H. P. Grice: Conversational Implicata and Conversation As Rational Co-Operation

Utterer's and Addressee's Reasoning in Conversation

The concept of reasoning may need some elucidation if we are going to defend the view of conversation as a type of rational co-operation

Why is the elucidation of the notion of 'reason' important? 

Well, it just _is_. 

Grice suggests one good way to start is the use of the verb, 'to reason.'

Reasoner R (Utterer or Addressee) reasons from Premise to Conclusion.

More specifically:

U/A holds psychological attitude Psi, with content "p"

---

U/A holds psychological attitude Psi', with content "c"

The rationale being, as it were, that reason, qua 'faculty,' a mere category shift from the verb, is manifested in _reasoning_. 

There will be a connection between 'reason' qua verb and 'reason' qua noun, via category shift.

Surely U/A are 'primary subjects,' and 'reason' becomes an 'attribute.'

By subjectification, 'reason' becomes a faculty or charasteristic of our rational U/A, who reason from p to c.

Grice proposes as a 'stalking horse' for reasoning the occurrence (entertaining, but often acceptance) -- as 'manifested' in U's and A's conversational moves -- of a chain of inferences, or more precisely, a sequence of ideas, psychological states, attitudes, or stances (or propositions) which consists of an initial set (the initial premises) -- which may be suitably expanded by U/A on request from the premise actually entertained (an expansion thought by U/A to be formally cogent) -- together with further members each of which is thought by U/A to be justfiable derivable by applying a principle of inference P which is entertained by R to be a canonically formally valid one. 

An alternative formulation: 

R reasons from P to C if R think that P 

and R intends that, in thinking C, R should be thinking of something which would be the conclusion C of a formally valid argument the premise of which is a suplementation of P. 

In this occurrence, the premise P (or antecedent sequence), incidentally, is the 'reason' for the conclusion C.

But then, there's MISreasoning. 

Not all actual reasoning is _good_ reasoning. 

"Some is actually downright appalling."

Consider Wittgenstein:

"He said, "That pillar box seems red to me," therefore the sense of 'seems' includes a reference to doubt and/or denial."

Hence the proviso: 

The conclusion is _thought_ by R (say, Witters) to be derivable, rather than that it _is_ indeed derivable. 

Consider:

(1) 

Jack to Jill:

Career women always smoke heavily.

You certainly smoke heavily, Jill.

Therefore, you must be a career woman, Jill.

Logical form ("If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying"):

"|- ((Ax)(Ax > Bx) and (Ex.Bx)) > (Ex).Ax

is _not_ a theorem. 

|- ((Ax)(Ax > Bx) and (Ex).Ax)) > (Ex).Bx

is

While there is, indeed, _bad_ reasoning, as in this bit above by, of all people, Jack, 'reasoning' is still a value-paradigmatic notion (unlike, say, 'climate,' or 'weather,' especially at Oxford). 

We have to know what _good_ reasoning is in order to elucidate 'reasoning' _simpliciter_.

Then, there's 'Incomplete' (_sic_ with scare quotes) reasoning. 

A bit of reasoning can be 'incomplete' (albeit expandable). 

As in: "He remembered his name; I don't mean to say he once forgot it."

Here something like a principle of conversational helpfulness is made to work. 

Most actual reasoning, as manifested in your common-or-garden exchange of conversational moves is enthymematic.

It involves a conversational implicatum which addressee A works out under the assumption that utterer U is abiding by the principle of conversational helpfulness.

(2) Jill to Joe:

Jack is an Englishman.

He is, therefore, brave -- broken crown and all.

The 'supressed bit' may be understood as 'an inferential schema': 

"Infer Bx from Ax if whatever satisfies 'A' _also_ satisfies 'B'. 

Whatever satisfies 'Englishman' also satisfies 'brave.'

Alternatively, we may speak of a _suppressed (or implicated) premiss_: 

"Every Englishman is {always/normally/usually/likely to be}brave." 

Finicky elaboration of steps is frowned upon, as it is an offence to the principle of conversational helpfulness ("Don't assume your partner is an idiot.")

Grice brings back at this point his fellow undergraduate ("Shropshire") at Corpus, Oxford way back in the 1930s, who in one tutorial with Hardie claimed:

"The immortality of the human soul is proved by the fact that, if you cut off a chicken's head, it will run round the yard for approximately 15 minutes before dropping. 

A rational re-construction for "Shropshire" may go:

(3) SHROPSHIRE'S PROOF OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL:

If the soul is *not* dependent on the body (vide Grice, 'Personal identity'), the soul is immortal. 

