by JLS
for the GC
Some commented excerpts from Quinton's "Linguistic Analysis" chapter in "Philosophy in the Mid-Century":
Quinton entitles the section:
"Philosophy as the Analysis of Language"
and comments:
"The kind of philosophy that is now dominant in [Oxford] has
taken many forms and been given many names."
Grice was amused by one such label, "Oxford School of Ordinary Language" -- or, let me check, "The Ordinary Language Approach to Philosophy" (WoW:170):
--- as this American 'philosopher of science' approached Grice as to whether such approach had 'anything to contribute to the Philosophy of Science'.
Quinton continues:
"Even if it would be more or less sincerely rejected as
a description of their views by many of the philosophers to whom
I shall apply it, the title 'linguistic analysis' is probably as
good as any."
Good implicature-free riposte.
Quinton:
"It has the merit of bringing out the two main
points of agreement, which add up to a genuine
community of method and aims, of an otherwise very
varied collection of thinkers."
---- Grice was fascinated by the diversity even within the bounds of the "Play Group": Paul, Urmson, Hart, Hare, Austin, Grice, Nowell-Smith, Gardiner, Pears, etc. -- and Quinton.
Quinton:
(a) Re: 'analysis':
"The word 'analysis' conveys their
idea of the proper object and purpose
of philosophical inquiries,
as opposed to constructive metaphysical speculation
of the traditional sort. For the analyst, philosophy
is not a discipline coordinate with or comprehensive of
the special sciences: it is an activity of clarification
directed on to the concepts and methods we employ
in these sciences and, indeed, in all forms of thought."
(b) Re: 'linguistic'
"The word 'linguistic', on the other hand, shows
what they see as the proper subject-matter of
philosophy. They recommend that philosophers
should attend to the use of language rather than the character
of the world as a whole or the nature of thought and knowledge."
Quinton:
"It could be argued that this recommendation is not
so far-reaching in its implications as at first appears,
that in fact it is no more than the proposal of a new
idiom for philosophical exposition, but, even if this
is correct, the change of idiom is sufficiently
revolutionary in itself to count as a major innovation."
--- Grice agreed that what happened in Oxford around the mid-century WAS revolutionary. Of course he would have held Ryle mostly responsible for it -- but the new generation that flourished in the post-war period was just as influential (Ryle, born 1900; Austin, b. 1911, Grice, b. 1913; Quinton, b. 1925).
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This is the Klibansky volume on "Metaphysics and Analysis" and the Quinton essay occupies pp. 146 to 202, and was published in Firenze.
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