According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.
Tuesday, May 29, 2018
Grice on alérgica akrasia
Speranza
According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.
According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.
Implicature and the collapsing principle
Speranza
If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a corresponding comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative relations, John Broome’s Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward two alleged counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. In this paper, I argue that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I also argue that it is implausible.
If ‘F’ is a predicate, then ‘Fer than’ or ‘more F than’ is a corresponding comparative relational predicate. Concerning such comparative relations, John Broome’s Collapsing Principle states that, for any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y. Luke Elson has recently put forward two alleged counter-examples to this principle, allegedly showing that it yields contradictions if there are borderline cases. In this paper, I argue that the Collapsing Principle does not rule out borderline cases, but I also argue that it is implausible.
Weak implicature
Speranza
Indirect speech reports can be true even if they attribute to the speaker the saying of something weaker than what she in fact expressed, yet not all weakenings of what the speaker expressed yield true reports. For example, if Anna utters ‘Bob and Carla passed the exam’, we can accurately report her as having said that Carla passed the exam, but we can not accurately report her as having said that either it rains or it does not, or that either Carla passed the exam or pandas are cute. This paper offers an analysis of speech reports that distinguishes weakenings of what the speaker expressed that yield true reports from weakenings that do not. According to this analysis, speech reports are not only sensitive to the informational content of what the speaker expressed, but also to the possibilities a speaker raises in making an utterance. As I argue, this analysis has significant advantages over its most promising competitors, including views based on work by Barwise and Perry : 668–691, 1981), views appealing to recent work on the notion of content parthood by Fine :199–226, 2016) and Yablo, and Richard’s : 605–616, 1998) proposal appealing to structured propositions.
Indirect speech reports can be true even if they attribute to the speaker the saying of something weaker than what she in fact expressed, yet not all weakenings of what the speaker expressed yield true reports. For example, if Anna utters ‘Bob and Carla passed the exam’, we can accurately report her as having said that Carla passed the exam, but we can not accurately report her as having said that either it rains or it does not, or that either Carla passed the exam or pandas are cute. This paper offers an analysis of speech reports that distinguishes weakenings of what the speaker expressed that yield true reports from weakenings that do not. According to this analysis, speech reports are not only sensitive to the informational content of what the speaker expressed, but also to the possibilities a speaker raises in making an utterance. As I argue, this analysis has significant advantages over its most promising competitors, including views based on work by Barwise and Perry : 668–691, 1981), views appealing to recent work on the notion of content parthood by Fine :199–226, 2016) and Yablo, and Richard’s : 605–616, 1998) proposal appealing to structured propositions.
Grice on the alethic
Speranza
Asay (2018) criticizes our contention that psychologists do best to adhere to a substantive theory of correspondence truth. He argues that deflationary theory can serve the same purposes as correspondence theory. In the present article we argue that (a) scientific realism, broadly construed, requires a version of correspondence theory and (b) contrary to Asay’s suggestion, correspondence theory does have important additional resources over deflationary accounts in its ability to support generalizations over classes of true senten
Asay (2018) criticizes our contention that psychologists do best to adhere to a substantive theory of correspondence truth. He argues that deflationary theory can serve the same purposes as correspondence theory. In the present article we argue that (a) scientific realism, broadly construed, requires a version of correspondence theory and (b) contrary to Asay’s suggestion, correspondence theory does have important additional resources over deflationary accounts in its ability to support generalizations over classes of true senten
Mr and Mrs Grice
Speranza
What one decides fit for appearance through writing and speech bears a political signifi cance that risk being distorted through both language, reception in the public, and through calls for gendered representations. How can work of female philosophers be interpreted as a concern for the world from that of having to respond to a male-dominated discourse through which speech becomes trapped into what one might represent as ‘other’? In this paper, I explore the public reception of two female thinkers who question, in diff erent ways, the dominant notion of the author or philosopher as a male subject; what kind of limitations does the relative notion of ‘female’ pose political action, and how can privilege constitute a hindrance to feminist solidarity?