If the soul is dependent on the body, it is dependent on that part of the body in which it is located. 

If my soul is located in my body, it is located in my head. 

If the soul of a chicken is located in the head of the chicken, the soul of the chicken would be destroyed if the head is rendered inoperative by removal from the rest of the body of the chicken.

 The chicken runs round the yard after head-removal. 

The chicken can do this only if animated, and controlled by a soul. 

Ergo, the soul of the chicken is _not_ located in, and _not_ dependent on, the head of chicken. 

Ergo, the soul of the chicken is _not_ dependent on the body of the chicken.

Ergo, the soul of the chicken is immortal. 

If the chicken's soul is immortal, _a fortiori_ the human soul is immortal. 

Ergo, the human soul is immortal. 

Grice one notes one small problem here.

Grice has reconstructed, on Shropshire's behalf, Shropshire's reasoning.

But will Shropshire himself exand the reasoning exactly like that? 

There is an uneliminable 'indeterminacy' here, just as there is in the canonical case of the conversational implicature.

We don't know!

Maybe yes, maybe no!

Then there's stuff which is too _good_ to be reasoning. 

Having allowed for _bad_ reasoning, we also face reasoning which is 'too good' 'too logical' 'to be reasoning' (like a child who is too well behaved for his own good.

Examples:

(4) John has arrived and Mary has arrived.

Ergo: Mary has arrived.

NOT helpful: A already knew that from P.

(5) John has arrived.

Ergo: John has arrived.

Not helpful: A already knew that from P.

(6) My wife is at home.

Ergo: Someone is at home.

Not always helpful: A assumed C from P.

A related problem: 

We require, to ascribe reasoning to R, that R is trying to solve _some_ problem. 

We are reluctant to call 'reasoning' an utterly pointless sequence of formally valid steps as in

Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics:

(7) 

I have 2 hands. 

If I had 3 more hands, I would have 5 hands. 

If I were to have double 5, I'd have 10 hands. 

If 4 hands were removed, 6 hands would remain. 

Ergo: I would then have 4 more hands than I have now.

The goal of resoning -- the solution of a problem -- gives us a criterion for _successful_, or flat apt, reasoning. 

Successful reasoning achieves its goal.

Intention pervades reasoning: 

Merely _judging_ that there _exists_ a formally valid supplementation does not _count_ as reasoning. 

It may be that 

|- P > C

But if that's not the object of R's _intention_, there's no need to call it even a _possible_ reasoning. 

"We think of the reasoner as *intending* the production of C to _be_ the consequence of P (which clearly

is different from R merely _judging_ that C is derivable from P).

What can't logic catch, but an implicatum can.

There are factors in reasoning seldom touched on by Whitehead's and Russell's so-called 'classical,' modernist logic. 

Consider the philosopher who many months ago undertakes to give a set of 10 lectures. 

One month before the starting date, he is asked for the titles of the individual lectures, and reasons to himself as follows:

(8) 

Oh God. It's all a mess. 

I have piles of material. 

None of it seems worth listening to. 

It isn't in shape. 

I am in a terrible muddle. 

If I give them the titles I had in mind, I'm not sure the titles will fit what finally emerges (if anything). 

Why do I do these things? 

Why don't I learn? 

If I cancel the whole thing, though, my name will be mud. 

What I'll do is give them those titles I had planned, and ask for latitude to depart from them if need be.

The philosopher's lament illustrates what Grice calls the degree-variant notion of 'reasoning' (as opposed to the 'flat' notion). 

Reasoning is a gradational notion. 

It's also specific, or local.

One may be good at mathematical reasoning but not good at theological reasoning. 

(This does not apply to Philosophy, regina scientiarum).

There are, however, basic 'excellences' as it were (also degree-variant). 

Grice lists 4: 

simplicity

economy

accuracy

inventiveness

We usually distinguish between 'rational' and 'reasonable'. 

Does the distinction hold water? 

Grice engages here in a bit of linguistic botany, old Oxonian, Austinian style: 

Consider the negation contexts.

"not rational", "not reasonable". 

While it would not be 'irrational' (not rational) to expect my wife to clean my football boots, it might be _unreasonable_ (not reasonable). (She has enough things to do, and she is not my slave, and she hasn't played football).

Those football boots, too, were not bought at a very _rational_ price.

The were bought only at a very _reasonable_ price, actually.

In a different context: 

To cheat someone in a business deal (as such) is neither _irrational_ nor  _unreasonable_.

It's just morally repulsive. 

