Grice's Bucket

by JLS
for the GC

ANOTHER AUTHOR discussed by Schoolfield in his online MSc (Edinburgh) dissertation, at

www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/.../1/Grice%20paper%20Final%20Draft.doc

is good ol' S. C. Levinson ('ol' respectively, because 'good Levinson' is ambiguous. He is old compared to nobody!).

Schoolfield writes:

"Continuing with the modifications of Neo-Gricean theory, one must mention the theory presented in Levinson’s Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature."

I once asked Horn, "Have you read that book?" -- as when you ask someone, "Any recent films you've seen". He replied, "Yes, in galleys. I was its reader".

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"[The book] concerns itself with general conversational implicatures (GCIs) rather than particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs). Thus, Levinson’s theory of pragmatics is intentionally incomplete, as he points out when he writes, “a theory of GCIs has to be supplemented with a theory of PCIs that will have at least as much, and possibly considerably more, importance to a general theory of communication” (Levinson 2000, 22)."

"One of the problems Levinson sees in the Gricean theory is that there is no major distinction between the generalized implicatures and the particular implicatures. Levinson writes:"

"In the immediate context of a discussion of the distinction, Grice provides only one, none too clear, example… viz. the inference from the indefinite article to the assumption that the speaker is not in a position to be specific. Thus the assertion of (6) might normally carry the GCI inference."

“I saw a woman in my office.”
GCI: ‘I saw someone other than my wife/girlfriend/mother/etc.’
because “the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have been expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific” [Grice 1989, 37-38]. (Levinson 2000, 17)"

"However, Levinson claims that Grice was particularly interested in these generalized implicatures; thus, the GCI theory Levinson creates would be of great interest to philosophers with similar interests to Grice’s."

"This GCI theory is comprised of three heuristics, upon which all of the Gricean general implicature should rest. This theory should guide the interpretation of ambiguous sentences. The three heuristics are the Q-heuristic (regarding quantity), the I-heuristic (regarding “informativeness”), and the M-heuristic (regarding manner). Levinson uses they symbol “+>” to mean “implicates, as in ‘p’ +> ‘q’ (uttering ‘p’ implicates ‘q’)” (Levinson 2000, xi). This is differentiated from the symbol “++>” which, for Levinson means, “communicates (the sum of what is said and what is implicated)” (Levinson 2000, xi)."

"The Q-heuristic is supposed to model Grice’s Q1-maxim, “What isn’t said, isn’t” (Levinson 2000, 35). This is important for his theory of scalar implicature between words like “all” and “some,” and others like “not all” and “none.” It also can be used in regards to the simpler aspects of the Q1-maxim such as “‘Three boys came in’ +> ‘not four’” (Levinson 2000, 36). However, the scalar implicatures presented by Levinson are particularly interesting, primarily the relation of the Q-heuristic to the traditional square of opposition. Levinson writes."

"Aristotle held that in the case of the modals the I/O relation was logical but in the case of the quantifiers it was a nonlogical suggestion. Hamilton and Jespersen held the relation is logical for all the squares, De Morgan and J. S. Mill that it is nonlogical for all the squares, and so on."

"The theory of GCIs helps to explain the confusion. The I (some) corner of the square carries a generalized scalar implicature to the effect that the O (not all) corner also holds. It is the generalized nature of the inference that explains the confusion even among these eminent scholars thinking deep and hard about the problem. “Some” strongly suggests ‘not all’, and “Some in fact all” or “Not all, indeed none,” indicating that the suggestion cannot be a logical relationship. (Levinson 2000, 68)"

