From wiki on Feyerabend -- that I was re-reading following J's suggestion that I read the bio bits:
"Feyerabend was influential in the development of eliminative materialism, a radical position in the philosophy of mind that holds that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind (folk psychology) is false. It is succinctly described by a modern proponent, Paul Churchland, as follows: "Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our commonsense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience."[7] In three short papers published in the early sixties[8][9][10], Feyerabend sought to defend materialism against the supposition that the mind cannot be a physical thing. Feyerabend suggested that our commonsense understanding of the mind was incommensurable with the (materialistic) scientific view, but that nevertheless we ought to prefer the materialistic one on general methodological grounds. This view of the mind/body problem is widely considered one of Feyerabend's most important legacies. Even though Feyerabend himself seems to have given it up in the late 1970s, it was taken up by Richard Rorty and, more recently, by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland. In fact, as Keeley observes[11], "PMC [Paul Churchland] has spent much of his career carrying the Feyerabend mantle forward".
For Grice's arguments CONTRA 'eliminative materialism' -- and reductionist analyses in general -- vide Studies in the way of words ("Retrospective Epilogue") for the reductive/reductionist distinction -- and more importantly his "Conception of Value" book, which contains the 1970s attack of the Churchlands -- "From the banal to the bizarre (and back): method in philosophical psychology". For Grice, folk psychology is banal, but at least it's not as bizarre as what the Churchlands write!
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There's some debate on the relation of Feyerabend to eliminative materialism (and the Churchlands). Yes, PF did advance the idea in the 60s (I think it was in response to Popper's change to a quacky-quantum idealism in the 50s, and the psychons, spirit-world, etc). Yet...PF later also seemed a bit...Kantian at times, or at least...non-reductionist in some sense; he broke with Popper, etc. So I think EM was one of PF's phases, but not his thinking say from Against Method forward. The Stanford entry on PF as well has some interesting material.
ReplyDeleteThat said dualists have the burden of proof to establish that 1) Mind exists (and to define what Mind is), and 2) that Mind exists apart from neurology, ala Cartesianism of some sort. I agree--usually--with 1. 2, unlikely.
Good points. I got bored (honestly!) by reading Grice on eliminative materialism! But I got his gist! It's all about C and C'. He thinks that a physical law is C, and that a psychological law is C'. So if you ask,
ReplyDelete"Why did you raise your arm?" -- to use O'Shaughnessy's example.
The answer given by me as a neurophysiologist is IRRELEVANT in a court proceeding! ("I voted for the continuity of the British crown").
I'll have a look at the Stanford on Feyerabend. Feyerabend was good for the preppies: $teinford, and also Yale. Ah well: give me one of THOSE anarchists anyday!
---- He should have written more in German and less in English. But then cfr. Arnold Schwazzenegger (another Austrian -- less philosophical perhaps).
I find that when Feyerabend uses the English word, he uses the wrong English word, as when he self-described as a staunch empiricist, I think he did.
I suppose there are 5 senses of 'staunch', but which one is the empirical correct one? Etc.
(I'm teasing, of course -- so be kindly to me).