And, while it would NOT be irrational to cheat a man when you knew you might be found out and as a result lose a valuable client, that would be a rather unreasonable thing to do. 

Irrational would be to cheat him when you knew it was quite likely that you would be found out, and when, if you were, you would lose your job at a time when employment is very difficult to obtain. 

A third context: 

Yielding to a tempting invitation to go out drinking when you have already decided to spend the evening working on tomorrow's lecture would be (as such) neither irrational nor unreasonable.

Just weak and foolish, to some.

To yield to that temptation when you have _not_ yet decided what do do but *know* you ought to get on with that work for tomorrow would yet not be irrational although it _might_ be unreasonable. 

A fourth context: 

If you have bungingly got your firm into a difficulty, and you go and confess the matter to your boss, your boss might be both rational and reasonable about it. 

Rational if he coolly and in a reasoned way tells you what is the best course to take.

Reasonable in that he is not too hard on you. 

This suggests some _rationale_: 

"reasonable", but not "rational", is, a _privative_ adjective, what R. Hall calls an excluder. 

It's _unreasonable_ the word that wears the trousers, to use Austin's artless sexist idiom.

To be reasonable is to be relatively free from unreasonableness. 

The 'rational' is the realm of what Aristotle in _Nichomachean Ethics_ calls, the ratiocinative soul which is _intrinsically_ or essentially (second substance) rational. 

The 'reasonable' is the realm of the desiderative soul: the appetites and feelings, the pre- or sub-rational 'soul' -- which is only _extrinsically_ (accidentally) rational as it heeds to the executive dictates of the ratiocinative soul.

This _privative_ notion of reasonableness is beneficial for the characterisation of a rational being such as a person, in his best moments, is.

Akrasia, or *incontinentia*, is not the stumbling block in the theory of rationality, but, quite contrarily, something the possibility of which we must provide from the very start.

A reasons can be justificatory or explanatory. 

If reasons are the stuff of which reasoning is made, it is proper to proceed to a consideration of the nominal "reason."

Grice features five features of _flat_ 'reason.'

Flat reason is:

1) not variable

2) basic

3) non-valuational

4) essential to the idea of rational being

5) the source for degree-variant reason. 

He lists thirteen manifestations ("excellences") of this degree-variant reason:

clear headedness

critical acumen

thoroughness

tenacity in argument

felixibility

orderliness

breadth

a sense of relevance

intellectual caution

nose (intuitiveness)

inventiveness

subtlety

memory. 

Some of these are truly specificatory (e.g. orderliness, critical acumen).

Some are just ancillary (memory) -- just as in tennis a good eyesight is while indispensable not itself a part of excellence as having a powerful service is.

Grice proposes to focus on what he calls the 'justicatory' use of 'reason'. 

He distinguishes it from a purely 'explanatory' use by a number of criteria for Reason: justificatory

and explanatory:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

| | Distinctive Features |

| |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|

| Canonical Form |factive|explanatory |causal|mass/count|relative |

|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_P _C_ |_ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _|

|i. Justificatory:|No Yes |P justifies C|P > X | mass | Yes |

|P is a reason for| | | | | |

|x to C. | | | | | |

|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ _ |

|i. Explanatory: |Yes Yes|P explains C | P > C | count | No |

|P is a reason | | | | | |

|why C | | | | | |

|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ | _ _ _ _ _ _ | _ _ _| _ _ _ _ _| _ _ _ _ |

A justificatory 'reason' always allow the qualification "good" or "bad" (or "little" or even "no" reason).

Not so with explanatory 'reason':

"There was a bad reason why the bridge collapsed" sounds terrible. 

A justificatory reason may become explanatory. 

This happens when the reasoner _thinks_ that P is a _justificatory_ reason for C, and goes on and acts accordingly.

A justificatory reasons can be, to borrow from von Wright, "alethic" (doxastic, judicative) or "deontic" (boulemaic, volitive).

With this Grice introduces what is Grice's main thesis in the lectures, viz. the so-called Aequi-vocality Thesis: 

'reason' is aequi-vocal (univocal) in the collocations "alethic" and "deontic."

His approach to conversational implicature suggests so ("Arrest the intruder!").

Grice discusses Davidson's arguments in 'How is weakness of the will possible' viz:

(9) 

If the barometer falls, it will probably rain.

The barometer falls.

Ergo, ceteris paribus it will probably rain.

Underlying logical form ("If you can't put it in symbols, it's not worth saying.")

Prob (h, p) = Good (h; a, b). 

