Grice on 'implicatures' of 'seem' -- Quinton on its uses

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From op. cit., p. 55 of Swartz's reprint of Quinton, The problem of perception.

"But there is another use of 'appear' in

which no reason can be given for statements

containing it, and which DO report observations."


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Quinton:

" (iv) It appears to be green.

we might say of a distant house."

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"If challenged we can repeat, or perhaps correct,

ourselves or protest,

--- (v) Well, that is how it appears to me.

But such a statement would normally be made

in answers to such questions as

--- (vi) What colour is that house?

and could be replaced by

-- (vii) It's green, I think.

or

-- (viii) It's green, isn't it?

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"They report observations in a tenative

way where we know, believe, or suspect,

that the circumstances are unfavourable

to an accurate report, that there is

something wrong with, or

abnormal about, the conditions of

observation."

----

"They resemble ordinary categorical

descriptions,

---- (ix) The house is green.

in subject matter, but differ from

them in expressing inclinations to

believe rather than full beliefs."

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"There is a THIRD use of 'appear', which

resembles the last one mentioned, in that NO REASONS

OR EVIDENCE can be given, for statements

containing it, but differs from it in that

certain conventional conditions of observation

are supposed to obtain, whether they do or not."

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---- (x) It looks to me (here, now) elliptical.


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"we say of a plate we KNOW to be tilted

and round, supposing it to be at right

angles to our line of vision."

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"This statement answers the question (xi)."

--- (xi) How does it strike you, look to you, what exactly do you see?

"It is replaceable by (xii)."

--- (xii) There is an elliptical patch in the centre of my visual field.

"It is in this type of case ONLY that the description of
appearances and experience coincide."

-- Quinton.