Brillian Schoolfield on Kasher on Grice

by JLS
for the GC

Revising what Schoolfield had to say about 'game theory', or rather the authoritarian application of that notion by Hintikka to something as charming as Grice's 'conversational games', we have Schoolfield on Kasher as it relates to Kramer's point on it all boiling down to something like Grice's principle of economy of rational effort ("P. E. R. E.").

Here is Schoolfield then in that online site which contains his whole MSc for Edinburgy ('by research'). It is a very tidy thesis and v. good to explore secondary bibliography and particular authors dealing with Grice.

In the chapter on Kasher he writes:

www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/.../1/Grice%20paper%20Final%20Draft.doc - Similares

"Kasher presents one of the more obvious criticisms to Grice’s work in his essay, “Conversational Maxims and Rationality.” Kasher"

This is an early 1977 essay. Kasher told me that Grice was aware of Kasher's research via a graduate student of Kasher's who was on scholarship at Berkeley.

Schoolfield continues:

"places his emphasis on the dubiousness of the Cooperative Principle; primarily, he examines whether or not the Cooperative Principle is actually inherent to conversation. Kasher begins by elaborating Grice’s position,


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"primarily noting the Cooperative Principle. He then points to his own objectives, which are to show

“(a) that the cooperation principle has a problematic presumption, (b) that the connection between the cooperation principle and the principles to be derived from it is a problematic one, and (c) that the latter four principles follow from more general and more basic principles” (Kasher 1976, 201).

"Kasher attempts to show these three points by viewing conversation through a goal-achievement lens. Kasher directly addresses the second of these statements first. He makes a parallel between the Cooperative Principle and a goal-achievement principle, which he lays in the following way:"

"Is the cooperation principle one on which the four principles of quantity, quality, relation, and manner are well grounded? The general relationship between the cooperation principle and the other principles is parallel to the relationship between the general instruction of (5) and the more specific instructions of (6):

(5) At every stage on a way towards achieving an end of yours, act as required for the achievement of the aim.

(6) (a) Do not use the means you have for achieving your ends more or less than is required for their achievement, ceteris paribus;
(b) Try to achieve your ends by the standard use of the means you have for their achievement, ceteris paribus;
(c) At every stage on the way to achievement of your ends, consider the means being used by other persons to achieve their ends, as you come to determine the manner of your progress at that stage, ceteris paribus; and prefer using your means in a manner which is likely to help the progress of others on their way to the achievement of their ends, over any other use of these means, ceteris paribus;
(d) Give preference to means which lead you to your ends over means which lead you to situations wherein achievement of the ends themselves is just a possible result" (Kasher 1976, 202-203)

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"Here, Kasher notes (b)-(d) are parallel to (5) in the same way that quality, relation, and manner relate to the Cooperative Principle, respectively. The point that Kasher is making with this long set of parallels is that the Gricean maxims are not derivable from the Cooperative Principle. He begins his argument by showing that (a)-(d) clearly hinder (5)."

"Condition (a) prevents one from using all the means one has to achieve goals, (b) prevents one from using nonstandard means, (c) requires one to consider others goals, etc."

"The only time when one must follow (a)-(d) is when two people cannot achieve their goals alone and must depend on each others resources. Here, one can see the parallel; as Kasher writes, “Can it be that the element of cooperation may make it possible to derive the accompanying principles from the cooperation principle? It is quite clear - with one exception – that such is not the case” (Kasher 1976, 204)."

"Thus, the general Cooperative Principle “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the state at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged,” does not in necessarily lead one to follow the Gricean maxims (Grice 1989, 26)."

"People must only follow them in cases where they cannot achieve their conversational goals without the assistance of others. Kasher also notes, about the exception regarding mutual necessity, “this exception does not show that cooperation of aims and means is an essential element in the connection between the cooperation principle and the accompanying principles” (Kasher 1976, 204)."

"Thus, Kasher shows, as he intended, that “the connection between the cooperation principle and the principles to be derived from it is a problematic one,” or at least is not a necessary one (Kasher 1976, 201)."