More prob (h; p, q) =

Better (h; a, b).

(10) 

If, prima facie, Act I would be a lie and Act II would not,

P is better than Q.

Act I, but not Act II, would be a lie.

Ergo, ceteris paribus, P is better than Q.

Grice notes one problem with _deontic_ or non-alethic modality.

For anyone else, though, a non-alethic conclusion is _nothing_ that one can draw, either logically or decently or sensibly. 

What is a reason for a reasoner R1 to do something may _not_ be a reason to so something for R2. 

Grice's example:

(11) If Tommy has been tormenting my cat, it's best that I ambush him on his way home from school.

Tommy _has_ been tormenting my cat.

Principle of Total Evidence

Ergo, I shall ambush Tommy.

Grice introduces the operator "Acc": 

"It is reasonable/rational that...". 

"Acc" is followed by a neustic (or mood operator: "." and "!") and a phrastic or radical. 

The scheme for Procedure Specifiers for Mood Operators is:

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

| mood | sub- | | |

| operator | mood | differential | complement |

|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|

| |exhibitive| | |

| | !1 | none | |

|imperative|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| wills that p |

| ! |protreptic| | |

| | !2 | wills addreseee A | |

|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|

| |exhibitive| | |

| | .1 | none | |

|indicative|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _| judges that p |

| . |protreptic| | |

| | .2 | wills addressee A | |

|_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _|

"Willing that" and "Judging that" are treated as primitive concepts in a

functionalist theory of psychology ('Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre').

Actually, 'willing-that' is MORE primitive.

For the neustic, Grice draws from the idea of "direction of fit", as distinguishing alethic or doxastic and deontic or boulomaic. 

A perceptual beliefs is _caused_ by the world (the world affects the doxastic system), but in the case of the boulomaic subsystem it is the system (the will) which _affects_ the world.  Cf. Schopenhauer, the world as will or representation.

Grice remarks that he does not limit the scope of the phrastic for !-utterances: 

"_They_ shall not pass" as a legitimate intentional (indicative exhibitive)

"The sergeant is to muster the men at dawn" -- uttered by a captain to a lieutenant -- as a legitimate imperative. 

There is no need to restrict the realm of the intentional to the first person, or imperatives to the second.

There's Conditional and Unconditional Rationality: relative vs. absolute. 

Further to his Aequi-vocality thesis, Grice considers:

"S must get the Oxford Chair of Pastoral Theology."

i.e. 

"There is (some) reason for S to get the Chair"). 

Unlike 'alethic' modality, there seems to be an agency-relative necessity. 

It's either S or _us_ who must do something about that. 

How are we to deal with this apparent asymmetry?

Grice examines general introduction and elimination rules alla a natural deduction system:

"Derive Nec.P from P" and "Derive P from Nec.P". 

This rules may be interpreted as syntactic (= 'provabilitiy') or semantic (= validity or demonstrability). 

In the alethic realm, for example, Fermat's conjecture is not provable yet valid. 

The apparent asymmetry ("[]p -> p" vs. "ObligatoryP~-> P") Grice judges a matter of interpretation only. 

If R says that R must eat his hat, R is committed to his saying that he shall eat it. 

The agency-relativity of "must" is just _system_-relativity. 

Consider: 

"It is necessary for R1 that R2 becomes his ambassador". 

We mean: 

R2's becoming an ambassador will be advantageous to R1, and that it's R1 who shall bring about that R1 becomes so. 

It is as if the introduction rule were: 

If it is established in R's system that P, "Nec (relative-to-R) P" is establishable (i.e. satisfactory-for-R). 

The elimination rule would read: 

If it is necessary (relative-to-R) that R shall eat his hat, 'R shall eat his hat' will be establishable. 

A further problem concerns utterances which containa _double_ agency-relative modality. E.g. 

"It is necessary for Joe Gumb that the American public retains an interest in baseball". 

Here, we must distinguish between the agent R1 for whom something is a reason and the agent R2 the utterance is _about_ when it is said what there is a reason for. 

Grice proposes a general universalisability thesis to deal with these complex cases: 

It is necessary that, if it is necessary for R1 that p should be the case, let there be some condition C such that R1

satisfies >; and necessarily for any R2 who satisfies it is also necessary for R2 that p should be the case.

Justificatory reason: alethic and practical. 

Justificatory reason can become explanatory: 

If R judges that P is a justificatory reason for accepting that Q, and if R does accept Q on account of P, P _explains_ his accepting Q. 

One must distinguish three readings of "Acc", though:

 i. The Kantian "must" (full, indefeasible, acceptability). E.g. 