What one decides fit for appearance through writing and speech bears a political signifi cance that risk being distorted through both language, reception in the public, and through calls for gendered representations. How can work of female philosophers be interpreted as a concern for the world from that of having to respond to a male-dominated discourse through which speech becomes trapped into what one might represent as ‘other’? In this paper, I explore the public reception of two female thinkers who question, in diff erent ways, the dominant notion of the author or philosopher as a male subject; what kind of limitations does the relative notion of ‘female’ pose political action, and how can privilege constitute a hindrance to feminist solidarity?
He, Grice
Speranza
In this paper, we defend two main claims. The first is a moderate claim: we have a negative duty to not use binary gender-specific pronouns he or she to refer to genderqueer individuals. We defend this with an argument by analogy. It was gravely wrong for Mark Latham to refer to Catherine McGregor, a transgender woman, using the pronoun he; we argue that such cases of misgendering are morally analogous to referring to Angel Haze, who identifies as genderqueer, as he or she. The second is a radical claim: we have a negative duty to not use any gender-specific pronouns to refer to anyone, regardless of their gender identity. We offer three arguments in favor of this claim (which appeal to concerns about inegalitarianism and risk, invasions of privacy, and reinforcing essentialist ideologies). We also show why the radical claim is compatible with the moderate claim. Before concluding, we examine common concerns about incorporating either they or a neologism such as ze as a third-person singular gender-neutral pronoun. These concerns, we argue, do not provide sufficient reason to reject either the moderate or radical claim.
In this paper, we defend two main claims. The first is a moderate claim: we have a negative duty to not use binary gender-specific pronouns he or she to refer to genderqueer individuals. We defend this with an argument by analogy. It was gravely wrong for Mark Latham to refer to Catherine McGregor, a transgender woman, using the pronoun he; we argue that such cases of misgendering are morally analogous to referring to Angel Haze, who identifies as genderqueer, as he or she. The second is a radical claim: we have a negative duty to not use any gender-specific pronouns to refer to anyone, regardless of their gender identity. We offer three arguments in favor of this claim (which appeal to concerns about inegalitarianism and risk, invasions of privacy, and reinforcing essentialist ideologies). We also show why the radical claim is compatible with the moderate claim. Before concluding, we examine common concerns about incorporating either they or a neologism such as ze as a third-person singular gender-neutral pronoun. These concerns, we argue, do not provide sufficient reason to reject either the moderate or radical claim.
Grice and Staal
Speranza
- Comparative philosophy between two disparate cultural-philosophic traditions, such as Western and Chinese philosophy, has become a new trend of philosophical fashion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Having learned from the past, contemporary comparative philosophers cautiously safeguard their comparative studies against two potential pitfalls, namely cultural universalism and cultural relativism. The Orientalism that assumed the superiority of the Occidental has become a memory of the past. The historical pendulum has apparently swung to the other extreme. The more recent "reverse Orientalism" has started to reclaim the superiority of the Oriental. We have even been told that the twenty-first...
Implicature and Game
Speranza
Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle’s answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections.
Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle’s answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections.
Wednesday, May 23, 2018
Monday, May 21, 2018
Some sensible remarks about the senses
Speranza
Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify it here and, having done so, offer reason to doubt the argument. This will put us in a position to draw some lessons about the relation between object-directed and representation-internal aspects of cognitive significance.
Fregeanism and Relationism are competing families of solutions to Frege’s Puzzle, and by extension, competing theories of propositional representation. My aim is to clarify what is at stake between them by characterizing and evaluating a Relationist argument. Relationists claim that it is cognitively possible for distinct token propositional attitudes to be, in a sense, qualitatively indistinguishable: to differ in no intrinsic representational features. The idea of an ‘intrinsic representational feature’ is not, however, made especially clear in the argument. I clarify it here and, having done so, offer reason to doubt the argument. This will put us in a position to draw some lessons about the relation between object-directed and representation-internal aspects of cognitive significance.
Frege’s Disimplicature
Speranza
Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory of identity statements. To show this, I sketch a framework for developing solutions of this sort. I also consider how this result could be implemented by two influential solutions to Frege's puzzle, Perry's referential-reflexivism and Fine's semantic relationism.
Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory of identity statements. To show this, I sketch a framework for developing solutions of this sort. I also consider how this result could be implemented by two influential solutions to Frege's puzzle, Perry's referential-reflexivism and Fine's semantic relationism.
Bruce Fretts's Implicature
Speranza
There was an interesting implicature by Steve Martin reported by Bruce Fretts at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/arts/television/steve-martin-martin-short-netflix-comedy.html
In fact, the implicature is a triad and involves not just Fretts and Martin, but Short. Here is the passage.
First the reference,
Fretts, Bruce, "Steve Martin and Martin Short on friendship and what's truly funny."
Reference:
There was an interesting implicature by Steve Martin reported by Bruce Fretts at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/arts/television/steve-martin-martin-short-netflix-comedy.html
In fact, the implicature is a triad and involves not just Fretts and Martin, but Short. Here is the passage.
First the reference,
Fretts, Bruce, "Steve Martin and Martin Short on friendship and what's truly funny."
Steve Martin and Martin Short on Friendship and What’s Truly Funny
Now the relevant passage:
SHORT Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”
MARTIN I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”
"you were just called" is hyperlinked. To what?
To:
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/rabbit-holes/is-martin-short-the-greatest-talk-show-guest-of-all-time
A piece by Ian Grouch.
Is Martin Short the Greatest Talk-Show Guest of All Time?
Reference:
Crouch, Ian. Is Martin Short the greatest talk-show guest of all time?
So Fretts is taking some Griceian liberties, because Crouch poses the question, er, in the erotetic mode, as Grice calls it.
So let's revise the NYT wording:
SHORT Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”
MARTIN I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”
Let's formalise that alla Frege:
FRETT's proposition:
(i) Short is one of the greatest late-night guests of all time.
Short's 'correction' -- Short's proposition
(ii) Short is the greatest late-night guest of all time.
Martin's rebuke -- Martin's proposition:
(iii) Short is among the greatest late-time guests of all time.
Fretts:
-- by Ian Crouch. Although Crouch poses this as a question. The article seems to IMPLICATE an affirmative answer to the question in the title. Which leads to Fretts's proposition (i) above.
SHORT
"Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”"
Leading to Short's proposition (ii)
(ii) Short is the greatest late-night guests of all time.
Note Short's emphasis on "not to correct you," since, alla Grice, he isn't -- at the level of what is said (if not implicated or disimplicated).
MARTIN
"I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”"
Martin is right. He SHOULD read that article again (i.e. 'reread' it) and check Crouch's lingo.
In any case, consider again the logical form of (i), (ii), and (iii). Grice would say that they are all true at the level of what is said, if not implicated or disimplicated.
There's implicature for you!
Nobody is correcting nobody -- and No body is correcting Any body if you mustn't!
Marty Short's Implicature
Speranza
Speranza
There was an interesting implicature by Steve Martin reported by Bruce Fretts at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/arts/television/steve-martin-martin-short-netflix-comedy.html
In fact, the implicature is a triad and involves not just Fretts and Martin, but Short. Here is the passage.
First the reference,
Fretts, Bruce, "Steve Martin and Martin Short on friendship and what's truly funny."
Reference:
Speranza
There was an interesting implicature by Steve Martin reported by Bruce Fretts at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/arts/television/steve-martin-martin-short-netflix-comedy.html
In fact, the implicature is a triad and involves not just Fretts and Martin, but Short. Here is the passage.
First the reference,
Fretts, Bruce, "Steve Martin and Martin Short on friendship and what's truly funny."
Steve Martin and Martin Short on Friendship and What’s Truly Funny
Now the relevant passage:
SHORT Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”
MARTIN I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”
"you were just called" is hyperlinked. To what?
To:
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/rabbit-holes/is-martin-short-the-greatest-talk-show-guest-of-all-time
A piece by Ian Grouch.
Is Martin Short the Greatest Talk-Show Guest of All Time?
Reference:
Crouch, Ian. Is Martin Short the greatest talk-show guest of all time?