"Kasher then lays out the rationality principle that he will rely on. He writes, “(R) Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at least cost, attains that end, ceteris paribus” (Kasher 1976, 205). He then shows how each of the sub-principles in (6) is achieved by (R). This principle (R) has in it a clear call for efficiency. Thus, it implies the previous principle (6a) and with it the first Gricean maxim when considered in regards to conversational goals. Secondly, (6d) also follows from this (R) principle, because one would want to raise the probability of achieving one’s goals as much as possible, all things being equal. Kasher also notes that the first half of (6c) is also implied by (R). The second half of (6c) and (6b), however, require more explanation."

"The reason why (6b) is fulfilled by (R) depends strongly on the ceteris paribus cause. Given that all things are equal (Kasher uses the example of striking a nail with a hammer as opposed to striking a nail with a coconut), one ought to opt for the standard hammering implement, due to an inherent risk that is involved when using a tool for a purpose other than its standard function."

"This risk may be negligible in many cases; however, no matter how small the risk, it is rational to play it safe. In this way, (6b) is fulfilled."

"There are some problems, however, in the explanation of the second half of (6c), that one should “prefer using your means in a manner which is likely to help the progress of others on their way to the achievement of their ends, over any other use of these means, ceteris paribus”."

"The first notable problem that Kasher accepts is that of Hobbesian theory."

"In certain circumstances in a state of nature, a person might not want to use means to assist others in achieving their goals, due to a constant mistrust. Because this state of nature is such a nasty place, it is logical for one to assume the goals achieved by others may threaten a person, and may ultimately end in harming him or her."

"However, as Kasher argues, helping others achieve a goal creates the possibility of attaining the benefit of two things: future help from the person one assists and possible benefits from the goal he or she is trying to achieve (Kasher 1976, 208-209)."

"Therefore, if the person one could help has the goal of, say, building a large weapon that could help him or her injure others, perhaps one should not assist that person; however, if that goal is something that one doesn’t think can be used to harm others, all things being equal, the possibility of future benefit should be enough to make it rational to use means which will also benefit others."

"Thus, the (R) principle satisfies all of (6c)."

"Kasher still believes that the Gricean model is effective; however, there must be an argument for forming implicatures. Kasher writes, “Since we are not accepting the cooperation principle – neither as the basis for the accompanying maxims nor itself – we should try improving the structure of the characteristic argument for forming implicatures” (Kasher 1976, 210)."

"In order to do this, Kasher suggests the rationalization principle. He writes, “(RP) There is no reason to assume that the speaker is not a rational agent; his ends and his beliefs regarding his state, in the context of utterance supply the justifications of his behavior” (Kasher 1976, 210)."

"This principle, as a premise to Kasher’s argument, seems essential. On occasion people attempt to converse with non-rational agents: the mentally ill, pets, and even plants. However, supposing one is communicating with another rational agent, one must presume that when that agent begins violating (6a-d), there is a purpose."

"As Kasher states, “If we replace, in the implicature-forming argument structure, the cooperation principle (CP) with the rationalization principle (RP), we shall not lose any power of explanation but rather gain additional power” (Kasher 1976, 211). The additional power includes certain replies of silence, for example “if I refrain from answering Morton’s question, at the threshold of my home, ‘Have you stopped playing the trumpet?’, and I stare at him without opening my mouth, my silence has a complicated disjunctive implicature” (Kasher 1976, 213)."

"Here, Kasher has the power to present the implicatures that Grice provides; however, he does so under the rationality principle (R), rather than the Cooperative Principle. This argument against Grice is quite effective, since it encompasses the Gricean implicature model while having greater explanatory power."

"Kasher accomplishes his three starting goals, showing that sometimes “there is no full cooperation, because it is contrary to my interests, to a certain extent… Grice’s cooperation principle does not permit such an explanation without radical changes in its content, its justification and the manner of its operation. We have presented such radical changes in this article” (Kasher 1973, 214-215)."

"It is this view of communication that must be exploited to have a full comprehension of implicature in general. However, this view is not widely accepted by philosophers interested in conversational implicature. It is in expounding on these ideas where the bulk of this work will be derived."

----- Kasher has let me have ALL his later views on this. He has extended his rationality model to politeness principle. And he has been very good in respecting the spirit of Grice. In his "Critical Concepts" in pragmatics he dedicates the sixth volume to Grice and implicature. Not only reprinting Grice's "Logic and Conversation" but his "Further notes on logic and conversation", and interestingly, the fragment in Grice's Retrospective Epilogue to Studies in the Way of Words -- written twenty years after the original lectures -- as it deals with the topic -- Strand 6 especifically.