"A bishop must get fed up with politicians". 

Associated conditional: 

"If x is a bishop, (unreservedly), x will get fed up with policians". 

ii. The weaker "ought" (ceteris paribus acceptability). E.g.

"To keep his job, a bishop ought not to show his irritation with politicians". 

Associated conditional: 

"If one is to keep one's job and if one is a bishop, ceteris paribus, one is not to show one's irritation with politicians". 

iii. Degree-Variant acceptability: 

it is to such-and-such a degree acceptable that..." 

There is _another_ distinction to be made, a progress as it were, from 'technical' (Kant's "rules of

skill"), via (ii) 'prudential', to (iii) 'categorical' modality.

Given akrasia, we cannot accept that if R concludes, via practical resoning, that it is acceptable that R shall go home', he would _ipso facto_ _will_ to go home.

Similarly, if R concludes, via alethic reasoning, that it is acceptable that it snows, would, _ipso facto_ _judge_ that it snows. 

We should allow for the conditionality involved here formally. 

Grice proposes:

(12) 

Acc (Given that S has a red face, S has high blood pressure)

and this from "Acc (Given that x has a red face, x has high blood pressure)"

S has a red face

Ergo, Acc S has high blood pressure.

While for indicative-doxastic reasoning we qualify the conclusion with the

phrase "with some degree of probability", for imperative-boulomaic

reasoning we use "with some degree of _desirability_: 

"Let it be that A. It is the case that B. Ergo, with some degree of desirabiity, let it be that C."

Consider (13) and its more formal counterpart (14):

(13) 

It is acceptable that, given that R is to keep dry and that it the the case that R is such that it rains, that R is to take an umbrella.

R is to keep dry.

It rains.

Ceteris paribus, it is desirable that R takes an umbrella.

(14) 

Acc (Given !A & .B, !C)

(via Acc (Given !Fx & .Gx, !Hx)

!A

.B

(Principle of Total Evidence)

Ergo, it is desirable that !C

Consider:

(15) Acc, given that x is to survive, x is to eat.

by Universal Instantiation,

Acc, given that R is to survive

that R is to eat.

R is to survive.

Ergo, by Det, Acc, R is to eat.

_Ceteris paribus_ generalisations permeate boulomaic reasoning. 

Consider:

(16) 

Ceteris Paribus,

Acc (given that R1 likes R2,

R1 wants R2's company

R1 likes R2

No DEFEATER (e.g. R is ill)

Ergo: R1 wants R2's company.

(17) 

Ceteris Paribus

Acc (given that R is to leave USA,

& R is an alien, that R is to obtain a saling permit from the Internal Revenue

R is to leave USA and is an alien.

No Defeater (e.g. R is a close friend of the President and R arranges a travel in Air Force I)

Ergo: R is to obtain a sailing permit.

The principle of total evidence: can it be made explicit?

Consider R, the owner a firm which makes & sells ornaments from sea-shells.

Concerned if business will improve during the coming year, R reasons:

(18) These days, every beachcomber is collecting seashells like mad (so as

to sell them to firms such as mine), so I can get seashells more cheaply.

It is thus likely that given that I will get seashells more cheaply, the

business will improve. Yet, my not easily replaceable craftsmen are getting

restive for higher pay. I accept that given that the craftsmen are restive,

the business will _not_ improve. Ornaments from seashells are all the rage

at the moment, so I may be able to put my prices up though & make more

money. Ergo, it is pretty likely, given that I will get seashells more

cheaply, that my employees are restive, & that everyone is eager to buy

sheashell ornament, my business will improve.

Grice provides a correlative boulomaic version.

Now R is head accountant of a firm in Redwood City (it's accounting time) & gets an invited from his

mother to visit her in Milwaukee. Further, his wife has hada head a bad

car accident and is lying in a hospital in Boise, Idaho.

We can represent R's reasoning as:

(19)

Acc (Given that R is to give his mother pleasure & that R is her

favourite son, R is to visit her in Milwaukee next week). Acc (Given that R

is to get ready his firm's accounts -- he's head accountant & it's

accounting time, R is to spend next week in his office). Acc, given that R

is to give his mother pleasure and he's to get ready the firm's accounts, &

that he's the favourite son, & head accountant and it's accounting time,

that R visit his for a long weekend & return to the office on Tuesday. Acc,

given that R is to sustain his wife & she is lying, after with two broken

legs, internal injuries, & much pain, that R is to spend next week in Boise

Idaho. Acc, given that R is i. to give his mother pleasure and ii. get

ready the firm's accounts and iii. sustain his wife, and that iv. R is the

favourite son and v. he's head accountant at accounting time, and vi. R is

a husband with a wife lying in Boise, Idaho, that R is to spend next week

in Boise, Idaho, and telephone the mother and the office daily. Ergo Acc (R

is to spend next week in Boise, telephoning his mother and office daily.