"The significance of the Q-heuristic here is obvious. It allows the square of opposition to be understood not for just the typical all, some none(not some), not all pairs, but can be implemented even with the logical connectives and, or neither/nor, not both (Levinson 2000, 64-67). Still, the real affect that this Q-heuristic produces is the conditions by which the hearer knows that statements tend to be more efficient than they technically must be. People will often, as this heuristic allows, disregard specifier phrases such as in “exactly n things,” and “Possibly, but not definitely X” in casual speech. Thus, the Q-heuristic allows for limits on what one must say, so as not to exasperate speakers or confuse hearers.
The I-heuristic that Levinson presents is somewhat different. He defines this heuristic as, “What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified”; here Levinson mimics Grice’s Q2-maxim “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required” (Levinson 2000, 37). This heuristic covers things often left unsaid, for simplicity’s sake. Levinson gives the example, “‘If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you $5.’ +> ‘Iff you mow the lawn, will I [sic] give you $5’” (Levinson 2000, 37). The I-heuristic also has particular applicability in explaining why conjunction statements usually imply temporal order and causal connection, and why conditional statements almost always imply a causal relation. This is why, for example when one says, “He got in the car, turned on the engine, and drove away,” typically that person implies that the actions were done in that order, and that there was a causal connection between them. This heuristic, however, will need to work with the M-heuristic to have any serious weight; because, in order for something to be said in the stereotypical way, there must be a way to say something non-stereotypically, which is what the M-heuristic marks for hearers."

"The M-heuristic is related to Grice’s maxim of Manner. Levinson explains, “What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal” (Levinson 2000, 38)."

"To explain this principle Levinson continues, “The underlying idea here is that there is an implicit opposition or parasitic relationship between our second and third heuristics: what is said simply… picks up the stereotypical interpretation; if in contrast a marked expression is used, it is suggested that the stereotypical interpretation should be avoided” (Levinson 2000, 38). This heuristic is used in order to interpret oddly worded sentence, which contain superfluous wordage, e.g. excessive phrasing or double negation. The example Levinson gives are of the following form, “‘Bill stopped the car’ +> (by I) ‘in the stereotypical manner with the foot pedal’,” which invokes the I-heuristic due to its simplicity; whereas, “‘Bill caused the car to stop’ +> (by M) ‘indirectly, not in the normal way, e.g., by the use of the emergency brake’,” which relies on the M-heuristic because of the indirect way in with the statement is made (Levinson 2000, 39)."

"Davis’ criticisms of this theory of implicature, to be discussed in depth later, will effectively undermine these implicatures; thus, the relationship between these heuristics may be in jeopardy."

"One of the main pieces of work Levinson incorporates, that Grice clearly fails to explicitly provide for, is his guidelines for the resolution of implicature clashes. Where Grice addresses the fact that clashes may occur, he does not explicate which of his principles will have precedence over others. This allows for the problematic situation where one must decide which maxim is most important in any given situation, and thus, which maxim one ought to follow rather than another. Levinson sees this problem and addresses it when he writes, “As sentences become complex, these inferences may arise from different clauses, and traffic rules will need to be established. In short, we have a projection problem” (Levinson 2000, 157). Levinson’s “resolution schema” is as follows."

"a: Genuine Q-implicature… take precedence over I-implicatures;
b: In all other cases, the I-principle induces stereotypical interpretations, unless:
c: A marked expression has been used where an unmarked one could have been employed instead, in which case the M-implicature defeats the relevant I-implicature, by inducing the inference to the complement of the I-implicature that would have arisen from the unmarked expression. (Levinson 2000, 157)
More simply put, “Q-implicatures > M-implicatures > I-implicatures”; yet, even Levinson admits that this is much too simple of a model, because “This still leaves much detail unresolved—for example, the resolution of potential implicatures of different subtypes arising under the same principle, or of inferences coming from different clauses” (Levinson 2000, 157-158). However, this general schema seems sufficient for Levinson’s ends, as his theory is about implicature in general, and if pressed he should be able to provide a more in depth version to suit the needs of different problems."

"This theory of generalize conversational implicature, though much more cohesively formed, has still been criticized by Davis, as noted, among others. One of the main issues is that, like Grice’s theory, Levinson must also incorporate the Cooperative Principle, which many have argued is faulty. Davis argues via counterexamples that this type of system will ultimately fail."


----- A good thing about Levinson: he is a neo-Gricean. Have you noticed that Dilthey is a neo-Kantian? What does THAT mean? Well, for one, Dilthey lived hundred years AFTER Cant, so I cant swallow the neo-. But with people who were alive when Grice was, I kant! Call me paleao-!