by JLS
-- for the GC
GRICE REMARKS, cursorily that the 'causal theory' may have a say on the analysis of 'factive' psychological attitudes (like 'see', 'know', 'realise', 'discover', 'regret', 'prove', 'conclude', 'infer', and ... perhaps, 'hear').
He is sticking with 'know' and proposes(WoW:52)
"A knows that p just in case
1. p
2. A thinks that p.
3. "Some condition placing restriction
on how [A] came to think p (cf. causal
theory)."
--- This OBVIOUSLY opened the door to Stampe and Dretske to play 'informational games'. Which reminds me I'll have to re-address Kramer's apt dictum combining: probability, possibility, and information.
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Sunday, June 13, 2010
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