A slightly different case concerns a doctor examining a patient: should he

give him electromixosis?

(20)

Given that the patient is to be relieved of cephalalgia (symptom:

headache) & he is of blood group G, the patient ought to take an aspirin.

Given that the patient is to be relieved of cepahlalgia _and gasteroplexis_

(symptom: stomach cramp) and that the patient is of blood group G, the

patient ought to be treated by electromixosis. Given that the patient is to

be relieved of cephalalgia and gasteroplexis and that he is of blood group

G & that his blood has an abnormally high alcohol content, the patient

ought to be given gentle message until his condition changes. R does not

find an abnormally high alcohol content in the patient's blood. Ergo (via

the Kantian switch on the face of unqualified indefeasibility), the patient

not just ought, but _must_ be given electromixosis.

The principle of total evidence here seems to be:

If R accepts-at-t an acceptability conditional C1, the antecedent of which _favours_ to degree d

the consequent of C, and R accepts-at-t the antecedent of C1, and C is

optimal-at-t for R (i.e. after _due_ (or proper -- sic valuational) search

by R for such a further conditional, there seems to be _no_ conditional C

such that R accepts-at-t C2 & its antecedent, & the antencent of C2 is an

extension of the antecedent of C1, & the consequent of C2 is a _rival_ of

the consequent of C1, & the antecedent of C2 favours the consequence of C2

more than it favours the consequent of C1, R may accept-at-t, to degree d,

the consequent of C1.

"Satisfactory" is the term chosen by Grice to do general duty for both "truth" -- the radical of an indicative utterance -- and "goodness" -- the radical of an imperative utterance. 

It may be possible to define goodness in terms of truth as follows:

It is acceptable that !p if 'It is good that !p' is true.

Satisfactoriness provides general versions for the truth-conditions of usual operators: 

"p AND q" is satisfactory
if p is satisfactory AND
q is satisfactory. 

"p OR q" is satisfactory
if p is satisfctory OR q is satisfactory. 

"IF p, q" is satisfactory
if p is not satisfactory
OR q is satisfactory.

This presents complications with "mixed-modal" utterances. 

'The best is filthy & don't touch it' is alright,

but it's reverse, 'Don't touch the beast & it is filthy' is dubious. 'Touch

the beast & the beast bites you' is not the _conjunction_ that "and"

suggests it is.

And, while 'Either he is taking a bath or leave the

bathroom door open' is alright, 'Either leave the bathroom door open or he

is talking a bath' seems less so.

Grice proposes that in case of these

utterances, we take the boulomaic operator as having broader scope.

 There's

also problem with the operation of negation.

With doxastic modality there

is really no problem: ".~p" and "~.p" are truth-conditionally equivalent.

With "!" the issue is more complex. It looks as if "~!~A" may read as "you

may (permissive) do A" (one signifies one's refusal to prohibit the

addressee's doing A.

Yet another complication is brought by utterances like

"The bicycle is to face north."

which he regards as value-indifferent. None

of this complications is insoluble, though.

How to cross the divide.

Inferential relations between alethic &

boulomaic modality. Is boulomaic modality reducible to doxastic modality.

Consider: "To preserve a youthful complexion, if one has a relatively

insensitive skin, one should smear one's face with peanut butter before

retiring at night". More formally: It should be, given that R is to

preserve a youthful complexion & that S has a relatively insensitive skin,

that S is to smear the face with peanut butter before retiring" ("SHOULD

(!p, .q; !r). Now, the boulomaic acceptability here seems to be based on

the flat doxastic acceptability of "SHOULD (.q, .r; .p)": "It should be, given that R smears the face with peanut butter skin before retiring & that R has a relatively insensitive skin, that R preserves a youthful complexion".

There is one problem with the reducibility thesis: in the boulomaic version, the phrastic "p"

features in the antecedent; in the doxstic version, it features in the

consequent. Some defeater may be so for the former but not but not for

latter.

This, Grice notes, is what concerned Kant in the _Grundlegung_.