So Fretts is taking some Griceian liberties, because Crouch poses the question, er, in the erotetic mode, as Grice calls it.
So let's revise the NYT wording:
SHORT Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”
MARTIN I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”
Let's formalise that alla Frege:
FRETT's proposition:
(i) Short is one of the greatest late-night guests of all time.
Short's 'correction' -- Short's proposition
(ii) Short is the greatest late-night guest of all time.
Martin's rebuke -- Martin's proposition:
(iii) Short is among the greatest late-time guests of all time.
Fretts:
-- by Ian Crouch. Although Crouch poses this as a question. The article seems to IMPLICATE an affirmative answer to the question in the title. Which leads to Fretts's proposition (i) above.
SHORT
"Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”"
Leading to Short's proposition (ii)
(ii) Short is the greatest late-night guests of all time.
Note Short's emphasis on "not to correct you," since, alla Grice, he isn't -- at the level of what is said (if not implicated or disimplicated).
MARTIN
"I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”"
Martin is right. He SHOULD read that article again (i.e. 'reread' it) and check Crouch's lingo.
In any case, consider again the logical form of (i), (ii), and (iii). Grice would say that they are all true at the level of what is said, if not implicated or disimplicated.
There's implicature for you!
Nobody is correcting nobody -- and No body is correcting Any body if you mustn't!
Ian Crouch's Implicature
Speranza
Speranza
There was an interesting implicature by Steve Martin reported by Bruce Fretts at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/arts/television/steve-martin-martin-short-netflix-comedy.html
In fact, the implicature is a triad and involves not just Fretts and Martin, but Short. Here is the passage.
First the reference,
Fretts, Bruce, "Steve Martin and Martin Short on friendship and what's truly funny."
Reference:
Speranza
There was an interesting implicature by Steve Martin reported by Bruce Fretts at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/arts/television/steve-martin-martin-short-netflix-comedy.html
In fact, the implicature is a triad and involves not just Fretts and Martin, but Short. Here is the passage.
First the reference,
Fretts, Bruce, "Steve Martin and Martin Short on friendship and what's truly funny."
Steve Martin and Martin Short on Friendship and What’s Truly Funny
Now the relevant passage:
SHORT Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”
MARTIN I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”
"you were just called" is hyperlinked. To what?
To:
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/rabbit-holes/is-martin-short-the-greatest-talk-show-guest-of-all-time
A piece by Ian Grouch.
Is Martin Short the Greatest Talk-Show Guest of All Time?
Reference:
Crouch, Ian. Is Martin Short the greatest talk-show guest of all time?
So Fretts is taking some Griceian liberties, because Crouch poses the question, er, in the erotetic mode, as Grice calls it.
So let's revise the NYT wording:
SHORT Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”
MARTIN I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”
Let's formalise that alla Frege:
FRETT's proposition:
(i) Short is one of the greatest late-night guests of all time.
Short's 'correction' -- Short's proposition
(ii) Short is the greatest late-night guest of all time.
Martin's rebuke -- Martin's proposition:
(iii) Short is among the greatest late-time guests of all time.
Fretts:
-- by Ian Crouch. Although Crouch poses this as a question. The article seems to IMPLICATE an affirmative answer to the question in the title. Which leads to Fretts's proposition (i) above.
SHORT
"Not to correct you, and it doesn’t matter, but it wasn’t “one of the greatest late-night guests of all time,” it was “the greatest.”"
Leading to Short's proposition (ii)
(ii) Short is the greatest late-night guests of all time.
Note Short's emphasis on "not to correct you," since, alla Grice, he isn't -- at the level of what is said (if not implicated or disimplicated).
MARTIN
"I’d like to read that article again and see if it said “among the greatest.”"
Martin is right. He SHOULD read that article again (i.e. 'reread' it) and check Crouch's lingo.
In any case, consider again the logical form of (i), (ii), and (iii). Grice would say that they are all true at the level of what is said, if not implicated or disimplicated.
There's implicature for you!
Nobody is correcting nobody -- and No body is correcting Any body if you mustn't!
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