By JLS
for the GC
--- J in comment on "Process and Conversation":
"the politics of the science establishment is not strictly a semantic or syntactic affair".
Hear, hear. But one wishes! I have to meditate on this so a hurried reply. In semiotic circles, there are indeed three angles to consider:
syntactics -- the interreation between signs. Consider Hilbert's formalism in mathematics. I think it would not be unfair to consider a formalist as being pretty happy and satisfied with a syntax of mathematics. (He would not use the word 'syntactics'). Since we then have a System, or Language -- call it System H, for Hilbert --, most of the notions should be defined at THIS level. A true formalist is never going to ask you what a sign 'means' or represents. So I would think concatenation of signs is a pretty basic thing and obviously prior to any interpretation.
With intuitionism, logicism, etc., there's the realm of the 'semantics' of a language to be taken into account. This, since the development of 'model' theory SHOULD be understood as making a claim on 'reality'. A predicate-calculus (like Grice's System G) needs to specify the correlations with 1 (truth) and 0 (falsity) -- polyvalent models are even trickier. Now, at THIS level, a theory, a system, or a language MAY be said to be a 'semantic' affair. But people usually underestimate semantics as when they criticise Clinton, "Depends on what you mean by 'is'" as being mere 'semantic'. Etc.
Finally, there is the 'pragmatic' dimension. This has been explored notably by Kuhn, and Lakatos -- even for the 'progress' or revolutions in 'formal' and not so formal sciences. Consider Lakatos on what COUNTS as evidence in a research programme. It would be a good idea to encompass those considerations which EXTEND beyond the 'semantics' of the language of a specific theory as dealing with its pragmatics.
J:
"the politics of the science establishment is not strictly a semantic or syntactic affair".
In the case of the big-bang cosmology, for example, the politics HAS been confirmationist. I.e. alternate-cosmologies have been given little support, the wiki says, because, well, they have been thought to have been 'falsified'. When it comes to more formal disciplines, like mathematics, logic, or some sort of conceptual analysis, the points may be trickier. No wonder Grice LOVED the longitudinal unity of what he called 'philosophy': treat those who were great and are dead as if they are great and living. Why is it? Just for an amor theologicus, or because of some point about the inner architectonics of concepts, or stuff?
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Finally, there is the 'pragmatic' dimension. This has been explored notably by Kuhn, and Lakatos -- even for the 'progress' or revolutions in 'formal' and not so formal sciences. Consider Lakatos on what COUNTS as evidence in a research programme. It would be a good idea to encompass those considerations which EXTEND beyond the 'semantics' of the language of a specific theory as dealing with its pragmatics.
ReplyDeleteKuhn and Lakatos may have done important work, but I'm not sure "pragmatics" describes it (at least pragmatics in the language sense, ala Grice)--Kuhn's discussion of paradigms for one seems somewhat historically- oriented (going from that thriller "Structure of Sci. Rev"), even determinist to a degree. Im not sure I see the GC connection--Kuhn's "programme" seems a bit contra-ord.language types.
I haven't read much Lakatos, but his skeptical but scientifically informed critique seems somewhat similar to Feyerabend as I think PF said himself, and also distinguished himself from Kuhn, who at times soundeds a bit ..Popperian or something, i.e. another lackey for academia, if not corporate interests. Feyerabend's for democracy, humanistic science, sound applications of theory and technology, even.... ecotopia (perhaps he was a bit naive). Kuhn on the other hand worked for the statist-bureaucracy.
You are perfectly right that Lakatos, Kuhn, and Feyerabend are historicists. Feyerabend has a delightful anecdote about Grice which I learned from L. M. Tapper (who contributes in this blog) -- they shared examinations at Berkeley and Feyerabend just couldn't stand sharing an examination table with the other "Paul". (I must have the anecdote elsewhere in the minutes of the club).
ReplyDeleteI guess the stretch, because a stretch IT is, is to wonder where those 'historical considerations' fit in: it cannot be 'syntax' -- for I don't think Einstein brought a syntactic revolution to science/physics. It could be "semantic" -- and it may be pragmatic. Most likely it was just 'semantic'.
Recall that for some time, due to the efforts of Carnap, all that analytic philosophers of science were allowed to do is to provide a good critical examination of the language used by theorists. This requires quite some knowledge of logic --. There are specific studies, for example, on the 'language' of biology -- how to formalise 'emergence' for example, how to provide an 'axiomatic' treatment of the main postulates of 'life', and so on.
Grice touches on this tangentially in "Method in philosophical psychology" when he considers 'psychology' as a science (which must be 'folksy' in his conception) built out of 'concepts' which do NOT overlap with the concepts of 'physics'. He would also speak of 'hypostasis' versus 'hypothesis'.
If one considers a language as a logical system, it seems we have not yet touched on issues as what counts a evidence, etc., which is a pretty basic question. I just love Lakatos speaking of 'research programmes' which become degenerate, and totally ad hoc, and the idea of the protective belt. I was thinking that since these issues relate to the use of the system, or the protection of the system, they could perhaps be seen as 'historically pragmatic' at most.
Grice was pretty respectful of what he called the unity of philosophy, in its latitude (its branches) and longitude (its history). Nothing like that in the hard, and even soft sciences. Talk to a professional psychologist about Aristotle and expect a diatribe against the spiritual conception of the soul. It all starts with Watson for them! -- I guess it's easy to be a scientist in THAT respect!