Kant's example was: "It's fully acceptable, given that R is to bisect a

line on an unerring principle, that R is to draw from its extremities two

intersecting arcs". Such a conditional is vouched for by the analytic claim

of geometry: "If R bisects a line on an unerring principle, R does so as a

result of having drawn from its extremities two intersecting acts". In its

more general terms, we need to explore the basis for "He who wills the end,

wills the indispensable means".

Grice proposes seven steps in the

derivation.

Step I: It is a fundamental law of psychology that, ceteris

paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R wills P & judges if P, P

as a result of Q, R wills Q.

Step II: Place this law within the scope of a

"willing" operator: R wills for any P & Q, if R wills P & judges that if P,

P as a result of Q, R wills Q.

Step III: "wills" turns to "should": if

rational, R will have to block unsatisfactory (literally) attitudes: R

should (qua rational) judge for any P & Q, if it's satisfactory to will

that P & it's satisfactory to judge that if P, P as a result of Q, it's

sastisfactory to will that q.

Step IV: Expliciting mood specifications: R

should (qua rational) judge for any P & Q, if it's satisfactory that !P &

that if it .P, .P only as a result of Q, it's satisfactory that !Q.

Step V:

via (p & q -> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)): R should (qua rational) judge for any

P & Q, if it's satisfactory that if .P, .P only because Q, it's

satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let it be that Q.

Step VI:
R should

(qua rational) judge for any P & Q, if P, P only because p _yields_ if let

it be that P, let it be that Q.

Step VII:
For any P & Q if P, P only

because Q _yields_ if let it be that P, let it be that Q.

What about 'Counsels of prudence'?

Prudential acceptability can be dealt

with in a similar fashion, i.e. as analytical consequences of indicative

statemetns to the effect that so-and-so is the means to such-and-such, with

the proviso that there is a special end: "let R be happy".

Grice regards

that end as what Hume would call a "natural disposition", i.e. a matter of

_natural_ necessity.

One complication is drawn from J. L. Austin: one thing is to

know what is to be done (the realm of "wisdom" qua _administrative_

rationality), another how to do what is to be done (the realm of

_phronesis_ as the executive rationality).

A further complication is

brought by ends which are not only _finitely_ non specific (I may want a

large fierce dog to guard my house, and don't care which kind) but

antecedently _indeterminately_ non specific -- i.e. not yet deliberated: I

may want a large fierce dog to guard my house, but may have not yet decided

which kind. Is the boundary between prhonesis and wisdom clear-cut?

Consider the case of ever dilligent Secretary. If a boss empowers his

secreatary to make determinate the boss's indeterminately non-specific

desires not on behalf of his boss, but as _she_ thinks best, she just

ceases to be a secretary. She's best described as an administrative

assistant.

A further problem is that ends relating to prudence may be

non-propositional (just as an amimal desires food, and not _to eat an

apple_).

 Grice explores at this stage an extremem scheme of "Crazy-Bayesy"

deliberation which rests on a mechanical model of the vectoring of forces

(with desires -- or animal spirits -- as such drives). In the scenario, R

has two ends E1 & E2; each has a different degree of desirability: d1 and

d2. Now for any action A1 which will realise E1 or E2 -- to this or that

degreee -- there is a probability p1 that A1 will realise E1 & a

probability p2 that A1 will realise E2. The desirability of the action,

relative to E1 & E2 is a function of the desirabiity of E1 and E2 & the

probability that A1 will realise E1 and E2. Only if A1 scores higher (in

action-desirability relative to E1) than any alternative action, should R

should choose to do A1. Provisions should be made for, e.g. long-term

(standing) vs. situational ends. R may priorise family over business, and

his children over Aunt Jemima (who's been living with R all these years).

On a particular occasion, though, R may priorise Aunt Jemima (to get her

out of one of her tantrums) over taking R's son to see the hippopotami at

the zoo. While prudential rationality is perhaps _not_ just means-end

rationality, the determination over desires certainly does involve

means-end rationality.

BONUS TRACK:

How do we deal with Ends, systems of ends, and 'happiness'?

Grice proposes to

explore the_inclusive_ end of "counsels of prudence", viz. let R be happy.

Grice tries: to be happy is to be well-off, and this is analytic. Qua

inclusive end, this not only connects with the phenomenon of diminishing

marginal utility, but of _vanishing_ marginal utility. It may be, as Grice

puts it, that that, on occasions, the bucket of happiness is filled, and no

further inpouring of a desirable has any effect on its contents. One

feature to be preserved in the analysis is that what gives rise to the end

of happiness is not, strictly, a _means_ to happiness. Being a inclusive

end -- and a _rationally_ inclusive end at that -- it means it's rather, a

a set, or better, harmonic system, of ends, an end for the sake of which

certain desirables are desirable.

