by J. L. Speranza
for the Grice Club
Grice is not saying that those were problems -- just 'difficulties', and he does not claim they are the only ones. "To meet such difficulties as these", he writes -- suggesting there may be others -- which may not even be LIKE those. The manoevures he lists are again, open-ended, and include six:
FIRST MANOEUVRE:
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(a bad one).
To reject "Pegasus".
Here Grice uses "N" to stand for 'a grammatically proper name'. N will be admissible only if N has a bearer. This amounts to reject the third natural inclination. Some manoevure!
Here Grice must distinguish between 'constant of individual' and 'name'.
N is only admissible "as a substituend
for an individual constant (is only classifiable
as a name, in a certain appropriate sense of
'name') if N has a bearer"
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Since this is only a very inappropriate sense of 'name', I can see why Grice rejects this in toto!
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Second manoevure:
TRUTH-VALUE gap and presupposition. Strawson's manoevure (in "Identifying reference and truth-value", THEORIA, repr. Logico-Linguistic Papers).
To involve the notion of 'presuppose' to do double duty for 'implicate'.
This amounts to rejecting the fourth and fifth natural inclinations -- regarding bivalence.
In "Fa" and "~Fa", if there is no object named by a, "Fa" and "~Fa" would lack a truth-value.
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THIRD manoeuvre:
This amounts to rejecting the first natural inclination and it's Quine's nonstandard advocacy for the eliminability of individual constants. It would treat any 'ordinary' name (as Grice calls it) as being 'reducible' a 'definite description'.
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FOURTH manoeuvre:
The Meingongian jungle --
"Pegasus" would have a bearer. This bearer would have, if not existence, at least 'being'. In this manoeuvre, (Ex)Fx should read as entailing something different. The second natural inclination is rejected (that names are sometimes 'vacuous' in one reading of 'vacuous').
And (Ex)Fx should read as "There is" rather than "there exists".
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FIFTH manoeuvre:
To reject the sixth natural inclination regarding the unrestricted application of UG and EG. Restrict UI and EG
only in conjunction with an additional premise
such as E!a, representing a statement to the effect that a exists.
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SIXTH manoevure:
To reject the eight natural inclination about derivability of psi from phi.
That is, in Grice's view:
This manoevure would start, Grice thinks, by
"the substitution of the concpet of
'entailing subject to assumption A'
for the simple[r] concept of
entailment in one's account of the logical
relation between the premises and the
conclusions of [the relevant] inferences."
Where the relevant inferences
are:
'inferences made in natural discourse
in accordance with the inference-licenses
provided by the system are made
subject to the 'marginal' (extra-systematic)
assumption that all names which occur
in the expression of [the aforementioned]
inferences have bearers."
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