H. P. Grice: Conversational Implicata and Conversation As Rational Co-Operation

H. P. Grice: Conversation

“There are all sorts of imperatives, axioms, principles, desiderata, or maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as ‘be polite,’ that are normally observed by participants in conversations.”

“The principle of conversational helpfulness, however, and the conversational implicata connected with this principle, are specially connected, it is hoped, with the particular purpose that conversation is adapted to serve, and is primarily or centrally in fact employed to serve.

This particular collaborative or concerted purpose may be identified as comprising a maximally effective exchange of information, and an influencing, or directing, of the action of your co-conversationalist.”

“Conversational implicata are, by definition, and as their name suggests, essentially connected with some such general features of conversation.”

“But what are these general features?”

“The following description may provide a first shot or approximation to what we may label a general principle of conversational helpfulness.”

"A conversation will not normally consist of a succession of totally disconnected 'moves'."

“A conversation would indeed not be a rational concerted activity if it did.”

“A conversation on the other hand is, rather, and characteristically, to some degree at least, what we may regard as a rational, co-operative, effort.”

“Each participant must recognise in aconversation in which he is engaged, to some extent, a shared, common purpose, or set of shared, common purposes, or at least a mutually accepted 'direction.'”

“This conversational common purpose, purposes, or direction, may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion).

“Or the shared, common purpose, purposes, or direction, may evolve during the conversation itself.”

“The conversational shared common purpose may be fairly definite."

"But then again the conversational shared common purpose may be so indefinite as to leave quite some considerable latitude to the conversationalists, as in a casual, naturally-occurring conversation.”

“But, in any case, at each stage, some possible conversational moves will be deemed as being excluded and deemed conversationally unsuitable.”

“A rough version, again, of this general principle, the principle of conversational helpfulness, which conversationalists are expected, ceteris paribus, to observe, may run: ‘make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted shared common purpose or direction of the conversation in which you are engaged.”

 “The avowed aim of this philosophical enterprise is to regard conversation as a special case, indeed, or a variety, of not just purposive, but strictly rational, behaviour.”

“Therefore, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions connected with this principle of conversational helpfulness have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are still concerted, coooperative, and rational, but not conversations.”

“These analogies are relevant to one fundamental question about the principle of conversational helpfulness, viz., what the basis is for the assumption which we seem to make, and on which it appears that a great range of conversational implicata depend, that conversationalists will, in general, ceteris paribus, and in the absence of indications to the contrary, proceed in the manner that the principle of conversational helpfulness prescribes.”

“A dull but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer to that fundamental question is that it is just a well-recognised empirical fact that conversationalists do behave in helpful ways.”

“Conversationalists have learned to subscribe to a principle of conversational helpfulness in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so.”

“Indeed, it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit.”

“One may want to be, however, enough of a rationalist to wish to find a basis that underlies these empirical facts, undeniable though these empirical facts may be.”

“One would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all, or most, do in fact follow, but as something that it is reasonable for conversationalists to follow, that conversationalists should not abandon.”

“One may feel attracted by the idea that observance of a principle of conversational helpfulness, in a conversation, may be thought of as a tacit quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm of conversation.”

“If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded car, I, no doubt, have some degree of expectation that you will offer help.”

“Once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler).”

“Conversation does seem to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish co-operative transactions in general.”

“First, participants in a co-operative transaction have some shared or common immediate aim, like getting a car mended.”

“Their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and not shared, even in conflict.”

“Each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded.”

“In characteristic conversations, however, we may assume a shared, common aim, even if, as in an over-the-garden-wall chat, it is a second-order aim, viz., that each party to the conversation should, at least for the time being, identify himself with, or honour, the albeit transitory conversational interests of the other.”

“Also, the contributions of the participants in a co-operative transaction should be dove-tailed, mutually dependent.”

“Finally, there is, in a co-operative transaction, some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit) that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate co-operative style, unless both parties to the transaction are agreeable that it should terminate.”

“You do not just shove off, or start doing something else.”

“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases of conversation, there are too many other types where such a basis fails to fit comfortably.”

“One would like to be able to show, rather, that the observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness is reasonable/rational along stronger line than a mere quasi-contractual basis.

“Anyone who does care about the goals that are central to conversation (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) should be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in conversations that will be profitable only on the assumption that these conversations are conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational helpfulness.”

“Whether any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain.”