Speranza
Timothy Williamson and others have made a strong case for the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion.
Reasons to think that assertion has an epistemic norm also, interestingly, provide a reason to think that conversational implicature has a norm as well.
This norm, it is argued, cannot be knowledge.
In addition to highlighting an under-explored topic at the intersection of epistemology and linguistics, the discussion of conversational implicature puts dialectical pressure on the knowledge norm of assertion account.
The fact that knowledge is not the norm of conversational implicature forces one either to claim that there is one epistemic norm for the conveying of information and that it is not knowledge, or else to embrace a heterogeneous picture of communicative norms generally that undercuts some of the grounds for thinking that the norm of assertion should be presumed to be a simple norm as Williamson argues.
Wednesday, November 8, 2017
Grice on norms for implicature
Speranza
Timothy Williamson and others have made a strong case for the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Reasons to think that assertion has an epistemic norm also, interestingly, provide a reason to think that conversational implicature has a norm as well. This norm, it is argued, cannot be knowledge. In addition to highlighting an under-explored topic at the intersection of epistemology and linguistics, the discussion of conversational implicature puts dialectical pressure on the knowledge norm of assertion account. The fact that knowledge is not the norm of conversational implicature forces one either to claim that there is one epistemic norm for the conveying of information and that it is not knowledge, or else to embrace a heterogeneous picture of communicative norms generally that undercuts some of the grounds for thinking that the norm of assertion should be presumed to be a simple norm as Williamson argues.
Timothy Williamson and others have made a strong case for the claim that knowledge is the norm of assertion. Reasons to think that assertion has an epistemic norm also, interestingly, provide a reason to think that conversational implicature has a norm as well. This norm, it is argued, cannot be knowledge. In addition to highlighting an under-explored topic at the intersection of epistemology and linguistics, the discussion of conversational implicature puts dialectical pressure on the knowledge norm of assertion account. The fact that knowledge is not the norm of conversational implicature forces one either to claim that there is one epistemic norm for the conveying of information and that it is not knowledge, or else to embrace a heterogeneous picture of communicative norms generally that undercuts some of the grounds for thinking that the norm of assertion should be presumed to be a simple norm as Williamson argues.
Wednesday, November 1, 2017
Grice's Friend, Kantotle
Speranza
Judith Baker, as cited by Grice, provides a conceptual
analysis of ‘friend’ from an Aristotelian (or Kantotelian) point of view.
Is 'friend' a value-oriented concept? It obviously seems so!
Although Grice gives “He is a fine friend,” as said of a
scoundrel, as his first example of ‘irony,’ it might be argued that ‘fine’ is
not ‘good’.
“Good” is more basic.
Thus, to use another example, ‘sentence,’ is
a value-oriented concept, so that ‘good sentence’ is well-formed sentence,
making ‘good’ otiose.
But why did Aristotle think that one’s
friend is one’s alter ego?
Grice mentions Baker’s analysis, “Another Self:
Aristotle on Friendship,” in Grice’s WoW – Way of Words.
As Grice notes,
rather than ‘another self’ we should have ‘another me’, or ‘another I,’
strictly.
“At his point,” Grice notes, “I turn to [this] essay
by Judith Baker, entitled, "Another Self": Aristotle on friendship. On
the present occasion, my concern is focused on METHODOLOGICAL,” rather than
substantive “questions; so I propose first to consider the ideas about
METHODOLOGY, in particular Aristotle's methodology,” with a view to an analysis
as to “whether these ideas by Aristotle suggest any additions to the subject
matter of philosophical eschatology.” “Baker
suggests that Aristotle's philosophical method treats
the existence of a common consensus of opinions with respect to a proposition
as conferring at least provisional validity (validity ceteris paribus) upon the
proposition in question. In general, no external justification of the
acceptance of the objects of universal agreement is called for. This idea has not
always been accepted by philosophers." "If my perception of Moore is
correct, he would in Aristotle's view have been looking for an EXTERNAL
justification for the acceptance of the deliverances of common sense where none
is required. Though no EXTERNAL justification is
required for accepting the validity of
propositions which are generally or
universally believed, the validity in question
is only provisional. For a common consensus may be undermined in either of two
ways. First, there may be a common consensus that proposition “p” is true, but
there may be two mutually inconsistent propositions, (q1 and q2), where while
there is a common consensus that q1 or q2, there is no common consensus
concerning the truth of q1 or the truth of q2; there are, so to speak, two
schools of thought, one favouring q1 and one favouring q2. Furthermore (we may
suppose) the combination of q1 with p will yield r1, whereas the combination of
q2 with p will yield r2; and r1 and r2 are mutually inconsistent. In such a
situation, it becomes a question whether the acceptability of p is LEFT INTACT.
