction, not just conversational, some sort of understanding (which may be explicitly formulated, but which is often tacit) that, other things being equal, the co-operative concerted transaction should continue in appropriate co-operative style, unless both parties to the transaction are agreeable that the transaction should terminate.”

“You do not just shove off, or start doing something else.”

“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this one we have just described may apply to some cases of conversation, there are too many other types, perhaps of a more argumentative character, where such a basis fails to fit comfortably.”

“One would like to be able to show, or prove, rather, that the observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness is reasonable (or indeed, rational) along somewhat stronger line than those a mere quasi-contractual basis provides.

“Almost in transcendental terms, we should be able to prove that any conversationalist who does care about the goals that are central to conversation (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) should be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in conversations that will be profitable only on the assumption that these conversations are conducted in general accordance with our principle of conversational helpfulness.”

"Whether any such conclusion or transcendental proof can be reached, I am far from certain."

"But if philosophy generated no problems, it would be dead!"