Grice's Early Verificationism

When reading Chapman on Grice on "Negation" (1938) etc., I am fascinated by the scorn with which Grice treats 'primitive verificationism'. It's all very clever. In the Oxford of the 1930s, verificationism was sort of the rule, with Ayer, and Berlin, defending it. Grice wanted to see himself as an 'introspectionist', rather -- although his claims, Chapman thinks (rightly), are totally consistent with 'verificationism' -- and empiricism at large.

On the other hand (the same, really), I read -- as adviced by J -- from the bio bits in wiki's "Feyerabend"

"Feyerabend changed the subject of his study to philosophy and submitted his final thesis on observation sentences."

Such as,

"I observe that my aunt is reading a newspaper."