If it is, a method will have to be devided for deciding between q1 and q2.
Second, to cope with problems created by the appearance on the scene of
conflicts or other stumbling blocks the theorist may be expected to systematise
the data which are vouched for by common
consensus by himself devising general
propositions which are embedded in his theory.
Such generalities will NOT be directly attested by the consensus, but their ACCEPTABILITY
will depend on the ADEQUACY of the theory in which they appear to yield propositions
which are directly matters of general agreement. When an impasse
("aporia") arises, the aim of the theorist will be to ELIMINATE the
impasse with minimal disturbance to the material regarded as acceptable BEFORE
the impasse, including the theoretical generalities of the theorist."
It is here that Grice makes use of Aristotle:
amicus = alter ego.
Or in Grice’s translation:
friend = another I.
Since Aristotle’s equivalence (“friend = another
I”) HAS BEEN MET with criticism (Baker mentions David Sachs), Grice concludes
that the reflections in which I have just been engaged, suggest to me TWO
FURTHER items which might be added to a prospective subject matter of
philosophical eschatology. One would be a classification of the various kinds
of impasse or “aporia” by theorists who engaged in the Aristotelian undertaking
of attempting to systematise mterial with which they are presented as LAY
inquirers, together with a classification of the variety of responses which
might be effective against such impasses. The other would be a thorough-going analysis
of the boundary between legitimate and ILLEGITIMATE imputations to a theorist
of the sin of 'having changed the subject.’ Beyond these additions I have at
the moment only one further suggestion. Sometimes, the activities of the
eschatologist might involve the suggestion of certain PRINCIPLES and some of
the material embodied in those principles might contain the potentialty of independent
life, a potentiality which it would be theoretically advantageous to explore.
This further exploration might be regarded as being itself A PROPER OCCUPATION for
the eschatologist. One example might be a further examination of the
theoretical notion of an “alter ego.””
In fact, it is Cicero who translates Aristotle
here (“állos egṓ,” “héteros egṓ,
“heteros autos,” Nich. Eth. 9. 9.10 ), as “alter ego” (Ad Atticum 3.15.4, Ad familiaris, 7.5.1). Grice’s “another I.” Cicero prefers to translate Aristotle’s “heteros autos” as “alter idem,” in the nominative (“De Amicitia.”). For the record, Zeno uses “allos ego” (as cited by Diogenes Laertius).
“heteros autos,” Nich. Eth. 9. 9.10 ), as “alter ego” (Ad Atticum 3.15.4, Ad familiaris, 7.5.1). Grice’s “another I.” Cicero prefers to translate Aristotle’s “heteros autos” as “alter idem,” in the nominative (“De Amicitia.”). For the record, Zeno uses “allos ego” (as cited by Diogenes Laertius).
Aristotle does not strictly argue that one ought to have only
ONE friend, but, as Richard Kraut notes, he does not argue, either, that “one
is always too few.” Kraut continues to note that Aristotle notes that “the
friendships commemorated in verse are those that exist between just two people”
(Eth. Nich. 1171a15).
Aristotle: “[T]he
famous examples [of friendships] of poetry [such as
Achilles and Patroclus, Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Pirithous] are pairs
of friends.”
The passage is
slightly tricky: “Friendships between comrades only include a
few people, and the famous examples of poetry are pairs of
friends.”
Therefore, it is not quite or exactly clear whether pairs like
Achilles/Patroclus, Orestes/Pylades and Theseus/Pirithous] are quoted as
examples of comradeship or friendship in general.
And stuff!
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