We need to analyse the contributiveness relation, i.e. the

predicate "... is contributive in way w to ...".

Grice proposes: R wills to

do P for the sake of Q just in case R wills to do P because R judges his

doing P as somehting which is contributive in way w to the realisation of

Q, and R _wills_ Q. This involves all sorts of sub-modalities. Take

'causal': The causal element may be an initiating factor ("I stop Jones

talking by knocking him cold") or a sustaining one ("I stop Jones's talking

by keeping my hand over his mouth"). Take 'specificatory': A host's seating

someone at this right hand side at dinner may be a specification of

treating him with respect. Take 'inclusive proper': R may wish to take a

certainly advertised cruise because it includes a visit to Naples. R may be

hospitable to someone today because R desires to be hospitable to that

someone throughhout his visit to R's town. Perhaps Aristotle's

considerations on the practical syllogism may help us here.

Grice notes two

versions of such a syllogism. R wills to realise Q, he enquires what would

lead to Q & decides that doing P would. So, R comes to will, & do, P. Or: R

conceives his doing P, enquires what doing P would lead to, sees that it

would lead to Q, which he finds himself willing. So R comes to will, and

do, P. There are complications, with regard to inclusive ends with _special

circumstances_. For one, a man wrecked on a desert island where he has thus

to spend some time (fixed scenario, not chosen) decides to study the local

flora and fauna. A second complication is with reason versus

rationalisation: a man wants to move to Ipswich, but he decides it's

because of the salubrious climate. Here the reason (though not,

consciously, _his_ reason) why he desires to move to a salubrious climate

is that such a desire will justify the desire to move to Ipswich. A third

type of case is illustrated by the tyrant who punishes a minister by

conferring to him the organisation of the disposal of the garbage of the

palace. Now, just to frustrate the tyrant's plan to humiliate the minister,

the ministe decides to take pride in the discharge of his duty. Here a

higher-order desire is involved: the minister wants to discharge his office

efficiently, "for its own sake" as it were, and he wants to want this

because he wants by so wanting to frustrate the tyrant.

Grice thus notes

that "wanting p for the sake of q" covers indeed two different cases: R

wants P because R judges it to be a means for R, and (the minister case), R

wants P because he judges that _wanting_ P will help to realise Q. This is

important: with the inclusive end, "that R be happy", its components are

not, strictly, the realisation of a specific end but, rather, the desire

for that realisation. Wanting p for the sake of q, where q is happiness

does not strictly require that R judges P is a means for Q; only that R

judges that _wanting_ P will help realise Q; or, in other words, judging P

is one of a set of items which collectively exhibit the open feature

associated with happiness.

"R is to be happy" being a rationally inclusive end, it follows

that happiness is a higher-order desire, i.e. a desire to have, and

satisfy, a set of desires which exemplifies some open feature. Willing is

crucial here: R's _decides_ that certain items are constitutive of his

happiness. One may still wish to list some features which are conducive to

stability and flexibility, which will characteristic of happiness qua

realisation of a system of ends. Such features are: Feasibility: the

adopted system of ends should be workable. Autonomy: or self-sufficiency.

It's better, for example, not to have to rely on government grants (p.132).

Compatibility or 'harmony' of component ends: i.e. the practical analogue

of consistency or coherence. Comprehensiveness: the practical analogue of

completeness. Supportiveness of component ends: one's devotion to one's

wife, for example, may inspire one to heightened endeavour in one's

business of selling encyclopaedias. Simplicity: related to feasibility.

Agreebleness, understood not as the mere satisfaction of a desire, but as

the idea of an activity being a source of delight, or an attraction

supporting an otherwise not very desirable principle. Grice is aware of

limitations. One may wish to add ideals such as maximal development of

one's natural talents, or the provision of scope for outstanding or

distinctive achievement. Perhaps a more serious problem is the closed

systematicity of the listed features. Except for "agreebleness" they seem

all internal, and thus prone to objections such as those directed to the

coherence theory of truth. It will thus be difficult, in the present

scheme, to decide between the real happy life, and, say, the life of a

hermit, a monomaniacal stamp collector, an unwavering egoist, and a

well-balanced, kindly country gentleman.

A way out of this objection

concerns the importation of the notion of value.

Rationality is after all,

man's metier of man, the capacity with which the Genitor has endowed us in

order to make us maximally viable in our living condition, i.e. in the

widest manageable range of different environments.